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ABSTRACT	
	
	
	
The	role	of	alternative	justice	mechanisms	(AJMs)	in	international	criminal	justice	(ICJ)	
has	been	the	subject	of	rigorous	debate	in	recent	years.		This	thesis	joins	the	discussion	
by	investigating	whether	AJMs	can	achieve	the	aims	of	ICJ	that	are	attributed	to	criminal	
prosecutions.		If	AJMs	can	attain	ICJ	goals,	there	are	important	implications	for	the	entire	
complementarity	regime	at	the	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC),	requiring	ICC	judges	
to	defer	prosecutions	 in	their	 favour.	 	By	establishing	a	framework	against	which	 ICC	
trials	 and	 AJMs	 can	 be	 evaluated,	 the	 thesis	 contributes	 to	 the	 debate	 and	 aims	 to	
provide	an	element	of	consistency	in	an	area	which	is	dominated	by	creative	ambiguity.		
	
Arguing	 that	 criminal	 prosecutions	 have	 a	 limited	 impact	 on	 ICJ	 aims,	 the	 thesis	
considers	 AJMs	 generally	 before	 undertaking	 an	 in-depth	 historical	 and	 comparative	
analysis	 of	 the	 Mato	 Oput	 process	 in	 Uganda	 and	 the	 South	 African	 Truth	 and	
Reconciliation	Commission	(SATRC).		It	concludes	that	Mato	Oput	does	not	satisfy	the	
goals	of	ICJ	and	therefore	would	be	unlikely	to	persuade	the	Court	to	defer	prosecutions.		
It	suggests,	however,	that	an	AJM	based	on	the	SATRC	model	would	have	the	potential	
to	attain	many	ICJ	goals	and	therefore	the	ICC	should	declare	a	situation	where	the	state	
adopts	this	method	of	justice	and	accountability	inadmissible	to	the	ICC.		
	
Finally,	 the	 thesis	 examines	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 ICC	 judges	 in	 previous	 admissibility	
challenges	 and	 argues	 that	 they	 must	 demonstrate	 a	 broader	 and	 more	 flexible	
approach	 when	 interpreting	 the	 ICC’s	 mandate	 if	 AJMs	 are	 to	 satisfy	 the	
complementarity	principle.		Doing	so	would	also	help	to	avert	the	growing	antipathy	of	
many	African	states	towards	the	ICC	and	ensure	the	future	support	and	co-operation	of	
states	parties.	
	
	 1	
CHAPTER	ONE	
INTRODUCTION	
Introduction	
When	 the	 Rome	 Conference	 ended	 on	 17th	 July	 1998	 ‘amid	 an	 atmosphere	 of	
euphoria’,1	the	expectations	for	the	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	were	very	high	
and	the	subsequent	ratification	of	the	Rome	Statute	(RSt	or	the	statute)	within	a	shorter	
time	than	anticipated	was	described	as	a	‘milestone	in	humankind’s	efforts	towards	a	
more	 just	world’	 in	the	Court’s	 founding	documents.2	 	Yet	within	fifteen	years	of	the	
ICC’s	establishment	 in	2002,	criticisms	of	the	Court	are	widespread,	particularly	 from	
Africa,	a	continent	that	once	had	heralded	the	Court’s	potential	to	bring	accountability	
to	its	conflict-ridden	nations.			
	
With	33	African	states	having	ratified	the	treaty,3	Africa	comprises	the	largest	regional	
bloc	of	the	123	countries	to	have	accepted	the	ICC’s	jurisdiction4	and	the	ICC	was	widely	
supported	by	African	governments	until	it	began	investigating	African	Presidents,	such	
as	Bashir	of	Sudan	and	Kenyatta	of	Kenya.5	African	leaders	began	to	denounce	the	ICC’s	
style	of	international	criminal	justice	(ICJ),6	with	criticisms	ranging	from	allegations	of	
‘neo-colonialism’	arising	from	the	perception	that	the	ICC	 is	concentrating	on	African	
states	 for	 investigation,	 through	 tensions	 over	 the	 selection	 of	 cases	 to	 prosecute,	
particularly	 the	 indictment	 of	 sitting	 heads	 of	 state;	 to	 accusations	 of	 cultural	
insensitivity	and	interference	with	ongoing	peace	processes.7		The	dissatisfaction	led	to	
																																																						
1	Kirsch,	P.	and	Robinson,	D.	(2002)	‘Reaching	Agreement	at	the	Rome	Conference’	in	Cassese,	A.,	Gaeta,	P.,	Jones,	
J.R.W.D.	The	Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court:	A	Commentary	Volume	1	(Oxford:	OUP)	p77	
2	See	‘Founding	treaty:	The	Rome	Statute’	[Online]	Available:	https://www.icc-cpi.int/about	[Accessed	13.03.17]	
3	Burundi	was	the	34th	African	State	to	ratify	the	Rome	Statute	(making	124	member	states)	but	withdrew	on	27	
October	2017	
4	Annan,	K.	(2016)	‘African	Exodus	from	ICC	must	be	stopped,	says	Kofi	Annan’		The	Guardian	18	November	[Online]	
Available:	 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/18/african-exodus-international-criminal-court-kofi-
annan	[Accessed	27.04.17]	
5	Roth,	K.	(2014)	‘Africa	Attacks	the	International	Criminal	Court’	NY	Review	of	Books	14	January	
6	See	e.g.	Kimani,	M.	(2009)	‘Pursuit	of	Justice	or	a	Western	plot?	International	indictments	stir	angry	debate	in	
Africa’	23(3)	AfricaRenewal	October	
7	Murithi,	T.	(2013)	‘The	African	Union	and	the	International	Criminal	Court:	An	Embattled	Relationship?’	The	Institute	
for	Justice	and	Reconciliation:	Policy	Brief	Number	8	March	pp1-9	at	pp2-4;	see	also	York,	G.	(2017)	‘African	Union’s	
mass	 withdrawal	 strategy	 mounts	 pressure	 on	 ICC’	 The	 Globe	 and	 Mail	 1	 February	 [Online]	 Available:	
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/african-unions-mass-withdrawal-strategy-a-fresh-blow-to-
international-court/article33869212/	[Accessed	22.02.17]	
	 2	
several	African	states	indicating	their	intention	to	withdraw	from	the	ICC	in	late	20168		
and	to	African	leaders	adopting	a	strategy	for	withdrawal	from	the	ICC	at	the	conclusion	
of	the	African	Union	(AU)	summit	in	January	2017.9				
	
This	move	by	the	AU	appears	to	be	a	reversal	of	views	expressed	at	the	Assembly	of	
State	Parties’	(ASP)	‘open	bureau	meeting’	on	Friday,	18th	November	2016	to	discuss	
the	 ICC-Africa	 relationship10	 when	 many	 states	 expressed	 a	 desire	 for	 genuine	
discussions	about	the	future	of	ICJ.		The	three	withdrawing	states	(South	Africa,	Burundi	
and	The	Gambia)	explained	their	experiences	and	criticisms	and	whilst	others	indicated	
they	were	considering	withdrawal,	still	more	affirmed	their	support	for	the	Court.11		The	
view	that	the	core	principles	and	purpose	of	the	statute	should	not	be	undermined	was	
widely	expressed	but	 it	was	stressed	also	that	where	accountability	meets	 important	
issues	 such	 as	 peace,	 governance	 and	 pluralism,	 there	 should	 be	 flexibility	 and	
negotiation	about	how	these	incommensurable	values	can	best	be	reconciled.12	 	This	
was	encouraging	but	the	ICC	clearly	has	been	given	a	serious	wake-up	call:	it	must	be	
less	prescriptive	and	more	ready	to	adapt	and	compromise.			
	
These	will	not	be	easy	tasks	for	the	ICC,	with	its	strong	emphasis	on	retributive	justice.		
For	 centuries,	 criminal	 justice	 ethics	 have	 been	 dominated	 by	 retributivism	 and	
consequentialism	 and	 although	 their	 justifications	 differ,	 both	 hold	 that	 punishment	
should	be	the	main	response	to	crime.13	 	At	the	 international	 level,	demands	for	the	
truth	 about	 past	 human	 rights	 abuses	 and	 punishment	 of	 those	 responsible	 for	
perpetrating	them	are	viewed	as	pre-requisites	for	the	establishment	of	democracy	and	
																																																						
8	South	Africa	and	Gambia	have	submitted	notices	of	withdrawal	to	the	United	Nations	(UN)	and	Kenya	and	Namibia	
seem	ready	to	follow.	However,	the	newly-elected	President	of	Gambia	has	recently	formally	informed	the	UN	that	
Gambia	is	reversing	its	request	to	withdraw	from	the	ICC	and	South	Africa	has	issued	a	notice	to	formally	revoke	its	
withdrawal	after	the	Gauteng	High	Court	ruled	in	February	2017	that	the	initial	process	to	withdraw	from	the	ICC	was	
unconstitutional	and	invalid			
9	Associated	Press	in	Addis	Ababa	(2017)	‘African	leaders	plan	mass	withdrawal	from	international	criminal	court’		31	
January	 [Online]	Available:	https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jan/31/african-leaders-plan-mass-withdrawal-
from-international-criminal-court	[Accessed	22.02.17]	
10	15th	session	of	the	Assembly	of	States	Parties,	16	to	24	November	2016,	World	Forum,	The	Hague	
11	Informal	summary	by	the	President	on	the	“Relationship	between	Africa	and	the	International	Criminal	Court”	ICC-
ASP/15/36	24	November	2016	paras.	5-9	
12	 See	 statement	 of	Mr.	 Sidiki	 Kaba,	 President	 of	 the	 ASP	 of	 the	 ICC	 at	 the	Open	 Bureau	meeting	 “Relationship	
between	Africa	and	the	ICC”	18.11.2016	
13	Tallgren,	I.	(2002)	‘The	Sensibility	and	Sense	of	International	Criminal	Law’	13	EJIL	pp561-595	at	p568	
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respect	 for	 the	 rule	 of	 law.14	 	 The	 ten	 years	 after	 1993,	 for	 example,	 saw	 the	
establishment	of	ad	hoc	international	tribunals	for	the	former	Yugoslavia	and	Rwanda,	
the	ICC	in	The	Hague	and	hybrid	tribunals	in	Kosovo,	Sierra	Leone,	Timor-Leste,	Bosnia-
Herzegovina	 and	Cambodia,	which	 indicates	 the	unparalleled	 importance	of	 criminal	
trials	and	reflects	the	contemporary	dominance	of	transatlantic	jurisprudence.			
	
However,	in	spite	of	this	dominance,	in	‘affluent	democratic	societies’15	the	alternative	
model	 of	 restorative	 justice	 (RJ)	 also	 became	 ‘immensely	 popular	 from	 the	 1990s	
onwards	[…]	viewed	by	many	as	a	social	movement	of	global	dimensions.’16	RJ	offered	
fresh	hope	for	‘progressive	change	in	criminal	justice,	despite	a	continuing	conservative	
landscape.’17	 Interest	 in	 RJ	 had	 first	 emerged	 in	 the	 1970s,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 ‘major	
development	in	criminological	thinking’.18	Social	change	in	the	1960s	and	1970s19	had	
led	 to	 questions	 about	 punishment	 and	 society,	 with	 early	 advocates	 of	 RJ	 being	
generally	‘against	punishment’,	their	views	reflecting	‘the	optimism	of	the	times,	when	
it	seemed	possible	to	shift	criminal	justice	toward	a	more	constructive	and	less	punitive	
direction.’20	 	Rising	imprisonment	rates	and	conservatism	in	penal	politics	caused	the	
optimism	to	falter	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	but	RJ	‘emerged	as	a	new	term	in	the	late	
1980s.’21	
	
For	Braithwaite,	RJ	is	‘most	commonly	defined	by	what	it	is	an	alternative	to’,22	although	
both	he	and	Daly	quote	a	definition	by	Tony	Marshall,	 a	well-known	advocate	of	RJ:		
‘Restorative	 justice	 is	 a	 process	 whereby	 all	 the	 parties	 with	 a	 stake	 in	 a	 particular	
offense	come	 together	 to	 resolve	 collectively	how	 to	deal	with	 the	aftermath	of	 the	
																																																						
14	See	e.g.	Report	of	the	Secretary-General	The	rule	of	law	and	transitional	justice	in	conflict	and	post-conflict	societies	
S/2004/616	23	August	2004	
15	Daly,	K.	(2013)	‘The	Punishment	Debate	in	Restorative	Justice’	in	Simon,	J.	and	Sparks,	R.	The	SAGE	Handbook	of	
Punishment	and	Society	(London:	SAGE	Publications	Ltd)	p356	
16	Ibid	p360	
17	Ibid	p357	
18	Braithwaite,	J.	(1999)	‘Restorative	Justice:	Assessing	Optimistic	and	Pessimistic	Accounts’	25	Crime	and	Justice	pp1-
129	at	p1	
19	For	example,	the	emergence	in	Europe	and	the	US	of	a	politics	of	law	and	order,	an	increase	in	violent	crime,	a	
wave	of	social	and	political	unrest,	violent	police	responses	to	protest	and	widespread	demands	for	greater	social	
justice	for	minorities	
20	Daly,	K.	(2013)	p356	
21	Ibid	p357	
22	Braithwaite,	J.	(1999)	p4	
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offense	and	its	implications	for	the	future.’23	Within	domestic	criminal	justice	processes,	
RJ	can	entail	a	‘variety	of	[…]	practices,	which	normally	bring	victim	and	offenders	(and	
others)	 together	 in	 a	process	 in	which	both	 lay	 and	 legal	 actors	make	decisions	 and	
whose	 (stated)	 aim	 is	 to	 repair	 the	 harm	 for	 victims,	 offenders,	 and	 perhaps	 other	
members	 of	 ‘the	 community’	 in	 ways	 that	 matter	 to	 them.’24	 	 In	 the	 context	 of	
international	crimes	involving	gross	breaches	of	human	rights,	RJ	may	involve	recourse	
to	 alternative	 justice	 mechanisms	 (AJMs)	 as	 a	 means	 of	 dealing	 with	 the	 past	 and	
effecting	reconciliation	between	former	enemies.	 	Although	 it	dealt	only	with	abuses	
that	were	 crimes	under	 its	domestic	 law,	 the	South	African	Truth	and	Reconciliation	
Commission	(SATRC)	 is	an	example	of	how	restorative	 justice	can	be	used	to	address	
system-wide	offences	that	affect	a	major	section	of	society.		It	demonstrates	that	a	Truth	
Commission	 (TC)	 has	 the	 potential,	 if	 implemented	 properly,	 to	 be	 an	 effective	 RJ	
approach	for	international	crimes,	as	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	Six.			
	
For	states	emerging	from	violent	intrastate	conflict	or	repressive	authoritarian	rule,	the	
option	to	forgo	justice	in	the	form	of	trials	and	punishment	in	favour	of	truth-telling	and	
acknowledgment	 of	 wrong-doing	 may	 be	 expedient	 if	 the	 outcome	 is	 a	 peaceful	
transition	 for	 the	 new	 nation.	 	 Thus,	 in	 recent	 years,	 alternative,	 restorative	 justice	
mechanisms	are	more	often	being	considered	the	preferred	means	of	achieving	ICJ	in	
transitional	situations,	as	reflected	in	various	UN	reports,25	international	workshops,26	
academic	conferences	and	research27	and	NGO	and	intergovernmental	focus.28	
	
																																																						
23	Ibid	p5,	see	also	Daly,	K.	(2013)	p361	
24	Daly,	K.	(2001)	‘Restorative	Justice:	the	real	story’	Paper	revised	from	that	presented	to	the	Scottish	Criminology	
Conference,	Edinburgh,	21-22	September	2000	p9	
25	For	example,	Guidance	Note	of	the	Secretary-General	(2010)	United	Nations	Approach	to	Transitional	Justice,	
March	[Online]	Available:	https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf	[Accessed	
14.03.17]	
26	The	ICTJ	conducts	a	wide	range	of	workshops	and	courses	on	Transitional	Justice	as	does	the	Transitional	Justice	
Institute	at	Ulster	University		
27	Such	as	the	Conference:	‘Transitional	Justice	and	Alternative	Mechanisms	for	Peace’	hosted	by	Stockholm	Centre	
for	 the	Ethics	of	War	and	Peace	and	 the	University	of	 Johannesburg	Stellenbosch	 Institute	 for	Advanced	Studies,	
South	Africa,	8th-9th	April	2016		
28	See,	for	example,	Amnesty	International	(2010)	‘Commissioning	Justice:	Truth	Commissions	and	Criminal	Justice’;	
also	 see	 Harper,	 E.	 (ed)	 (2011)	 ‘Working	 with	 Customary	 Justice	 Systems:	 Post-Conflict	 and	 Fragile	 States’	
(International	Development	Law	Organization)	
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What	is	meant	by	‘International	Criminal	Justice’?	
	
It	 can	be	 surprisingly	difficult	 to	articulate	all	 that	 ICJ	 involves.	 	Basically,	 the	phrase	
describes	‘the	response	of	the	international	community	-	and	other	communities	-	to	
mass	atrocity.’29	The	atrocities	are	frequently	the	legacy	of	states	emerging	from	periods	
of	violent	internal	conflict	or	repressive,	authoritarian	rule.		International	lawyers	may	
argue	that	the	appropriate	response	 is	 international	trials	and	there	 is	no	doubt	that	
criminal	 prosecutions	 are	 strong	 weapon	 against	 the	 perpetrators	 of	 international	
crimes.	 	However,	 ICJ	 is	not	merely	 international	criminal	 law	(ICL)	but	 ‘the	extent	to	
which	some	degree	of	‘justice’	can	be	brought	to	situations	where	international	crimes	
have	been	or	are	being	committed’.30	As	discussed	in	the	preceding	paragraph,	there	
exist	a	range	of	other	responses	which	reflect	a	less	retributive	and	more	reconciliatory	
approach	to	justice.		These	‘other’	or	‘alternative’	responses	can	take	into	consideration	
socio-economic,	political	and	historical	concerns	that	are	absent	from	a	one-size-fits-all	
blanket	application	of	criminal	prosecutions.			
	
Truth	commissions	are	one	such	alternative	response	to	demands	for	ICJ.		Almost	half	
of	Africa’s	55	countries	have	established	 truth	commissions	since	 the	mid-1970s	and	
more	may	be	established	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Arab	Spring.31	Other,	community-based	
approaches,	include	Mato	Oput	in	Northern	Uganda,	the	Gacaca	courts	in	Rwanda	and	
Fambul	 Tok	 in	 Sierra	 Leone.	 	 These	 AJMs	 demonstrate	 a	 more	 culturally	 specific	
response	 to	 ICJ	 and	 focus	 primarily	 on	 social	 repair	 through	 acknowledgement	 and	
reconciliation	as	opposed	to	retribution.			
	
It	is	clear	therefore	that	the	answer	to	the	question	‘what	is	meant	by	ICJ?’	cannot	be	
answered	simply	by	reference	to	 ICL.	 	As	Richard	Goldstone	has	stated,	although	the	
																																																						
29	Boas,	G.	(2012)	‘What	is	in	a	Word:	The	Nature	and	Meaning	of	International	Criminal	Justice’	in	Boas,	G.,	Schabas,	
W.	and	Scharf,	M.	(eds.)	International	Criminal	Justice:	Legitimacy	and	Coherence	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar)	p1	
30	Garkawe,	S.	(2012)	‘Have	recent	changes	designed	to	benefit	victims	of	international	crimes	added	to	the	legitimacy	
of	 international	 criminal	 justice’	 in	 Boas,	 G.,	 Schabas,	 W.	 and	 Scharf,	 M.	 (eds.)	 International	 Criminal	 Justice:	
Legitimacy	and	Coherence	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar)	p270	
31	Fombad,	C.M.F.	(2017)	Update:	Transitional	Justice	in	Africa:	The	Experience	with	Truth	Commissions	[Online]	
Available:	http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Africa_Truth_Commissions1.html	[Accessed	21.01.18]	
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‘most	common	form	of	justice’,	prosecutions	are	‘not	the	only	form,	nor	necessarily	the	
most	appropriate	form	in	every	case.’32		The	subject	requires	a	broader	analysis	and	an	
engagement	 with	 other	 disciplines	 beyond	 the	 law	 itself	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 justice	
sought	 and	 obtained	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 victims	 of	 the	 atrocities	 and	 is	 not	 simply	
satisfying	the	demands	for	retribution	expressed	by	the	international	community.33			
	
Transitional	Justice	–	A	Brief	Overview	
	
Transitional	justice	(TJ)	is	a	relatively	new	field	of	study,	emerging	after	the	Cold	War	
amid	 hopes	 for	 global	 respect	 for	 humanitarianism,	 human	 rights	 and	 international	
law.34	 	 TJ	 mainly	 concerns	 how	 states	 in	 transition	 from	 war	 to	 peace	 or	 from	
authoritarian	rule	to	democracy	address	their	legacies	of	mass	abuse.35		Whilst	there	are	
many	variations	of	transitional	situations,	the	one	similarity	is	the	legacy	of	widespread	
violence	and	repression	and	it	is	this	aspect	that	led	to	the	development	of	the	field	of	
TJ.		Part	of	the	broader	topic	of	human	rights,	the	TJ	field	of	study	has	burgeoned	over	
the	 last	 two	 decades,	 engaging	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 disciplines	 and	 professions	
encompassing	aspects	of	law,	policy,	ethics	and	social	science.36		Within	the	debate	on	
the	 theoretical	 and	 ethical	 issues	 surrounding	 TJ	 norms	 and	 its	 institutions,	 there	 is	
concern	 over	 whether	 TJ	 structures	 other	 than	 criminal	 trials	 are	 merely	 political	
compromises,	‘second	best’	options	where	‘[j]ustice	becomes	the	casualty	of	a	political	
calculation’,37	whether	they	have	a	consistent	set	of	goals	and	whether	they	fulfil	the	
claim	 to	heal	 victims	and	nations	and	effect	 reconciliation	between	 former	enemies.		
These	secondary	issues	also	will	be	addressed	in	this	thesis.	
	
TJ	focusses	on	four	main	mechanisms:	trials,	fact-finding	bodies,	reparations	and	justice	
reforms	and	encompasses	 features	 such	as	amnesty,	 reconciliation,	memorialisation,	
																																																						
32	Goldstone,	R.	(1996)	‘Justice	as	a	Tool	for	Peace-Making:	Truth	Commissions	and	International	Criminal	Tribunals’	
28	NYUJIL&P	pp485-503	at	p491	
33	To	illustrate	this	point,	see	‘Report	of	the	African	Union	High	Level	Panel	on	Darfur	(AUPD)	29	October	2009	
PSC/AHG/2(CCVII)	paras.203-205	
34	Hinton,	A.L.	(2007)	Transitional	Justice:	Global	Mechanisms	and	Local	Realities	after	Genocide	and	Mass	Violence	
(London:	Rutger	UP)	p2	
35	Freeman,	M.	(2006)	Truth	Commissions	and	Procedural	Fairness	(Cambridge:	CUP)	p4		
36	Ibid	p4	
37	 Allen,	 J.	 (2001)	 ‘Balancing	 Justice	 and	 Social	Unity:	 Political	 Theory	 and	 the	 Idea	of	 a	 Truth	 and	Reconciliation	
Commission’	49	U.	Toronto	LJ	pp315-353	at	p315	
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lustration,	 democratisation	 and	 peacebuilding.38	 	 Clearly,	 TJ	 includes	 criminal	
prosecutions	but	it	extends	far	beyond,	mainly	due	to	the	sheer	numbers	of	victims	and	
perpetrators	but	also	because	frequently	those	who	perpetrated	the	abuses	still	retain	
some	element	of	political	authority	and	police	or	military	power.		Other	impediments	to	
domestic	 criminal	 trials	 can	 result	 from	 the	 states’	 justice	 systems	 being	 weakened	
and/or	corrupt,	the	destruction	of	evidence	by	the	previous	regime	and	the	scarcity	of	
resources	which	are	needed	 for	 immediate	 social	needs	 such	as	housing,	health	and	
education	 rather	 than	 costly	 prosecutions.	 	 The	 fundamental	 issue,	 however,	 is	 the	
imperative	 of	 securing	 peace	 which	 sometimes	 necessitates	 a	 political	 realism	 that	
minimises	accountability	for	crimes	to	ensure	a	successful	transition	process.	
	
The	central	aims	of	TJ	emphasise	the	recognition	of	the	dignity	of	individuals,	redressing	
and	 acknowledging	 violations	 of	 their	 human	 rights	 and	 ensuring	 their	 future	
prevention.39	 	Additional	TJ	aims,	which	vary	according	to	context,	 include	promoting	
respect	for	the	rule	of	law,	facilitating	peace	processes	and	durable	conflict	resolution	
and	 advancing	 reconciliation.40	 	Whereas	 TJ	 scholars	 envisage	holistic	 approaches	 to	
justice	 which	 promote	 possibilities	 for	 peace,	 reconciliation	 and	 democracy	 for	
countries	 emerging	 from	 periods	 of	 conflict	 or	 repression,	 advocates	 for	 the	 ICC	
promote	it	as	having	a	central	role	in	achieving	TJ	through	a	fixed,	judicial	response	to	
atrocities	 and	 they	 call	 for	 the	 ICC	 to	 intervene	 ‘frequently,	 liberally	 and	 robustly’,	
particularly	(to	date)	in	Africa.41			
	
As	a	field	of	study,	TJ	is	most	often	associated	with	political	science	and	academic	debate	
appears	 to	 be	 intra-disciplinary	 with	 political	 scientists	 seeing	 TJ	 as	 a	 conceptually	
separate	 discipline	 from	 law,	 the	 two	developing	mutually-exclusively	 as	 either	 non-
judicial	 (flexible)	 or	 judicial	 (rigid)	 responses	 to	 HR	 violations.42	 	 The	 fundamental	
objective	 of	 the	 ICC	 is	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 crimes	 within	 its	 jurisdiction	 do	 not	 go	
																																																						
38	Freeman,	M.	(2006)	p5-6;	see	also	Hinton,	A.L.	(2007)	p4	
39	ICTJ	(2017)	‘What	is	Transitional	Justice?’	[Online]	Available:	https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-
Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf	[Accessed	21.02.18]	
40	Ibid	
41	Okafor,	O.C.,	Ngwaba,	U.	(2015)	‘The	International	Criminal	Court	as	a	‘Transitional	Justice’	Mechanism	in	Africa:	
Some	Critical	Reflections’	9	IJTJ	pp90-108	at	p90	
42	Flory,	P.	(2015)	‘International	Criminal	Justice	and	Truth	Commissions:	From	Strangers	to	Partners?’	13	JICJ	pp19-
42	at	p20	
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unpunished	but	as	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	Three,	in	addition,	the	ICC	has	been	given	
aims	which	extend	beyond	the	demands	of	domestic	criminal	justice	systems	(that	is,	
retribution,	deterrence,	incapacitation	and	rehabilitation)	to	incorporate	TJ	goals.		This	
was	made	clear	in	the	UN	Secretary	General’s	2004	report	to	the	UN	Security	Council	
(UNSC)	in	which	the	objectives	for	trials	at	the	ICC	were	stated	to	include	(inter	alia)	the	
TJ	aims	of	securing	justice	and	dignity	for	victims,	preventing	a	recurrence	of	violations	
of	 their	HR,	 promoting	 national	 reconciliation	 and	 contributing	 to	 the	 restoration	 of	
peace.43		
	
The	ICC	is	often	criticised	as	being	an	ineffective	TJ	mechanism	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	
distanced	 both	 geographically	 and	 contextually	 from	 those	 for	 whom	 it	 is	 seeking	
justice.44		Furthermore,	detractors	argue,	trials	at	the	ICC	undermine	state	and/or	local	
justice	systems	and	are	subject	to	the	vagaries	of	international	political	influence	as	can	
be	seen,	 for	example,	 in	the	contrasting	approaches	of	 the	UNSC	to	the	situations	 in	
Libya	and	Syria.45		Clearly,	the	ICC	is	the	primary	‘global’	institution	for	achieving	justice	
in	situations	of	transition	but	in	this	thesis,	the	ICC	will	be	examined	not	specifically	from	
the	TJ	 viewpoint	but	 to	determine	whether	 trials	 at	 the	 ICC	 successfully	 achieve	 the	
numerous	justice	aims	attributed	to	them	and	before	then	appraising	the	capacity	of	
AJMs	to	attain	the	same	justice	aims.			
	
One	has	only	to	compare	the	situations	in	Uganda	(a	post-conflict	situation)	and	South	
Africa	(the	demise	of	an	authoritarian	government)	to	appreciate	that	there	is	no	‘one-
size-fits-all	approach’46	to	a	lasting	peace	and	democracy.			The	issue	of	‘the	local’	has	
gained	prominence	over	the	years,	with	the	argument	widely	expressed	among	scholars	
and	 practitioners	 that	 each	 situation	 is	 different	 and	 demands	 a	 locally-attuned	
response.47		Desmond	Tutu,	for	example,	has	referred	to	retributive	justice	as	‘western’,	
																																																						
43		The	rule	of	law	and	transitional	justice	in	conflict	and	post-conflict	societies:	Report	of	the	Secretary-General	23	
August	2004	UN	Doc.	S/2004/616	para.	38	
44	Flory,	P.	(2015)	p19	
45	Okafor,	O.C.,	Ngwaba,	U.	(2015)	p95-96	
46	Foreword	(2016)	‘Symposium’	14	JICJ	pp21-23	
47	See,	for	example,	Drumbl,	M.A.	(2003)	‘Towards	a	Criminology	of	International	Crime’	Ohio	State	Journal	on	Dispute	
Resolution	pp263-282	at	p267	
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with	African	understanding	of	justice	being	more	restorative,	to	‘restore	a	balance	that	
has	been	knocked	askew.’48	
	
The	area	that	is	of	central	concern	in	this	thesis	is	whether	the	ICC	has	demonstrated	
intractability	regarding	the	issue	of	AJMs	when	dealing	with	African	states	and	should	
be	more	sensitive	to	context	and	cultural	identity.		Whilst	the	Court	is	clearly	mandated	
to	 ‘put	 an	 end	 to	 impunity’,49	 this	 thesis	 questions	 whether	 the	 Court	 should	 be	
prepared	to	be	pragmatic	and	carry	its	supporters	(and	detractors)	with	it	by	means	of	
engagement,	support	and	compromise.		Further	and	based	on	African	experience,	the	
thesis	examines	whether	this	requires	the	Court	to	be	open	to	AJMs	which	genuinely	
seek	to	achieve	many	of	the	same	goals	of	ICJ	that	are	attributed	to	prosecutions	at	the	
ICC	and	may	even	satisfy	them	more	successfully.		
	
In	considering	when	and	 in	what	circumstances	 the	 ICC	should	defer	 to	an	AJM,	 this	
thesis	 is	 not	 seeking	 to	 introduce	 an	 AJM	 through	 the	 back	 door	 by	 persuading	 the	
Prosecutor	to	use	her	discretion	not	to	prosecute	the	case	by	relying	on	the	Interests	of	
Justice	provisions	set	out	in	Article	53	of	the	RSt.50		Rather	it	argues	that	it	should	be	
possible	under	the	RSt’s	complementarity	regime	to	persuade	the	ICC	that	any	AJM	that	
attains	 the	 goals	 of	 ICJ	 that	 are	 attributed	 to	 criminal	 trials	 should	 make	 the	 case	
inadmissible	to	the	ICC.		Whether	the	admissibility	provisions	of	Article	17	as	currently	
drafted	and	interpreted	by	the	ICC	Judges	would	enable	an	AJM	to	satisfy	the	Court’s	
complementarity	 principle	 is	 questioned	 more	 fully	 in	 Chapter	 Eight.	 	 Ultimately,	
however,	it	will	be	argued	that	for	an	AJM	that	does	fulfil	the	same	ICJ	aims	as	criminal	
prosecutions	at	the	ICC	to	trump	prosecutions	at	the	ICC,	either	the	Court	must	be	much	
more	flexible	in	its	interpretation	of	the	RSt’s	admissibility	provisions	or	the	Statute	will	
have	to	be	amended	by	the	ASP	to	enable	an	AJM	to	meet	the	admissibility	criteria.		
	
																																																						
48	Minow,	M.	(1998)	Between	Vengeance	and	Forgiveness	(Boston:	Beacon	Press)	p81	
49	Preamble	to	the	RSt,	para.	5	
50	Article	53(1)(c)	gives	the	Prosecutor	the	discretion	to	decline	to	initiate	an	investigation	if	there	are	‘substantial	
reasons	to	believe	that	an	investigation	would	not	serve	the	interests	of	justice’	and	Article	53(2)(c)	enables	her	to	
conclude	that	a	‘prosecution	is	not	in	the	interests	of	justice’,	provided	certain	criteria	listed	in	the	article	are	met	
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Thesis	Research	Questions	
	
This	thesis	will	discuss	an	issue	which	the	ICC	has	not	yet	had	to	address	but	which	it	
may	well	have	to	face	in	the	future,	whether	from	Africa	or	another	continent	and	it	
directly	 relates	 to	 the	 issues	 of	 peace,	 governance	 and	 pluralism	 that	 African	 states	
stressed	at	 the	ASP	open	bureau	meeting	 in	November	2016	as	being	of	 concern	 to	
them.	 	Whilst	 the	 ICC	 has	 faced	 several	 admissibility	 challenges,	 it	 has	 not	 faced	 a	
challenge	based	on	a	state	wishing	to	deal	with	the	perpetrators	of	the	 international	
crimes	within	the	Court’s	jurisdiction	by	means	of	an	AJM.		The	main	research	question	
for	this	thesis	is	whether	AJMs	can	satisfy	the	same	ICJ	aims	that	are	required	of	trials	
at	the	ICC	and	in	what	circumstances	should	the	ICC	be	prepared	to	defer	to	that	state.		
Drawing	on	the	analysis	of	the	examples	of	Mato	Oput	in	Uganda	and	the	SATRC,	the	
thesis	 will	 develop	 a	 framework	 that	 could	 be	 used	 by	 a	 state	 in	 an	 admissibility	
challenge	to	the	ICC	in	relation	to	its	proposed	AJM	and	by	the	ICC	in	its	assessment	of	
the	state’s	proposed	AJM.		
	
In	seeking	to	answer	the	main	research	question,	this	thesis	will	address	the	following	
sub-questions:	
	
1. How	did	the	international	community	come	to	choose	an	international	criminal	
court	 based	 on	 western	 notions	 of	 ‘justice’	 rather	 than	 another	 means	 of	
accountability	for	international	crimes?	
2. What	are	the	ICJ	aims	of	prosecutions	at	the	ICC?	
3. How	can	an	admissibility	challenge	based	on	an	AJM	be	made	to	 the	 ICC	and	
what	are	its	chances	of	success	under	the	Court’s	current	interpretation	of	the	
complementarity	regime?	
	
Two	case	studies	will	be	used	to	answer	the	questions	posed	by	this	thesis	and	to	more	
clearly	 illustrate	 the	 factors	 it	 is	 argued	 should	 be	 considered	 in	 the	 Court’s	
determination	of	 issues	of	 admissibility	 and	 complementarity.	 The	 first	 case	 study	 is	
Mato	Oput,	the	ceremony	of	reconciliation	traditionally	used	by	the	Acholi	people	of	
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northern	Uganda	in	cases	of	inter-clan	deliberate	or	accidental	killings.51		For	the	second	
case	study,	the	SATRC	was	chosen	because	truth	commissions	have	‘become	the	most	
prominent	government	initiative	to	respond	to	past	abuses	and	the	starting	point	from	
which	other	methods	of	accountability,	reparations	and	reforms	may	be	developed.’52		
In	the	next	section,	more	detailed	reasoning	is	given	for	choosing	these	particular	AJMs	
as	case	studies.	
	
Why	Mato	Oput	and	the	South	African	TRC?	
	
The	situation	in	northern	Uganda	involving	the	conflict	between	the	government	and	
the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	(LRA)	 led	by	 Joseph	Kony	was	chosen	as	a	case	study	 for	
several	reasons.		First,	the	conflict	is	ongoing	and	the	case,	which	was	self-referred	by	
President	Museveni	in	December	2003	remains	at	the	ICC.53		Second,	after	issuing	arrest	
warrants	for	five	LRA	leaders,	the	Prosecutor	was	asked	by	representatives	of	the	Acholi	
people	(who	arguably	have	suffered	most	from	the	LRA	conflict)	to	defer	prosecutions	
and	allow	the	Acholi	to	deal	with	the	LRA	leaders	themselves	using	Mato	Oput,	 their	
traditional	method	of	 conflict	 resolution.	 The	Prosecutor	 refused	 to	 accede	 to	 these	
requests	which	 led	 to	 the	 failure	of	peace	 talks	between	 the	government	of	Uganda	
(GoU)	and	the	LRA.		As	a	result,	Uganda’s	President	Museveni	became	a	vocal	critic	of	
the	Court,	calling	it	a	‘useless	institution’	and	encouraging	support	in	the	African	Union	
for	 a	 mass	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 RSt.	 54	 	 Third,	 is	 the	 nature	 of	Mato	 Oput	 itself,	 a	
traditional	Acholi	justice	mechanism	said	by	their	Elders	to	have	cultural	relevance	for	
the	 Acholi	 people.55	 The	 GoU	 has	 not	 suggested	 Mato	 Oput	 as	 the	 appropriate	
accountability	mechanism,	the	suggestion	has	come	from	the	Acholi	Elders	who	insist	
that	 it	 is	 the	 way	 the	 Acholi	 people	 traditionally	 deal	 with	 conflict	 resolution	 and	
therefore	it	is	preferable	to	trials.56		Investigating	Mato	Oput		will	enable	an	assessment	
																																																						
51	Baines,	E.	(2007)	‘The	Haunting	of	Alice:	Local	Approaches	to	Justice	and	Reconciliation	in	Northern	Uganda’	1	IJTJ	
pp91-114	at	p104		
52	Hayner,	P.B.	(2011)	Unspeakable	Truths:	Transitional	Justice	and	the	Challenge	of	Truth	Commissions	(Abingdon:	
Routledge)	pxi-xii	
53	Situation	in	Uganda	ICC-02/04	
54	 Buchanan,	 E.	 (2016)	 ‘Ugandan	 President	Museveni	 praises	 African	 nations	 for	withdrawing	 from	 ‘useless’	 ICC’	
International	 Business	 Times,	 26	 October	 [Online]	 Available:	 http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ugandan-president-
museveni-praises-african-nations-withdrawing-useless-icc-1588328	[Accessed	18.02.17]	
55	Afako,	B.	(2002)	‘Reconciliation	and	justice:	‘Mato	Oput’	and	the	Amnesty	Act’	Accord	11	pp64-67	
56	These	claims	will	be	examined	in	Chapter	Five	and	it	will	be	seen	they	are	open	to	challenge	
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of	whether	a	grass-roots	 justice	mechanism,	suggested	by	 the	representatives	of	 the	
victims	of	international	crimes	themselves,	would	satisfy	the	aims	of	ICJ.				
	
In	contrast,	the	SATRC	was	not	a	‘traditional’	grass-roots	justice	mechanism	but	a	top-
down	mechanism	of	justice,	established	by	a	democratically-elected	government.		There	
have	 been	 several	 truth	 commissions	 in	 Africa	 but	 none	 are	 as	 well-known	 and	
internationally	praised	as	the	SATRC,	which	has	been	credited	with	helping	to	facilitate	
a	smooth	transition	from	the	repressive	apartheid	regime	to	democracy	and	to	create	a	
culture	 of	 respect	 for	 human	 rights	 in	 South	Africa.57	 	One	 interesting	 aspect	 of	 the	
SATRC	is	the	conditional	amnesty	that	was	offered	to	the	individual	perpetrators	of	gross	
violations	 of	 human	 rights	 in	 return	 for	 their	 full	 and	 frank	 admissions	 before	 the	
Commission.58		This	is	clearly	the	antithesis	of	the	ICC’s	principle	that	such	crimes	‘must	
not	 go	 unpunished	 and	 that	 their	 effective	 prosecution	 must	 be	 ensured’.59	 	 It	 is	
therefore	instructive	to	consider	whether	the	ICC	would	insist	on	prosecutions	if	South	
Africa	were	in	the	same	position	of	transition	today	as	it	was	in	1994/5	when	the	TRC	
was	in	the	process	of	being	established.	
	
Thesis	Structure	
	
The	thesis	will	begin	in	Chapter	Two	by	investigating	the	rise	and	development	of	ICJ	
and	will	consider	why,	when	seeking	to	deal	with	perpetrators	of	‘atrocities	that	deeply	
shock	the	conscience	of	humanity’,60	the	international	community	(as	represented	by	
the	United	Nations)	chose	to	promote	retributive	justice	in	the	form	of	an	international	
criminal	court	 rather	 than	alternative	means	of	accountability,	 for	example,	one	that	
favours	restorative	justice.		It	will	argue	that	the	drive	for	a	court	came	predominantly	
from	Western	powers	for	which	retributive	justice	has	long	been	the	norm.		
	
																																																						
57	Wilson,	R.A.	(2001a)	The	Politics	of	Truth	and	Reconciliation	in	South	Africa:	Legitimizing	the	Post-Apartheid	State	
(Cambridge:	CUP)	p223	
58	Hayner,	P.	(2011)	p13		
59	Preamble,	para.	4	
60	Ibid	para.	2	
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Chapter	Three	will	identify	the	ICJ	goals	that	the	ICC	was	established	to	achieve	and	will	
assess	how	successful	prosecutions	at	the	Court	have	been	in	satisfying	these	goals.		It	
will	argue	that	as	well	as	the	domestic	aims	of	retributive	justice	such	as	punishment,	
deterrence,	 expressivism	 and	 rehabilitation,	 the	 ICC	 has	 been	 over-burdened	 with	
additional	 transitional	 justice	 goals	 including,	 for	 example,	 attaining	 peace,	 effecting	
reconciliation	 and	 writing	 a	 historical	 record.	 	 Several	 of	 these	 ICC	 goals	 conflict,	
resulting	in	the	power	of	each	being	diluted	which	can	lead	to	dissatisfaction	with	the	
ICC’s	achievements.			
	
Chapter	Four	will	 then	examine	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	AJMs,	using	mainly	
African	examples,	to	assess	their	capacity	to	achieve	the	same	ICJ	aims	accredited	to	
trials	at	the	ICC.		Having	considered	AJMs	as	a	general	topic,	Chapter	Five	will	focus	on	
northern	 Uganda’s	 Mato	 Oput,	 an	 AJM	 used	 by	 the	 Acholi	 people.	 	 This	 chapter	
examines	Mato	 Oput	 processes	 to	 establish	 whether	 it	 does	 achieve	 ICJ	 aims	 and	
therefore	could	potentially	make	a	successful	admissibility	challenge	at	the	ICC.		It	finds	
that	despite	the	assertions	of	Acholi	Elders	to	the	contrary,	the	traditional	Mato	Oput	
ceremony	 is	no	 longer	 in	common	usage.	 	Further,	 the	modern	(abridged)	version	of	
Mato	Oput	being	promulgated	by	 the	Elders	does	not	 satisfy	 the	goals	of	 ICJ,	 either	
locally	for	the	Acholi	people	or	nationally	for	the	citizens	of	Uganda	who	are	not	Acholi	
but	whose	lives	often	have	been	affected	by	the	government’s	conflict	with	LRA.	
	
Chapter	Six	will	then	consider	whether	a	TC	can	satisfy	the	aims	of	ICJ	and	will	focus	on	
the	work	of	the	SATRC,	despite	it	having	completed	its	work	prior	to	the	establishment	
of	the	ICC.	The	issue	of	interest	for	this	thesis	is	whether	the	SATRC,	which	was	lauded	
by	the	international	community	at	the	time,	satisfies	the	requirements	of	ICJ	and	thus	
could	persuade	the	Court	 to	defer	prosecutions	 in	 its	 favour	today.	 	The	chapter	will	
conclude	that	a	TC	can	satisfy	the	requirements	of	ICJ	provided	it	meets	specific	criteria.		
This	finding	can	suggest	a	framework	for	a	state	proposing	a	TC	rather	than	domestic	
trials	in	an	admissibility	challenge	to	the	ICC	should	the	Prosecutor	refuse	to	defer	in	the	
state’s	favour.	
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Chapter	 Seven	 examines	 the	 likelihood	 of	 an	 AJM	 being	 accepted	 by	 the	 ICC	 as	 an	
alternative	 to	 prosecutions	 at	 the	 Court	 pursuant	 to	 the	 Court’s	 principle	 of	
complementarity.	 It	 discusses	 the	 procedure	 to	 be	 followed	 by	 any	 state	wishing	 to	
challenge	the	admissibility	of	a	case	at	the	 ICC	where	the	Prosecutor	has	declined	to	
defer	to	the	state	and	insists	on	proceeding	with	prosecutions.		The	chapter	examines	
the	Court’s	judgments	(and	dissenting	judgments)	in	admissibility	challenges	previously	
heard	by	the	court,	to	ascertain	how	flexible	(or	otherwise)	the	Judges	have	been	in	their	
interpretation	of	 the	provisions	of	 the	RSt	 and	 the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	
(RPE).			
	
All	 the	 admissibility	 challenges	 to	 date	 have	 been	 based	 on	 proposed	 domestic	
prosecutions	 but	 the	 judges’	 findings	 are	 of	 relevance	 to	 this	 thesis	 as	 they	 give	 an	
indication	of	the	potential	for	success	of	a	challenge	based	on	an	AJM	rather	than	trials.	
The	 chapter	will	 find	 that	 far	 from	acting	 flexibly,	 the	 Judges	have	demonstrated	an	
inclination	to	make	robust	decisions	even	when	the	Court’s	intervention	is	opposed	by	
states	declaring	themselves	willing	and	able	to	conduct	domestic	criminal	proceedings.		
It	will	conclude	that	a	state	wishing	to	rely	on	AJMs	rather	than	trials	will	have	an	uphill	
struggle	 to	 persuade	 the	 Court	 to	 declare	 the	 case	 inadmissible	 to	 the	 ICC	 and	will	
suggest	changes	that	may	be	required	for	the	Court	to	be	willing	to	defer	to	an	AJM,	not	
least,	for	example,	in	the	judges’	narrow	interpretation	of	the	RSt.		
	
Finally,	Chapter	Eight	will	conclude	this	thesis	by	drawing	together	all	 the	macro	and	
micro	arguments	in	support	of	the	central	contention	that	AJMs	are	potentially	capable	
of	 attaining	 the	goals	of	 ICJ	 and	 therefore	 the	 ICC’s	 complementary	principle	 should	
work	in	their	favour.		It	will	provide	a	framework	for	the	State	and	for	the	ICC	to	facilitate	
the	assessment	of	the	proposed	AJM’s	capacity	to	satisfy	the	goals	of	ICJ	identified	in	
Chapter	Three.		It	will	conclude	that	if	it	can	be	shown	within	this	framework	that	the	
proposed	AJM	satisfies	the	requirements	of	ICJ	at	least	to	the	standard	achieved	by	ICC	
trials,	the	Court	should	defer	to	the	state,	even	if	it	means	offenders	are	‘unpunished’.		
It	will	reassert	the	intention	of	the	drafters	of	the	RSt	and	of	the	delegates	at	the	Rome	
Conference	 that	 the	 ambiguity	 of	 some	 of	 the	 RSt’s	 provisions	 permit	 their	 flexible	
interpretation	 and	 will	 close	 with	 the	 warning	 that	 if	 the	 ICC	 maintains	 its	 current	
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intractability,	there	could	be	further	withdrawals	and	setbacks	for	ICJ.		Instead,	the	ICC	
should	respect	and	engage	with	the	genuine	desire	of	states	to	do	justice	differently,	
accepting	that	ICJ	is	a	living,	organic	and	holistic	concept	
	
Conclusion	
	
It	will	be	suggested	 in	this	thesis	that	the	history	of	 international	criminal	 justice	has	
been	driven	forward	by	ideas	of	legal	rationality	that	are	almost	exclusively	European.		
Thus,	it	cannot	be	argued	with	any	conviction	that	the	ICC	is	a	truly	global	legal	process	
with	 universal	 relevance	 and	 authority.	 	 This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	 ICC	 does	 not	
represent	 a	 valuable	 and	 paradigmatic	 justice	 system,	 developed	 in	 Europe	 over	 an	
extended	period	and	influenced	by	important	and	universal	values	of	due	process	and	
human	 rights	 before	 these	 were	 spread	 to	 other	 continents.	 	 The	 thesis	 questions,	
however,	whether	the	procedures	adopted	by	the	ICC	represent	the	only	way	the	global	
values	of	justice,	human	rights	and	the	rule	of	law	can	be	upheld,	or	whether	AJMs	can	
satisfy	the	requirements	of	ICJ.	
	
There	 is,	 of	 course,	 extensive	 literature	on	African	AJMs	and	on	 the	 ICC,	particularly	
regarding	the	principle	of	complementarity.61		The	question	of	amnesties	and	ICJ	is	also	
well-rehearsed,62	 as	 is	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	 transitional	 justice	 mechanism	 could	
persuade	 the	 ICC	 to	defer	 prosecutions,	 both	often	within	 the	 ‘peace	 versus	 justice’	
debate.	 For	 example,	 Linda	 Keller’s	 article	 on	 western	 retributive	 justice	 versus	
traditional	 restorative	 justice	 based	 on	Mato	Oput	and	 her	 proposal	 that	 these	 two	
conceptions	of	justice	should	be	harmonised	in	the	context	of	ICC	deferrals	to	traditional	
justice	mechanisms	was	the	initial	catalyst	for	the	research	in	this	thesis.63		However,	
the	 ‘interests	of	 justice’	debate	 is	not	 the	 focus	of	 this	 thesis	which	seeks	 instead	 to	
coalesce	many	of	 the	 arguments	 in	 existing	 literature	 and	 add	 to	 the	 scholarship	by	
specifically	identifying	the	ICJ	aims	of	prosecutions	at	the	ICC	and	then,	using	this	same	
																																																						
61	See,	for	example,	Waldorf,	L.	(2006)	‘Mass	Justice	for	Mass	Atrocity:	Rethinking	Local	Justice	as	Transitional	
Justice’	79	Temple	LR	pp1-88	
62	See,	for	example,	Scharf,	M.P.	(1999)	‘The	Amnesty	Exception	to	the	Jurisdiction	of	the	International	Criminal	
Court’	32	Cornell	ILJ	pp507-527	
63	Keller,	L.M.	(2008)	‘Achieving	Peace	with	Justice:	The	International	Criminal	Court	and	Ugandan	Alternative	
Justice	Mechanisms’	23	Connecticut	JIL	pp209-279	
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framework	to	assess	Mato	Oput	and	the	SATRC.		It	is	argued	that	where	a	proposed	AJM	
equals	or	betters	the	performance	of	the	ICC	in	achieving	the	ICJ	aims,	there	are	strong	
grounds	for	successfully	persuading	the	ICC	that	a	case	is	inadmissible	within	the	RSt’s	
complementarity	regime.		
	
Transitional	justice	has	successfully	engaged	a	wide	range	of	disciplines	which	has	added	
to	the	knowledge	and	understanding	of	local	justice	needs	of	victims	as	opposed	to	the	
universal	justice	demands	that	have	predominated	over	the	last	two	or	three	decades.		
More	research	on	AJMs	is	needed:	closer	case	studies	over	longer	periods,	deeper	legal	
analysis	of	the	link	with	courts,	broader	studies	across	more	countries	to	evaluate	their	
impact	on	trauma	and	healing	to	mention	just	a	few	areas.		The	ICC	is	necessary	for	the	
specific	cases	where	only	prosecution	and	punishment	will	suffice	but	as	Daryl	Robinson	
has	commented,	‘[s]ome	recalibrations,	based	on	African	experiences,	could	make	the	
ICC	better	not	just	for	Africa	but	for	the	world.’64	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
64	Robinson,	D.	(2016)	‘Feeling	a	Way	Forward	for	International	Justice	–	ICC,	Africa	and	the	World’	EJIL:	Talk!	[Online]	
Available:	 http://www.ejiltalk.org/feeling-a-way-forward-for-international-justice-icc-africa-and-the-world/#more-
14771	[Accessed	16.02.17]	
	 17	
CHAPTER	TWO	
	
THE	DEVELOPMENT	OF	A	COLLECTIVE	CONSCIENCE	
	
Introduction	
	
	
For	those	pressing	for	an	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	during	the	latter	half	of	the	
20th	 century,	 its	 establishment	 in	 2002	 was	 ‘a	 cultural	 achievement	 of	 historic	
importance	in	the	realisation	of	common	and	long-held	aspirations’1	to	bring	an	end	to	
impunity	 for	 the	 perpetrators	 of	 ‘unimaginable	 atrocities	 that	 deeply	 shock	 the	
conscience	of	humanity.’2		The	consciousness	that	some	crimes	are	so	serious	that	they	
concern	‘the	international	community	as	a	whole’3	had	advanced	gradually	during	the	
20th	 Century,	 described	 as	 ‘the	 bloodiest	 era	 in	 history.’4	 	 ‘Mindful	 that	 during	 this	
century	 millions	 of	 children,	 women	 and	 men	 have	 been	 victims’5	 the	 collective	
conscience	of	 the	 international	 community	was	pricked	 into	action	and	 the	 idealistic	
notion	of	states	coming	together	to	call	to	account	and	punish	the	guilty	seemingly	came	
to	 fruition	 at	 the	 Rome	 Conference	 in	 1998.	 	 The	 establishment	 of	 the	 Court	 was	
described	 as	 ‘a	 major	 break-through	 in	 the	 effective	 enforcement	 of	 international	
criminal	law’6	signifying	the	‘values	of	global	justice,	human	rights	and	the	rule	of	law’.7				
	
Several	factors	contributed	to	this	‘major	break-through’,	most	of	which,	it	is	argued	in	
this	 chapter,	 were	 driven	 by	 western	 governments.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 International	
Military	Tribunals	at	Nuremberg	(1945)	and	for	the	Far	East	(1946)	had	expanded	the	
application	of	international	law	towards	individual	rather	than	state	accountability.	They	
																																																						
1	Fouladvand,	S.	(2014)	‘Complementarity	and	Cultural	Sensitivity:	Decision-making	by	the	International	Criminal	
Court	Prosecutor	in	the	Darfur	Situation’	14	ICLR	pp1028-1066	at	p1029	
2	Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	1998,	(RSt)	Preamble,	para.	2	
3	Ibid	para.	4	
4	Ferguson,	N.	(2006)	‘The	Next	War	of	the	World’	85	Foreign	Affairs	pp61-74	at	p61	
5	Preamble,	para.	2	
6	Cassese,	A.	(2002)	‘From	Nuremberg	to	Rome:	International	Military	Tribunals	to	the	International	Criminal	Court’	
in	Cassese,	A.,	Gaeta,	P.,	Jones,	R.W.D.,	(eds.)	The	Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court:		A	Commentary	
(Oxford:		OUP)	p3	
7	McGoldrick,	D.	(2004)	‘Criminal	Trials	Before	International	Tribunals:	Legality	and	Legitimacy’	in	McGoldrick,	D.,	
and	Donnelly,	E.,	(eds.)	The	Permanent	International	Criminal	Court.		Legal	and	Policy	Issues	(Portland:	Hart	
Publishing)	p42	
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also	had	prioritised	international	over	domestic	law,	thereby	undermining	the	principle	
of	state	sovereignty	which	had	been	recognised	as	the	basis	for	international	relations	
since	the	Treaty	of	Westphalia	 in	1648.	 	 International	human	rights	 laws	and	treaties	
had	proliferated	in	the	period	as	had	the	establishment	of	human	rights	organizations	
such	as	Amnesty	International	and	Human	Rights	Watch.8		Another	important	factor	was	
the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	ending	of	the	Cold	War	in	1991	which	had	led	
to	 greater	 co-operation	 between	 world	 powers,	 particularly	 regarding	 the	
establishment	of	ad	hoc	international	tribunals	in	the	aftermath	of	genocidal	conflicts	in	
the	 1990s.	 	 Also	 significant	was	 the	 transition	 from	 authoritarian	 rule	 or	 intra-state	
conflict	to	peace	and	democracy	of	a	number	of	states	in	South	America,	Africa	and	the	
Far	 East	 during	 this	 period,	 which	 left	 a	 legacy	 of	 abuses	 to	 be	 addressed	 by	 the	
successor	regime.			
	
The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	examine	whether,	rather	than	reflecting	global	ideals	
of	justice,	human	rights	and	the	rule	of	law,	the	rise	and	development	of	international	
criminal	law	(ICL)	during	the	20th	century,	which	culminated	in	the	establishment	of	the	
ICC,	was	driven	by	western	enlightenment	ideas	of	universality.		It	seeks	to	argue	that	
intellectual	 and	 institutional	 development	 in	 the	 field	 of	 ICL	 was	 dominated	 by	 the	
western	powers	which	promulgated	their	values	to	the	exclusion	of	other	approaches	
to	 justice.	 	To	establish	that	no	 justice	mechanisms	other	 than	a	criminal	court	were	
considered	as	a	potential	global	means	of	accountability,	the	records	of	the	meetings	of	
the	 International	 Law	 Commission	 (ILC),	 the	 United	 Nations	 (UN),	 the	 Preparatory	
Commission	(PrepCom)	and	the	Rome	Conference	are	reviewed.		The	chapter	ultimately	
questions	whether	the	ICC	truly	reflects	the	justice	values	of	the	global	community	or	
whether	its	existence	attests	to	the	dominance	of	European	influence	at	precisely	the	
time	 when	 demands	 for	 justice	 and	 accountability	 were	 actively	 addressed.	 	 By	
examining	the	origins	of	the	moves	to	end	impunity	for	the	crimes	within	the	jurisdiction	
of	the	Court,	the	chapter	explores	the	argument	that	the	ICC	reflects	support	for	the	
retributive	concept	of	justice	that	is	fundamental	in	Europe	and	America	to	the	exclusion	
																																																						
8	In	1961	and	1978	respectively	
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of	possible	alternative	mechanisms	which	are	 favoured	by	nations	where	 restorative	
justice	is	the	norm.		
	
In	 the	 first	 section	 and	 in	order	 to	 explain	 Europe’s	 global	 dominance,	 the	medieval	
origins	of	ICL	will	be	considered.		Often	described	as	‘euro-centric’,	they	arose	from	the	
16th	 century	 European	 system	 of	 states	 which,	 through	 colonial	 expansion	 and	
domination,	spread	to	other	continents.9		Given	the	criticisms	of	the	ICC	from	several	
African	states	and	the	threats	of	mass	African	withdrawal	from	the	Rome	Treaty,	this	
chapter	considers	whether	the	establishment	of	the	ICC	signifies	a	‘soft-colonial’	or	‘neo-
colonial’	 approach	by	 Europe	 towards	Africa.	 	 It	 is	 also	 relevant	 to	 consider	how	 far	
Europe’s	colonial	history	contributed	to	African	states’	initial	acceptance	of	the	western-
inspired,	formal	method	of	adjudication.	
	
The	(European)	Origins	of	International	Law	10	
	
According	to	Grewe,	‘the	medieval	world	had	neither	States	nor	a	State	system	in	the	
modern	sense	of	these	terms.’11	The	political	face	of	Europe	was	dominated	by	Pope	
and	Emperor12	each	fighting	for	supremacy	in	the	exercise	of	authority	over	Christian	
princes	who	ruled	autonomous	communities,	which	were	unified	by	a	common	faith	
(Christianity),	language	(Latin)	and	culture	and	regularly	engaged	in	legal	relations	with	
one	another.13	The	ecclesiastical	supremacy	of	 the	Pope	was	acknowledged	by	these	
rulers	and	the	sanctity	of	their	treaties	was	upheld	by	fear	of	excommunication	in	the	
event	of	a	breach	of	an	oath	given.14			
																																																						
9	See,	for	example,	Schwarzenberger,	G.	(1957)	International	Law	as	applied	by	International	Courts	and	Tribunals:	1	
(London:	Stevens	&	Sons	Ltd)	p21;	Cassese,	A.	(2012)	‘States:	Rise	and	Decline	of	the	Primary	Subjects	of	the	
International	Community’	in	Fassbender,	B.,	and	Peters,	A.	(eds.)	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	the	History	of	
International	Law	(Oxford:	OUP)	pp49-69;	Brownlie,	I.	(1963)	International	Law	and	the	Use	of	Force	by	States	
(Oxford:	OUP)	pp14-18	
10	For	a	contrary	view	of	the	origins,	see	Orakhelashvili,	A.	(2006)	‘The	Idea	of	European	International	Law’	17	EJIL	
pp315-47	who	argues	that	viewing	international	law	as	the	product	of	European	tradition	is	conceptually	flawed	since	
‘European	international	law	is	an	ideology	based	not	on	evidence	but	on	prejudice	and	chauvinism	generated	from	a	
sense	of	racial,	cultural	and	religious	superiority	over	those	who	are	different’	p347	
11	Grewe,	W.G.,	(2000)	(translated	by	Michael	Byers),	The	Epochs	of	International	Law	(Berlin:	Walter	de	Gruyer),	
p37;	see	also	Strayer,	J.R.,	(1970)	On	the	Medieval	Origins	of	the	Modern	State	(Princeton:	PUP),	p40	
12	Grewe,	W.G.,	(2000)	p40		
13	Ibid	p12	
14	de	Vitoria,	F.	in	Pagden,	A.	&	Lawrence,	J.	(eds.)	(1991)	Vitoria	Political	Writings	(Cambridge:	CUP),	pp295-327;	
see	also	Keeton,	G.W.	&	Schwarzenberger,	G.	(1939)	Making	International	Law	Work	(London:	Peace	Book	
Company	(London)	Ltd),	p20	
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Towards	the	end	of	the	sixteenth	century,	however,	there	was	a	movement	away	from	
this	 classically-based,	 medieval	 legal	 order.15	 	 The	 authority	 of	 the	 church	 and	 its	
teachings	 waned	 as,	 conversely,	 the	 independent	 and	 autonomous	 communities	 in	
Christendom	 increasingly	 became	 more	 distinct,	 well-organised	 and	 monarchical.16	
Although	 Christianity	 remained	 the	 common	 faith,	 the	 ‘unity’	 of	 Christendom	 was	
irreparably	 damaged	 by	 both	 the	 Protestant	 Reformation	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 powerful	
European	nations	which	continually	pitted	themselves	against	each	other,	pursuing	their	
own	 interests	 and	 not	 acting	 with	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 Church	 for	 the	 good	 of	
Christendom.17			
	
After	thirty	years	of	war	in	Europe	between	Protestant	and	Catholic	rulers	fighting	for	
dominance,	the	1648	Peace	of	Westphalia	brought	an	end	to	the	conflicts	and	is	widely	
credited	 with	 originating	 modern	 international	 law.18	 	 The	 treaties	 incorporated	
principles	promulgated	by	Grotius,19	which	are	recognised	as	providing	the	foundation	
of	the	modern	state	system,	as	they	articulated	the	concept	of	state	sovereignty	and	the	
fundamental	 right	 of	 self-determination,	 legal	 equality	 between	 states	 and	 non-
intervention	by	one	state	in	the	internal	affairs	of	another.20		The	act	of	affirming	these	
rights	reformulated	not	only	the	political	structure	of	Europe	but	its	‘conception	of	the	
universe	on	which	that	structure	was	laid.’21	 	Chesterman	states	that	the	‘idea	of	the	
State	[…]	can	be	seen	[…]	as	a	corollary	of	the	emergent	European	mind:	conceiving	of	
[…]	the	world	as	conquerable	and	possessible.’22	
	
This	is	significant	because	the	re-moulding	of	the	European	outlook	led	to	a	period	of	
global	 colonialist	 expansion	 by	 the	 competing	 European	 powers	 and	 to	 the	
																																																						
15	Grewe	(2000)	p141-2;	see	also	Chesterman,	S.	(1995-96)	'Law,	Subject	and	Subjectivity	in	International	Relations:	
International	Law	and	the	Postcolony’	20	Melbourne	ULR	pp979-1022	at	p989	
16	Brownlie,	I.	(1963)	p11;	see	also	Keeton,	G.W.	&	Schwarzenberger,	G.	(1939)	p20	
17	Grewe,	W.G.	(2000)	p143	
18	The	Treaties	of	Münster	and	Osnabrück	commonly	are	known	at	the	Peace	of	Westphalia	
19	Hugo	Grotius	(1583-1645),	Dutch	Jurist,	philosopher	and	theologian	described	as	the	‘father’	of	international	law	
20	In	1625	Grotius	published	De	jure	belli	ac	Pacis	libri	tre	wherein	he	argued	the	right	and	authority	of	the	
sovereign,	independent	State	as	opposed	to	the	rights	of	the	individual,	with	each	State	being	legally	equal	to	the	
other	
21	Chesterman,	S.	(1995-6)	p989	
22	Ibid	p990	(emphasis	in	original)	
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corresponding	 spread	 of	 European	 influence	 over	 their	 colonies	 in	 several	 areas,	
including	the	administration	of	 law	and	‘justice’.	 	Grotius’	view	that	 international	 law	
was	universal	and	that	secular	natural	law	applied	to	all	states	was	not	reflected	in	the	
expansionist	 ambitions	 of	 European	 states,	 however.23	 Bowden	 argues	 that	 the	
foundation	of	the	Westphalian	states	system	prompted	the	European	‘classical	standard	
of	civilisation’24	 in	 international	 law	and	society,	 the	 importance	of	which	 ‘cannot	be	
underestimated	in	terms	of	the	violent	European	civilising	missions	that	it	helped	give	
rise	to.’25		
	
It	 is	 arguable	 that	 the	 ‘classical	 standard	 of	 civilisation’	 that	 emerged	 and	 took	 root	
following	 European	 encounters	 with	 the	 non-European	 world	 during	 this	 colonial	
expansionist	period	greatly	influenced	the	attitudes	of	Western	powers	in	later	debates	
about	human	rights	in	general	and	the	appropriate	form	of	justice	mechanism	to	deal	
with	international	crimes,	in	particular.		Bowden	states	that	any	nation	or	peoples	that	
did	 not	 share	 the	 laws	 and	 customs	 of	 Europe	 was	 automatically	 excluded	 from	
international	society	and	it	was	assumed	that	it	was	the	task	of	the	civilised	nations	of	
Europe	 to	 assist	 with	 the	 training	 of	 the	 uncivilised	 (i.e.	 non-European)	 in	 their	
aspirations	to	enter	the	civilised	world	should	they	demonstrate	the	propensity	to	do	
so.26	 	 Furthermore,	 he	 argues	 that	 such	 attitudes	 have	 been	 ‘deployed	 “by	western	
powers	 in	 their	 suppression	 of	 the	 non-western	 world	 and	 […]	 are	 still	 regularly	
employed	 in	 contemporary	 international	 relations	 in	 the	 supposedly	 post-imperial	
world.”’27		It	certainly	helps	to	explain	the	propensity	of	Europe	to	further	its	own	values	
as	universally	applicable	norms	with	which	the	colonial	peoples	had	to	conform	if	they	
were	to	avoid	sanctions	and	achieve	full	membership	of	the	international	community.	
	
																																																						
23	See	Phillipson,	C.	 (1916)	Wheaton’s	Elements	of	 International	Law	 (London:	Stevens	and	Sons	Ltd)	arguing	that	
international	law	had	always	been	limited	to	civilised	and	Christian	people	of	Europe	or	to	those	of	European	origin	
and	that	although	the	law	of	nations	could	apply	outside	Europe,	it	was	necessarily	inferior	to	European	international	
law	(pp14-18);	see	also	Lorimer,	J.	(1833)	The	Institutes	of	the	Law	of	Nations	(London:	William	Blackwood	and	Sons)	
arguing	that	‘the	same	rights	and	duties	do	not	belong	to	savages	and	civilised	men’	p13	
24	That	is,	the	means	by	which	people’s	or	nations	have	historically	been	admitted	into	or	barred	from	the	
international	society	of	states,	based	on	shared	values	and	norms	
25	Bowden,	B.	(2005)	‘The	Colonial	Origins	of	International	Law.		European	Expansion	and	the	Classical	Standard	of	
Civilization’	7	Journal	of	the	History	of	International	Law	pp1-23	at	p1	
26	Bowden,	B.	(2005)	p15	
27	Ibid	p23	
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The	period	of	Enlightenment	that	followed	the	ending	of	the	European	religious	and	civil	
wars	of	the	17th	century	had	seen	the	development	of	theories	of	natural	rights	(i.e.	that	
people	are	born	free	and	equal)	which	became	the	main	concern	of	European	thinkers	
and	philosophers	during	the	17th	and	18th	centuries.		John	Locke,	for	example,	argued	
that	 natural	 rights	 did	 not	 rely	 on	 citizenship	 or	 on	 any	 state	 law,	 nor	 were	 they	
necessarily	limited	to	one	particular	ethnic,	cultural	or	religious	group.28	Immanuel	Kant	
suggested	 that	every	 individual	has	 ‘citizenship	of	 the	world’29	and	 that	world	peace	
could	 be	 attained	 ‘as	 a	 consequence	 of	 increased	 communication	 among	 human	
beings’.30	 	 Kant’s	 view,	 however,	 that	 Europeans	 were	 the	 only	 mature	 species	 of	
humanity31	 	helped	to	 reinforce	 the	Enlightenment’s	 link	with	colonial	expansionism.		
Hegemonic	notions	of	global	unity	were	 justifications	for	Europe’s	Christian,	civilising	
and	 modernising	 missions	 from	 the	 conquest	 of	 the	 Americas	 in	 the	 16th	 and	 17th	
centuries	 to	the	colonisation	of	Asia	and	Africa	 in	 the	19th	and	early	20th	centuries.32		
Arguing	 the	 universality	 of	 their	 ideas,	 Enlightenment	 thinkers	 denied	 cultural	
differences	 and	 moral	 and	 social	 relativity.	 	 Using	 its	 doctrine	 of	 progress,	 colonial	
conquest	was	legitimated	under	the	guise	of	the	civilising	mission	and	Enlightenment’s	
celebration	 of	 reason	 prompted	 the	 labelling	 of	 all	 alternative	 belief	 systems	 as	
irrational	or	superstitious.33	
	
The	first	half	of	the	19th	century	then	witnessed	one	of	the	longest	periods	of	peace	in	
European	history,	creating	conditions	for	unprecedented	economic	growth	and	serving,	
so	 it	 appeared,	 to	 affirm	 the	 superiority	 of	 European	 civilisation.34	 	 The	 period	 is	
characterised	by	the	gradual	acceptance	of	norms	justified	by	theories	of	natural	 law	
about	sovereignty	and	property	rights	as	they	applied	to	relations	between	European	
																																																						
28	See	John	Locke’s	Second	Treatise	of	Government	published	in	1689	
29	Benhabib,	S.	(2012)	‘Cosmopolitanism	after	Kant:	Claiming	rights	across	borders	in	a	new	century’	in	Tunstall,	K.	E.	
(ed)	Self-Evident	Truths?		Human	Rights	and	the	Enlightenment	(The	Oxford	Amnesty	Lectures	(London:	Bloomsbury	
Publishing)	p78	
30	Ibid	p81	
31	Fine,	R.	(2011)	‘Enlightenment	Cosmopolitanism:	Western	or	Universal?’	in	Adams,	D.	and	Tihanov,	G.	(eds.)	
Enlightenment	Cosmopolitanism	(Cambridge:	Legenda)	p159	
32	Ibid	p157	
33	Nonetheless,	 the	 ideals	of	Enlightenment	 thinkers	were	 transformative,	being	at	 the	core	of	 the	American	and	
French	Revolutions	at	the	end	of	the	18th	century	and	providing	the	rational	basis	for	the	later	emancipation	of	slaves	
and	enfranchisement	of	women	
34	Koskenniemi,	M.	(2001)	The	Gentle	Civilizer	of	Nations:	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	International	Law	1870-1960	
(Cambridge:	CUP)	p11	
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states.35	The	emergence	of	an	‘international	society’,	by	which	is	meant	the	European	
system	of	interrelations	and	customs	of	international	law,	was	therefore	formulated	in	
the	context	of	the	demands	of	colonisation.36			
	
European	liberalism,	which	sought	to	prolong	the	somewhat	precarious	peace37	through	
the	 uniting	 of	 nations	 via	 the	 mechanism	 of	 free	 trade	 and	 increased	 popular	
enlightenment,	 was	 radically	 activist	 and	 internationally	 organised	 within	 peace	
societies	and	movements.38		Humanitarian	moves	to	limit	excesses	of	war	began	to	be	
initiated	in	Europe	and	the	United	States	(US).		In	the	US,	for	example,	in	1863	Francis	
Leiber	wrote	a	code	of	conduct	for	the	treatment	of	prisoners,	wounded	soldiers	and	
civilians	 under	 occupation.	 39	 	 In	 Europe,	 also	 in	 1963,	 Gustave	 Moynier	 and	 Henri	
Dunant	co-founded	the	International	Committee	for	Relief	to	the	Wounded	(renamed	
the	 International	 Committee	 of	 the	 Red	 Cross	 in	 1876)40	 and	 persuaded	 the	 Swiss	
Government	to	hold	international	negotiations	which	led	to	the	Geneva	Convention	of	
1864,	when	rules	were	established	for	the	treatment	of	wounded	soldiers	and	for	the	
protection	of	medical	personnel,	vehicles	and	equipment.41	
	
Only	 six	 years	 later,	 the	 1870	 Franco-Prussian	War	 led	 to	 violations	 of	 the	 Geneva	
Convention	 being	 alleged	 by	 both	 sides,	 including	 widespread	 misuse	 of	 Red	 Cross	
insignia.42	 	 	 Making	 the	 first	 serious	 proposal	 for	 an	 international	 tribunal	 to	 judge	
violations	of	 internationally	agreed	rules	on	the	conduct	of	war,43	Moynier	proposed	
that	 future	violations	be	discouraged	by	 the	establishment	by	 treaty	of	a	permanent	
international	 tribunal,	 which	 would	 be	 convened	 as	 soon	 as	 war	 broke	 out,	 with	
																																																						
35		Varadarajan,	L.	(2015)	‘The	Trials	of	imperialism:	Radhabinod	Pal’s	dissent	at	the	Tokyo	tribunal’	2	EJIR	pp793-
815	at	p802	
36	Ibid	
37	As	demonstrated	by	the	Crimean	War	1853-1856,	although	this	was	not	viewed	at	the	time	as	a	threat	to	the	
European	peace	system	as	it	primarily	involved	the	ambitions	of	Russia,	only	a	marginally	European	country	
38	Koskenniemi,	M.	(2001)	p35	
39	Leiber’s	Instructions	for	the	Government	of	Armies	of	the	United	States	in	the	Field	was	the	forerunner	for	other	
governments	to	follow,	the	first	British	Manual	of	Military	Law	being	published	in	1884	
40	Dunant	had	witnessed	the	plight	of	dead	and	wounded	after	the	battle	of	Solferino	in	1859	and	had	written	a	
book	on	his	experience	which	was	read	by	Moynier	in	1862	
41	The	Convention	was	signed	by	the	major	states	of	Europe	
42	Hall,	C.K.	(1998)	‘The	first	proposal	for	a	permanent	international	criminal	court’	International	Review	of	the	Red	
Cross	No.	322	(unnumbered	pages)	[Online]	Available:	
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jp4m.htm	[Accessed	03.03.17)	
43	Ibid	
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adjudicators	from	the	warring	and	neutral	states	passing	sentences	to	be	carried	out	by	
states.44	The	proposal	resulted	in	much	debate,	with	some	experts	in	international	law	
welcoming	the	initiative	to	enforce	the	Geneva	Convention	but	most	criticising	the	idea	
of	an	international	tribunal,	preferring	other	means	of	enforcement	such	as	arbitration	
or	commissions	of	enquiry	and	the	strengthening	of	humanitarian	aid	agencies.45	 	 	 In	
1899	 and	 1907,	 the	 Hague	 Conventions	 expanded	 the	 Geneva	 Convention	 and	
incorporated	Leiber’s	rules	of	war.	 	These	conventions	were	the	first	major	source	of	
international	humanitarian	law	in	a	treaty.		Linked	with	liberal-humanitarian	ideals	and	
theories	 about	 the	 natural	 evolution	 of	 European	 societies,	 they	 demonstrated	 a	
growing	 awareness	 in	 the	 ‘civilised’	 nations	 of	 those	 states’	 humanitarian	
responsibilities.46		
	
The	brutality	of	 the	First	World	War	 (WW1)	 led	 to	 calls	 for	an	 international	 criminal	
tribunal	 to	 try	 war	 criminals	 being	 voiced	 at	 the	 Paris	 Peace	 Conference	 in	 January	
1919.47		The	conference	was	attended	by	leaders	of	32	states,	representing	about	75%	
of	the	world’s	population	but	negotiations	were	dominated	by	the	‘Big	Three’:	France,	
Britain	and	the	US.48		Unsurprisingly,	therefore,	when	reporting	on	potential	means	of	
accountability	for	war	criminals,	the	Commission	on	the	Responsibility	of	the	Authors	of	
War	and	on	the	Enforcement	of	Penalties	convened	by	the	Allies,	proposed	that	an	ad	
hoc	international	tribunal	be	created	to	deal	with	two	categories	of	crimes:	‘acts	which	
provoked	the	World	War	and	accompanied	its	inception’	and	‘violations	of	the	laws	and	
customs	 of	 war	 and	 the	 laws	 of	 humanity’.49	 	 It	 stated	 that	 not	 to	 punish	 those	
responsible,	 including	 heads	 of	 state,	 notably	 Kaiser	 Wilhelm	 II,	 ‘would	 shock	 the	
																																																						
44	Ibid	The	proposal	was	made	at	a	meeting	of	the	International	Committee	for	Relief	to	the	Wounded	on	3rd	
January	1872	
45	Ibid	
46	Chesterman,	S.	(1997)	‘Never	Again	…	and	Again:	Law,	Order,	and	the	Gender	of	War	Crimes	in	Bosnia	and	
Beyond’	22	Yale	JIL	pp299-343	at	p303	
47	Schabas,	W.	(2017)	An	Introduction	to	the	International	Criminal	Court	(Cambridge:	CUP)	p3;	see	also	Adatci,	M.	
(1920)	 ‘Commission	 on	 the	 Responsibility	 of	 the	 Authors	 of	 the	 War	 and	 on	 Enforcement	 of	 Penalties:	 Report	
Presented	to	the	Preliminary	Peace	Conference	March	29,	1919’	14	AJIL	pp95-154	at	p122	
48	Thompson,	D.	(1966)	Europe	Since	Napoleon	(Middlesex:	Penguin	Books)	p570,	616-617;	Thompson	states	that	
Japan	and	Italy	were	‘at	first	included	out	of	courtesy	[but]	soon	gave	up	the	unequal	struggle.’		
49	Adatci,	M.	(1920)	p116;	see	also	Hudson,	M.O.	(1938)	‘Editorial	Comments:	The	Proposed	International	Criminal	
Court’	32	AJIL	pp549-554	at	p549;	Alfaro,	R.J.	(1950)	‘Report	on	the	Question	of	International	Criminal	Jurisdiction’	
Documents	of	the	Second	Session	including	the	Report	of	the	Commission	to	the	General	Assembly,	YBILC	Vol	II,	UN	
Doc.	A/CN.4/15,	pp1-18,	para.	7	
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conscience	 of	 civilized	 mankind.’50	 The	 Commission	 called	 for	 the	 tribunal	 to	 try	
individuals	from	Germany,	Austria,	Turkey	and	Bulgaria	for	alleged	violations	of	the	laws	
of	 war.51	 	 Turkey’s	 massacre	 of	 Armenians	 had	 caused	 the	 Allies	 to	 issue	 a	 joint	
declaration	of	condemnation	on	24th	May	1915,	stating	‘In	view	of	these	new	crimes	of	
Turkey	against	humanity	and	civilization,	the	Allied	governments	announce	publicly	…	
that	they	will	hold	personally	responsible	…	all	members	of	the	Ottoman	government	
and	those	of	their	agents	who	are	implicated	in	such	massacres.’52		Unfortunately,	the	
Allies	did	not	 follow	up	 this	 threat,	 a	 failure	which	apparently	was	not	unnoticed	by	
Hitler	when	he	pursued	his	genocidal	policies.53	
	
The	 Treaty	 of	 Versailles	 1919	 which	 formally	 ended	 WW1	 required	 Germany	 to	
surrender	 suspected	 war	 criminals	 for	 trial	 by	 Allied	Military	 Tribunals.54	 	 However,	
Germany	was	conscious	of	the	need	to	maintain	respect	for	its	sovereignty	by	retaining	
its	 national	 criminal	 jurisdiction	 and	 so	 persuaded	 the	 Allies	 to	 permit	 it	 to	 try	 the	
offenders	 itself,	before	the	Supreme	Court	 in	Leipzig.55	 	To	ensure	that	Germany	was	
‘sincerely	resolved	to	administer	justice	in	good	faith’,	the	Allies	reserved	‘in	the	most	
express	manner	the	right	to	bring	the	accused	before	their	own	tribunals’	if	the	trials	
‘did	not	result	in	just	punishment	being	awarded	to	the	guilty’.56	However,	despite	most	
of	 the	 suspected	war	 criminals	managing	 to	 avoid	 prosecution	 and	 those	who	were	
prosecuted	 either	 being	 acquitted	 or	 receiving	 very	 short	 sentences,	 the	 Allies	
reservation	was	not	activated,	possibly	because	the	thirst	for	prosecutions	had	waned	
by	this	time.57		
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53	Scharf,	M.P.	(1999)	‘The	Amnesty	Exception	to	the	Jurisdiction	of	the	International	Criminal	Court’	Cornell	ILJ	
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56	Ibid	p629	
57	Of	the	895	Germans	initially	accused	by	the	Allies,	only	45	were	selected	to	be	prosecuted	by	the	Germans,	12	
indictees	were	brought	to	trial	at	Leipzig	and	six	were	acquitted.		Of	those	six,	one	was	immediately	released	and	the	
others	 received	 light	 sentences.	 	 The	 Kaiser,	 who	 under	 Art.	 227	 was	 to	 be	 tried	 for	 supreme	 offences	 against	
international	 morality	 and	 the	 sanctity	 of	 treaties,	 fled	 to	 Holland	 where	 he	 was	 granted	 political	 asylum.	 	 An	
extradition	request	was	refused	and	he	eventually	died	there	in	1941,	the	international	community	having	given	up	
hope	of	ever	getting	him	into	court.	
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Ultimately,	therefore,	the	Allies’	attempt	to	punish	WW1	war	criminals	‘was	a	complete	
failure’58	 but	 their	 efforts	 did	 serve	 to	 stimulate	 interest	 in	 the	 development	 of	
international	 criminal	 justice	 (ICJ)	 and	 specifically,	 in	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 forum	
‘competent	to	try	crimes	constituting	a	breach	of	international	public	order	or	against	
the	universal	law	of	nations.’59		The	atrocities	committed	during	wars	started	in	Europe	
and	 fought	 predominantly	 on	 the	 European	 continent	 became	 the	 catalyst	 for	 the	
humanitarian	 development	 of	 international	 laws	 of	 war	 and	 led	 to	 calls	 for	 the	
punishment	of	those	guilty	of	causing	wars	and	committing	war	crimes.		Since	in	Europe	
and	America	criminal	trials	were	the	established	means	of	holding	people	to	account,	
the	proposal	 that	offenders	should	be	prosecuted	was	uncontested	after	WW1.	 	The	
idea	of	considering	any	justice	mechanism	other	than	its	own	certainly	would	not	occur	
to	a	Europe	convinced	of	its	political	and	intellectual	superiority.	
	
In	this	section,	 it	has	been	argued	that	Europe’s	global	pre-eminence	began	with	the	
post-Westphalian	growth	of	autonomous	and	independent	states	and	was	followed	by	
a	period	of	colonial	expansion	and	unprecedented	economic	growth	which	underpinned	
European	belief	 in	the	superiority	of	 its	own	civilisation.	 	The	Enlightenment	thinkers	
argued	 the	 universality	 of	 their	 theories	 which	 provided	 justification	 for	 colonialist	
claims	that	their	activities	facilitated	the	spread	of	European	values	and	norms	to	the	
uncivilised	peoples	of	 the	world.	 	 The	distinction	between	 ‘civilised’	 and	 ‘uncivilised’	
peoples	had	become	so	embedded	in	the	legal,	political	and	intellectual	debate	from	
the	 end	 of	 the	 18th	 to	 the	 early	 20th	 century	 that	 it	was	 virtually	 unassailable60	 and	
indeed,	persisted	to	some	degree	until	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	(WW2).61	
	
In	 the	next	 section,	 progress	made	 in	 the	 codification	of	 international	 crimes	 and	 in	
reaching	agreement	on	the	appropriate	forum	for	holding	perpetrators	of	those	crimes	
to	account	will	be	discussed.	The	dominant	role	played	by	the	West	 in	both	of	these	
areas	will	be	highlighted.	
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Early	Calls	for	an	International	Criminal	Jurisdiction	
	
As	 already	 mentioned,	 negotiations	 at	 the	 Paris	 Peace	 Conference	 in	 1919	 were	
dominated	by	three	big	Western	powers,	France,	Britain	and	the	US.		In	keeping	with	
Kant’s	 theory	 that	 greater	 communication	 between	 human	 beings	 promotes	 world	
peace,	the	Conference	agreed	to	the	foundation	of	a	League	of	Nations	(LoN).62		WW1	
had	interfered	with	European	global	exploitation	and	the	aim	now	was	to	ensure	the	
continuity	of	 pre-war	 forms	of	 rule	 and	 the	 avoidance	of	 open	 conflict	 between	 the	
major	powers.63		Article	14	of	the	Versailles	Treaty	had	envisaged	a	Permanent	Court	of	
International	 Justice	 and	 in	 1920,	 the	 Council	 of	 the	 LoN	 appointed	 an	 Advisory	
Committee	 of	 Jurists64	 to	 draft	 plans	 for	 its	 establishment.	 The	 committee	
recommended	that	a	High	Court	of	International	Justice	should	be	set	up	alongside	the	
International	Court	of	Justice	(ICtJ),	with	jurisdiction	over	‘crimes	against	international	
public	order	and	against	the	universal	law	of	nations’	which	had	been	referred	to	it	by	
the	LoN	Assembly	or	by	the	Council	of	 the	League	due	to	their	exceptional	gravity.65		
However,	the	recommendation	was	not	taken	up	as	the	Third	Committee	of	the	LoN	
Assembly	 argued	 that	 it	 was	 premature	 since	 there	 was	 no	 defined	 notion	 of	
international	crimes	and	no	international	penal	law,	that	the	principle	nulla	poena	sine	
lege	would	 be	 disregarded	 and	 since	 only	 States	were	 subjects	 of	 international	 law,	
individuals	could	only	be	punished	in	accordance	with	their	national	law.66	It	was	further	
argued	that	‘if	 it	were	possible	to	refer	certain	crimes	to	any	jurisdiction,	 it	would	be	
more	practical	to	establish	a	special	chamber’	in	the	ICtJ.67			
	
The	decision	of	the	Third	Committee	led	to	a	decline	of	interest	in	the	project	among	
the	LoN	member	states.	However,	the	inference	drawn	from	their	comments		was	not	
that	it	was	undesirable	or	impossible	to	punish	crimes	against	the	international	public	
																																																						
62	Thompson,	D.	(1966)	p639	
63	Varadarajan,	L.	(2015)	p802	
64	Members	were	representatives	from	Belgium,	Japan,	Spain,	Brazil,	Norway,	France,	GB,	Netherlands,	Italy	and	the	
USA.	
65		Procès-Verbaux	of	the	Proceedings	of	the	Advisory	Committee	of	Jurists	p49	
66	Alfaro,	R.J.	(1950)	paras.	16-17	
67	Historical	Survey	of	the	Question	of	 International	Criminal	Jurisdiction	1949,	UN	Doc	A/CN.4/7/Rev.1	(Historical	
Survey)	p12		
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but	that	‘if	the	difficulties	could	be	overcome,	an	international	criminal	jurisdiction	was	
necessary	 and	 desirable.’68	 	 Accordingly,	 several	 non-governmental	 organisations	
(NGOs)	met	in	the	1920s69	and	resolved	that	‘the	creation	of	an	International	Court	is	
essential	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 justice’	 (ILA);70	 to	 ‘draw	 up	 a	 preliminary	 draft	 and	 an	
International	Legal	Code’	(IPU)71	and	to	draft	a	statute	for	an	international	court	(IAPL).72		
	
It	was	not	until	the	atrocities	of	WW2	that	the	minds	of	Allied	Governments	were	again	
concentrated	on	how	best	to	deal	with	war	criminals,	the	main	question	being	over	what	
crimes	and	to	what	extent	should	an	international	court	exercise	jurisdiction?	The	Allies	
had	begun	seriously	to	address	the	 issue	of	war	crimes	and	their	 investigation	 in	the	
early	1940s.		At	a	meeting	of	representatives	of	seventeen	of	the	Allied	nations73	on	20th	
October	 1943,	 the	 UN	 War	 Crimes	 Commission74	 was	 officially	 established	 with	 a	
mandate	 to	 collect,	 record	 and	 investigate	 evidence	 of	 war	 crimes	 and	 their	
perpetrators,	 to	 liaise	with	governments	on	 their	 findings	and	 to	advise	on	 the	 legal	
procedures	to	be	adopted	in	bringing	offenders	to	trial.		The	question	of	establishing	an	
international	court	for	the	trial	of	war	criminals	was	also	considered.75		The	final	draft	of	
the	Convention	for	the	Establishment	of	a	UN	War	Crimes	Court	was	approved	on	26th	
September	1944	and	whilst	‘[r]ecognising	that	in	general	the	appropriate	tribunals	for	
the	 trial	 and	 punishment	 of	 such	 crimes	will	 be	 national	 courts’	 but	 ‘mindful	 of	 the	
possibility	that	cases	may	occur	in	which	such	crimes	cannot	conveniently	or	effectively	
be	punished	by	a	national	court’	its	jurisdiction	extended	to	all	war	criminals.76	
	
In	the	event,	the	plan	to	establish	a	UN	War	Crimes	Court	by	treaty	came	to	nothing	and	
the	preferred	method	of	dealing	with	war	criminals	was	by	mixed	military	tribunals.		In	
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75	Bathurst,	M.E.	(1945)	‘The	United	Nations	War	Crimes	Commission’	39	AJIL	pp567-570	
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the	Moscow	Declaration	of	30th	October	1943,77	it	was	stated	that	those	responsible	or	
involved	 in	 German	 atrocities	 would	 be	 ‘sent	 back	 to	 the	 countries	 in	 which	 their	
abominable	deeds	were	done	in	order	that	they	may	be	judged	and	punished	according	
to	the	laws	of	these	liberated	countries’.78	However,	major	criminals	‘whose	offences	
had	no	particular	geographical	localization’	were	to	be	‘punished	by	joint	decision	of	the	
government	of	the	Allies’.79	
	
In	furtherance	of	this	Declaration,	the	Nuremberg	International	Military	Tribunal	(NIMT)	
was	established	on	8th	August	1945	by	the	Allied	Powers	to	try	those	major	war	criminals	
‘whose	offences	had	no	particular	geographical	location’.80		The	crimes	covered	by	the	
Tribunal	 were	 conspiracy	 to	 commit	 crimes	 against	 peace;	 planning,	 initiating	 and	
waging	wars	of	aggression;	war	crimes	and	crimes	against	humanity	(CAH).81		The	Hague	
Conventions	gave	guidance	on	the	definition	of	war	crimes	and	the	Kellogg-Briand	Pact	
on	crimes	against	peace.82	CAH	were	included	as	a	category	of	offences	to	enable	the	
indictment	 of	 German	 perpetrators	 of	 crimes	 against	 German	 citizens.83	 The	 NIMT	
eventually	tried	22	accused	(of	whom	19	were	convicted)	for	crimes	against	peace,	war	
crimes	and	CAH.		Additionally,	in	occupied	Germany,	the	four	major	Allies	prosecuted	
the	 same	 crimes	 in	 their	 own	 zones	 of	 occupation.	 	 On	 19th	 January	 1946,	 an	
International	Military	Tribunal	for	the	Far	East	(TIMT)	was	established	in	Tokyo	to	try	the	
Japanese	perpetrators	of	atrocities	during	WW2	and	it	functioned	almost	identically	to	
the	NIMT,	prosecuting	crimes	against	peace,	war	crimes	and	CAH.84			
	
The	Nuremberg	and	Tokyo	 trials	were	 the	 first	 time	 in	world	history	 that	 individuals	
accused	of	crimes	against	world	peace	and	against	humanity	had	been	brought	before	
international	criminal	tribunals	to	answer	for	their	actions.85	The	trials	were	important	
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because	 they	 established	 new	 legal	 norms	 and	 standards	 of	 individual	 responsibility	
which	served	to	advance	the	international	rule	of	law	and	promote	ICJ.		However,	the	
dilemma	 faced	 by	 the	 Tribunals	 (i.e.	 whether	 a	 breach	 of	 strict	 legal	 positivism	 by	
permitting	 the	 retrospective	 extension	 of	 international	 criminal	 responsibility	 to	
perpetrators	of	crimes	under	the	Tribunals	charters	was	justifiable,	given	the	atrocities	
committed	by	 the	perpetrators)	was	 ‘resolved	by	moral	 […]	 rather	 than	 strictly	 legal	
arguments’.86	 	 For	 example,	 German	 defence	 counsels’	 objections	 that	 the	 Tribunal	
should	not	apply	ex	post	 facto	 law	was	countered	by	the	argument	that	 ‘substantive	
justice	 punishes	 acts	 that	 harm	 society	 deeply	 and	 are	 regarded	 as	 abhorrent	 by	 all	
members	of	society,	even	if	these	acts	were	not	prohibited	as	criminal	conduct	when	
they	were	performed.’87			
	
Similarly,	criticisms	have	been	levelled	that	the	tribunals	imposed	‘victor’s	justice’,	that	
the	 judges	 and	 prosecutors	 all	 came	 from	 the	 Allied	 nations	 with	 no	 neutral	 or	
German/Japanese	judges	on	the	bench,	that	allegations	of	Allied	war	crimes	were	not	
prosecuted	and	that	the	trials	were	unfairly	run88	in	that	they	curtailed	the	ability	of	the	
accused	to	access	documents	and	conduct	investigations.89		The	independence	of	TIMT	
was	 also	 questioned	 when,	 for	 example,	 the	 US	 ordered	 Prosecutors	 not	 to	 bring	
charges	against	the	Emperor	or	members	of	his	family.90	However,	great	efforts	were	
made,	at	least	at	the	NIMT,	to	ensure	the	proceedings	were	fair	and	the	running	of	the	
trials	is	‘generally	considered	to	have	been	professional	and	defensible,	certainly	by	the	
standards	of	the	day’,	thus,	‘overall,	the	judgment	of	history	on	the	Tribunal	has	been	
basically	positive.’91			
	
Minow	states	that	the	Nuremberg	and	Tokyo	trials	came	to	‘represent	the	possibility	of	
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legal	responses	[to	war	crimes	and	mass	atrocity],	rather	than	responses	grounded	in	
sheer	power	politics	or	military	aggression.’92		It	is	argued,	however,	that	although	the	
tribunals	were	innovatory	and	were	intended	to	introduce	a	new	and	progressive	world	
order	based	on	the	ideals	of	a	world	committed	to	the	common	values	of	humanity,	the	
material	 interests	 underpinning	 them	 were	 embedded	 in	 imperialism.93	 	 It	 is	 this	
argument	 that	 is	 at	 the	 core	 of	 Justice	 Pal’s	 dissenting	 opinion	 at	 the	 TIMT94	which	
‘provides	crucial	insights	into	the	nature	of	the	world	order	that	was	being	rearticulated	
by	the	post-war	international	tribunals.’95		Pal	asserted	that	global	politics	of	the	mid-
20th	 century	was	 still	 fundamentally	 defined	 by	 imperialism,	 as	 characterised	 by	 the	
violent	 acquisition	 of	 territories	 and	 thereafter	 by	 military,	 political	 and	 economic	
domination	of	much	of	the	world	by	Western	powers	by	the	late	19th	century.96		Pal’s	
dissenting	judgment	therefore	highlights	the	‘connections	between	the	development	of	
seemingly	universally	 applicable	 international	 legal	 norms	and	 the	perpetuation	of	 a	
highly	unequal	and	fundamentally	unjust	“international	society”	as	they	appeared	at	the	
historical	crossroads	of	the	post-Second	World	War	order.’97		
	
For	many	in	the	West,	the	pre-war	order	was	‘legitimate	and	moral’	and	had	emerged	
due	to	the	superior	culture	of	some	nations	which	had	‘assumed	control	of	others	for	
the	benefit	 of	 all’.98	 	 Kantian	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 LoN	and	 indeed	 the	 two	 IMTs,	
promulgated	 the	existence	of	an	 international	community	bound	 together	by	shared	
norms	which	 governed	 interactions	 between	 its	members,	 based	 on	 their	 ‘common	
humanity’.99	 	 As	 Falk	 comments,	 ‘[t]he	 West	 has	 been	 particularly	 proficient	 at	
mythologizing	its	experiences	as	the	foundation	for	a	beneficial	order	for	the	whole	of	
humanity.’100		Ignoring	their	own	violence	in	establishing	their	colonies,	the	attempt	to	
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upset	 the	 status	 quo	 through	 violent	 conflict	 was	 termed	 ‘aggression’	 by	 these	
imperialist	powers.101		Such	aggression	would	not	be	tolerated	since	if	a	nation	‘had	the	
right	to	change	its	geographical	and	economic	status	suddenly	by	war,	then	every	other	
nation	as	badly	situated,	from	the	economic	standpoint,	had	the	same	right.’102		
	
For	Pal,	however,	this	‘common	humanity’	claim	was	a	fallacy	since	no	moral	consensus	
for	 the	 pre-war	 nature	 of	 international	 relations	 could	 exist	 given	 that	 they	 were	
grounded	in	violent	subjugation.103		He	argued	that	if	an	international	community	based	
on	 its	common	humanity	did	exist,	then	domination	of	one	nation	by	another	nation	
against	 its	will	was	 the	worst	 example	of	 aggression.	 	 Therefore	 it	was	 the	Western	
powers	(four	of	which	were	represented	on	the	bench	of	the	TIMT	and	who	between	
them	controlled	significant	colonies	in	Asia	at	the	end	of	WW2)104	who	had	initiated	the	
aggression	which	had	then	provoked	a	violent	response	from	colonised	nations	wishing	
to	 challenge	 the	 status	 quo.105	 	 Pal	 stated	 that	 to	 argue	 otherwise,	 as	 the	majority	
judgment	appeared	to	do,	‘required	a	wilful	blindness	to	the	violent	history	of	modern	
imperialism’	and	amounted	to	‘the	drawing	of	arbitrary	historical	timelines	to	determine	
what	constituted	aggression’,	judging	it	differently,	depending	on	who	had	perpetrated	
it.106	
	
Falk	 has	 questioned	why,	 given	 the	 problems	 of	 retroactivity	 and	 of	 the	 Allies’	 own	
wartime	conduct,	they	validated	international	criminal	accountability	of	leaders	for	war	
crimes.		He	states	it	only	makes	sense	‘if	the	imposition	of	accountability	is	understood	
to	 be	 a	 particularly	 advantageous	 response	 to	 a	 given	 geopolitical	 challenge	 whose	
wider	implications	can	be	avoided’.107		It	is	suggested,	therefore,	that	equating	‘peace’	
with	maintaining	 the	status	quo	was	a	political	decision,	 intended	 to	perpetuate	 the	
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imperialist	world	order	until	the	colonial	powers	were	ready	to	accept	change	which,	
according	to	Keenan,	must	occur	by	‘evolutionary	means’,	not	violent	conflict.108	
	
In	 the	 next	 section,	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 ILC,	 established	 by	 the	 UN	General	 Assembly	
(UNGA)	to	progress	the	codification	of	international	crimes	and	the	establishment	of	an	
international	 criminal	 court,	will	 be	discussed.	 	Unsurprisingly,	 Pal’s	 arguments	were	
pointedly	ignored	and	although	the	status	of	the	West	as	a	leader	of	the	‘civilised’	world	
was	damaged	by	the	atrocities	committed	by	the	West	during	WW2,109	it	will	be	seen	
that	 it	 clearly	 retained	 sufficient	 global	 authority	 to	 enable	 it	 to	 assert	 its	 influence	
during	debates	concerning	the	means	of	holding	those	responsible	to	account.	
	
The	Work	of	the	ILC	
	
The	onset	of	WW2	proved	that	the	LoN	had	failed	in	its	primary	purpose	of	preventing	
war	and	in	1945,	it	was	replaced	by	the	UN.		As	with	the	LoN,	the	UN	is	an	institution	
grounded	 in	 Kant’s	 philosophy	 of	 global	 citizenship	which	 promotes	 the	 universalist	
ideals	of	the	Enlightenment	Age.		In	establishing	the	UN,	the	dominant	Western	powers	
aimed	 to	create	and	maintain	global	order	 through	peace,	 security	and	co-operation	
between	 states.	 	 In	 a	 repudiation	 of	 historical	 colonialism,	 this	 new	 global	 order	
recognised	the	right	of	self-determination	of	non-European	states	which	were	to	be	run	
in	 accordance	with	 human	 rights.110	 	 However,	 a	 new	 form	 of	 colonialism	 emerged	
which	confirmed	that	the	political	independence	of	former	colonial	nations	was	largely	
illusory,	since	they	remained	bound	to	the	West	politically,	legally	and	economically.111	
	
In	 1947,	 the	 UNGA	 established	 the	 ILC112	 for	 the	 ‘promotion	 of	 the	 progressive	
development	of	 international	 law	and	 its	 codification’.113	Chaired	by	Manley	Hudson	
(US),	the	ILC	comprised	15	members	from	Europe	(5),	South	America	(4)	and	one	each	
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from	 India,	 Syria,	 China,	 Czechoslovakia	 and	 USSR.	 	 The	 following	 year,	 the	 UNGA	
adopted	the	Convention	on	the	Prevention	and	Punishment	of	the	Crime	of	Genocide.114	
The	 final	 wording	 of	 draft	 Article	 VII,	 adopting	 the	 principle	 of	 complementarity,	
required	that	persons	charged	should	be	tried	by	a	‘competent	tribunal	of	the	State	in	
the	 territory	 of	 which	 the	 act	 was	 committed	 or	 by	 a	 competent	 international	
tribunal’.115	In	furtherance	of	its	Kantian	aspirations,	the	UN	had	resolved	that	‘in	the	
course	of	the	development	of	the	international	community	there	will	be	an	increasing	
need	for	an	international	judicial	organ	for	the	trial	of	certain	crimes	under	international	
law’.116		
	
It	was	the	lack	of	any	‘competent	international	tribunal’	that	led	to	the	UNGA	inviting	
the	ILC	‘to	study	the	desirability	and	possibility	of	establishing	an	international	judicial	
organ	for	the	trial	of	persons	charged	with	genocide	or	other	crimes’	and	to	consider	
‘the	 possibility	 of	 establishing	 a	 Criminal	 Chamber	 of	 the	 International	 Court	 of	
Justice’.117	After	a	full	debate,	the	Commission	voted	that	it	was	both	desirable118	and	
possible119	to	establish	an	international	judicial	organ	but	it	did	not	recommend	that	it	
should	be	a	Criminal	Chamber	of	the	ICtJ.120		Review	of	the	ILC	meetings	confirms	that	
members	were	determined	to	keep	firmly	to	the	UNGA	resolution	and	discuss	only	the	
desirability	and	possibility	of	establishing	an	‘international	judicial	organ’,	thus	possible	
alternative	justice	mechanisms	(AJMs)	were	not	debated.	
	
During	the	1950s,	the	 ILC	continued	to	work	on	a	draft	Code	of	Offences	against	the	
Peace	and	Security	of	Mankind	(draft	code)	alongside	work	on	a	draft	Declaration	of	the	
Rights	and	Duties	of	States121	and	 formulation	of	 the	Nuremberg	principles.122	 	 In	 its	
second	 report	 to	 the	 UNGA,	 the	 ILC	 outlined	 seven	 Nuremberg	 Principles,	 which	
subsequently	 have	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 much	 of	 the	 development	 of	 international	
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criminal	law.123		The	ILC	finally	completed	the	draft	code	in	1954,	submitting	it	to	the	
UNGA	 with	 its	 report	 of	 its	 work	 of	 its	 sixth	 session.	 	 The	 UNGA	 postponed	 its	
consideration	of	the	draft	code,	ostensibly	to	await	an	agreed	definition	of	‘aggression’,	
which	was	proving	notoriously	difficult	to	achieve.124	Schabas	comments	that	‘political	
tensions	associated	with	the	Cold	War	had	made	progress	on	the	international	criminal	
court	agenda	virtually	 impossible.’125	 It	was	not	until	December	1978	that	 the	UNGA	
returned	 to	 the	1954	draft	 code	and	 requested	 the	UN	Secretary	General	 (UNSG)	 to	
invite	Member	States	and	relevant	organisations	to	submit	their	comments.126				
	
In	 the	 meantime,	 to	 fulfil	 the	 UN	 intention	 that	 all	 states	 should	 be	 governed	 in	
accordance	with	human	rights,	there	were	advances	in	this	field.		In	1948,	in	addition	to	
the	Genocide	Convention,	the	UNGA	adopted	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	
(UDHR).127	In	1973,	the	Apartheid	Convention	categorised	apartheid	as	a	crime	against	
humanity,	providing	that	persons	charged	‘may	be	tried	by	a	competent	tribunal	of	any	
State	 Party	 to	 the	 Convention	 […]	 or	 by	 an	 international	 penal	 tribunal	 having	
jurisdiction	 with	 respect	 to	 those	 States	 Parties	 which	 shall	 have	 accepted	 its	
jurisdiction.’128	The	1960s	and	1970s	also	saw	a	burgeoning	of	NGOs	such	as	Amnesty	
International	 (founded	 in	 1961),	 Human	 Rights	 Watch	 (an	 amalgamation	 of	 several	
civilian	human	rights	groups	which	had	flourished	since	the	mid-1970s)	and	many	other	
organisations	with	aims	of	monitoring	and	confronting	breaches	of	human	rights.129			
	
This	 period	 also	 saw	 developments	 in	 the	 organisation	 of	 former	 colonial	 nations	
opposed	 to	 the	 regime	 and	 discourse	 of	 domination	 and	 subordination	 that	 had	
historically	characterised	international	law.		Referred	to	as	Third	World	Approaches	to	
International	Law	(TWAIL),	Matua	describes	the	TWAIL	movement	as	reactive	in	that	it	
responds	 to	 international	 law	 as	 an	 imperial	 project	 but	 proactive	 because	 it	 seeks	
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internal	transformation	of	conditions	in	the	Third	World.130		The	opposition	had	begun	
with	 the	 decolonisation	movement	 that	 swept	 the	 globe	 after	WW2,	 its	 intellectual	
roots	originating	 in	the	Afro-Asian	anti-colonial	struggles	of	the	1940s	to	1960s.131	 	 It	
formally	 emerged	 from	 a	 1955	 Conference	 in	 Bandung,	 Indonesia,	 which	 created	 a	
coalition	of	Third	World	states	that	would	force	political	and	economic	issues	of	specific	
reference	to	them	on	to	the	international	agenda.132	As	mentioned	above,	these	states	
found	themselves	still	bound	to	Western	states	through	their	control	of,	for	example,	
multi-national	 corporations	 and	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 World	 Bank,	 International	
Monetary	 Fund	 and	 the	 General	 Agreement	 on	 Tariffs	 and	 Trade.133	 This	 continued	
dependency	upon	and	exploitation	by	the	former	imperial	powers	has	been	defined	as	
‘neo-colonialism’	and	encroaches	also	into	the	area	of	international	justice,	as	Mamdani	
has	argued:	
	
The	emphasis	 on	big	powers	 as	 the	protectors	of	 rights	 internationally	 is	
increasingly	being	twinned	with	an	emphasis	on	big	powers	as	enforcers	of	
justice	 internationally.	 […]	 Its	 name	 notwithstanding,	 the	 ICC	 is	 rapidly	
turning	into	a	Western	court	to	try	African	crimes	against	humanity.		It	has	
targeted	 governments	 that	 are	 US	 adversaries	 and	 ignored	 actions	 the	
United	States	doesn’t	oppose,	like	those	of	Uganda	and	Rwanda	in	eastern	
Congo,	effectively	conferring	impunity	on	them.134	
	
In	the	area	of	ICJ,	TWAIL	may	question,	for	example,	whether	the	ICC	is	the	only	suitable	
justice	mechanism	for	Africa,	whether	it	is	effective	as	a	transitional	justice	mechanism	
in	African	contexts	and	having	examined	the	positives	and	negatives	of	ICC	intervention,	
TWAIL	scholars	may	attempt	to	reconceptualise	the	ICC’s	role	on	the	continent.135			
	
The	attention	of	the	UNGA	again	turned	to	the	 issue	of	 international	 justice	 in	1981,	
when	 it	 invited	 the	 ILC	 to	 recommence	 its	 work	 on	 the	 draft	 code	which	would	 be	
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accorded	‘priority	and	the	fullest	possible	consideration’.136		The	ILC	included	the	draft	
code	item	in	the	agenda	for	its	1982	session	and	appointed	Doudou	Thiam	(Senegal)	as	
Special	 Rapporteur.137	 	 By	 1982,	 ILC	membership	 had	 expanded	 to	 34,	 the	majority	
coming	from	Africa	(9),	Europe	(7)	and	South	America	(5).138		In	1989,		after	a	UN	special	
session	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 drug	 trafficking139	 during	 which	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 had	
proposed	a	motion140	entitled	 ‘International	criminal	 responsibility	of	 individuals	and	
entities	engaged	in	illicit	trafficking	in	narcotic	drugs	across	national	frontiers	and	other	
transnational	criminal	activities;	establishment	of	an	international	criminal	court	with	
jurisdiction	 over	 such	 crimes’,141	 the	 UNGA	 asked	 the	 ILC	 to	 work	 on	 this	 proposal	
alongside	its	work	on	the	draft	code,	something	which	the	ILC	had	in	fact	been	doing	for	
some	time.142			
	
In	response	to	the	UNGA’s	request,	on	16th	May	1990,	the	ILC	established	a	Working	
Group	under	the	chairmanship	of	Mr	Thiam	and	its	report	on	its	work	during	the	session	
details	 a	 general	 discussion	 on	 the	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 of	 the	 possible	
establishment	of	an	international	criminal	court	but	as	compared,	in	particular,	to	the	
system	of	universal	jurisdiction	based	on	prosecutions	by	national	tribunals	rather	than	
to	any	alternative	 (non-retributive)	means	of	accountability.143	 It	notes,	 for	example,	
comments	 that	 developments	 in	 international	 relations	 and	 international	 law	 had	
contributed	 to	 the	 feasibility	 of	 such	 a	 court144	 and	 that,	 whilst	 curtailing	 national	
sovereignty,	 the	 court	 would	 ensure	 uniform	 application	 of	 the	 law	 with	 the	 best	
possible	guarantees	of	objectivity	to	try	these	kinds	of	crimes.145	Apart	from	a	general	
comment	that	a	court	would	combat	international	crime	which	‘can	endanger	the	very	
existence	of	states	and	seriously	disturb	international	peaceful	relations’,146	review	of	
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the	ILC	records	for	the	1990	(42nd)	session	reveals	no	specific	references	to	ICJ	goals	or	
debates	about	potential	alternative	justice	methods.	
	
In	December	1991,	the	UNGA	repeated	its	invitation	to	the	ILC	to	work	on	the	issue	of	
an	 international	 criminal	 jurisdiction	within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 draft	 code,147	 and	
during	its	43rd	session,	several	ILC	members	spoke	in	favour	of	the	establishment	of	a	
court	which:		
	
would	mark	a	step	forward	in	developing	international	law	and	which,	if	it	
enlisted	broad	support	from	the	international	community,	would	strengthen	
the	rule	of	law	throughout	the	world,	[…]	could	alone	guarantee	the	required	
objectivity	and	impartiality	in	applying	the	Code,	and	without	those	factors	
there	could	be	no	valid	and	lasting	international	order.148			
	
	
On	19th	May	1992,	the	ILC	established	another	Working	Group,	chaired	by	Abdul	Koroma	
(Sierra	Leone),	specifically	tasked	with	considering	the	issue	of	an	international	criminal	
jurisdiction.149	 	 The	 group	 comprised	 representatives	 from	 Europe	 (4),	 Africa	 (3),	
Eastern-bloc	(2)	and	one	each	from	Australia,	USA,	South	America,	Asia,	the	Middle	East	
and	the	Caribbean.150		In	its	report	to	the	UNGA	of	its	work	during	the	session,	the	ILC	
stated	 it	 ‘had	 concluded	 the	 task	 of	 analysing	 the	 question	 of	 establishing	 an	
international	criminal	court	or	other	international	criminal	trial	mechanism’151	and	that	
it	could	not	envisage	any	such	mechanism	other	than	a	‘criminal	court’,	although	some	
members	did	‘caution	against	the	temptations	of	drawing	too	closely	on	models	from	
internal	criminal	codes’	and	advise	‘flexibility	in	any	approach’.152	Alternatives	to	a	court	
that	members	had	mentioned	included	an	international	mechanism	simply	stating	the	
law	with	national	courts	conducting	the	trial;	ad	hoc	tribunals;	advisory	opinions	of	ICJ	
and	regional	tribunals.153		However,	the	ILC	decided	a	court	‘could	provide	a	workable	
system’	and	proposed	that	the	UNGA	should	authorise	it	to	commence	work	on	a	draft	
																																																						
147	UNGA	Res	46/54	9	December	1991	
148	YBILC	1991,	Vol.	II	(2),	UN	Doc.	A/46/10,	para.	111	
149	YBILC	1992,	Vol.	II	(2),	UN	Doc.	A/47/10,	para.	6		
150	Ibid	
151	Ibid	para.	104(a)	(emphasis	added)	
152	Ibid	para.30	
153	Ibid		
	 39	
statute.154		
	
In	 1992,	 the	UNGA	 requested	 the	 ILC	 to	 start	work	 on	 a	 draft	 statute	 based	 on	 the	
Working	Group’s	report	‘as	a	matter	of	priority’.155	Mr	Thiam	prepared	a	draft	consisting	
of	 37	 articles	 divided	 into	 three	 parts:	 	 (1)	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 court,	 (2)	 its	
organisation	 and	 functioning	 and	 (3)	 its	 procedure.156	 After	 considering	 the	 draft	
statute,	the	ILC	re-established	the	Working	Group	chaired	by	Mr	Koroma	and	its	report,	
comprising	draft	articles	and	commentaries,	was	presented	to	the	ILC	on	21st	July	1993.		
It	was	decided	to	submit	the	draft	statute	for	UNGA	consideration	at	its	1993-4	session	
and	 in	 the	 meantime,	 to	 Governments	 for	 their	 comments	 via	 the	 UNSG.157	 Thirty	
Member	States	(only	two	from	Africa:	Algeria	and	Tunisia,	the	rest	predominantly	from	
the	West)158	submitted	their	observations	on	the	draft	statute,	all	largely	constructive	
and	supportive	of	the	establishment	of	an	international	criminal	court.159	
	
After	further	work	to	review	and	refine	the	draft	statue	the	following	year,	a	final	version	
plus	detailed	commentaries	was	adopted	by	the	ILC	in	July	1994,	when	it	was	decided	
to	recommend	to	the	UNGA	that	an	international	diplomatic	conference	be	convened	
to	study	the	draft	and	‘conclude	a	convention	on	the	establishment	of	an	international	
criminal	 court’.160	 It	 was	 then	 realised	 that	 the	 two	 should	 be	 co-ordinated	 and	
encouraged	 by	 the	 UNGA	 to	 complete	 the	 draft	 code	 as	 soon	 as	 possible,	 the	 ILC	
returned	to	work	on	the	draft	code	of	crimes	it	had	adopted	in	1991	but	subsequently	
had	left	to	concentrate	on	the	draft	statute	for	an	international	criminal	court.161	The	
ILC’s	work	on	the	draft	code	concluded	in	1996,	with	the	adoption	of	the	final	text	of	20	
articles	 constituting	 the	 code	 of	 crimes	 against	 the	 peace	 and	 security	 of	 mankind	
together	with	commentaries.162		In	order	to	reach	a	consensus,	the	scope	of	the	code	
had	been	considerably	reduced	and	regarding	the	form	the	draft	code	should	take	(i.e.	
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a	separate	international	convention,	incorporation	into	the	statute	of	an	international	
criminal	court	or	a	declaration	by	the	UNGA),	the	ILC	left	it	to	the	UNGA	to	select	the	
form	which	would	achieve	the	highest	possible	acceptance	of	the	code.163	
	
In	this	section,	the	work	of	the	ILC	appointed	by	the	UNGA	to	codify	international	crimes	
and	ultimately	to	draft	a	statute	for	an	international	court	has	been	outlined,	revealing	
how	fundamental	 its	efforts	were	to	the	success	of	the	project.	 	 It	was	seen	that	the	
composition	 of	 the	 ILC	 substantially	 changed	 over	 the	 decades,	 increasing	 from	 15	
members	in	1947	(none	of	whom	came	from	the	African	continent),	to	34	members	in	
1982,	nine	of	whom	came	from	Africa,	making	them	the	largest	contingent	on	the	ILC.		
Africans	also	played	leading	roles	within	the	ILC,	with	Mr	Koroma	chairing	the	Working	
Group	and	Mr	Thiam	being	appointed	Special	Rapporteur	and	primarily	responsible	for	
the	draft	statute	of	the	international	criminal	court.		It	would	appear	therefore	that	the	
Enlightenment	 ideas	 of	 global	 citizenship	 and	 the	 homogeneity	 of	 mankind	 had	
successfully	been	absorbed	by	the	educated	elite	of	former	colonies,	who	were	actively	
supportive	of	the	universal	human	rights	discourse	and	silent	on	the	issues	of	cultural	
diversity	and	relativity.			
	
The	UNGA	had	acted	with	a	degree	of	procrastination	during	the	period	but	as	with	the	
two	IMTs,	the	incentives	for	moves	to	codify	international	criminal	law	and	establish	an	
international	 criminal	 court	 in	 the	 1990s	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 ‘geo-political	
convenience’.164	As	stated	in	the	Introduction	to	this	chapter,	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	
ushered	 in	 a	 period	 of	 co-operation	 between	 the	major	 powers.	 	 Falk	 goes	 further,	
arguing	 that	 it	 led	 also	 to	 a	 perception	 that	 allegations	 of	 criminality	 would	 not	
automatically	be	viewed	as	‘an	exercise	in	hostile	propaganda	that	dangerously	inflamed	
efforts	 to	 sustain	 […]	 “peaceful	 co-existence”,	which	was	 a	necessity	 given	 the	 large	
arsenals	of	nuclear	weapons	possessed	by	both	superpowers.’165	 	 	Rogue	states	were	
also	posing	security	threats	to	the	established	order,	as	mentioned	above	regarding	drug	
trafficking	 and	 other	 transnational	 criminal	 activities.	 	 It	 also	 became	 necessary	 for	
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liberal	 democracies	 to	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 doing	 something	 for	 the	 victims	 of	 genocidal	
conflicts	 that	erupted	during	 the	1990s,	especially	given	 the	growing	engagement	of	
their	societies	with	humanitarian	concerns.		These	issues	will	be	discussed	further	in	the	
next	two	sections	of	this	chapter.	
	
The	United	Nations	Security	Council	
	
When	the	UN	was	established	in	1945,	it	was	proclaimed	by	the	Western	powers	to	be	
a	neutral,	universal	 institution	that	would	act	as	guardian	of	the	global	new	order.166		
However,	Matua	comments	that	‘the	use	of	the	UN	as	a	front	by	the	big	powers	“simply	
changed	the	form	of	European	hegemony,	not	its	substance.’”167		European	hegemony	
over	global	affairs	was	transferred	to	the	UNSC,	the	permanent	members	of	which	are	
the	US,	Britain,	France,	Russia	and	China.		As	the	most	powerful	organ	in	the	UN,	the	
Security	Council	has	primacy	over	the	UNGA,	a	situation	which	clearly	calls	into	question	
the	notion	of	equality	of	states,	subordinating	Third	World	countries,	particularly,	to	the	
vagaries	of	power	politics.				
	
The	collapse	of	the	Berlin	Wall	in	1989	was	followed	in	1991	by	the	dissolution	of	the	
Soviet	Union	into	separate	republics,	which	in	turn	led	to	the	fall	of	communism	across	
the	Eastern-bloc.	 	Whilst	widely	welcomed	by	the	West,	the	dissolution	of	the	Soviet	
Union	 and	 the	 ending	 of	 the	 Cold	War	 had	 some	dire	 consequences,	 caused	 by	 the	
security	vacuum.168		The	former	multi-ethnic	Yugoslavia	disintegrated	with	rival	ethnic	
groups	declaring	their	independence	as	sovereign	states	and	seeking	to	unify	or	expand	
their	territories.169		Ethnic	minorities	were	subjected	to	horrific	crimes	by	all	sides	of	the	
conflict	and	in	1993	the	UNSC	created	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	Yugoslavia	
(ICTY)	 to	 prosecute	 and	 punish	 those	 who	 had	 committed	 serious	 violations	 of	
international	humanitarian	law	since	1991.170		The	ICTY	was	created	pursuant	to	Chapter	
VII	of	the	UN	Charter	which	authorises	the	UNSC	to	take	measures	to	maintain	or	restore	
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international	peace	and	security	and	under	which,	the	decisions	of	the	UNSC	are	legally	
binding	 on	 members	 of	 the	 UN.171	 The	 tribunal	 was	 given	 primary	 (concurrent)	
jurisdiction	to	prosecute	grave	breaches	of	the	1949	Geneva	Conventions,	war	crimes,	
genocide	and	crimes	against	humanity.172		
	
Just	over	a	year	later,	in	Rwanda,	the	genocidal	slaughter	of	Tutsis	by	Hutus	which	began	
on	6th	April	1994	and	lasted	100	days,	left	approximately	800,000	dead.		Again	using	its	
Chapter	VII	powers,	the	UNSC	established	an	ad	hoc	tribunal.		The	International	Criminal	
Tribunal	 for	Rwanda	1994	 (ICTR)173	was	based	 substantially	 on	 the	 ICTY	model,	with	
primacy	 over	 domestic	 courts	 and	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 crimes	 of	 genocide,	 crimes	
against	humanity	and	violations	of	Article	3	of	the	Geneva	Conventions	and	Additional	
Protocol	II.174	
	
Following	 the	 creation	of	 the	 ICTY	 and	 ICTR,	 there	were	many	 calls	 for	 the	UNSC	 to	
establish	other	ad	hoc	tribunals175	but	the	UNSC	demurred	using	its	Chapter	VII	powers	
for	 this	purpose,176	possibly	due	to	 the	waning	of	 the	spirit	of	co-operation	 that	had	
accompanied	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 but	 also	 due	 to	 the	 political	 interests	 of	
permanent	members	of	the	UNSC	in	specific	international	situations.177		There	was	also	
considerable	‘tribunal	fatigue’	felt	by	the	UNSC	and	those	nations,	frustrated	with	the	
ever-increasing	 costs	 of	 the	 two	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals,	 who	 were	 contributing	 the	 most	
financially.178	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 UNSC	 was	 regularly	 forced	 to	 deal	 with	 issues	 and	
difficulties	arising	out	of	the	events	at	and	administration	of	the	tribunals,	which	it	found	
distracting	and	time-consuming.179			
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However,	the	events	in	Yugoslavia	and	Rwanda	had	shocked	the	world	and	the	concept	
of	prosecuting	those	who	had	committed	the	atrocities	was	gaining	wide	acceptance.180		
It	was	largely	due	to	the	influence	of	Habermas		that	in	the	1990s	there	was	a	revival	of	
interest	in	Kant’s	universalist	ideas	of	a	cosmopolitan	community.181		Habermas	argued	
that	the	devastating	 impact	of	unrestrained	nationalism	in	the	20th	century,	together	
with	 the	 increasing	 influence	 of	 the	 interconnected	 global	 economy	 necessitated	 a	
radical	 new	 interpretation	 of	 Kant’s	 theories.182	 Habermas’	 solution	was	 ‘a	modern,	
institutional	framework	for	perpetual	peace	based	upon	the	protection	of	human	rights’	
and	he	and	other	European	scholars	who	held	similar	views	made	timely	and	positive	
contributions	to	the	debate	regarding	the	feasibility	of	an	ICC.183		
	
Indeed,	human	rights	activists	were	campaigning	at	grassroots	public	opinion	level	to	
pressure	governments	to	support	the	establishment	of	an	international	criminal	court	
‘that	could	operate	as	an	integral	element	in	any	viable	scheme	for	global	governance.184	
Certainly,	 as	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 settled	 into	 their	 roles,	 they	 gained	 international	
recognition	and	credibility	which	also	assisted	the	cause	of	a	permanent	international	
criminal	 court,	 which	 it	 was	 hoped,	 would	 have	 all	 of	 the	 benefits	 but	 few	 of	 the	
problems	of	the	ad	hoc	tribunals.185	
	
In	the	next	section,	the	establishment	by	the	UNGA	of	Ad	Hoc	Committee	 (AHC)	and	
Preparatory	 Committee	 (PrepCom)	 to	 advance	 the	 proposed	 international	 criminal	
court	will	be	discussed.		It	was	argued	by	the	AHC	particularly	that	the	establishment	of	
a	 single	permanent	 court	would	obviate	 the	need	 for	ad	hoc	 tribunals	 for	 particular	
crimes	such	as	those	established	for	Yugoslavia	and	Rwanda,	thereby	ensuring	stability	
and	 consistency	 in	 international	 jurisdiction.186	 The	 two	ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 had	 drawn	
extensively	on	the	ILC’s	draft	statute	for	the	international	criminal	court	and	although	
there	were	substantial	difficulties	in	getting	them	‘up	and	running’,	they	showed	that	
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the	UN	could	create	the	means	whereby	perpetrators	of	international	crimes	would	be	
brought	 to	 justice.	This	alone	was	a	 substantial	development	 in	 the	 realm	of	 ICL.	 	 In	
addition,	 the	 tribunals	 acted	 as	 a	 guide	 as	 to	 what	 would	 and	 would	 not	 work,	
highlighting	 problems	 and	 successes	 and	 offering	 a	 mass	 of	 experience	 and	
jurisprudence	 as	 the	 work	 of	 the	 PrepCom	 continued.	 	 Representatives	 from	 both	
tribunals	regularly	attended	meetings	with	those	involved	in	the	negotiations	and	were	
regularly	 invited	 to	 address	 meeting	 on	 their	 experiences	 of	 the	 subjects	 under	
discussion.	187	
	
The	United	Nations	General	Assembly	
	
Although	 some	 States	 supported	 the	 ILC’s	 recommendation	 of	 an	 international	
diplomatic	conference,	others	believed	it	was	premature	as	there	was	still	so	much	work	
outstanding,	 particularly	 on	 agreeing	 the	 various	 provisions.	 Therefore,	 rather	 than	
convening	a	conference,	the	UNGA	established	an	AHC	‘to	review	the	major	substantive	
and	administrative	issues	arising	out	of	the	draft	statute’	and	to	consider	arrangements	
for	 the	 convening	 of	 the	 conference.188	 The	 AHC	 was	 open	 to	 all	 UN	 members	 or	
members	of	Specialised	Agencies	and	chaired	by	Adrian	Bos	 (The	Netherlands),189	 its	
meetings	 in	April	and	August	1995	proved	to	be	an	excellent	 forum	for	engaging	the	
minds	of	governments.	190	
	
Regarding	the	perceived	objectives	of	an	international	criminal	court,	a	review	of	the	
AHC’s	report	to	the	UNGA	reveals	that	‘there	was	broad	recognition’	its	establishment	
‘could	ensure	that	perpetrators	of	serious	international	crimes	were	brought	to	justice	
and	deter	future	occurrences	of	such	crimes.’	191	For	the	first	time,	the	issue	of	national	
amnesties	 was	 raised	 by	 some	 delegations192	 which	 no	 doubt	 reflects	 the	 reality	 of	
several	nations	having,	in	recent	years,	granted	amnesty	to	members	of	a	former	regime	
that	had	committed	 international	crimes.193	 	 In	four	of	these	countries	(Cambodia,	El	
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Salvador,	 Haiti	 and	 South	Africa),	 the	UN	had	 ‘pushed	 for,	 helped	 negotiate,	 and/or	
endorsed	 the	 granting	 of	 amnesty	 as	 a	 means	 of	 restoring	 peace	 and	 democratic	
government.’194	Concerned	delegations	suggested	that	the	statute	‘should	address	the	
issue	 of	 national	 amnesties	 and	 provide	 guidelines	 on	 the	 matter,	 indicating	 the	
circumstances	in	which	the	international	criminal	court	might	ignore,	or	intervene	ahead	
of,	a	national	amnesty.’195	 	No	decisions	on	the	issue	were	made	by	the	AHC	and	the	
question	of	national	amnesties	was	again	raised	during	PrepCom	meetings	and	at	the	
Rome	Conference.			
	
The	AHC	concluded	that	further	work	on	the	draft	statute	was	necessary	prior	to	the	
calling	of	 an	 international	 conference	but	 ‘aware	of	 the	 interest	of	 the	 international	
community	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 international	 criminal	 court	 which	 would	 be	
widely	accepted,	the	committee	recommends	that	the	GA	take	up	the	organization	of	
future	 work	 with	 a	 view	 to	 its	 early	 completion’.196	 	 The	 committee	 encouraged	
participation	by	the	‘largest	number	of	States	in	future	work’.197			
	
Accordingly,	on	11th	December	1995,	the	UNGA	established	a	PrepCom	to	work	on	the	
ILC	draft	statute	(taking	into	account	the	report	of	the	AHC,	States’	comments	on	the	
draft	statute	and	contributions	from	relevant	organisations).		The	meetings	were	open	
to	all	States	or	members	of	specialised	agencies	as	recommended	in	the	AHC	report	and	
the	UNGA	urged	 the	 active	participation	of	 the	 largest	 number	of	 states	 in	 order	 to	
promote	universal	support	for	an	international	criminal	court.198		Chaired	by	Mr	Adrian	
Bos,	the	PrepCom	met	in	March/April	and	August	1996.199		The	number	of	governments	
involved	in	this	stage	of	negotiating	and	drafting	new	texts	increased	from	sixty	to	over	
120	delegations	after	the	PrepCom	commenced	its	work.200		Three	further	sessions	were	
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held	in	1997	and	one	in	March/April	1998.201		At	its	final	session,	the	PrepCom	adopted	
a	consolidated	draft	statute202	 largely	based	on	the	draft	agreed	at	an	inter-sessional	
meeting	in	Zutphen	(The	Netherlands)	in	January	1998.203		The	UNGA	now	decided	the	
diplomatic	conference	should	be	held	in	Rome	from	15th	June	to	17th	July	1998	for	the	
purpose	 of	 ‘finalizing	 and	 adopting	 a	 convention	 on	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	
international	criminal	court’.204	Rome	was	an	interesting	choice,	since	potential	criticism	
from	 non-Europeans	 that	 the	 whole	 ICC	 project	 was	 grounded	 in	 European	
Enlightenment	ideals	of	universality	would	doubtless	have	been	buttressed	by	selecting	
Rome,	the	centre	of	Western	Christianity,	as	the	birthplace	of	the	Court.205	
	
A	study	of	the	summary	of	the	PrepCom	proceedings	in	March-April	1996206	reveals	that	
during	 discussions	 on	 the	 draft	 statute	 approved	 by	 the	 ILC	 in	 1994	 there	 was	 no	
mention	 of	 AJMs,	 particularly	 regarding	 complementarity	 and	 admissibility	 issues.207	
However,	 at	 a	 meeting	 of	 the	 Working	 Group	 on	 Complementarity	 and	 Trigger	
Mechanisms	 in	 August	 1997,	 national	 amnesties	 were	 mentioned	 and	 several	
delegations	 expressed	 the	 view	 that	 the	 issue	 of	 pardons	 and	 amnesties	 was	 not	
adequately	addressed	for	the	purposes	of	complementarity.208			
	
This	point	had	concerned	the	US	delegation	which	had	circulated	a	‘nonpaper’	in	August	
1997,	suggesting	that	the	proposed	court	should	take	into	account	‘such	amnesties	in	
the	interest	of	international	peace	and	national	reconciliation	when	deciding	whether	
or	not	to	exercise	jurisdiction	over	a	situation	or	to	prosecute	a	particular	offender.’209		
This	was	required,	the	US	text	argued,	to	balance	prosecution	against	‘the	need	to	close	
“a	door	on	the	conflict	of	a	past	era”	and	“to	encourage	the	surrender	or	reincorporation	
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of	 armed	 dissident	 groups,”	 and	 thereby	 facilitate	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy.’210		
Scharf	comments	that	the	US	proposal	met	with	much	criticism211	and	it	is	noted	from	
the	Working	Group’s	report	that	it	was	agreed	‘these	questions	should	be	revisited	in	
light	of	further	revisions	[…]	to	determine	[…]	whether	additional	language	was	needed	
[…]	to	address	these	situations.’212		Dugard	suggests	that	the	amnesty	issue	was	‘raised,	
but	not	seriously	considered’	by	the	PrepCom.213		As	shall	be	seen	in	the	next	section,	at	
the	Rome	Conference,	it	was	also	evaded	with	the	result	that	the	Rome	Statute	(RSt)	is	
silent	on	the	issue	of	amnesties.	
	
In	this	section,	the	efforts	of	the	UNGA	to	finalise	the	codification	of	international	crimes	
and	 progress	 the	 establishment	 an	 international	 court	 have	 been	 outlined	 and	
examination	of	the	records	of	discussions	in	the	AHC	and	PrepCom	has	established	that	
whilst	the	work	is	dedicated	to	the	establishment	of	a	Court,	the	question	of	national	
amnesties	granted	to	former	regimes	does	arise	within	the	context	of	admissibility	to	
the	 Court	 of	 situations	 resulting	 from	 the	 transition	 of	 states	 from	 conflict	 or	
authoritarian	rule	to	peace	and	democracy	but	is	deferred	for	later	consideration.	
	
The	Rome	Diplomatic	Conference	
	
The	Rome	Conference	opened	on	15th	June	1998	with	160	States	in	attendance214	plus	
specialised	agencies,	intergovernmental	organisations	and	NGOs	with	observer	status.	
The	draft	statute	contained	over	14000	square-bracketed	points	for	discussion215	and	to	
save	 time,	 it	was	decided	 to	establish	 informal	working	 groups,	 each	 simultaneously	
working	on	a	section	of	the	draft	statute.216	Unfortunately,	this	decision	disadvantaged	
smaller	 or	 non-English-speaking	 delegations	 which	 were	 unable	 to	 cover	 all	 of	 the	
working	 groups,	many	 of	which	were	 conducted	 in	 English	 only,	 thus	 leaving	 larger,	
richer	and	more	powerful	delegations	potentially	able	to	dominate	negotiations.217	 It	
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did	result	in	111	Articles	being	completed	by	15th	July,	which	left	the	contentious	Part	2	
Articles	5	to	21	(unassigned	to	working	groups	due	to	their	politically	sensitive	character)	
to	 be	 dealt	 with	 in	 the	 last	 two	 days.218	 These	 included	 the	 definition	 of	 crimes,	
jurisdiction,	triggering	mechanisms,	the	role	of	the	Prosecutor	and	the	role	of	the	UNSC.		
	
In	the	context	of	Article	17	and	decisions	not	to	prosecute,	the	relationship	between	the	
ICC	 and	 national	 AJMs	 coupled	 with	 amnesties	 was	 raised	 during	 the	 Rome	
Conference219	and	was	debated	at	length.220		The	delegation	from	South	Africa	regularly	
reminded	 conference	 that	 their	 country’s	much-acclaimed	 approach	 to	 post-conflict	
justice	 had	 been	 to	 reject	 criminal	 trials	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	
Commission	and	conditional	amnesties.221	The	South	Africans	were	very	concerned	that	
such	an	approach	now	would	be	viewed	by	the	Court	as	a	decision	not	to	prosecute,	
thereby	opening	the	door	to	international	prosecution.222	While	there	was	‘widespread	
sympathy	with	the	South	African	model’,223	views	on	the	issue	of	AJMs	and	amnesties	
were	diametrically	opposed.		Some	advocated	that	trials	were	the	only	response	to	the	
crimes	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	and	others	that	AJMs	were	acceptable	if	 it	
meant	the	restoration	of	peace	and	democracy,	such	as	had	occurred	in	South	Africa.224	
Robinson	effectively	explains	the	dilemma	facing	delegations:	
	
Even	 among	 those	 delegations	 most	 committed	 to	 prosecution	 of	 all	
international	crimes,	many	had	misgivings	about	laying	down	an	iron	rule	for	
all	 time	 mandating	 prosecution	 as	 the	 only	 acceptable	 response	 in	 all	
situations.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 creating	 an	 explicit	 exception	 allowing	
amnesties	 was	 equally	 untenable.	 	 Some	 delegations	 opposed	 any	
exceptions	in	principle,	whereas	others	were	concerned	that	any	exception	
would	be	immediately	exploited	and	abused.225		
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Part	 of	 the	 problem	was	 delegates’	 recollection	 of	 the	 amnesties	 granted	 by	 South	
American	dictators	to	themselves	and	their	cohorts.226	 	The	main	difficulty,	however,	
even	if	there	had	been	a	general	consensus	on	the	acceptability	of	AJMs,	was	codifying	
guidelines	 that	would	enable	 the	Court	 to	use	 its	discretion	 in	 favour	of	 a	particular	
AJM.227	The	answer	at	the	Rome	Conference,	therefore,	was	to	adopt	provisions	that	
reflected	 ‘creative	 ambiguity’,	 228	 thus	enabling	 the	Prosecutor	 and	 the	Court	 to	use	
discretion	 and	 ‘to	 develop	 an	 appropriate	 approach	 when	 faced	 with	 concrete	
situations’,229	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis.	 	 Indeed,	 for	 Scharf,	 the	 final	 text	 of	 the	 RSt	
‘contains	several	ambiguous	provisions	which	could	be	interpreted	as	codifying	the	US	
(1997)	proposal.’230	
	
According	 to	Robinson,	 ‘it	 is	 at	 least	 conceivable	 that	 the	 ICC	 could	 conclude	 that	 it	
would	not	be	in	the	‘interests	of	justice’	to	interfere	with	a	democratically	adopted,	good	
faith	 alternative	 programme	 that	 creatively	 advanced	 accountability	 objectives.’231		
Therefore,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	complementarity	principle	does	not	exclude	local	
demands	for	justice232	and	in	the	final	paragraph	of	the	first	of	his	bi-annual	reports	to	
the	UNSC	on	the	Situation	in	Darfur,	the	ICC	Prosecutor	confirmed	that	such	demands	
would	be	accommodated:	
	
Additional	 international	 and	 national	 efforts	 will	 be	 required	 to	 bring	 to	
justice	other	offenders	and	 to	promote	 the	 rule	of	 law	and	reconciliation	
through	traditional	and	other	mechanisms.		This	has	particular	significance	
…	where	…tribal	and	traditional	systems	exist	for	the	promotion	of	dispute	
resolution.	 	 The	 ICC	 will	 cooperate	 with	 and	 support	 such	 efforts,	 the	
combination	of	which	will	mark	a	comprehensive	response	to	the	need	for	
peace,	justice	and	reconciliation.233	
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Conclusion	
	
A	 brief	 examination	 of	 the	 medieval	 international	 legal	 order	 in	 this	 chapter	 has	
demonstrated	 that	 the	 assertion	 of	 euro-centricity	 is	 reflected	 in	 certain	 aspects	 of	
Western	historiography	and	evidenced	by	the	movement	away	from	the	unifying	ideals	
of	Christendom	with	its	adherence	to	natural	law,	towards	an	emphasis	on	the	States	
and	 State	 sovereignty.	 	 The	 post-Westphalian	 colonial	 expansion	 that	 followed	 was	
supported	by	the	ideas	of	the	Enlightenment	era,	with	the	development	of	international	
law	being	linked	to	ideologies	of	toleration	in	relations	between	European	states	and	a	
so-called	civilising	mission	in	their	encounters	with	non-European	states.	
	
The	first	attempts	to	limit	the	horrors	of	war	which	preceded	calls	for	an	international	
criminal	tribunal	stemmed	from	concern	for	good	international	relations	and	this	helps	
to	explain	the	early	focus	on	war	crimes	committed	during	the	violent	disputes	between	
competing	European	States234	and	accounts	for	the	predominantly	Atlanticist	focus	in	
the	development	of	international	justice.			
	
The	establishment	of	the	two	IMT’s	in	the	aftermath	of	WW2	signified	great	advances	
in	 the	 development	 of	 ICL	 but	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 here	 that	 they	were	 linked	 to	 an	
intention	on	the	part	of	the	West	to	restore	and	maintain	peace	on	the	pre-war	model,	
reinforcing	their	supremacy	rather	than	heralding	in	a	new	and	progressive	world	order	
based	on	the	ideals	of	the	equality	of	humankind.		However,	the	rise	of	independence	
movements	after	the	war	resulted	in	changes	to	the	global	order	as	imperialist	nations	
lost	 their	 colonies	 and	 were	 obliged	 to	 adopt	 alternative	 means	 of	 exerting	 their	
influence.	
		
Post-WW2	there	was	a	shift	in	ICJ	focus	to	reflect	the	increasingly	intra-state	nature	of	
armed	conflicts,	as	is	evidenced	not	only	by	the	ad	hoc	and	hybrid	tribunals	established	
after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	which	prosecuted	crimes	committed	predominantly	during	
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internal	 armed	 conflicts235	 but	 also	 by	 the	 development	 of	 new	 jurisdictions	 being	
equally	applicable	to	internal	as	to	international	conflicts.236	
	
It	is	the	work	of	the	ILC	between	1982	and	1996	to	which	most	progress	towards	the	
codification	of	international	crimes	and	the	establishment	of	the	ICC	can	be	attributed.		
An	examination	of	the	composition	of	the	ILC	during	this	period	reveals	that	its	work	
was	not	driven	by	Europeans	or	Americans	but	by	representatives	from	every	continent.		
In	1994,	 the	 ILC	membership	of	34	was	dominated	by	Africa	 (9)	with	Europe	 (6)	and	
South	America	(5)	also	well	represented.		Mr	Thiam,	a	Senegalese	diplomat,	politician	
and	 lawyer,	 in	 his	 role	 as	 Special	 Rapporteur	 worked	 tirelessly	 to	 assist	 the	 ILC	 to	
complete	the	draft	code	of	crimes	and	later,	on	the	topic	of	an	international	criminal	
jurisdiction,	 writing	 a	 total	 of	 13	 reports	 which	 substantially	 contributed	 to	 the	
achievements	of	 the	 ILC	 in	these	areas.	Likewise,	Mr	Koroma,	a	Sierra	Leonian	Judge	
chaired	the	ILC	Working	Group	which	finalised	the	wording	of	the	Draft	Statute	between	
1992	and	1994.			
	
It	appears,	therefore,	that	far	from	being	dominated	by	Europeans	demanding	western-
style	 justice,	by	this	stage,	 the	work	towards	the	establishment	of	 the	 ICC	was	being	
driven	 forward	 predominantly	 by	 Africans.	 	 However,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 these	
Africans	were	drawn	from	the	educated	elite	in	their	societies	and	were	‘Europeanised’.		
Mr	 Thiam,	 for	 example,	 graduated	 from	 the	 University	 of	 Poitiers	 in	 France,	 before	
becoming	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	in	Senegal	and	then	a	member	of	the	ILC	in	1970.		
Likewise,	Mr	Koroma	graduated	with	a	Master’s	degree	in	International	Law	from	King’s	
College,	London,	worked	as	a	Barrister	and	then	in	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	for	
Sierra	Leone,	before	becoming	a	member	of	the	ILC	in	1982.		The	fact	remains,	therefore,	
that	the	key	drafters	of	the	RSt	were	immersed	in	the	West’s	intellectual	and	cultural	
traditions.	This	‘European-isation’	of	the	educated	and	social	elite	of	nations	formerly	
under	 the	yoke	of	European	colonialism	may	explain	 their	enthusiasm	for	a	Western	
justice	system	that	initially	had	been	imposed	upon	them.	
	
																																																						
235	For	example,	the	former	Yugoslavia,	Rwanda,	Sierra	Leone	and	Cambodia	
236	Greenwalt,	A.K.	(2011)	p1087	
	 52	
Today,	African	states	are	well-represented	in	the	ICC:	four	of	18	Judges	are	African,237	
Fatou	Bensouda	from	Gambia,	having	been	Deputy	Prosecutor	since	2004,	became	the	
Prosecutor	in	2012	and	Phakiso	Mochochoko	from	Lesotho	is	head	of	the	‘Jurisdiction,	
Complementarity	and	Cooperation	Division’.		African	civil	society	also	appears	to	offer	
broad	 support	 for	 the	 ICC,	with	more	 than	800	African	NGOs	being	members	of	 the	
Coalition	 for	 the	 ICC,	 amounting	 to	 approximately	 one-third	 of	 its	 member	
organisations.238	 	 Furthermore,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 until	 it	 began	 investigating	
presidents,	 the	 ICC	was	 broadly	 supported	 by	 African	 governments,	 indeed	 the	 first	
three	situations	before	the	Court	were	self-referrals	from	African	nations.239			
	
It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 Africa’s	 initial	 enthusiasm	 for	 the	 ICC	 was	 borne	 out	 of	
frustration	 and	despair	 at	 the	 lack	of	 success	 of	 other	 international	 organisations	 to	
bring	peace	and	stability	to	their	conflict-ridden	continent	and	the	hope	that	the	ICC,	
with	its	apparently	universalist	precepts	would	succeed	where	others	had	failed.240		This	
may	well	have	contributed	to	African	acceptance	of	the	western-inspired,	formal,	legal-
rational	method	of	 adjudication	but	 it	 has	been	 relevant	 to	 investigate	whether	 any	
other	options	for	ICJ	were	considered	during	the	crucial	period	when	practical	plans	for	
an	 international	 criminal	 jurisdiction	were	 first	proposed	and	 to	question	how	much	
influence	was	exercised	by	the	less	powerful	States	such	as	those	in	Africa	in	the	debates	
and	negotiations	which	led	to	the	establishment	of	the	ICC.					
	
The	difficult	relationship	existing	today	between	the	ICC	and	some	nations	in	Africa	gives	
cause	for	alarm	as	many	Africans	remain	vulnerable	to	violations	of	their	human	rights.		
The	ICC	has	a	mandate	to	investigate	and	prosecute	crimes	within	its	jurisdiction	but	the	
problem	remains,	however,	that	criminal	prosecutions	are	inherently	a	western	justice	
mechanism	and	may	not	be	the	best	option	for	every	State	transitioning	from	conflict	
or	repressive	rule	to	peace	and	democracy.	 	 Indeed,	 it	could	be	argued	that	 in	some	
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transitional	 contexts,	 criminal	 prosecutions	 fail	 to	 satisfy	 the	 ICJ	 goals	 of	 ordinary	
citizens,	who	may	be	more	desirous	of	peace,	 reconciliation	and	 social	 stability	 than	
punishment	 and	 retribution.	 	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 argued,	 this	 may	 require	 the	 ICC	 to	
demonstrate	far	more	flexibility	in	its	interpretation	of	the	complementarity	provisions	
of	the	RSt	than	it	has	to	date,	so	as	to	enable	a	State	to	deal	with	its	legacy	of	human	
rights	abuses	by	justice	methods	other	than	criminal	trials.		This	issue	will	be	examined	
in	later	chapters	of	this	thesis.	
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CHAPTER	THREE	
	
THE	AIMS	OF	INTERNATIONAL	CRIMINAL	JUSTICE	AND	THE	INTERNATIONAL	
CRIMINAL	COURT	
	
Introduction	
	
In	the	last	chapter,	it	was	seen	that	it	was	the	atrocities	committed	during	wars	started	
in	the	20th	Century	that	triggered	moves	to	codify	international	crimes	and	establish	an	
international	criminal	court	where	offenders	could	be	prosecuted.		The	Rome	Statute	
(RSt)	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	was	adopted	by	the	Rome	Conference	on	
17th	July	1998	and	having	received	the	required	sixty	ratifications	by	April	2002,	entered	
into	 force	 on	 1st	 July	 2002.1	 The	 Preamble	 declares	 that	 in	 establishing	 the	 ICC	 and	
thereby	affirming	that	those	responsible	for	atrocities	will	be	prosecuted	and	punished,2	
the	 international	 community	 is	 determined	 to	 end	 impunity	 for	 the	 perpetrators	 of	
grave	crimes,3	contribute	to	the	prevention	of	such	crimes	in	the	future4	and	guarantee	
lasting	respect	for	and	the	enforcement	of	international	justice.5	The	Preamble	reveals,	
therefore,	 that	 the	 international	 criminal	 justice	 (ICJ)	 aims	 of	 trials	 at	 the	 ICC	 are	
punishment,	deterrence	and	respect	for	and	enforcement	of	the	rule	of	law.		These	are	
what	Branch	 refers	 to	 as	 a	 ‘‘scaled-up’	 version	of	 liberal	 domestic	 law’6	 in	 that	 they	
reflect	 theories	 of	 justice,	 (namely	 retribution,	 deterrence,	 incapacitation	 and	
rehabilitation)	 that	 are	 conventionally	 applied	 in	 liberal	 western	 domestic	 criminal	
justice	systems,	for	which	reason	they	have	been	also	termed	the	‘domestic-criminal-
law-styled’	 aims	 of	 ICJ.7	 	 One	 question	 for	 this	 chapter	 is	 whether	 these	 aims	 for	
domestic	criminal	justice	can	be	applied	effectively	at	the	international	level.	
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Contemporaneous	with	 the	discourse	about	 international	 justice	based	on	 the	 ideals	
drawn	from	Nuremberg	arose	the	‘revolutionary	international	aspirations	of	the	human	
rights	movement	in	the	new	world	order.’8	The	emergence	of	transitional	justice	(TJ)	as	
a	 multidisciplinary	 field	 of	 study	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 and	 early	 1990s9	 led	 to	 justice	
becoming	 more	 victim-focussed,	 emphasising	 seeking	 redress	 for	 victims	 and	
recognition	of	 their	 dignity	 as	 citizens	 and	human	beings.10	 	 From	 the	 late	1980s,	 TJ	
increasingly	gained	a	foothold	in	international	law	with	decisions	imposing	obligations	
on	states	to	protect	human	rights.11	Equally	important	was	an	emerging	recognition	that	
justice	 in	 the	 international	 context	of	 ‘systematic	or	widespread	violations	of	human	
rights’	may	not	 be	 satisfied	by	 a	 ‘domestic-criminal-law-styled’	 response	but	 instead	
may	require	an	holistic	approach,	promoting	possibilities	for	peace,	reconciliation	and	
democracy.12	
	
As	 part	 of	 this	 holistic	 approach,	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	 dignity	 of	 individuals	 and	
redressing	 and	 acknowledging	 violations	 and	 ensuring	 their	 future	 prevention13	 	 are	
constant	aims	of	TJ	but	they	are	supplemented	by	complementary	aims	which	can	vary	
according	to	context	and	include:	
	
• Establishing	 and	 restoring	 confidence	 in	 accountable	 institutions	 (such	 as	 the	
police,	judiciary,	military)	
• Enabling	 access	 to	 justice	 for	 society’s	 most	 vulnerable	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	
violations	
• Ensuring	that	women	and	marginalised	groups	participate	in	the	pursuit	of	a	just	
society	
• Respect	for	the	rule	of	law	
• Facilitating	peace	processes	and	fostering	durable	resolutions	of	conflicts	
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• Establishing	a	basis	to	address	underlying	causes	of	conflict	and	marginalisation		
• Advancing	the	cause	of	reconciliation14	
	
Expectations	of	trials	at	the	ICC,	which	had	been	expressed	in	predominantly	retributive	
terms,	gradually	began	 to	 reflect	TJ	aims,	demonstrating	 the	extent	 to	which	human	
rights	issues	had	shifted	‘from	the	margins	of	policy	formation	to	assume	an	influential	
role	[…]	on	the	international	stage.’15		For	example,	when	Kofi	Annan,	the	UN	Secretary	
General	 (UNSG)	 reported	 to	 the	UN	Security	Council	 (UNSC)	 in	August	2004	 that	 the	
establishment	 of	 the	 ICC	 was	 ‘the	 most	 significant	 recent	 development	 in	 the	
international	 community’s	 long	 struggle	 to	 advance	 the	 cause	 of	 justice	 and	 rule	 of	
law’,16	expectations	of	prosecutions	at	the	ICC	had	expanded	beyond	those	expressed	
in	the	RSt	Preamble	into	a	long	list	of	objectives	for	the	court	which	clearly	drew	on	TJ	
aims.	 	 The	 combined	 ‘domestic-criminal-law-style’	 and	 TJ-influenced	objectives	were	
summarised	by	the	UNSG	in	his	report	as	including:	
		
• bringing	to	justice	those	responsible	for	serious	violations	of	human	rights	and	
humanitarian	law		
• putting	an	end	to	such	violations	and	preventing	their	recurrence		
• securing	justice	and	dignity	for	victims		
• establishing	a	past	record	of	events		
• promoting	national	reconciliation		
• re-establishing	the	rule	of	law													
• contributing	to	the	restoration	of	peace17		
	
																																																						
14	Ibid	
15	Byrne,	R.	(2006)	p491	
16	The	rule	of	law	and	transitional	justice	in	conflict	and	post-conflict	societies:	Report	of	the	Secretary-General	23	
August	2004	UN	Doc.	S/2004/616	para.	49	(UNSG	Report)	
17	Ibid	para.	38			
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Ambos	describes	these	objectives	as	having	“an	individualistic	and	a	collective	side”	in	
that	they	aim	to	protect	individual	human	rights	and	additionally	to	contribute	to	world	
peace,	security	and	wellbeing.18			
	
It	 is	 these	 combined	 (and	 sometimes	 conflicting)	 objectives	 of	 international	 criminal	
justice	(ICJ)	and	the	focus	on	individual	prosecutions	at	the	ICC	as	the	means	of	achieving	
them,	that	is	the	topic	of	this	chapter.		To	assess	the	capacity	of	the	ICC	to	achieve	the	
ICJ	goals	set	for	it,	the	seven	objectives	outlined	in	Mr	Annan’s	report	will	be	used	as	a	
framework.	 	 For	 consistency,	 the	 same	 framework	 will	 then	 be	 used	 to	 assess	 the	
capacity	 of	Mato	 Oput	 and	 the	 South	 African	 Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	 Commission	
(SATRC)	to	achieve	those	goals,	in	chapters	five	and	six	respectively.			
	
In	the	following	sections,	each	of	the	seven	 ICJ	objectives	 for	the	 ICC	outlined	by	Mr	
Annan	in	his	2004	report	to	the	UNSC	will	be	discussed	individually	and	the	performance	
or	potential	of	prosecutions	at	the	ICC	to	satisfy	the	objective	will	be	assessed.		Since	
the	 Court’s	 primary	 objective	 of	 ‘bringing	 those	 responsible	 for	 serious	 violations	 of	
human	 rights	and	humanitarian	 law	 to	 justice’	emphasises	 the	previously-mentioned	
four	 objectives	 of	 domestic	 criminal	 justice	 systems	 (retribution,	 deterrence,	
incapacitation	and	rehabilitation),	the	Court’s	capacity	to	achieve	each	of	these	will	be	
considered	separately.		In	fact,	the	retributive	and	deterrent	objectives	of	criminal	trials	
are	covered	by	Mr	Annan’s	specified	objectives	for	the	ICC	of	‘bringing	those	responsible	
to	 justice’	 and	 ‘ending	 violations	 and	 preventing	 their	 recurrence’.	 	 However,	 the	
domestic	criminal	justice	system	objectives	of	incapacitation	and	rehabilitation	relate	to	
the	perpetrators	of	crimes	as	opposed	to	victims	and	survivors	and	neither	Mr	Annan’s	
report	nor	the	stated	aims	of	TJ	mention	these	functions	of	trials	as	objectives	for	ICJ.		
However,	because	they	are	a	fundamental	feature	of	criminal	prosecutions,	the	ICC’s	
capacity	to	achieve	these	objectives	also	will	be	considered.		The	chapter	will	conclude	
that	the	ICC	cannot	hope	to	satisfy	the	many	conflicting	goals	attributed	to	it	and	thus	
																																																						
18	Ambos,	K.	(2013a)	‘Punishment	without	a	Sovereign?	The	Ius	Puniendi	Issue	of	International	Criminal	Law:	A	First	
Contribution	 towards	 a	 Consistent	 Theory	 of	 International	 Criminal	 Law’	OJLS	 pp293-315	 at	 p294	 (emphasis	 in	
original)		
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should	prioritise	its	objectives	on	a	case	by	case	basis,	taking	account	of	the	contextual	
demands	of	each	situation	referred	to	it.		
	
	
Part	One:	Bringing	Those	Responsible	to	Justice		
	
In	 this	section,	 the	retributive	qualities	of	 trials	at	 the	 ICC	will	be	examined	since,	as	
previously	stated,	the	objective	of	bringing	those	responsible	to	justice	through	criminal	
prosecutions	 prioritises	 an	 objective	 of	 western-liberal	 domestic	 criminal	 justice.		
According	to	Kantian	deontology	of	criminal	punishment,	‘even	if	society	were	on	the	
verge	of	dissolution,	it	has	the	duty	to	punish	the	last	offender’.19	Drumbl	states	that	the	
deontological	 retributive	approach	 is	 ‘au	 courant	among	 international	 lawyers,	 [and]	
posits	that	trials	of	selected	individuals	(preferably	undertaken	at	the	international	level)	
constitute	 the	 favoured	 and	 often	 exclusive	 remedy	 to	 respond	 to	 all	 situations	 of	
genocide	and	crimes	against	humanity’.20		
	
Orentlicher	is	regarded	as	one	such	advocate	of	prosecutions,	insisting	that	successor	
governments	have	a	duty	to	prosecute	the	human	rights	violations	of	a	prior	regime	as	
prosecutions	 are	 the	 ‘most	 effective	 insurance	 against	 future	 repression’21	 and	may	
‘inspire	 societies	 that	 are	 re-examining	 their	 basic	 values	 to	 affirm	 fundamental	
principles	of	 respect	 for	 the	rule	of	 law	and	for	 the	 inherent	dignity	of	 individuals’.22	
Orentlicher’s	 argument	was	 criticised	 for	 taking	 no	 account	 of	 the	 varied	 and	 often	
difficult	realities	faced	by	successor	governments.23	However,	although	she	argued	that	
governments	 ‘should	 be	 expected	 to	 assume	 reasonable	 risks	 associated	 with	
																																																						
19	Drumbl,	M.	(2000)	‘Punishment,	Postgenocide:	From	Guilty	to	Shame	to	Civis	in	Rwanda’	NYULR	pp1221-1326	at	
p1228;	Nino,	C.S.	(1996)	Radical	Evil	on	Trial	(New	Haven	and	London:	YUP)	p112	
20	Drumbl,	M.	(2000)	p1228	
21	Orentlicher,	D.F.		(1990-1991)	‘Settling	Accounts:	The	Duty	to	Prosecute	Human	Rights	Violations	of	a	Prior	Regime’	
100	YLJ	p2537-2615	at	p2542	
22	Ibid	
23	Nino,	C.S.	(1990-1991)	‘Duty	to	Punish	Past	Abuses	of	Human	Rights	put	into	Context:	The	Case	of	Argentina’	100	
YLJ	pp2619-2640	at	p2619	
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prosecutions,	including	a	risk	of	military	discontent’,24	she	did	not	assert	that	this	should	
be	to	the	point	of	provoking	their	own	collapse.25	
	
Other	 supporters	 of	 prosecutions,	 such	 as	 Cassese,	 emphasise	 their	 essential	 role	 in	
dissipating	calls	for	revenge,26	thereby	avoiding	what	Minow	describes	as	‘a	downward	
spiral	 of	 violence	 or	 an	 unquenchable	 desire	 that	 traps	 people	 in	 cycles	 of	 revenge,	
recrimination	and	escalation’.27		Minow	describes	retribution	as	‘vengeance	curbed	by	
the	intervention	of	someone	other	than	the	victim	and	by	principles	of	proportionality	
and	 individual	 rights’.28	 	 Aukerman	 agrees	 that	 trials	 serve	 ‘to	 channel	 vengeance,	
thereby	both	discouraging	less	controlled	forms	of	victims’	justice,	such	as	vigilantism	
and	 restoring	 the	 moral	 and	 social	 equilibrium	 that	 was	 violently	 disturbed	 by	 the	
offender.’29		
	
However,	the	results	of	her	empirical	study	in	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	(BiH)	in	2008	led	
Clark	to	question	faith	in	trials	themselves	as	dissipaters	of	revenge.30	She	found	that,	
despite	 high	 levels	 of	 discontent	 with	 the	 retributive	 justice	 achieved	 by	 the	
International	Criminal	Tribunal	 for	 the	Former	Yugoslavia	 (ICTY),	 it	was	 the	 tribunal’s	
existence	 that	dissipated	 calls	 for	 revenge	at	 a	normative	 level,	with	 criminal	 justice	
being	identified	as	the	most	legitimate	response	to	war	crimes.31		
	
Adherence	to	the	retribution	theory	demands	that	every	guilty	person	should	get	their	
‘just	deserts’,	which	poses	a	difficulty	for	the	ICC	where	prosecutions	have	to	be	limited	
and	 selective.	 	 The	 crimes	 within	 the	 ICC’s	 jurisdiction,	 by	 definition,	 can	 involve	
																																																						
24	Orentlicher,	D.F.	(1990-1991)	p2549	Orentlicher	subsequently	re-examined	her	assertions,	describing	‘an	evolution	
in	[her]	thinking’	as,	rather	than	promulgating	the	relevant	rule	of	international	law,	she	now	emphasised	victims’	
agency	‘in	defining	their	own	interests	and	preferences	and	in	participating	in	national	processes	aimed	at	designing	
policies	of	transitional	 justice.’	See	Orentlicher,	D.F.	 (2007)	 ‘Settling	Accounts	Revisited:	Reconciling	Global	Norms	
with	Local	Agency’	IJTJ	pp10-22	at	p19	
25	Orentlicher,	D.F.	(1990-1991)	p2548	
26	Cassese,	A.	(1998)	‘Reflections	on	International	Criminal	Justice’	61	Mod	LR	pp1-10	at	p6		
27	Minow,	M.	(1998)	Between	Vengeance	and	Forgiveness	(Boston:	Beacon	Press)	p10	
28	Ibid	p12	
29	Aukerman,	M.J.	(2002)	‘Extraordinary	Evil,	Ordinary	Crime:	A	Framework	for	Understanding	Transitional	Justice’	15	
Harvard	JHR	pp39-97	at	p55	
30	It	is	noteworthy	that	despite	the	existence	of	the	ICTY,	Kosovo	Albanians	carried	out	‘revenge	killings’	against	
Serbs	in	1999	and	despite	the	existence	of	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	Rwanda	(ICTR),	the	RPF	
committed	violent	reprisals	against	Hutus.	
31	Clark,	J.N.	(2009)	‘The	Limits	of	Retributive	Justice.	Findings	of	an	Empirical	Study	in	Bosnia	and	Hercegovina’	7JICJ	
pp463-487	at	p471		
	 60	
widespread	 violence	 perpetrated	 by	 many,	 who	 are	 all	 deserving	 of	 punishment,	
whereas	the	ICC	can	cope	only	with	a	small	number	of	prosecutions.	 	Acknowledging	
this	problem,	the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor	(OTP)	initially	adopted	a	policy	of	‘focusing	its	
efforts	on	the	most	serious	crimes	and	on	those	who	bear	the	greatest	responsibility	for	
these	crimes.’32		It	was	later	realised,	however,	that	the	evidentiary	standards	required	
to	target	those	‘most	responsible’	could	put	the	chances	of	a	successful	conviction	in	
jeopardy,	 so	 a	 strategy	of	 ‘gradually	 building	upwards’	was	 initially	 envisaged	 33	 and	
subsequently	 implemented,34	 whereby	 mid-and	 high-level	 perpetrators	 will	 be	
investigated	and	prosecuted	in	the	hope	of	securing	evidence	sufficient	to	convict	those	
most	responsible.35		The	OTP	also	indicated	that	it	will	even	‘consider	prosecuting	lower	
level	 perpetrators	 where	 their	 conduct	 was	 particularly	 grave	 and	 has	 acquired	
extensive	notoriety’.36	
	
Some	 welcomed	 this	 policy	 adaptation	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 targeting	 the	 most	
responsible	 singles	 out	 those	 in	 elevated	 positions	 who	 plan	 and	 orchestrate	 the	
atrocities	rather	than	the	people	on	the	ground	who	execute	them.37		Certainly,	those	
in	 command	are	morally	 responsible38	but	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	 the	 individuals	who	
enthusiastically	carry	out	their	orders	should	not	be	absolved	from	responsibility	simply	
because	they	are	lower	down	the	command-chain.		It	is	important	that	they	too	are	held	
accountable	 because	 of	 the	 central	 role	 they	 play	 in	 mass	 atrocities.	 	 A	 policy	 of	
prosecuting	only	those	‘most	responsible’	enables	the	vast	majority	who	participated	to	
‘reframe	their	actions	in	ways	that	excuse	their	activity.’39	This	point	also	impacts	on	the	
controversial	issue	of	individual	versus	collective	responsibility.	
	
																																																						
32	OTP	‘Report	on	Prosecutorial	Strategy’	14	September	2006	p5		
33	OTP	‘Strategic	plan	June	2012-2015’	11	October	2013	p14	para.	22	
34	OTP	‘Strategic	Plan	2016-2018’	6	July	2015	p16	para.	34	
35	Ibid	
36	Ibid	
37	Robinson,	D.	(2003)	‘Serving	the	Interests	of	Justice:	Amnesties,	Truth	Commissions	and	the	International	Criminal	
Court’	14	EJIL	pp481-505	at	p494	
38	Akhavan,	P.	(2001)	‘Beyond	Impunity:	Can	International	Criminal	Justice	Prevent	Future	Atrocities?’	95	AJIL	pp7-
31at	p10	insisting	‘Prevention	and	punishment	should	focus	primarily	on	those	unscrupulous	leaders	who	goad	and	
exploit	the	forces	advocating	a	spiral	of	violence.’	
39	 Fletcher,	 L.	 and	 Weinstein,	 H.	 (2002)	 ‘Violence	 and	 Social	 Repair:	 Rethinking	 the	 Contribution	 of	 Justice	 to	
Reconciliation’	24	HRQ	pp573-630	at	p605	
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Akhavan	argues	that	‘individual	accountability	for	massive	crimes	is	an	essential	part	of	
a	preventative	strategy’.40	Cassese	also	extols	the	virtue	of	trials	on	the	grounds	that	
they	individualise	rather	than	collectivise	guilt.41		Clearly,	the	notion	of	collective	guilt	is	
unattractive42	 but	 individualising	 guilt	 is	 contentious	 in	 situations	 of	 wide-scale	
participation	in	mass	killings	such	as	occurred	in	Rwanda	in	1994,	since	‘the	focus	on	
individual	crimes	has	been	used	by	many	to	claim	collective	innocence’.43		Fletcher	and	
Weinstein	 suggest	 that	 focussing	 on	 individual	 autonomy	 leaves	 ‘no	 room	 for	 those	
social	processes	that	collectively	influence	thinking	and	behaviour.’44			They	argue	that:	
	
while	the	legal	system	focuses	on	individual	behaviour	and	addresses	issues	
of	 motivation	 or	 criminal	 intent,	 it	 lacks	 the	 capacity	 to	 address	 the	
consequences	 of	 the	 many	 individual	 acts	 that	 characterize	 genocide	 or	
ethnic	cleansing	where	perpetrators	are	swept	up	in	the	group	violence.45		
	
They	 state	 that	 there	 is	 a	 communal	 engagement	 with	 mass	 violence	 which	 is	 not	
addressed	 by	 criminal	 trials,	 since	 individual	 autonomy	 is	 challenged	 in	 ‘group’	
situations,	with	membership	of	the	group	becoming	the	controlling	influence	and	norms	
of	behaviour	shifting	with	community	sanction.46	 	Thus	 individuals	who	participate	 in	
mass	 violence	 which	 has	 become	 the	 norm	 are	 ostensibly	 relieved	 of	 even	 moral	
responsibility	for	their	acts.47	
	
Fletcher	and	Weinstein	also	discuss	the	culpability	of	those	who	do	not	actually	involve	
themselves	in	the	violence	but	nor	do	they	do	anything	to	prevent	it,	a	situation	they	
term	 the	 ‘bystander	 phenomenon’.48	 They	 argue	 that	 the	 influence	 of	 societal	 and	
cultural	 factors	 can	pressure	bystanders	 into	 remaining	passive	because	 fear	 inhibits	
action	and	produces	conformity,	especially	 if	others	are	present.49	They	demonstrate	
the	power	of	the	collective	to	influence	behaviour	and	argue	that	by	individualising	guilt	
																																																						
40	Akhavan,	P.	(2001)	p10	
41	Cassese,	A.	(1998)	p6	
42	Clark,	J.N.	(2009)	p473	
43	Fletcher,	L.	and	Weinstein,	H.	(2002)	p604	
44	Ibid	
45	Ibid	
46	Ibid	p611;	see	also	Tallgren,	I.	(2002)	‘The	Sensibility	and	Sense	of	International	Criminal	Law’	13	EJIL	pp561-595	at	
p573	
47	Fletcher,	L.	and	Weinstein,	H.	(2002)	p611	(of	course,	this	argument	can	equally	apply	in	a	domestic	setting)	
48	Ibid	p613	
49	Ibid	p613-4	
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in	 criminal	 trials,	 the	 ‘legal	 paradigm	 reinforces	 the	 use	 of	 denial	 as	 a	 psychological	
defence	mechanism	within	the	population	at	large	and	supports	the	bystanders’	claim	
that	they	did	nothing	wrong,	that	is	collective	innocence.’50		
	
Clark	also	has	concerns	about	the	‘contentious	issue’	of	individualising	guilt	in	situations	
of	mass	participation	in	violence,	concluding	from	her	findings	in	BiH	regarding	ethnic-
cleansing	crimes,	that	prosecutions	of	a	few	did	not	dispel	the	resentment	against	the	
whole	group,	including	bystanders	who	did	nothing	to	help	or	warn,	which	led	to	many	
making	 their	 own	 judgments	 about	 the	 other	 ethnic	 groups’	 culpability.51	 	 Victims	
wanted	 much	 broader	 responsibility	 addressed,	 Clarke	 concluded	 and	 since,	 in	
situations	 of	 mass	 participation	 in	 violence,	 trials	 cannot	 be	 complete	 and	
comprehensive,	 this	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 assumption	 that	 individualising	 guilt	 is	
efficacious	and	that	trials	of	a	few	can	dispel	allegations	of	collective	guilt.52	
	
In	 this	 section,	 the	 ability	 of	 trials	 at	 the	 ICC	 to	 bring	 offenders	 to	 justice	 has	 been	
discussed	 and	 it	 has	 been	 seen	 that	 supporters	 of	 prosecutions	 uphold	 the	 Court’s	
retributive	qualities,	its	capacity	to	make	those	who	commit	great	crimes	‘face	truth,	be	
held	accountable,	and	serve	justice.’53		Clearly,	as	with	domestic	criminal	justice,	trials	
at	 the	 ICC	 fulfil	 the	 requirements	 of	 retribution	 by	 establishing	 guilt	 and	 imposing	
punishment	on	those	who	have	committed	heinous	crimes.		There	is	no	doubt	that	a	
head	of	state	or	warlord	would	wish	to	avoid	an	appearance	before	the	ICC	and	that	a	
conviction	 of	 any	 crime	 within	 the	 court’s	 jurisdiction	 would	 entail	 universal	
stigmatisation	 and	 condemnation.	 	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 ICC	 successfully	 fulfils	 its	
retributive	function	and	it	does	so	more	overtly	than	other	means	of	transitional	justice.		
However,	as	noted,	there	are	serious	limitations	to	what	the	ICC	can	achieve	by	way	of	
bringing	those	responsible	to	justice	primarily	due	to	its	selection	of	cases	to	prosecute,	
its	inability	to	prosecute	large	numbers	of	offenders	and	the	individualisaton	of	criminal	
responsibility	in	situations	of	mass	atrocity	which,	by	their	definition,	encompasses	the	
crimes	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	ICC.			
																																																						
50	Ibid	p615	
51	Clark,	J.N.	(2009)	p472-3	
52	Ibid	
53	Neier,	A.	(1998)	War	Crimes.	Brutality,	Genocide,	Terror	and	the	Struggle	for	Justice	(New	York:	Times	Books)	p260	
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Part	Two:	Ending	Violations	and	Preventing	their	Recurrence	
	
This	 ICJ	objective	 relates	 to	 the	deterrent	 function	of	domestic	 criminal	 trials	which,	
according	to	David	Wippman,	for	many	is	the	most	important	justification	and	the	most	
important	goal	of	criminal	justice,	national	or	international.54		Payam	Akhavan	defines	
deterrence	as	 ‘the	ability	of	a	 legal	 system	to	discourage	or	prevent	 certain	 conduct	
through	threats	of	punishment	or	other	expressions	of	disapproval.’55		
	
Deterrence	is	premised	on	two	notions:	first	that	the	offender	is	likely	to	be	caught	and	
punished	 and	 second,	 that	 punishment	 will	 prevent	 a	 rational	 decision-maker	 from	
committing	the	crime.		Taking	a	utilitarian	approach	to	offending,	the	assumption	is	that	
the	potential	offender	will	make	a	‘risk-reward’	calculation	and	will	commit	a	crime	only	
when	the	potential	reward	outweighs	the	attendant	risk.	 	 It	 is	anticipated,	therefore,	
that	risk	in	the	form	of	probability	of	prosecution,	conviction	and	sentence	can	deter	
crime.		Deterrence	operates	on	two	levels:	it	is	directed	at	the	offender	who	has	already	
committed	 a	 crime	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 preventing	 future	 offending	 (‘specific	
deterrence’)	and	against	 society	at	 large	with	 the	 intention	of	discouraging	potential	
criminal	behaviour	(‘general	deterrence’).56		
	
It	 is	difficult	to	estimate	the	preventative	effect	of	 international	trials	 for,	as	Tallgren	
notes,	 ‘[t]here	are	no	grounds	to	exclude	the	possibility	of	such	an	effect.	 	Neither	 is	
there	evidence	in	its	favour.’57		Although	we	have	experienced	nothing	on	the	scale	of	
the	Nazi	genocide	since,	 the	Nuremberg	trials	did	not	deter	 the	crimes	subsequently	
perpetrated	in,	for	example,	Algeria,	Cambodia,	Vietnam,	East	Timor,	Iraq	(against	the	
Kurds),	 former	 Yugoslavia	 or	 Rwanda.	 	 Indeed,	 as	 Judge	Richard	Goldstone,	 the	 first	
Chief	 Prosecutor	 of	 the	 ICTY	 and	 ICTR	 reportedly	 commented	 “[t]he	 hope	 of	 “never	
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again”	became	the	reality	of	again	and	again”.58		In	the	opinion	of	Meron,	despite	the	
widely	 publicised	warnings	 of	 punishment	 of	 those	 committing	 atrocities	 during	 the	
second	World	War	and	the	UNSC	warnings	regarding	crimes	committed	in	the	former	
Yugoslavia	 ‘there	 is	 no	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 effective	 deterrence	 in	 either	 case’.59		
Although	it	perhaps	should	be	conceded	that	the	lack	of	pre-existing	forum	in	which	to	
try	 these	 crimes	 could	 have	 undermined	 the	 deterrent	 effect	 of	 Nuremberg	 and	
subsequent	warnings,	it	is	noteworthy	that	the	existence	of	the	ICC	has	not	prevented	
atrocities	being	committed	in,	for	example,	Syria,	60	Yemen61	and	South	Sudan,62	among	
many	other	possible	examples.	
	
Given	the	argument	that	deterrence	is	often	ineffective	to	prevent	crimes	in	domestic	
situations,	even	with	the	support	of	states’	law	enforcement	apparatus,63	the	deterrent	
effect	 in	 international	 situations	 is	 more	 questionable	 because	 the	 sheer	 scale	 and	
gravity	of	the	offending	behaviour	transcends	deviance	or	aberration	to	become	what	
Kant	 describes	 as	 ‘radical	 evil’.64	 	 Reisman	 argues	 international	 tribunals	 have	 a	 ‘fit’	
problem	because	‘in	liberal	societies,	the	criminal	law	model	pre-supposes	some	moral	
choice	or	moral	freedom’	on	the	offender’s	part	but	in	cases	of	atrocious	international	
crimes,	 many	 of	 those	 directly	 responsible	 ‘operate	 within	 a	 cultural	 universe	 that	
inverts	our	morality	and	elevates	 their	actions	 to	 the	highest	 form	of	group,	 tribe	or	
national	defence’.65		After	years	or	generations	of	imbibing	these	views,	he	argues,	the	
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World	Report	2017	[Online]	Available:	https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/12/yemen-no-accountability-war-
crimes	[Accessed	24.03.17]	
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[Online]	 Available:	 https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/11/south-sudans-soldiers-
allowed-to-rape-civilians-civil-war-says-un-government-torture	[Accessed	19.03.17]	
63	Meron,	T.	(1995)	p110;	see	also	Tallgren,	I.	(2002)	p569	stating	that	‘empirical	studies	of	the	national	systems	have	
met	with	considerable	criticism	and	are	of	very	limited	value’	to	the	international	context.	
64	Kant,	I.	‘Religion	within	Boundaries	of	Mere	Reason’	in	Immanuel	Kant:	Religion	and	Rational	Theology	(1996)	trans.	
and	ed.	by	Wood,	A.W.	and	diGiovanni,	G.	(Cambridge:	CUP)	p83;	see	also	Nino,	C.S.	(1996)	pvii		
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80	at	p77	
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offender	 ‘may	 not	 have	 the	 moral	 choice	 that	 is	 central	 to	 our	 notion	 of	 criminal	
responsibility’.66	
	
Nonetheless,	the	determination	to	contribute	to	the	prevention	of	the	crimes	within	the	
jurisdiction	of	the	ICC	places	deterrence	at	the	heart	of	the	Court’s	raison	d’être	67	and	
gives	the	ICC	‘its	distinctive	rationale.’68		Some	scholars	and	human	rights	activists	frame	
their	 argument	 for	 prosecutions	 around	 the	 message	 transmitted	 to	 would-be	
perpetrators	by	a	failure	to	prosecute,	which,	for	example,	Kritz	warns	‘can	be	expected	
not	only	to	encourage	new	rounds	of	mass	abuses	in	the	country	in	question	but	also	to	
embolden	the	instigators	of	crimes	against	humanity	elsewhere.’69	Orentlicher	agrees	
that	exemplary	prosecutions	can	send	a	message	to	the	future	of	non-toleration	since	
‘if	 law	 is	 unavailable	 to	punish	widespread	brutality	 of	 the	past,	what	 lesson	 can	be	
offered	for	the	future?’70			
	
Whilst	general	assertions	have	been	expressed	regarding	the	potential	of	international	
prosecutions	to	deter	future	atrocities,71	there	has	been	very	 little	empirical	study	to	
ascertain	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 ICC	 or	 other	 international	 tribunals	 in	 either	 specific	 or	
general	deterrence,	so	it	is	difficult	to	establish	the	efficacy	of	the	ICC	in	this	regard.72		
The	Court	has	been	 functioning	 for	15	 years	 and	even	a	brief	 review	of	 current	 and	
recent	 conflicts	 reveals	 that	 hopes	 for	 its	 strong	 deterrent	 role	 may	 have	 been	
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war.		As	they	acknowledge,	therefore,	the	evidence	that	the	ICC	deters	future	perpetrators	is	not	conclusive.	
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overstated.	 	 Since	 2011,	 for	 example,	 the	UN	has	 regularly	 issued	 reports	 on	 Syria73	
detailing	 abuses	 amounting	 to	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 allegedly	 committed	 by	
government	 and	 rebel	 forces	 but	 neither	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 deterred	 from	
committing	further	atrocities	on	civilians	despite	the	risk	of	future	prosecutions	at	the	
ICC.74	 	 Also,	 in	 Mali,75	 although	 the	 Court	 is	 already	 investigating	 alleged	 crimes	
committed	since	January	2012,76	there	has	been	a	renewal	of	fighting	since	mid-2014	
leading	 to	 Human	 Rights	Watch	 (HRW)	 calling	 on	 the	Malian	 government	 to	 curtail	
abuses	against	civilians	and	aid	workers	carried	out	by	armed	groups	and	state	security	
forces.77			
	
The	HRW	documentation	of	serious	human	rights	abuses	is	repeated	in	Nigeria,	Burundi,	
CAR,	 South	 Sudan,	DRC,	Uganda,	 Sudan	 and	 Somalia	 to	mention	 just	 some	of	 those	
reported	on	the	continent	of	Africa	alone.78	 	Given	this	depressing	record,	one	could	
question	 whether	 a	 prosecution	 at	 the	 ICC	 has	 any	 deterrence	 capacity	 but	 it	 is	
impossible	to	know	the	answer.		The	ICC	cannot	be	expected	to	deter	every	perpetrator	
of	 international	 crimes	 but	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 potential	 offenders	 could	 have	 been	
deterred.79		
	
Some	 scholars	 doubt	 that	 fanatical	 and	 genocidal	 leaders	 can	 be	 deterred	 from	
committing	international	crimes,80	suggesting	that	perpetrators	of	mass	atrocities	are	
so	‘irrational	and	motivated	by	bloodlust,	religious	fervour	or	ancient	ethnic	hatreds’81	
that	they	are	incorrigible.	However,	Ku	and	Nzelibe	assert	that	‘offenders	commit	more	
																																																						
73	See	e.g.	Report	of	the	Independent	International	Commission	of	Inquiry	on	the	Syrian	Arab	Republic	A/HRC/27/60	
13	 August	 2014;	 A/HRC/30/48	 13	 August	 2015;	 A/HRC/28/69	 5	 February	 2015;	 A/HRC/30/48	 13	 August	 2015;	
A/HCR/33/55	11	August	2016;	A/HRC/34/CRP.3	13	March	2017	
74	Although	Syria	is	not	a	party	to	the	RSt,	a	referral	to	the	ICC	could	be	made	by	the	UNSC		
75	Mali	ratified	the	RSt	on	16	August	2000	and	self-referred	to	the	ICC	the	situation	on	its	territory	since	January	2012		
76	Statement:	16/01/2013,	ICC	Prosecutor	opens	investigation	into	war	crimes	in	Mali:	“The	legal	requirements	have	
been	met.		We	will	investigate”	ICC-OTP-20130116-PR869	
77	HRW	(2015)	‘Mali:	Lawlessness,	Abuses	Imperil	Population:	Government	Needs	to	Restore	Security,	Justice	System’	
[Online]	 Available:	 https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/14/mali-lawlessness-abuses-imperil-population	 [Accessed	
20.03.17]	
78	 HRW	 ‘World	 Report	 2017:	 Events	 of	 2016’;	 see	 also	 Amnesty	 International	 Report	 2016/17:	 ‘The	 State	 of	 the	
World’s	Human	Rights:	Africa	Regional	Overview’	pp16-23	
79	Akhavan,	P.	 (2011)	 ‘Preventing	Genocide:	Measuring	Success	by	What	Does	not	Happen’	22	CLF	pp1-33	at	p28	
suggesting	that	a	threat	to	involve	the	ICC	averted	a	descent	into	mass	violence	in	Côte	D’Ivoire	in	2004.	
80	Meron,	 T.	 (2011)	p149;	 see	also	Drumbl,	M.	 (2004-5)	 stating	 ‘deterrence	 is	based	on	 the	essentially	unproven	
assumption	of	perpetrator	rationality…’	p590	
81	Cronin-Furman,	K.	(2013)	p439	
	 67	
atrocities	 in	 weak	 states	 because	 they	 have	 more	 opportunities	 to	 do	 so,	 and	 not	
because	 they	 have	 a	 greater	 inclination	 to	 commit	 such	 atrocities’,82	 an	 insight	 that	
could	 provide	 possibilities	 for	 deterrence.	 Moreover,	 Cronin-Furman	 supports	 ‘an	
assumption	of	perpetrator	rationality,	at	least	at	the	command	level’,83	arguing	that	the	
decision	to	commit	seemingly	‘‘wanton	and	senseless’	atrocities	‘can	be	understood	as	
part	of	a	rational	strategy.’’84	 	She	discusses	the	motivation	of	those	who	order	mass	
atrocities	 and	 argues	 that	 ‘overriding	 interests’	 such	 as	 avoiding	 defeat,	 territorial	
control	and	survival	outweigh	the	threat	of	prosecution	‘regardless	of	 its	certainty.’85		
She	also	observes	that	leaders	of	groups	that	commit	atrocities	can	be	separated	into	
commanders	who	order	the	commission	of	mass	atrocities	and	those	who	permit	or	fail	
to	punish	subordinates	for	these	crimes	and	argues	that	the	latter	group	is	more	likely	
to	 be	 deterrable,	 so	 the	 ICC	 should	 target	 prosecutions	 accordingly,	 since	 this	 could	
result	in	‘improved	oversight	in	armed	groups’.86			
	
One	factor	which	can	affect	the	risk-reward	calculation	for	deterrables	is	the	perceived	
certainty	of	prosecution.		For	Meron,	this	point	is	fundamental:	‘Instead	of	despairing	
over	 the	 prospects	 of	 deterrence,	 the	 international	 community	 should	 enhance	 the	
probability	of	punishment’.	87		At	the	ICC,	this	‘probability’	is	hampered	by	its	capacity	
to	handle	only	a	small	number	of	cases.		In	the	15	years	since	the	ICC	was	established,	
despite	an	increase	in	the	number	of	internationalised	armed	conflicts	between	2004	
and	2014,88	the	Prosecutor	has	conducted	ten	investigations	(nine	in	Africa)89	and	has	
issued	29	arrest	warrants	and	nine	summonses	to	appear.90	Of	the	arrest	warrants,	14	
have	 been	 implemented	 and	 six	 individuals	 are	 in	 custody,	 13	 being	 still	 at	 large.91	
Twenty-	three	cases	have	been	brought	before	the	Court	of	which	five	are	currently	at	
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the	trial	stage,	one	is	at	the	appeal	stage	and	three	are	at	the	reparations	stage.	Clearly,	
on	this	record,	the	risk	of	being	prosecuted	at	the	ICC	is	almost	negligible	and	arguably	
is	unlikely	to	figure	prominently	in	a	potential	offender’s	risk-reward	analysis.		
	
Another	factor	that	undermines	the	deterrent	effect	of	the	ICC	is	that	it	does	not	have	
any	means	of	compelling	state	co-operation,	upon	which	it	is	wholly	reliant,	since	it	has	
no	police	force	or	other	enforcement	mechanism	at	its	disposal	and	it	has	no	power	to	
compel	 the	production	of	 evidence	or	 to	 enforce	 judgments.	 	 If	 states	 refuse	 to	 co-
operate,	the	Court	can	only	refer	the	matter	to	the	ICC	Assembly	of	State	Parties	(ASP)	
or	 to	 the	UNSC	 (if	 a	UNSC	 referral)	 for	 sanctions	 to	be	 imposed	against	 the	non-co-
operating	state(s).92	
	
Unfortunately,	both	the	ASP	and	UNSC	have	consistently	chosen	not	to	support	the	ICC	
by	taking	action	against	non-co-operating	states,	some	of	which	have	openly	obstructed	
the	court.93		For	example,	certain	SPs	have	ignored	requests	to	arrest	and	transfer	to	the	
ICC	 Sudan’s	 President	 al-Bashir94	whose	 two	 arrest	warrants	 have	 been	 outstanding	
since	2009	and	2010.95	Indeed,	the	African	Union	(AU)	has	called	upon	its	members	to	
refuse	co-operation	with	the	Court	96	and	as	previously	mentioned,	has	recently	called	
for	a	mass	withdrawal	of	member	states	from	the	ICC	following	a	dispute	arising	from	
the	 ICC	 indicting	 sitting	 heads	 of	 state,	 including	 Kenyan	 President	 Kenyatta	 and	 his	
deputy,	 William	 Ruto	 for	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 following	 the	 2007	 post-election	
violence.97			
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In	December	2014,	the	Prosecutor	criticised	the	UNSC	for	failing	to	support	the	ICC	in	
securing	Bashir’s	arrest	when	she	announced	she	was	halting	the	Darfur	investigations	
after	 five	 years.98	 A	week	 earlier,	 the	 Prosecutor	 had	 also	 dropped	 the	 case	 against	
President	Kenyatta	citing	the	Kenyan	government’s	obstruction	of	the	ICC’s	efforts	to	
gather	sufficient	evidence	to	mount	a	prosecution.99	This	lack	of	support	from	the	UNSC	
and	resistance	from	SPs	could	suggest	that	if	states	obstruct	the	ICC	for	long	enough,	
they	can	thwart	the	court’s	attempts	to	fulfil	its	ICJ	objectives,	a	situation	which	clearly	
diminishes	any	deterrent	effect	the	Court	may	have	exerted.			
	
It	is	also	suggested	that	the	ability	of	the	ICC	to	fulfil	its	deterrence	mandate	is	seriously	
curtailed	by	three	of	the	five	permanent	members	of	the	UNSC	not	being	parties	to	the	
RSt100	and	by	UNSC	decisions	relating	to	the	maintenance	or	restoration	of	international	
peace	 and	 security101	 being	 greatly	 influenced	 by	 power	 politics	 and	 the	 national	
interests	of	the	permanent	five.102	For	example,	although	the	UNSC	co-operated	in	the	
referral	of	Sudan	in	2005	and	Libya	in	2011,	accountability	for	the	atrocities	committed	
in	 Syria	 since	 Spring	 2011	 remains	 unachievable	 despite	 concerted	 efforts	 by	 the	
international	 community	 to	 persuade	 a	 divided,	 reluctant	 UNSC	 to	 refer	 the	 Syrian	
situation	to	the	ICC.103		
	
Finally,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	atrocities	of	the	20th	century	(even	those	committed	
by	 the	Nazis)	 arose	 not	 from	 criminal	 intent	 but	 from	 ideologies	 that	 strove	 for	 the	
																																																						
98	 Smith,	 D.	 (2014)	 ‘ICC	 chief	 prosecutor	 shelves	 Darfur	 war	 crimes	 probe’	 The	 Guardian	 14	 December	 [Online]	
Available:	 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/icc-darfur-war-crimes-fatou-bensouda-sudan	
[Accessed	15.11.15]		
99	ICC	Press	Release:	05/12/2014,	Statement	of	the	Prosecutor	of	the	International	Criminal	Court,	Fatou	Bensouda,	
on	the	withdrawal	of	charges	against	Mr	Uhuru	Muigai	Kenyatta.		Kenyan	authorities	had	initially	co-operated,	holding	
intensive	negotiations	with	the	Prosecutor	prior	to	his	proprio	motu	intervention	to	ensure	their	willingness	to	co-
operate	once	a	formal	investigation	began,	see	Ambos,	K.	(2013b)	pp518,	519	
100	US,	Russia	and	China	are	not	SPs.	
101	UN	Charter,	Chapter	VII;	see	also	UNSC	Report	‘The	Rule	of	Law:	The	Security	Council	and	Accountability’,	18	
January	2013	[Online]	Available:	http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/cross-cutting-report/the-rule-of-law-the-
security-council-and-accountability.php	[Accessed	19.11.15]	discussing	how	‘the	rule	of	law	has	become	integral	to	
the	peacekeeping	and	peacebuilding	efforts	of	the	Security	Council’	
102	McGreal,	C.	(2015)	‘UN	security	council	is	failing	Syria,	Ban	Ki-moon	admits’	The	Guardian	7	September	[Online]	
Available:	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/un-security-council-is-failing-syria-ban-ki-moon	
[Accessed	20.03.17]	
103	Black,	I.	(2014)	‘Russia	and	China	veto	UN	move	to	refer	Syria	to	international	criminal	court’	The	Guardian	22	May	
[Online]	 Available:	 http://theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-china-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-syria-
international-criminal-court	[Accessed	20.03.17]	
	 70	
betterment	of	society	or	to	save	the	world	from	a	perceived	danger,104	which	implies	
that	the	threat	of	criminal	prosecution	would	offer	no	deterrence.		It	could,	therefore,	
be	more	 apposite	 to	 consider	 the	 Court’s	 deterrent	 potential	 lying	 in	 a	 didactic	 and	
motivational	role	over	the	long	term.	Indicted	leaders	of	government	and	rebel	forces	
who	remain	in	power	and	continue	to	commit	egregious	crimes	in	the	‘shadow’	of	the	
ICC105	have	the	Sword	of	Damocles	hanging	over	their	heads,	which	may	gradually	enter	
their	 risk-reward	 analysis	 and	 possibly	 deter	 them	 from	 perpetrating	 human	 rights	
violations	and	mass	atrocities.		This	effect	was	noted	by	a	HRW		Congo	researcher,	for	
example,	 whom	 Laurnet	 Nkunda,	 once	 a	 high-profile	 leader	 of	 a	 vicious	 Rwandan-
backed	rebel	group	in	eastern	Congo,	regularly	called	in	2007	and	2008	to	discuss	his	
fears	that	he	might	be	targeted	by	the	ICC	because	of	abuses	committed	by	his	troops.106		
Thus,	 it	 appears	 fear	 of	 investigation	 by	 the	 ICC	 can	 have	 a	 deterrent	 effect	 but	 as	
Wippman	has	commented,	it	‘seems	likely	to	be	modest	and	incremental,	rather	than	
dramatic	and	transformative.’107	
	
Part	Three:	Incapacitation	and	the	ICC	
	
Although	not	specifically	included	in	the	list	of	objectives	for	the	ICC	by	Kofi	Annan	in	his	
2004	report,	incapacitation	is	a	feature	of	retributive	justice	and	therefore,	by	analogy,	
of	prosecutions	at	the	ICC.	 	As	one	of	the	four	objectives	of	domestic	criminal	 justice	
systems,	the	aim	of	incapacitation	involves	punishing	offenders	in	a	way	that	prevents	
re-offending	 by	 removing	 them	 from	 society,	 usually	 by	 incarceration	 or	 in	 certain	
jurisdictions,	capital	punishment.		However,	since	punishment	is	founded	on	combating	
deviant	 behaviour,	 the	 challenge	 for	 ICJ	 is	 responding	 to	 radical	 evil	 with	 domestic	
penalties	that	arguably	are	insufficient.108			
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Arendt	was	of	the	opinion	that	extreme	evil,	whether	considered	radical	or	banal,109	was	
unpunishable	 and	 unforgivable,	 arguing	 that	 ‘these	 deeds	 def[y]	 the	 possibility	 of	
human	punishment’110	 and	 ‘explode	 the	 frame	of	our	 legal	 institutions.’111	 For	Nino,	
radical	 evil	 involves	 ‘offences	 against	 human	 dignity	 so	 widespread,	 persistent,	 and	
organized	 that	normal	moral	 assessment	 seems	 inappropriate.’112	 	Osiel	 agrees:	 ‘the	
intellectual	architects	of	administrative	massacre	may	possess	an	evil	so	“radical”	as	to	
exceed	our	capacity	to	punish	it’.113		He	elaborates	‘[b]ecause	we	possess	no	punishment	
more	severe	than	execution,	we	have	none	that	captures	and	corresponds	to	the	full	
severity	of	the	wrongdoer’s	acts	in	such	cases.		Because	his	evil	is	so	“radical”,	it	mocks	
our	efforts	 to	punish	 it.’114	As	Arendt	points	out,	however,	 ‘this	 [cannot]	conceivably	
mean	 that	 he	 who	 ha[s]	 murdered	 millions	 should	 for	 this	 very	 reason	 escape	
punishment.’115	
	
The	 sentencing	 options	 available	 to	 the	 ICC	 immediately	 reveal	 just	 how	 rooted	 the	
Court	 is	 in	 the	domestic	 criminal	 law	of	 liberal	western	 justice	 systems.	 	 There	were	
heated	 debates	 at	 the	 Rome	 Conference	 on	 both	 capital	 punishment	 and	 life	
imprisonment;	the	debate	on	capital	punishment,	according	to	Schabas,	‘threatened	to	
undo	the	Rome	Conference.’116	Many	states	opposed	life	imprisonment	on	the	grounds	
that	 it	 ‘neglected	 rehabilitation’,	 was	 ‘cruel,	 inhuman	 and	 degrading’	 and	 was	
‘prohibited	by	principles	of	 international	human	 rights	 law’.117	 Eventually	 agreement	
was	reached	but	the	‘price	to	be	exacted	for	a	consensus	on	excluding	the	death	penalty	
was	to	be	provisions	on	imprisonment	that	were	far	more	rigorous	than	many	states	
would	have	liked.’118	
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The	 Court	 can	 sentence	 an	 offender	 to	 a	maximum	of	 30	 years	 custody119	with	 the	
possibility	of	‘life	imprisonment	when	justified	by	the	extreme	gravity	of	the	crime	and	
the	individual	circumstances	of	the	convicted	person’.120	In	sentencing,	the	Court	must	
take	into	account	mitigating121	or	aggravating122	factors	and	the	sentence	must	‘reflect	
the	 culpability’	 and	 ‘consider	 the	 circumstances’	 of	 the	 convicted	 person	 and	 the	
crime.123	Schabas	argues,	the	ICC’s	sentencing	options	fail:		
	
to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 essential	 and	 fundamental	 aggravating	
circumstance,	namely	that	the	offences	[…]	are	crimes	against	humanity	or	
war	crimes.	The	[ICC	has]	been	created	precisely	to	deal	with	crimes	that	are	
inherently	 more	 serious	 than	 the	 underlying	 common	 law	 offences	
committed	 in	 peacetime.	 	 If	 the	 crimes	 are	 not	 the	 same,	 why	 should	
sentences	be	the	same?124	
	
Indeed,	Ku	and	Nzelibe	have	found	from	their	study	of	data	relating	to	‘coup	plotters	in	
Africa’125	 that	 in	 those	 regions,	 rather	 than	 ‘perpetrators	 operat[ing]	 in	 a	 culture	 of	
impunity	 …	 [they]	 routinely	 face	 sanctions	 which	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 more	 severe	 and	
certain’	than	any	imposed	by	the	ICC.126	For	perpetrators	of		international	crimes,	it	has	
been	 suggested	 that	a	 trial	 and	 sentencing	at	 the	 ICC	may	be	 the	preferable	option,	
especially	when	taking	account	of	the	better	detention	facilities,	access	to	funds	for	legal	
representation,	high	welfare	standards	and	guaranteed	due	process.	Stahn	states	that	
the	‘transfer	of	defendants	to	‘The	Hague’	is	often	perceived	as	a	reward	rather	than	as	
a	punishment	by	victims	or	even	defendants’,	who	prefer	to	be	tried	at	the	ICC	rather	
than	domestically.127		
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Without	proposing	any	alternative,	Drumbl	complains	that	 ‘despite	the	extraordinary	
nature	 of	 this	 criminality’	 punishment	 is	 	 ‘disappointingly	 ordinary’128	 and	
‘uninspiring’129	as	it	‘overwhelmingly	takes	the	form	of	incarceration	in	accordance	with	
the	classic	penitentiary	model.’130	 	He	 laments	that	the	 ‘“enemy	of	all	humankind”	 is	
punished	no	differently	than	a	car	thief,	armed	robber	or	cop	killer’131	and	finds	it	absurd	
that	 ‘[l]egal	 scholars	 have	 demarcated	 normative	 differences	 between	 extraordinary	
crimes	against	the	world	community	and	ordinary	crimes	against	the	local	community’	
and	yet	are	‘largely	content	to	subject	both	to	the	same	process.’132		In	answer	to	this	
criticism,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	very	banality	of	incarceration	for	years	is	its	power,	
removing	the	perpetrator	from	society	and	at	the	same	time	forestalling	any	suggestion	
of	martyrdom.	
	
When	 reflecting	 on	 the	 sentencing	 of	 international	 crimes	 of	 ‘enormous	 moral,	
historical,	or	political	significance’,133	Koskenniemi	remarks	‘if	the	trial	has	significance,	
then	that	significance	must	lie	elsewhere	than	in	the	punishment	handed	out’.134		In	fact,	
there	 does	 exist	 some	 evidence	 that	 international	 justice	 can	 contribute	 to	
incapacitation	in	the	form	of	assisting	in	the	de-legitimatisation	of	politics.		For	example,	
because	 he	 had	 been	 indicted	 by	 the	 ICTY,	 Radovan	 Karadžić	 was	 prevented	 from	
participating	in	the	1995	Dayton	Peace	Talks,	which	‘clearly	reduced	[his]	influence	on	
the	General	Framework	Agreement	for	Peace	in	BiH’.135		Furthermore,	an	expert	study	
in	2008	on	the	 impact	of	the	ICTY	found	that	the	proceedings	and	evidence	adduced	
‘significantly	‘shrunk	the	public	space’	in	which	political	leaders	could	credibly	deny	the	
truth	 about	 notorious	 atrocities’136	 for	 example,	 the	 number	 of	 victims	 killed	 in	
Srebrenica.	
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In	 this	 section,	 the	 discussion	 has	 highlighted	 the	 perceived	 inadequacy	 of	 the	
sentencing	 options	 available	 to	 the	 ICC	 given	 the	 heinous	 nature	 of	 the	 crimes	 it	 is	
dealing	with.		However,	in	the	absence	of	rational	alternatives	which	could	satisfy	these	
criticisms,	it	can	simply	be	argued	that	long	term	incarceration	is	a	serious	punishment	
which	diminishes	the	power	of	offenders	by	removing	them	from	the	formerly	abused	
community.	
	
In	the	next	section,	the	domestic	sentencing	function	of	rehabilitation	will	be	discussed	
to	ascertain	its	relevance	in	the	context	of	ICJ.	
	
Part	Four:	Rehabilitation	and	the	ICC	
	
Again,	the	rehabilitation	of	offenders	was	not	specifically	mentioned	by	Mr	Annan	as	an	
ICJ	objective	of	criminal	prosecutions	at	the	ICC.		However,	it	is	an	important	feature	of	
criminal	trials	in	the	domestic	criminal	justice	scenario,	which	thus	makes	this	aim	a	valid	
consideration	 when	 scaling	 up	 to	 international	 criminal	 trials.	 	 Rehabilitation	 of	 an	
offender	 focuses	 on	 their	 re-education	 and	 re-integration	 into	 society	 on	 the	
assumption	 that	 they	 acknowledge	 the	 error	 of	 their	ways	 and	 intend	 to	 adhere	 to	
accepted	social	norms.	However,	this	assumption	can	be	challenged	when,	rather	than	
an	offender	acknowledging	his	wrongdoing	and	wishing	to	atone,	the	retributive	process	
fosters	a	defensive	attitude	with	the	offender	denying	involvement,	disputing	evidence	
and	ignoring	the	harm	caused.137		
	
Some	international	and	regional	HR	instruments	stipulate	that	rehabilitation	should	be	
one	of	the	primary	concerns	for	a	sentencing	court	138	but	in	the	context	of	international	
crimes,	the	weight	given	to	rehabilitative	factors	may	be	limited.		The	RSt	makes	almost	
no	reference	to	the	purpose	of	sentencing139	and	during	the	drafting	of	the	RSt,	 ‘the	
issue	 of	 objectives	 in	 sentencing	 was	 rarely	 if	 ever	 considered’.140	 Certainly,	
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rehabilitation	is	not	mentioned	in	the	RSt	nor	 in	the	sentencing	decisions	 in	Lubanga	
and	Katanga.		
	
To	 Henman,	 this	 demonstrates	 ‘that	 the	 overriding	 sentiment	 of	 punishment	 in	 the	
international	arena	consists	of	revenge	and	retribution	tempered	by	poorly	articulated	
allusions	to	deterrence	(and	occasionally	rehabilitation	and	reconciliation)’.141	Although	
he	does	add	that	‘[w]here	sentences	fall	short	of	retributive	expectations	they	may	be	
rationalised	in	terms	of	rehabilitation	and	reconciliation.’142		
	
For	many,	restorative	justice	is	a	viable	alternative	to	retributive	justice	and	would	more	
successfully	achieve	the	rehabilitation	of	offenders.		Braithwaite,	a	vociferous	supporter	
of	 restorative	 justice,	 argues	 that	 ‘reintegrative	 shaming’	 is	 a	 key	 feature	 and	 the	
rehabilitation	of	offenders	can	be	achieved	more	successfully	by	instilling	shame	rather	
than	imposing	guilt.143		Drumbl	suggests	that	whilst	Braithwaite	‘does	not	contemplate	
the	extension	of	shame-based	restorative	justice	to	“radical	evil”	[his]	work	provides	a	
new	lens	through	which	to	assess	and	approach'	its	criminality.144				
	
The	main	issue	affecting	rehabilitation	is	the	scale	and	nature	of	the	crimes	committed,	
which	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 repeated	upon	 the	 offender’s	 eventual	 release	 from	prison	
which	 renders	 rehabilitation	 a	 secondary	 consideration	 to	 retribution	 and	 general	
deterrence	so	far	as	trials	at	the	ICC	are	concerned.	
	
Part	Five:	Securing	Justice	and	Dignity	for	Victims	
	
Securing	justice	and	dignity	for	the	victims	of	abuses	is	a	fundamental	and	constant	aim	
of	 TJ	 and	 it	 has	 been	 stated	 that	 prosecutions	 and	 punishment	 of	 offenders	 give	
significance	to	victims’	suffering	and	serve	as	a	partial	remedy	by	helping	to	restore	their	
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dignity.145		However,	a	victim	faced	with	an	offender	who	refuses	to	accept	responsibility	
for	his	crimes,	even	after	conviction	in	some	cases,	could	instead	suffer	renewed	anger	
and	resentment	towards	the	offender	and	perhaps	even	towards	society	at	large	for	the	
perceived	failure	of	the	justice	system,	which	can	then	reinforce	feelings	of	victimhood	
and	powerlessness.146	
	
Furthermore,	 the	 distance	 of	 the	 court	 from	 the	 victim’s	 home	 and	 location	 of	 the	
atrocities	suffered	could	lead	to	the	victim/witness	feeling	isolated,	especially	given	the	
‘length	 and	 slow	pace	of	 proceedings	 [which]	has	become	a	 feature	of	 international	
criminal	 justice.’147	 Notwithstanding	 the	 ‘familiarisation’	 process	 offered	 by	 court	
staff,148	the	strangeness	of	the	formal	procedure,	atmosphere	and	language	of	the	ICC	
could	 give	 rise	 to	 feelings	 of	 insecurity,	 intimidation	 and	mistrust.149	 	 These	 feelings	
could	then	be	compounded	by	the	trial	process	which	focusses	on	the	defendant	and	
his	 or	 her	 rights	 of	 due	 process	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 victim,	whose	 role	 is	 purely	 as	 a	
witness	 for	 the	 prosecution.	 	 The	 lack	 of	 opportunity	 for	 the	 victim	 to	 narrate	 their	
experience	 in	 their	 own	words,	 to	 be	 constrained	 to	 yes	 or	 no	 answers	 by	 lawyers	
seeking	 to	 ensure	 the	 victim	 adheres	 to	 their	 script	 for	 proving	 or	 disproving	 the	
defendant’s	guilt	and	to	be	subject	to	evidential	rules	on	what	is	admissible	and	what	is	
not,	 could	be	 frustrating	and	bewildering	 for	victims	and	could	seriously	hamper	 the	
ICC’s	efforts	to	engender	in	them	a	sense	of	justice	and	dignity.			
	
It	is	argued	that	justice	and	dignity	for	victims	can	be	attained	by	less	formal	transitional	
justice	methods,	such	as	truth-telling	and	reparations.		Stahn	argues,	for	example,	that	
‘for	many	victims,	concrete	factual	elements	such	as	the	finding	and	recovery	of	bodies	
or	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	 specific	 facts,	 are	 often	more	 important	 than	 elaborate	
procedural	or	legal	assessments.’	150		It	is	suggested	therefore	that	prosecutions	at	the	
ICC	may	not	be	the	most	effective	way	of	achieving	this	particular	ICJ	objective.	
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 Part	Six:	Establishing	a	Past	Record	of	Events	
	
It	 is	 generally	 accepted	 that	 a	major	 contribution	 to	 peace	 and	 reconciliation	 is	 the	
establishment	of	a	full	and	comprehensive	historical	record	of	the	HR	violations	suffered	
by	victims	of	mass	atrocities.		Fletcher	and	Weinstein	confirm	that	‘transitional	justice	
scholars	 largely	 agree	 that	 a	 necessary	 foundation	 for	 healing	 a	 society	 that	 has	
experienced	mass	violence	is	learning	the	truth	about	what	happened’151	and	they	list	
the	salutary	effects	of	publicising	the	truth	as	‘includ[ing]	countering	and	condemning	
prior	 denials	 or	 partial	 disclosures	 of	 abuses	 and	 creating	 a	 new,	 authoritative	 and	
impartial	 record	 about	 the	 past	 that	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 a	 new	 national	
consensus.’152	Bassiouni	argues	that	‘central	truths	must	be	established	to	provide	an	
historic	 record	 to	 mitigate	 feelings	 of	 revenge,	 to	 educate	 and	 to	 prevent	 future	
victimization’.153		
	
There	is	wide	academic	support	for	the	capacity	of	trials	to	establish	a	past	record	of	
events.	 	 Cassese	 states	 that	 trial	 justice	 establishes	 a	 full	 record	 of	 atrocities	 and	
precludes	societal	amnesia	which	he	argues,	is	wrong	both	morally	and	practically,	as	
victims	themselves	do	not	forget	and	their	memories	can	fester.154	Booth	also	endorses	
the	commemorative	potential	of	international	courts’	capacity	to	build	an	objective	and	
impartial	record	of	events.155	Orentlicher	insists	that	‘the	most	authoritative	rendering	
of	the	truth	is	possible	only	as	a	result	of	a	judicial	enquiry,	and	major	prosecutions	can	
generate	a	comprehensive	record	of	past	violations.’156	Scharf	agrees	that	‘[w]hile	there	
are	various	means	to	develop	the	historic	record	of	such	abuses,	the	most	authoritative	
rendering	of	the	truth	is	only	possible	through	a	trial	that	accords	full	due	process.’157		
Wilson	also	 suggests	 that	 the	 ‘long-held	 assumption	…	 that	 courts	 are	 inappropriate	
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venues	 to	 construct	 wide-ranging	 historical	 explanations	 of	 past	 conflicts’	 can	 be	
challenged.158			
	
The	doubt	about	a	criminal	trial	being	the	appropriate	and	best	forum	for	producing	a	
full	 and	 comprehensive	 record	 lies	 in	 the	 obvious	 tension	 between	 the	 accurate	
recording	of	history	and	the	task	of	conducting	the	trial,	with	its	demands	of	due	process	
and	its	focus	on	the	defendant.		Arendt	is	clear	that	‘[t]he	purpose	of	a	trial	is	to	render	
justice	and	nothing	else’159	and	any	other	 task	 ‘can	only	detract	 from	the	 law’s	main	
business:	 to	 weigh	 the	 charges	 …	 to	 render	 judgment	 and	 to	 mete	 out	 due	
punishment.’160		
	
Aukerman	 considers	 a	 prosecution	 to	 be,	 at	 best,	 an	 imperfect	means	 to	 develop	 a	
complete	record	of	the	past.161	Clark	agrees	that	‘[t]rial	“truths”	can	be	partial	and	can	
get	lost	in	the	morass	of	juridical	and	evidentiary	detail’.162	Likewise,	Minow	warns	that	
‘[h]istory	 is	 never	 one	 story,	 and	 the	 telling	 of	 history	 involves	 a	 certain	 settling	 of	
accounts.’163	For	Koskenniemi,	there	is	a	‘difficulty	in	grappling	with	large	political	crises	
by	means	of	 individual	 responsibility	 [which]	 gives	 reasons	 to	question	 the	ability	of	
criminal	 trial	 [sic]	 to	 express	 or	 conserve	 the	 ‘truth’	 of	 a	 complex	 series	 of	 events	
involving	the	often	erratic	action	by	major	international	players’.164		
	
International	trials	often	use	historical	knowledge	to	support	evidence	and	examine	the	
broader	questions	of	why	a	conflict	occurred	at	a	particular	place	and	time	and	between	
specific	 groups.	 	 Oral	 evidence	 on	 the	 historical	 background	 from	 expert	 witnesses	
enables	judges	to	understand	the	history	and	culture	of	the	region	in	which	the	alleged	
crimes	were	committed	and	also	to	satisfy	the	definitions	of	the	 international	crimes	
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charged.165	For	Wilson,	the	result	can	give	‘an	authoritative	account’166	which	is	‘much	
more	comprehensive	in	scope’	than	anything	which	would	be	produced	in	a	domestic	
trial	 of	 mass	 atrocities.167	 	 He	 concedes,	 however,	 that	 the	 history	 does	 not	 satisfy	
everyone.168	What	 is	 accepted	as	 the	 truth	depends	on	 the	particular	 viewpoint	and	
there	may	be	not	just	one	truth	but	several,	as	Clark	found	in	her	research	in	BiH	‘where	
essentially	three	competing	versions	of	truth	exist’.169		As	Stahn	explains	‘[f]act-finding	
is	often	a	judgement	of	probability	in	a	criminal	process,	based	on	competing	narratives	
–	and	sometimes	different	layers	of	‘truth’.’170		Fletcher	and	Weinstein	appear	to	think	
it	naive	to	believe	that	international	criminal	trials	confer	heightened	legitimacy	to	the	
truth	or	that	the	judicial	record	will	outweigh	individual	and	group	rationalisations	for	
an	alternative	 interpretation	of	the	past	based	upon	philosophical,	moral,	or	political	
allegiances.171		
	
Ultimately,	Clark	argues,	what	is	important	is	‘not	whether	trials	can	establish	the	truth,	
whether	 they	can	and	should	create	a	historical	 record	or	whether	 trial	 truths	…	are	
sufficiently	 comprehensive	 …	 [but]	 whether	 those	 truths	 are	 accepted	 and	
internalized.’172	She	adds,	‘[h]owever	thorough	and	meticulous	the	Tribunal’s	judgments	
are,	they	cannot	combat	the	problem	of	denial	unless	people	are	ready	to	accept	the	
‘truth’	 and	 there	 are	 many	 …	 who	 are	 not.’173	 Ignatief	 agrees	 that	 ‘[r]esistance	 to	
historical	truth	is	a	function	of	group	identity’174	which	is	why	a	society	is	‘so	vehemently	
“in	denial”	about	facts	evident	to	everyone	outside	the	society.		War	crimes	challenge	
collective	moral	identities	and	when	these	identities	are	threatened,	denial	is	actually	a	
defence	of	everything	one	holds	dear.’175				
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Thus,	 despite	Wilson’s	 assertion	 that	 the	 definition	 and	 application	 of	 international	
crimes	 ‘have	elevated	 the	place	of	history	and	context	 in	 the	decisions,	 reports,	and	
judgments	 of	 international	 courts’	 and	 ‘alter[ed]	 the	 relationship	 between	 law	 and	
history’,176	it	appears	that	the	obstacle	for	the	ICC	in	creating	an	acceptable	and	accurate	
historical	record	is	that	‘judicial	truths’	established	during	a	trial	can	be	very	different	
from	 ‘local	 truths’,	 which	 again	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 ICJ.	 	 ICL	 seeks	 to	
individualise	roles	and	responsibility	so	selective	evidence	is	presented	to	support	either	
the	prosecution	or	the	defence	version	of	events.	Judicial	fact-finding	is	hampered	by	
the	realities	of	evidential	inconsistencies	and	competing	narratives	especially	as	the	ICC	
predominantly	 relies	 on	 eye-witness	 testimony	 which	 can	 be	 affected	 by	 practical	
difficulties	 arising	 from	educational,	 cultural	 or	 linguistic	 differences.	 	 For	 Stahn,	 the	
answer	is	‘to	make	‘best	use’	of	the	virtues	of	judicial	fact-finding’177	which,	he	suggests,	
would	entail	sharing	all	the	evidence	obtained	with	domestic	jurisdictions	or	other	fact-
finding	bodies	and	a	post-trial	analysis	of	judicial	records	to	make	them	fully	accessible	
for	future	research.178		
	
Part	Seven:	Promoting	National	Reconciliation	
	
The	ICJ	aims	of	securing	justice	and	dignity	for	victims	and	establishing	a	record	of	events	
(discussed	in	the	previous	two	sections)	are	integral	to	requirement	that	trials	at	the	ICC	
should	 promote	 national	 reconciliation,	 a	 goal	 which	 ‘exemplifies	 our	 increasing	
expectations	of	war	crimes	tribunals’.179		However	it	is	difficult	to	quantify	whether	and	
to	what	extent	the	ICC	has	a	beneficial	influence	on	community	healing180	and	the	repair	
of	relationships	which,	for	the	purposes	of	the	discussion	in	this	section,	are	equated	
with	national	reconciliation.			
	
In	support,	Cassese	argues	that	justice	in	the	form	of	criminal	prosecutions	facilitates	
reconciliation	181	and	Landsman	suggests	that	‘prosecution	may	be	essential	to	healing	
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the	social	wounds	caused	by	serious	human	rights	violations’	because	‘society	cannot	
forgive	what	it	cannot	punish’.182	Osiel	believes	legal	proceedings	‘produce	the	kind	of	
solidarity	 embodied	 in	 the	 increasingly	 respectful	 way	 that	 citizens	 can	 come	 to	
acknowledge	 the	 differing	 views	 of	 their	 fellows’.183	 For	 Robinson,	 prosecutions	 can	
facilitate	reconciliation	and	nation-building	by	stigmatising	and	removing	perpetrators	
of	human	rights	violations	and	mass	atrocities	from	society	thus	providing	victims	with	
the	 sense	 that	 justice	 has	 been	 done,	 which	 he	 considers	 ‘a	 precondition	 for	 real	
reconciliation’.184			
	
Some	maintain	that	trials	can	aid	reconciliation	by	establishing	the	truth185	but	reflecting	
the	discussion	in	the	previous	section,	Ignatief	argues	it	 is	‘open	to	question	whether	
justice	and	truth	actually	heals’	since	‘[e]very	society	[…]	manages	to	function	with	only	
the	 most	 precarious	 purchase	 on	 the	 truth	 of	 its	 own	 past.186	 	 Reconciliation	 pre-
supposes	a	community’s	willingness	to	enquire	into	its	own	collective	responsibility	but	
it	 can	 take	 a	 long	 time	 for	 a	 society	 to	 recognise	 the	moral	 wrong	 committed	 and	
condemn	 its	 own	 involvement	 in	 it,	 if	 ever.187	 Ignatief	 argues	 ‘[t]he	 idea	 that	
reconciliation	depends	on	shared	truth	presumes	that	shared	truth	about	 the	past	 is	
possible’.188	 Making	 a	 similar	 point	 to	 Clark	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 section,189	
Ignatief	insists	that	it	is	essential	to	‘keep	justice	separate	from	reconciliation’	because	
although	justice	[…]	will	serve	the	interests	of	truth	[…]	the	truth	will	not	necessarily	be	
believed	and	it	is	putting	too	much	faith	in	truth	to	believe	that	it	can	heal’.190			
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Indeed,	Stover	and	Weinstein	found	that	rather	than	effecting	reconciliation,	trials	often	
divided	and	exacerbated	suspicion	and	fear	within	small,	multi-ethnic	communities.191	
Ignatief	 agrees	 that	 the	 Balkan	 war	 ‘created	 communities	 of	 fear,	 and	 these	
communities	cannot	conceive	of	sharing	a	common	truth	–	and	a	common	responsibility	
–	with	their	enemies	until	they	are	less	afraid’.192	The	research	in	the	Balkans	reveals	
that	one	potential	problem	for	the	ICC	is	that	the	attitudes	of	individuals	are	shaped	by	
group	 identity	 and	 perception	 of	 victimhood,	 which	 holding	 particular	 individuals	
responsible	for	mass	HR	abuses	does	not	address.		For	Drumbl,	‘the	structural	simplicity	
avidly	pursued	by	the	prevailing	paradigm	of	prosecution	and	punishment	may	squeeze	
out	 the	 complexity	 and	 dissensus	 central	 to	 meaningful	 processes	 of	 justice	 and	
reconciliation.’193	Indeed,	the	underlying	issues	of	group	solidarities	and	group	conflicts	
may	even	 contribute	 to	 the	myth	of	 collective	 innocence	plus	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 an	
acquittal	might	easily	be	mistaken	for	innocence,	which	could	increase	tensions.194	As	
Stahn	says	 ‘judicial	 fact	 finding	and	outreach	alone	do	not	achieve	reconciliation	and	
may	even	cause	deeper	divisions.’	195	
	
Akhavan	suggests	that	‘the	symbolic	effect	of	prosecuting	even	a	limited	number	of	the	
perpetrators,	especially	 the	 leaders	who	planned	and	 instigated	the	genocide,	would	
have	considerable	 impact	on	national	 reconciliation’196	but	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 the	
absence	of	‘viable	benchmarks’197	by	which	to	assess	the	court’s	performance,	makes	
this	 objective	 of	 ICJ	 ‘the	 most	 contentious	 […and]	 one	 of	 the	 least	 explored	
empirically.’198	 Reliance	 on	 the	 research	 conducted	 by	 Stover	 and	Weinstein	 in	 BiH	
would	tend	to	suggest	the	ICC	would	underachieve	in	this	role,	as	they	found	‘no	direct	
link	 between	 criminal	 trials	 (international,	 national,	 and	 local/traditional)	 and	
reconciliation’	 because	 ‘survivors	 rarely,	 if	 ever,	 connected	 retributive	 justice	 with	
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reconciliation’	which	they	viewed	as	‘mostly	a	personal	matter	to	be	settled	between	
individuals’.199			
	
Part	Eight:	Re-Establishing	the	Rule	of	Law	
	
Promoting	the	rule	of	law	as	a	value	in	itself	is	argued	to	be	of	fundamental	importance	
in	 a	 society	 previously	 stricken	 by	 mass	 atrocities	 and	 gross	 HR	 abuses,	 as	 holding	
violators	accountable	 for	 their	misdeeds	makes	 clear	 to	 ‘all	members	of	 society	 that	
law’s	 authority	 is	 superior	 to	 that	 of	 individuals’	 and	 that	 no	 prerogatives	 attach	 to	
individuals	merely	 because	 of	 status	 or	 position.’200	 Expressivists	 argue	 that	 trials	 of	
offenders	 encourages	 public	 respect	 for	 the	 law201	 and	 their	 punishment	 sends	 a	
message	 of	 condemnation	 of	 their	 acts	 which	 instils	 important	 moral	 values	 into	
society.202	 Drumbl	 argues	 that	 although	 expressivist	 theory	 prioritises	 the	 message	
communicated	by	trials	and	convictions,	punishment	‘communicates	meaning	…	about	
power,	 authority,	 legitimacy,	 normality,	 personhood,	 social	 relations,	 and	 a	 host	 of	
other	tangential	matters’	and	operates	as	a	moral	educator	by	sending	the	message	that	
‘the	law	is	to	be	taken	seriously.’203		
	
Orentlicher	suggests	that	individual	accountability	for	breaches	of	the	law	upholds	the	
regularity,	stability	and	adherence	to	settled	law	that	the	rule	of	law	requires,	whereas	
‘a	complete	failure	of	enforcement	vitiates	the	authority	of	law	itself,	sapping	its	power	
to	deter	proscribed	conduct.’204		Fletcher	and	Weinstein	contend	that	trials	are	powerful	
and	effective	symbols	of	a	new	government’s	intent	to	both	break	with	and	confront	the	
past,	‘because	a	legitimate	judicial	process	is	the	antithesis	of	violence’	and	the	judicial	
process	 re-establishes	 ‘the	 orderly	 function	 of	 the	 civil	 state’.205	 	 Additionally,	
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prosecutions	 establish	 ‘the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 new	 democratic	 government,	
demonstrating	that	it	respects	HR	and	the	rule	of	law.’206	
	
The	UNSG’s	2004	Report	links	the	concepts	of	transitional	justice	and	the	rule	of	law:	
	
Our	 experience	 in	 the	 past	 decade	 has	 demonstrated	 clearly	 that	 the	
consolidation	of	peace	in	the	immediate	post-conflict	period,	as	well	as	the	
maintenance	 of	 peace	 in	 the	 long	 term,	 cannot	 be	 achieved	 unless	 the	
population	is	confident	that	redress	for	grievances	can	be	obtained	through	
legitimate	 structures	 for	 the	peaceful	 settlement	of	 disputes	 and	 the	 fair	
administration	of	justice.207	
	
However,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 ICC	must	 conform	 to	 powerful	 global	 and	 local	 political	
interests	adversely	affects	perceptions	that	the	ICC	can	facilitate	global	 justice	or	the	
rule	 of	 law.208	 	 For	 example,	 the	 United	 States,	 despite	 not	 being	 a	 SP	 exercises	 a	
‘disproportionate	influence’	on	prosecutorial	policy	as	was	noted	when	the	ICC	delayed	
issuing	 indictments	 in	 the	 Libyan	 situation	until	 after	 the	2011	North	Atlantic	 Treaty	
Organization-led	military	operation	in	that	country.209		Likewise,	the	ICC’s	concentration	
on	one	side	of	a	conflict	only,	despite	both	being	responsible	for	international	crimes	(as	
in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 LRA	 and	 the	 Ugandan	 government)	 serves	 to	 demonstrate	
unacceptable	selectivity	by	the	ICC,	which	disregards	justice	and	the	rule	of	law.210	
	
Some	‘liberal	proponents	of	the	ICC’	take	the	long-term	view	of	the	court	as	‘helping	to	
build	a	global	rule	of	law	in	which	criminal	violence	will	be	punished	today	for	the	sake	
of	preventing	it	in	the	future.’211	Whilst	alternative	justice	mechanisms	may	better	the	
ICC	in,	for	example,	truth-telling	capacity	or	censure	of	an	offender	at	 local	 level,	the	
global	 reach	 of	 legal	 proceedings	 at	 the	 ICC	 may	 possibly	 serve	 the	 wider	 didactic	
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purpose	of	asserting	the	importance	of	law,	stigmatising	offenders	and	highlighting	the	
fact	of	justice	being	seen	to	be	done.			
	
Part	Nine:	Contributing	to	the	Restoration	of	Peace	
	
The	contribution	of	the	ICC	to	the	restoration	of	peace	has	been	an	area	of	considerable	
debate	among	practitioners	and	scholars	 in	the	field	of	transitional	 justice	and	in	the	
UNGA,	UNSC,	AU	and	ICC	ASP.212	Advocates	of	ICJ	extol	the	positives	of	the	ICC	collecting	
information	and	monitoring	situations,	motivating	rebels	to	negotiate	peace,	isolating	
indicted	 individuals	and	 ‘its	capacity	 to	diffuse	potentially	 tense	situations	that	could	
lead	to	violence	by	setting	a	clear	line	of	accountability.’213		Peace	can	be	guaranteed,	
they	contend,	‘by	applying	criminal	law	to	individuals	in	such	a	way	that	ends	current	
episodes	of	violence	and	prevents	future	episodes	from	occurring.’214	
	
For	some,	however,	 it	 is	 inconceivable	that	the	 ICC,	simply	by	 imitating	the	domestic	
criminal	law	objective	of	ensuring	peace	within	a	community	through	the	prosecution	
and	punishment	of	transgressors,	will	contribute	meaningfully	to	the	aim	of	ensuring	
global	peace.215		Indeed,	Branch	argues	that	by	targeting	its	prosecutions	in	a	manner	
which	reflects	‘the	Prosecutor’s	own	pragmatic	self-interest’	and	‘international	power	
inequalities’,	 the	 ICC	 institutionalises	 conflict	 rather	 than	 global	 liberal	 peace.216	 For	
Branch,	 ‘the	 insistence	 that	 international	 criminal	 prosecutions	 will	 spread	 liberal,	
peaceful	 communities	within	 states,	 as	global	norms	 triumph	over	national	 and	 sub-
national	identities’	is	unconvincing	because	the	‘assumption	that	a	global	identity	based	
on	adherence	to	certain	liberal	norms	will	expand	and	consolidate	through	criminal	trials	
fails	to	recognize	[…]	the	collective	and	structural	character	of	mass	violence.’217	
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It	certainly	can	be	argued	that	the	ICC’s	mandate,	which	requires	it	to	‘engage	in	judicial	
proceedings	 […]	 even	 before	 [conflicts]	 have	 ended’218	 far	 from	 contributing	 to	 the	
ending	of	an	ongoing	conflict,	can	prolong	hostilities	as	leaders	hold	on	to	power	and	
continue	 fighting	 precisely	 to	 avoid	 being	 brought	 to	 justice.219	 The	 case	 of	 Uganda	
demonstrates	this	point,	for	although	ICC	intervention	is	credited	with	bringing	the	LRA	
to	the	negotiating	table	in	Juba,	the	issue	of	arrest	warrants	for	LRA	leaders	is	blamed	
for	the	subsequent	failure	of	the	peace	talks	and	for	renewed	violence.220		However,	a	
2007	OTP	policy	paper	emphasised	‘there	is	a	difference	between	the	interests	of	justice	
and	the	interests	of	peace’	and	the	latter	is	not	part	of	the	Prosecutor’s	mandate.	221	
Furthermore,	as	Fatou	Bensouda	reiterated	in	2013,	any	peace	initiative	must	conform	
to	the	RSt.222		Indeed,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	‘very	idea	[…]	that	a	criminal	court	
should	 have	 anything	 to	 do	 with	 issues	 of	 peace	 and	 security	 is	 rather	 strange’,223	
because	requiring	the	Prosecutor	to	make	decisions	based	on	political	factors,	such	as	
peace	 and	 security	 undermines	 the	 perception	 and	 reality	 of	 the	 Prosecutor	 as	 an	
independent	organ	beyond	political	influence.		
	
It	is	difficult	to	quantify	whether	and	to	what	extent	the	ICC	has	a	beneficial	influence	
on	the	establishment	of	regional	peace.224	Although	a	consequence	of	ICC	involvement	
can	have	a	destabilising	effect	on	a	fragile	post-conflict	peace	by	worsening	divisions	
between	communities	and	hindering	reconciliation,225	its	intervention	has	been	said	to	
have	produced	a	range	of	different	effects	on	domestic	communities,	in	some	situations,	
predominantly	 shaping	political	discourse	or	changing	 the	political	 landscape.	 	 In	 the	
DRC	in	2007,	for	example,	there	was	talk	of	possible	amnesties	for	senior	commanders	
to	encourage	demobilisation	of	armed	groups	but	following	discussions	with	the	OTP,	a	
clause	excluding	amnesties	for	RSt	crimes	was	incorporated	into	the	January	2008	Goma	
																																																						
218	Moreno	Ocampo,	L.	(2007)	‘Transitional	justice	in	ongoing	conflicts’	1	IJTJ	p8-9	
219	Damaska,	M.	(2008)	‘What	is	the	point	of	International	Criminal	Justice?’		Chi.-Kent	LR	p329-365	at	p332.		Sudan	
is	another	example.	The	indictment	of	President	Bashir	halted	peace	talks	and	led	to	renewed	violence.			
220	Keller,	L.M.	(2007-8)	p217	
221	ICC-OTP	(2007)	‘Policy	Paper	on	the	Interests	of	Justice’	September	p1	
222	Bensouda,	F.	(2013)	
223	Fletcher,	G.P.	and	Ohlin,	J.D.	(2006)	‘The	ICC	–	Two	Courts	in	One?’	4	JICJ	pp428-433	at	p433	(emphasis	in	
original)	
224	Stahn,	C.	(2012)	p278	
225	Rodman,	K.A	(2014)	‘Justice	as	a	Dialogue	Between	Law	and	Politics:	Embedding	the	International	Criminal	Court	
within	Conflict	Management	and	Peacebuilding’	12	JICJ	pp437-469	at	p443		
	 87	
Peace	Agreement.226		This	exclusion	of	amnesties	for	RSt	crimes	was	repeated	in	the	CAR	
Global	 Peace	 Agreement	 following	 conversations	 between	 the	 OTP	 and	 the	 main	
negotiators	in	June	2008.227		Furthermore,	HRW	noted	that	the	prosecution	of	Lubanga	
led	to	the	demobilisation	of	child	soldiers	by	a	CAR	rebel	group228	and	in	the	DRC,	HRW	
observers	 ‘noted	 the	 enormous	 educational	 impact	 of	 the	 Lubanga	 case’.229		
Additionally,	the	2007	post-election	violence	in	Kenya	was	not	repeated	after	the	2013	
elections,	which	some	have	attributed	to	the	involvement	of	the	ICC.230	
	
Thus,	although	serious	misgivings	exist	concerning	the	capacity	of	the	ICC	to	contribute	
to	the	restoration	of	peace	and	the	risk	of	politicisation	of	the	court	as	it	seeks	to	satisfy	
this	part	of	its	mandate,	it	seems	that	the	existence	and	involvement	of	the	ICC	can	have	
positive	effects	in	some	situations.		
	
Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	has	demonstrated	that	the	ICC	has	been	tasked	with	a	range	of	goals,	some	
of	which	may	be	unachievable	 in	certain	contexts.	 	Furthermore,	several	of	the	goals	
conflict.		There	is	tension,	for	example,	between	producing	an	accurate	historical	record	
and	individualising	guilt;	between	bringing	perpetrators	to	justice	and	ending	a	conflict;	
between	 prosecuting	 those	 ‘most	 responsible’	 and	 acknowledging	 collective	
responsibility	 and	between	protecting	 the	 rights	of	 the	Defendant	and	 satisfying	 the	
demands	of	victims.	
	
For	Tallgren,	the	system	of	ICJ	‘has	no	proper	justification	of	its	own’	and	uses	the	same	
methods	as	domestic	justice	systems:	proscription,	determination	of	responsibility	and	
the	intentional	infliction	of	pain,	which	makes	it	‘an	extension,	by	delegation,	of	state	
power	 to	 determine	 criminal	 law	 norms	 and	 to	 punish.’231	 	 Examination	 of	 ICJ’s	
																																																						
226	Mendez,	J.E.	(2015)	‘Justice	and	prevention’	in	Stahn,	C.	and	El	Zeidy,	M.	(eds.)	The	International	Criminal	Court	
and	Complementarity	(Cambridge	CUP)	p40	
227	Ibid	
228	HRW	‘Selling	Justice	Short:	Why	Accountability	Matters	for	Peace’	7	July	2009	[Online]	Available:	
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0709webwcover_1.pdf	[Accessed	28.11.15]	p127	
229	Ibid	p125	
230	International	Crisis	Group,	(2013)	‘Kenya	after	the	Elections’	Briefing	No.	94	15	May	
231	Tallgren,	I.	(2002)	p565	
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domestic-style-criminal-justice	 aims	 has	 revealed	 that	 trials	 at	 the	 ICC	 do	 fulfil	 the	
retributive	requirements	of	establishing	guilt	and	imposing	punishment	on	those	who	
have	committed	heinous	crimes	but	in	other	respects,	they	do	not	‘scale	up’	effectively	
to	the	international	forum.	Also,	there	are	justifiable	concerns	about	the	slow	pace	of	
proceedings	 which,	 for	 Stahn,	 reveals	 ‘a	 number	 of	 areas	 in	 which	 the	 institutional	
architecture	 of	 ICJ	 may	 be	 in	 need	 of	 procedural	 reform’.232	 	 Stahn	 disagrees	 with	
Drumbl’s	assertion	that	the	best	way	to	assess	the	performance	of	the	ICC	is	‘to	treat	
the	 institutions	 that	 enforce	 ICL	 as	 subjects	of	 study	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	domestic	
scholars	treat	domestic	courts’.233		Stahn	contends	that	the	assessment	of	pace	should	
not	 be	 measured	 against	 domestic	 proceedings	 but	 instead	 should	 ‘be	 placed	 in	
perspective	in	relation	to	the	distinct	goals	of	ICJ.’234		What	is	required	is	‘a	fuller	and	
more	nuanced	matrix,	which	identifies	appropriate	objects	of	comparison	and	relates	
facts	 to	 individual	 goals	 and	 resources.’235	 In	 fact,	 empirical	 research	 conducted	 by	
Galbraith236	has	revealed	that	‘the	pace	of	international	criminal	cases	is	only	modestly	
slower’	than	complex	domestic	proceedings.237	
	
Criticisms	levelled	herein	at	the	court’s	inability	to	satisfy	the	many	ICJ	objectives	it	has	
been	burdened	with	 is	not	 to	suggest	 that	 the	Court	does	not	perform	an	 important	
function	in	the	field	of	transitional	justice	but	that,	because	it	has	not	prioritised	its	ICJ	
objectives,	 this	has	 resulted	 in	 frustration,	dissatisfaction	and	a	perception	of	under-
performance.		By	analysing	its	achievements	in	each	of	the	roles	it	has	been	tasked	to	
perform,	the	Court	could	focus	on	what	it	does	well	and	thus	bring	a	sense	of	realism	to	
idealistic	expectations.		
	
Finally,	 having	 identified	 the	 objectives	 of	 ICJ	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 assessing	 the	 ICC’s	
performance	 in	achieving	 these	goals,	 it	 is	useful	 to	clarify	 that	 the	complementarity	
principle,	 which	 forms	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 the	 RSt	 legal	 system,	 enables	 the	 ICC	 to	
achieve	its	objectives	both	directly,	by	conducting	investigations	and	prosecutions	itself	
																																																						
232	Stahn,	C.	(2012)	p261	
233	Drumbl,	M.	(2009)	‘International	Criminal	Law:	Taking	Stock	of	a	Busy	Decade’	10	Melb.	JIL	pp38-45	at	p44	
234	Stahn,	C.	(2012)	p262	
235	Ibid	p264	
236	Galbraith,	J.	(2009-2010)	pp112-127		
237	Ibid	p142	
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and	 indirectly,	 by	 engaging	 with	 national	 authorities	 with	 a	 view	 to	 inducing	 and	
facilitating	 the	 compliance	 of	 states	 with	 their	 ‘duty’	 to	 exercise	 their	 ‘criminal	
jurisdiction	over	those	responsible	for	international	crimes.’238			The	existence	of	the	ICC	
can	act	as	a	motivator	for	States	to	mount	national	prosecutions	for,		whilst	it	is	the	right	
of	every	state	to	investigate	and	prosecute	the	crimes	within	the	Court’s	jurisdiction,	in	
reality	there	is	no	duty	or	obligation	to	do	either,	unless	the	state	has	ratified	a	treaty	
that	 imposes	 such	 a	 duty,	 such	 as	 the	 Genocide	 Convention.239	 	 By	 granting	 states	
primacy,	the	complementarity	principle	established	by	Articles	17	and	20(3)	acts	as	a	
catalyst	to	state	action	so	as	to	avoid	the	ICC	intervening	should	they	fail	to	do	so,	which	
would	seriously	impact	on	their	state	sovereignty.		To	quote	Mr		Moreno-Ocampo:	
	
As	a	consequence	of	complementarity,	the	number	of	cases	that	reach	the	
Court	should	not	be	a	measure	of	its	efficiency.		On	the	contrary,	the	absence	
of	 trials	before	this	Court,	as	a	consequence	of	 the	regular	 functioning	of	
national	institutions,	would	be	a	major	success.’240	
	
	
Further	 and	 as	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Seven,	 the	 RSt	 gives	 the	 ICC	 a	
monitoring	function	over	state	investigations	and	prosecutions,	requiring	the	state	
to	keep	the	Prosecutor	informed	of	progress,	under	threat	of	ICC	intervention	at	
any	 stage	 of	 the	 state’s	 investigation	 and	 prosecution	 if	 the	 state	 fails	 to	 co-
operate	or	if	the	Court	considers	the	is	state	demonstrating	an	unwillingness	or	
inability	to	investigate	or	prosecute	genuinely.			
		
Second,	 the	 ICC	 seeks	 to	 encourage	 the	 establishment	 of	 domestic	 accountability	
mechanisms	 to	 address	 international	 crimes	 and	 the	 national	 adoption	 of	 laws	
proscribing	international	crimes,	if	not	already	in	place.241		Clearly,	it	is	important	for	a	
																																																						
238		Preamble	to	the	RSt,	para.	6.		For	a	discussion	of	the	procedural	aspects	of	complementarity/admissibility,	please	
see	Chapter	Seven	
239	Nouwen,	S.M.H.	(2013)	Complementarity	 in	the	Line	of	Fire:	The	Catalysing	Effect	of	the	 International	Criminal	
Court	in	Uganda	and	Sudan	(Cambridge:	CUP)	p37	
240	Moreno-Ocampo,	 L.	 (2003)	 Statement,	 Ceremony	 for	 the	 solemn	 undertaking	 of	 the	 Chief	 Prosecutor	 of	 the	
International	Criminal	Court,	16	June,	The	Peace	Palace,	The	Hague,	The	Netherlands	
241	Kleffner,	J.K.	(2004)	‘Complementarity	as	a	catalyst	for	compliance’	in	Complementary	Views	on	Complementarity:	
Proceedings	 of	 the	 International	 Roundtable	 on	 the	 Complementary	 Nature	 of	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Court,	
Amsterdam,	25/26	June	2004	(The	Hague:	TMC	Asser	Press)	p81	
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state	wishing	to	avoid	the	intervention	of	the	ICC	by	virtue	of	complementarity	that	it	
ensures	its	domestic	law	covers	all	the	offences	within	the	ICC’s	jurisdiction.242		
	
Third,	since	the	RSt	is	silent	on	the	question	of	national	amnesties,	an	additional	feature	
of	complementarity	is	its	potential	to	discourage	the	use	of	domestic	amnesties	for	the	
crimes	within	the	 ICC’s	 jurisdiction	so	as	to	avoid	the	risk	of	the	 ICC	disregarding	the	
amnesties	and	proceeding	with	its	own	investigation	and	prosecution.243		Likewise,	the	
RSt	 is	 silent	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 AJMs	 and	 their	 capacity	 to	 satisfy	 the	 complementarity	
criteria	set	out	in	Article	17.		From	the	perspective	of	AJMs,	therefore,	it	would	appear	
that	the	ICC’s	‘catalysing	effect’244	does	not	extend	to	the	encouragement	of	a	state	to	
deal	with	 its	 legacy	of	human	 rights	 violations	 and	breaches	of	humanitarian	 law	by	
means	of	an	AJM	coupled	with	amnesties.		However,	in	the	next	chapter	the	nature	of	
AJMs	generally	will	be	discussed	and	it	will	be	seen	that	they	can	be	capable	of	achieving	
many	 of	 the	 same	 ICJ	 goals	 as	 criminal	 prosecutions	 but	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	
restorative	rather	than	retributive	justice.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
242	 Although	 many	 offences	 will	 likely	 already	 be	 criminalised	 under	 ordinary	 penal	 law,	 offences	 such	 as	 the	
recruitment	of	child	soldiers	and	modes	of	responsibility	such	as	command	responsibility	may	need	to	be	specifically	
criminalised.	
243	Nouwen,	S.M.H.	(2013)	p42	
244	Ibid	(and	throughout	the	book)	
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CHAPTER	FOUR		
	
ALTERNATIVE	JUSTICE	MECHANISMS	AND	THE	AIMS	OF	INTERNATIONAL	CRIMINAL	
JUSTICE	
	
Introduction	
	
Alternative	justice	mechanisms	(AJMs)	are	the	cornerstone	of	conflict	resolution	for	the	
poor	and	disadvantaged	in	developing	countries	with	some	estimates	that	they	account	
for	80%	of	all	dispute	resolutions,	particularly	in	conflict	and	post-conflict	communities,	
where	the	‘formal’	justice	system	is	either	non-functioning	or	inaccessible.1		Interest	in	
the	 processes	 of	 individual	 AJMs	 developed	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	 as	many	 states	
began	to	emerge	from	their	violent	or	authoritarian	past	and	aspiring	a	more	peaceful	
democratic	future,	sought	responses	for	the	widespread	commission	of	heinous	crimes	
against	 their	citizens.	 	As	previously	discussed,	 transitional	 justice	was	emerging	as	a	
new	field	of	debate	at	this	time,2	examining	how	societies	move	from	conflict	to	peace	
or	 from	 authoritarian	 rule	 to	 democracy	 and	 addresses	 issues	 of	 justice	 and	 social	
recovery.3	 	The	 International	Centre	 for	Transitional	 Justice	 (ICTJ)	defines	transitional	
justice	as	‘finding	legitimate	responses	to	massive	violations	under	real	constraints	of	
scale	and	societal	fragility’	which	is	also	what	distinguishes	it	from	human	rights	(HR)	
promotion	and	defence	in	general.4		As	well	as	seeking	acknowledgement	for	the	victims	
of	abuses,	 transitional	 justice	 ‘seeks	 to	contribute	 to	promoting	peace,	 reconciliation	
and	democracy.’5		
	
Between	the	mid-1940s	and	mid-1980s,	the	usual	response	of	a	transitioning	state	had	
																																																						
1	Johnstone,	N.	(2011)	‘Bush	Justice	in	Bougainville:	Mediating	Change	by	Challenging	the	Custodianship	of	Custom’	
in	Harper,	 E.	 (ed)	Working	with	 Customary	 Justice	 Systems:	 Post-Conflict	 and	 Fragile	 States	 (Rome:	 International	
Development	Law	Organization	(IDLO))	pp15-31	at	p16	
2	See	pp6-8	and	p55-56	ante	
3	Quinn,	J.R.		(2014)	‘Tradition?!		Traditional	Cultural	Institutions	on	Customary	Practices	in	Uganda’	49	Africa	
Spectrum	pp29-54	at	p30	
4	ICTJ	(2017)	‘What	is	Transitional	Justice?’	[Online]	Available:	https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice	
[Accessed	03.04.17]	
5	Quinn,	J.R.	(2014)	p30	
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been	to	overlook	the	crimes	and	injustices	of	the	past,	to	‘close	the	books’	6	and	move	
on,	as	had	occurred,	for	example,	 in	Cambodia	after	the	fall	of	the	Khmer	Rouge7,	 in	
Spain	 after	 the	 death	 of	 Franco8	 and	 in	 Chile	 after	 the	 resignation	 of	 Pinochet.9		
However,	 from	 the	mid-1980s,	 the	 global	 emergence	 of	 an	 increased	 awareness	 of	
human	rights	and	a	desire	to	fight	impunity	was	reflected	in	the	establishment	of	several	
ad	hoc	tribunals,	the	re-awakened	movement	within	the	United	Nations	(UN)	for	the	
establishment	of	an	international	criminal	court	and	contemporaneously,	in	the	search	
for	alternative	processes	of	accountability	which	would	not	endanger	a	state’s	transition	
from	conflict	or	the	abuses	of	a	previous	regime	towards	democracy.10		The	reason	for	
the	latter	was	that	in	some	political,	social,	economic	or	cultural	contexts,	it	was	felt	by	
successor	 governments	 that	 national	 prosecutions	 would	 endanger	 their	 fragile	
democracies	but	also	it	was	recognised	that	the	many	needs	of	victims	and	communities	
affected	 by	 the	 strife	 had	 to	 be	 addressed.	 	 In	 South	 America,	 for	 example,	 former	
military	juntas	had	granted	themselves	blanket	amnesties	before	relinquishing	power	
and	 the	 armed	 forces	 remained	 ever-alert	 to	 reassert	 their	 authority,	 Truth	
Commissions	 (TCs)	were	 adopted	 as	 the	 response	 to	 this	 transitional	 dilemma,	 as	 in	
Argentina	 (1983-84),	 Chile	 (1990-91),	 El	 Salvador	 (1992-3),	Guatemala	 (1997-99)	 and	
Peru	(2001-03).11	
	
The	turning	point	for	transitional	justice	came	in	1995	with	South	Africa’s	rejection	of	
prosecutions	 following	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 apartheid	 state,	 in	 favour	 of	 the	
establishment	 of	 a	 Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	 Commission	 (TRC)	 with	 its	 policy	 of	
individualised	amnesty	for	full	disclosure	of	the	truth.		At	the	same	time,	in	other	post-
conflict	 societies,	 consideration	 was	 being	 given	 to	 whether	 their	 own	 indigenous	
																																																						
6	Huyse,	L.	(2008a)	‘Introduction:	tradition-based	approaches	in	peacemaking,	transitional	justice	and	reconciliation	
policies’	in	Huyse,	L.	and	Salter,	M.	(eds.)	Traditional	Justice	and	Reconciliation	after	Violent	Conflict:	Learning	from	
the	African	Experience	(Stockholm:	IDEA)	pp1-22	at	p2	
7	1979	
8	1975	
9	1990	
10	Huyse,	L.	(2008a)	p2	
11	The	Argentinian	Commission	was	and	is	still	referred	to	as	the	National	Commission	on	the	Disappeared	(CONADEP)	
and	the	term	‘Truth	Commissions’	was	not	used	until	the	National	Commission	on	Truth	and	Reconciliation	in	Chile	
and	the	Commission	on	the	Truth	in	El	Salvador	almost	ten	years	later.		
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practices	of	conflict	resolution	and	reconciliation	could	be	a	satisfactory	response	to	the	
atrocities	committed	by	a	previous	regime	or	during	a	violent	conflict.12	
	
Recognising	this	growing	interest	in	alternative	means	of	accountability,	Kofi	Annan,	the	
former	UN	Secretary	General	 (UNSG),	 in	his	 2004	Report	 to	 the	UN	Security	Council	
(UNSC)	entitled	‘The	Rule	of	Law	and	Transitional	Justice	 in	Conflict	and	Post-Conflict	
Societies’	stated:	
	
due	 regard	 must	 be	 given	 to	 indigenous	 and	 informal	 traditions	 for	
administering	 justice	 or	 settling	 disputes,	 to	 help	 them	 to	 continue	 their	
often	vital	role	and	to	do	so	in	conformity	with	both	international	standards	
and	local	tradition.13	
	
In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 ‘indigenous	 and	 informal	 traditions	 for	 administering	 justice	 or	
settling	disputes’	referred	to	by	Kofi	Annan	will	be	considered	from	a	general	perspective	
but	ultimately	 to	 try	 to	establish	whether	 they	have	 the	capacity	and/or	potential	 to	
satisfy	the	goals	of	international	criminal	justice	(ICJ)	discussed	in	the	preceding	chapter.		
In	the	first	and	second	sections	of	this	chapter,	an	attempt	will	be	made	to	define	what	
(in	this	thesis)	have	been	referred	to	as	‘alternative	justice	mechanisms’	(AJMs)	and	their	
historical	 origins	 and	 influences	 will	 be	 examined.	 In	 the	 third	 section,	 the	 global	
durability	of	AJMs	will	be	discussed	with	particular	reference	to	AJM	practices	in	Africa.		
In	the	fourth	and	fifth	sections,	AJMs	will	be	evaluated	for	their	strengths	and	weakness	
respectively.		In	the	sixth	section,	AJMs	will	be	evaluated	for	their	ability	to	satisfy	the	
goals	 of	 ICJ	 identified	 in	 chapter	 three.	 	 The	 chapter	will	 conclude	 by	 evaluating	 the	
relevance	of	AJMs	to	ICJ	with	a	view	to	formulating	a	framework	for	the	International	
Criminal	Court	(ICC)	when	assessing	an	AJM	within	its	complementarity	provisions.			
	
Whilst,	to	date,	no	admissibility	challenge	pursuant	to	the	principle	of	complementarity	
and	based	on	an	AJM	being	a	State’s	chosen	means	of	accountability	has	been	made	to	
the	ICC,	that	day	will	surely	come	and	the	ICC	should	be	prepared	to	be	sensitive	and	
																																																						
12	For	example,	Rwanda,	Mozambique,	Sierra	Leone,	Uganda,	East	Timor.		See	Waldorf,	L.	(2006)	‘Mass	Justice	for	
Mass	Atrocity:	Rethinking	Local	Justice	as	Transitional	Justice’	79	Temple	Law	Review	pp1-88	at	p3;	Huyse,	L.	(2008a)	
p1	
13	UN	Doc.	S/2004/616,	23	August	2004,	para.	36	(UNSG	Report)	
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flexible	in	its	approach.		Initial	remarks	of	the	former	Prosecutor,	Luis	Moreno-Ocampo,	
appeared	supportive	of	AJMs14	but	ICC	decisions	in	the	admissibility	challenges	made	by	
Kenya	(2011),	Libya	(2012	and	2013)	and	Côte	D’Ivoire	(2013)	have	raised	concerns	that	
‘an	increasingly	hegemonic	international	criminal	justice	may	displace	and	discourage	
national	justice	and	reconciliation	efforts.’15		This	chapter	will	therefore	seek	to	assess	
the	arguments	for	and	against	the	contention	that	AJMs	generally	have	the	capacity	to	
satisfy	the	goals	of	ICJ	before,	in	the	subsequent	two	chapters,	studying	the	attributes	
and	deficits	of	two	specific	AJMs,	namely	Mato	Oput,	a	ritual	of	reconciliation	favoured	
by	the	Acholi	people	of	Northern	Uganda	and	the	South	African	Truth	and	Reconciliation	
Commission.	
	
Definition	of	AJMS	
	
Before	embarking	on	a	discussion	of	AJMs	in	general,	it	is	necessary	to	attempt	to	define	
what	is	meant	by	the	term	‘alternative	justice	mechanism’	and	to	answer	the	question:	
alternative	to	what?		The	alternative	to	AJMs	are	justice	mechanisms	that	are	connected	
to	the	national	(or	an	international)	governing	institution	and	have	codified	practices	to	
ensure	procedural	fairness	and	standards	of	accountability,	based	on	cultural	norms.16		
In	this	thesis,	such	justice	mechanisms	are	referred	to	as	‘formal’	justice	mechanisms,	of	
which	trials	are	the	best	known,	nationally	and	internationally.	By	contrast,	AJMs	tend	
not	 to	 be	 codified	 and	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 procedural	 and	 accountability	
requirements.17		Although	they	are	not	codified,	however,	because	they	are	founded	on	
ceremonies	and	traditions	that	have	evolved	over	centuries,	they	still	may	be	practised	
in	a	precise,	formulaic	manner.	
	
Unfortunately,	drafting	a	satisfactory	definition	for	AJMs	 is	not	straightforward	as	no	
one	term	can	be	both	sufficiently	precise	and	yet	broad	enough	to	encompass	the	range	
																																																						
14	See	p49	ante	
15	Waldorf,	L.	(2006)	p4;	see	also	Drumbl	M.A.	(2000)	‘Punishment,	Post-Genocide:	From	Guilt	to	Shame	to	Civis	in	
Rwanda’	 75	NYULR	pp1221-1326	at	 p1323-4;	Alvarez,	 J.E.	 (1999)	 ‘Crimes	of	 States/Crimes	of	Hate:	 Lessons	 from	
Rwanda’	24	Yale	JIL	pp365-483	at	p482	
16	Quinn,	J.R.		(2006)	‘Comparing	Formal	and	Informal	Mechanisms	of	Acknowledgment	in	Uganda’	p5	(Working	
paper	prepared	for	presentation	on	the	panel	‘Africa	as	a	subject	of	International	Justice’	at	the	International	
Studies	Association	Annual	Meeting,	23	March	2006.	Permission	to	cite	on	file)	
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of	 systems	 and	 processes	 that	 exist	 worldwide	 to	 deliver	 justice	 and	 governance,	
particularly	 where	 state	 authority	 is	 weak.	 Terms	 such	 as	 informal,	 traditional,	
customary,	alternative,	popular,	local,	grass-roots	and	indigenous	have	all	been	used	to	
describe	this	form	of	direct	popular	justice	and	it	is	impossible	to	select	one	above	others	
which	successfully	embodies	all	the	features	and	norms	that	are	present	in	the	various	
processes	these	terms	represent.		Whatever	the	label,	however,	such	justice	processes	
are	 ‘the	 oldest,	 most	 well-established	 and	most	 widely	 distributed	 form	 of	 criminal	
process.’18	
	
Acknowledging	the	difficulty	of	attempting	a	precise	definition,	Abel	suggests	some	of	
‘the	relevant	parameters’,	describing	informal	justice	as	unofficial,	non-coercive,	non-
bureaucratic,	 de-centralised,	 relatively	 undifferentiated	 and	 non-professional;	 with	
substantive	and	procedural	rules	that	are	imprecise,	unwritten,	democratic,	flexible,	ad	
hoc	 and	 particularistic.19	 	 Whilst	 such	 processes	 can	 encompass	 justice	 rooted	 in	
religious	 authority,	 local	 administrative	 authorities,	 specially	 constituted	 state	
customary	 courts	 (such	 as	 those	 in	 South	 Africa)	 or	 community	 projects	 for	 conflict	
resolution	 (mediation,	 for	 example),	 this	 chapter	 concentrates	 on	 AJMs	 which	 are	
rooted	 in	 customary	 and	 tribal	 or	 clan	 social	 structures	 in	 sub-Saharan	 Africa.	 	 Two	
important	features	that	many	such	mechanisms	have	in	common	is	that	they	are	non-
state	administered	and	exist	outside	a	state’s	 formal	 justice	system.	 	However,	 state	
involvement	does	not	preclude	a	process	from	being	an	AJM	as	in	the	cases,	for	example,	
of	the	South	African	TRC	and	Rwanda’s	Gacaca.		A	predominant	claim	is	that	they	reflect	
the	African	view	of	justice	which	is	aimed	not	at	‘retribution	or	punishment	but	[…]	the	
healing	 of	 breaches,	 the	 redressing	 of	 imbalances,	 the	 restoration	 of	 broken	
relationships’.20	 	 Its	proponents	contend	that	restorative	justice	‘seeks	to	rehabilitate	
both	 the	 victim	 and	 the	 perpetrator,	 who	 should	 be	 given	 the	 opportunity	 to	 be	
reintegrated	 into	the	community	he	or	she	has	 injured	by	his	or	her	offence.’21	Thus	
																																																						
18	Vogler,	R.	(2005)	A	World	View	of	Criminal	Justice	(Aldershot,	Ashgate	Publishing	Ltd)	p197	
19	Abel,	R.L.	 (1982)	 ‘Introduction’	 in	Abel,	R.L.	 (ed)	The	Politics	of	 Informal	Justice:	Volume	2:	Comparative	Studies	
(New	York:	Academic	Press	Inc.)	p2	
20	Tutu,	D.		(1999)	No	Future	without	Forgiveness	(London:	Rider)	p51	
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restorative	justice	is	being	served	‘when	efforts	are	being	made	to	work	for	healing,	for	
forgiveness	and	for	reconciliation	’.22		
	
Waldorf	states	that	AJMs	may	have	 ‘greater	 legitimacy	and	capacity	than	devastated	
formal	systems,	and	they	promise	 local	ownership,	access	and	efficiency.’23	 	A	report	
published	by	Penal	Reform	International	(PRI)	describes	the	salient	features	of	AJMs	in	
sub-Saharan	Africa	as:	viewing	the	problem	as	that	of	the	whole	community	or	group,	
emphasising	 reconciliation	 and	 restoration	 of	 social	 harmony,	 traditional	 arbitrators	
appointed	 from	 within	 the	 community	 overseeing	 a	 voluntary	 process	 with	 a	 high	
degree	of	public	participation	with	decisions	based	on	individual	circumstances	reached	
by	 agreement,	 flexible	 rules	 of	 evidence	 and	 procedure	 with	 no	 professional	 legal	
representation,	emphasising	restorative	penalties	which	are	enforced	by	social	pressure	
and	confirmed	through	re-integrative	rituals.24	
	
In	the	context	of	transitional	justice,	the	term	‘traditional	justice’	is	widely-used	and	has	
been	described	as	‘a	catch-all	to	describe	procedures	in	those	places	that	other	kinds	of	
justice	 provision	 cannot	 reach.’25	 For	 Alie,	 however,	 the	 term	 ‘traditional’	 has	
Eurocentric	connotations	and	‘tends	to	suggest	the	existence	of	profoundly	internalized	
normative	structures,	patterns	followed	in	static	economic	and	social	circumstances’26	
whereas	African	 traditional	 law	 is	never	 static	but	 is	 responsive	 to	 changes	 resulting	
from	diverse	factors	and	forces.27	Indeed,	Vogler	describes	traditional	justice	as	‘a	global	
phenomenon	and	one	which	is	highly	dynamic’28	and	Allen	and	MacDonald	agree	AJMs	
are	‘highly	dynamic	and	remarkably	adaptable;	they	are	rarely	static	and	timeless’.	29	
Colonizing	authorities,	modernisation,	violent	conflict	or	genocide	have	all	profoundly	
affected	the	original	practices	to	the	extent	that	it	can	be	validly	questioned	whether	
the	 term	 ‘traditional	 justice’	 is	 appropriate	 for	 mechanisms	 which	 are	 unerringly	
																																																						
22	Ibid	p52	
23	Waldorf,	L.	(2006)	p3-4	
24	Stevens,	J.	(2001)	Access	to	justice	in	sub-Saharan	Africa:	the	role	of	traditional	and	informal	justice	systems	
(London:	Penal	Reform	International)	p22	
25	Allen,	T.	and	Macdonald,	A.	(2013)	Post-Conflict	Traditional	Justice:	A	Critical	Overview	(London:	JSRP)	p2	
26	Alie,	 J.A.D.	 	 (2008)	 ‘Reconciliation	and	traditional	 justice:	 tradition-based	practices	of	 the	Kpaa	Mende	 in	Sierra	
Leone’	in	Huyse,	L.	and	Salter,	M.	pp123-146	at	p133	
27	Ibid	
28	Vogler,	R.	(2005)	p255	
29	Allen,	T.	and	Macdonald,	A.	(2013)	p9	
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vulnerable	to	change.30			
	
The	problem	of	terminology	is	also	complicated	by	the	risk	that	the	instrumental	use	of	
the	alternative	mechanisms	of	accountability	can	bring	them	within	the	realm	of	state	
influence	 which,	 in	 turn,	 can	 affect	 their	 ‘traditional’	 nature.31	 For	 example,	 the	
Rwandan	government	adapted	and	codified	the	traditional	gacaca	conflict	resolution	
mechanism	 into	 national	 law	 to	 deal	 with	 génocidaires.32	 Furthermore,	 the	 term	
‘customary’	has	been	deemed	to	be	 ‘too	close	to	 ‘traditional’’33	and	whilst	 ‘informal’	
does	accentuate	the	separation	between	such	processes	and	formal	state	systems,	it	is	
suggested	that	making	such	processes	part	of	a	policy	of	transitional	justice	can	result	
in	them	acquiring	formal	attributes.34	It	is	for	these	reasons	that,	in	this	thesis,	the	term	
‘alternative	justice	mechanisms’	has	been	adopted.		
	
Historical	Origins	and	Influences	of	AJMs	in	Africa	
	
In	this	section,	the	origins	of	African	AJMs	and	the	concept	of	colonial	legal	pluralism	
will	be	discussed.	
	
Many	people	living	in	fragile	or	war-torn	states	experience	multiple	rules	systems	and	
regulating	institutions	which	emanate	from	diverse	sources	and	attract	varying	degrees	
of	‘authority,	legitimacy,	coherence	and	capacity’,	according	to	the	issue	at	hand.35		This	
results	in	legal	pluralism,	where	‘two	or	more	legal	systems	co-exist	in	the	same	social	
field.’36	 	 Legal	 pluralism	 where	 ‘the	 transfer	 of	 whole	 legal	 systems	 across	 cultural	
boundaries’37	is	associated	with	the	emergence	of	colonialism	and	the	rapid	imposition	
of	 legal	 systems	 from	 Europe	 and	North	 America	 to	 South	 America,	 Asia	 and	 Africa	
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31	Ibid	
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between	the	16th	and	20th	centuries.38		However,	MacDonald	and	Allen	challenge	what	
they	 view	 as	 ‘the	 unhelpful	 over-emphasis	 on	 European	 colonialism	 in	 the	 legal	
pluralism	literature’39	for,	as	Merry	also	points	out,	 ‘the	Europeans	were	not	the	first	
outside	influence	bringing	a	new	legal	system	to	many	Third	World	peoples.		Indigenous	
law	has	been	shaped	by	conquests	and	migrations	for	centuries.’40		Occurrences	such	as	
the	growth	of	 Islam,	the	slave	trade	and	missionary	exploration	and	proselytization41	
have	all	added	to	legal	pluralism	that	has	long	existed	in	many	Third	World	countries.42		
	
Whilst	 19th	 century	 European	 colonialists	 believed	 that	 in	 imposing	 their	 own	 legal	
systems	on	their	colonies,	they	were	benefitting	their	peoples,	‘freeing	them	from	the	
scourges	of	war,	witchcraft,	and	tyranny’,43	early	20th	Century	research	of	 indigenous	
justice	systems	existing	among	tribes	and	villages	in	colonised	Africa,	Asia	and	the	Pacific	
revealed	a	 ‘rich	variety	of	 social	 control,	 social	pressure,	 custom,	customary	 law	and	
judicial	procedure	within	small-scale	societies	that	encompassed	both	indigenous	and	
European	law’.44	Far	from	eradicating	these	alternative	 justice	processes,	the	policies	
adopted	 by	 the	 colonial	 powers	 for	 the	 governance	 of	 their	 vast	 territories	 often	
contributed	to	their	continued	survival.		Indeed,	according	to	PRI’s	2001	report,	‘[w]hen	
most	sub-Saharan	African	countries	became	independent	in	the	1960s,	the	majority	of	
African	 citizens	 were	 resolving	 their	 disputes	 using	 traditional	 and	 informal	 justice	
forums.’45	
	
Pre-colonial	African	 law	was	not	a	single	system	with	traceable	roots,	although	there	
were	 similarities	 in	 procedures	 and	 principles	 which	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	
commonality	of	environment	and	social	systems.46	As	Oomen	asserts,	‘[t]here	is	no	such	
thing	as	a	‘system’	of	customary	law,	there	is	a	flexible	pool	of	shared	values,	ideas	about	
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right	and	wrong,	and	acceptable	sources	of	morality,	that	are	commonly	acknowledged	
and	rooted	in	local	cultural	orientations’.47	African	‘traditional’	societies	tended	to	be	
small,	 family-based	groups	 in	which	 ‘order’	required	compliance	with	a	shared	set	of	
norms	and	in	which	the	‘individual’	was	secondary	to	the	community.48	Unwritten	and	
grounded	in	custom,	legal	principles	were	nonetheless	widely-known	and	accepted	by	
members	of	the	community	primarily	because	they	were	expressed	in	normal,	every-
day	language.49		By	virtue	of	their	heritage	or	status,	legal	‘specialists’	were	recognised	
and	well-regarded.50		For	example,	the	Kikuyu	of	Kenya	recognised	the	‘muthamaki’	as	
chief	 spokesman	 and	 judge	 in	 legal	 matters	 and	 as	 he	 gained	 experience,	 he	 could	
become	‘muthamaki	wa	chira’	(‘leader	in	law’)	presiding	over	a	wider	territorial	area.51		
Likewise,	every	 lineage	and	age	group	 in	 the	Arusha	of	Tanzania	would	have	 its	own	
‘olaigwenani’	(counsellor	and	arbiter	in	disputes).52	In	most	traditional	societies,	dispute	
management	could	go	through	a	number	of	different	stages	of	dispute	settlement,	for	
example,	family	members,	co-residents,	co-lineage	members,	age-mates,	specialists	in	
religion	or	magic	or	senior	and	influential	members	of	the	community.53	Similarly,	Allot	
agrees	 that	 the	 role	 of	 adjudicator	 of	 disputes	 would	 follow	 a	 chain	 of	 command	
commencing	with	the	father	of	the	family	and	passing	through	the	lineage	elder	to	the	
village	headman	or	chief.54	
	
As	already	stated,	despite	being	the	law	of	ancestors,	it	was	not	static	or	inflexible.		Since	
the	law	and	procedure	was	oral,	it	could	be	adapted	as	required	to	meet	any	changes	to	
the	moral	 code	of	 the	 community,	often	 following	 community	discussion.	 	 The	male	
members	of	the	Tswana	of	Botswana,	for	example,	would	attend	a	general	assembly	in	
order	to	participate	in	discussions	on	proposed	changes	to	the	law.55		Whilst	not	every	
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tribe	 enjoyed	 such	 popular	 participation	 in	 law	 changing,	 the	 law	 was	 a	 matter	 of	
popular	concern	and	not	the	privilege	of	the	few.	
	
In	 the	 late	 19th	 Century	 and	 early	 20th	 Century,	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 European	 colonial	
powers	and	the	swift	application	of	their	highly	organised	administrations	and	formal,	
rational	 legal	 systems	 reinforced	 by	 their	 military	 and	 police	 authorities	 could	 have	
threatened	the	continued	existence	of	African	traditional,	customary	law,	forged,	as	it	
was,	 ‘for	 industrial	 capitalism	 rather	 than	 agrarian	 or	 pastoral	 way	 of	 life	 [and]	
embod[ying]	very	different	principles	and	procedures’.56		However,	as	Vogler	points	out,	
‘[c]olonial	 authorities	 rarely	 possessed	 the	personnel	 or	 the	 resources	 to	 establish	 a	
network	 of	 courts	 throughout	 their	 territories	 and	 were	 obliged	 to	 tolerate	 the	
continuation	 of	 ‘native’	 forms	 of	 local	 adjudication	 and	 criminal	 justice	 in	 the	 rural	
areas’.57		Merry	states	that	in	Africa,	the	British	and	French	superimposed	their	law	on	
to	 indigenous	 law,	 incorporating	 customary	 law	 as	 long	 as	 it	 was	 not	 ‘repugnant	 to	
natural	justice,	equity	and	good	conscience’	or	‘inconsistent	with	any	written	law’.58		
	
In	British	colonial	Africa,	for	example,	the	native	courts	were	officially	recognised	and	
became	the	lowest	grade	in	the	judicial	system.59		Furthermore,	they	were	unsupervised	
by	professional	judges	and	magistrates	out	of	concern	that	the	traditional	African	laws	
might	be	subverted	and	forced	into	conformity	with	English	law.60		It	was	reasoned	by	
the	British	that	this	 ‘radical	policy	of	 ‘indirect	rule’’61	which	permitted	the	traditional	
chiefs	 and	 elders	 to	 govern	 rural	 areas	 using	 their	 own	 local	 customs	 and	 tribal	
procedures,	 ‘would	 enable	 friendly	 chiefs	 to	 compel	 their	 followers	 to	 obey	 colonial	
regulations.’62	 	 For	 Rama	Mani,	 this	was	 the	 origin	 of	 legal	 dualism,	 ‘a	 precursor	 to	
today’s	 legal	pluralism,63	where	one	set	of	modern	 laws	applied	to	the	white,	mainly	
urban	colonisers	and	another	set	of	customary	law	applied	to	the	‘native’	mainly	rural	
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population’.64		Although	broadly	supportive	of	the	legal	pluralist	theory,	Wilson	offers	
an	alternative	view	that	 ‘[p]luralism	is	but	a	 legal	fiction,	a	part	of	 ideology	of	British	
indirect	rule	in	African	[…]	territories’	where	‘colonial	and	customary	law	were	welded	
into	a	single	instrument	of	dispossession	and	were	part	of	a	wider	administrative	policy	
of	creating	and	maintaining	a	particular	type	of	peasantry’	and	was	‘manufactured	as	a	
legitimating	device	for	maintaining	the	status	quo	after	dispossession	by	reinforcing	the	
position	of	the	chieftaincy.65	
	
Unfortunately,	 the	 co-opting	of	 traditional	 leaders	 into	 the	administration	under	 the	
system	of	indirect	rule	had	the	effect	of	undermining	the	checks	and	balances	that	had	
regulated	 traditional	 decision-making,	 as	 the	 chiefs	 were	 no	 longer	 reliant	 on	 the	
acceptance	or	 approval	 of	 their	 subjects.66	 	 Accordingly,	 some	 chiefs,	 endowed	with	
virtually	unchallenged	authority	and	backed	by	the	power	of	the	colonial	state,	did	not	
always	 act	 benignly	 and	 ‘many	 manipulated	 this	 power	 to	 decide	 the	 content	 of	
customary	law	to	suit	their	own	purposes.’67		Mamdami	states	that	because	the	chiefs	
‘were	assured	of	back-up	support	from	colonial	institutions	–	and	direct	force	if	need	be	
–	in	the	event	they	encountered	opposition	or	defiance’,	customary	law	‘consolidated	
the	non-customary	power	of	colonial	chiefs’	68	which	did	not	always	result	in	laws	which	
were	 well-designed	 to	 achieve	 justice.	 	 Nonetheless,	 the	 decision	 of	 some	 colonial	
powers	 to	 administer	 their	 overseas	 territories	 with	 the	 assistance	 of	 the	 so-called	
‘native	 authorities’	 may	 well	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 continued	 survival	 of	 the	
indigenous	processes	despite	their	‘dramatic	transformation	under	indirect	rule’.69	
	
Following	 independence,	post-colonial	 governments	 in	 sub-Saharan	Africa	 frequently	
perceived	 local,	 informal	 justice	 processes	 as	 obstacles	 to	 nation-building	 and	 the	
centralisation	of	the	state	administrative	apparatus	and	pursued	a	strategy	of	‘ironing	
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out	local	legal	systems	and	[c]entralizing	and	unifying	justice	institutions,	often	based	
on	European	law	models’.70		However,	they	met	‘with	pockets	of	intense	resistance	from	
groups	 whose	 law	 ha[d]	 been	 preserved	 in	 some	 fashion’71	 and	 the	 ‘local	 justice	
mechanisms	 enmeshed	 in	 the	 everyday	 practices	 of	 individuals	 and	 groups’72	 were	
rarely	displaced.73		To	demonstrate	this	point,	Maru	reflects	that	in	Sierra	Leone,	‘of	the	
two	 overlapping	 legal	 regimes,	 customary	 law	 has	 more	 practical	 relevance	 for	 the	
majority	 of	 Sierra	 Leoneans	 than	 the	 formal	 legal	 system’74	which	 perhaps	 tends	 to	
support	 the	 observation	 that	 ‘throughout	 the	 global	 south	 there	 are	 vast	 regions	 in	
which	the	power	and	authority	of	state	law	is	‘nominal	rather	than	operational’’.75		
	
The	Durability	of	AJMs	
	
In	 this	 section,	 some	 statistics	 relating	 to	 the	use	of	AJMs	will	 be	discussed	 and	 the	
reasons	for	the	continuing	global	popularity	of	AJMs	will	be	considered,	predominantly	
concentrating	on	their	role	in	African	society.	
	
Informal,	customary	or	non-state	forms	of	law	are	not	restricted	to	the	poorer	countries	
of	the	world:	alternative	forms	of	justice	operate	in	the	majority	of	nations	worldwide	
and	much	of	 human	behaviour	 is	 shaped	and	 influenced	by	 informal	 and	 customary	
normative	 frameworks.76	 	 In	 countries	 where	 the	 state	 and	 non-state	 systems	 have	
developed	alongside	each	other,	 they	 frequently	 serve	 to	complement	and	 reinforce	
accepted	codes	and	rules	whereas	in	fragile	states,	the	state	system	may	be	rejected	or	
ignored	in	favour	of	AJMs	which	act	completely	independently.77		In	many	fragile	states,	
																																																						
70	Waldorf,	 L.	 (2006)	p11;	 see	 also	Wilson,	 R.	 A.	 (2001a)	The	 Politics	 of	 Truth	 and	Reconciliation	 in	 South	Africa:	
Legitimizing	the	Post-Apartheid	State	(Cambridge:	CUP)	p198;	Merry,	S.	(1988)	p871,	Roberts,	S.	(1979)	p49	
71	Ibid	(Merry)	p872	
72	Waldorf,	L.	(2006)	p12	
73	 In	Ghana,	for	example,	a	viable	traditional	 justice	system	survived	attempts	by	the	regime	of	President	Kwame	
Nkrumah	to	abolish	it;	see	Rathbone,	R.		(2000)	Nkrumah	and	the	Chiefs:	The	Politics	of	chieftaincy	in	Ghana	1951-60	
(Oxford:	James	Currey	Ltd)	pp140-60	
74	Maru,	V.		(2005)	‘The	Challenges	of	African	Legal	Dualism:	An	Experiment	in	Sierra	Leone’	Human	Rights	and	Justice	
Sector	 Reform	 in	 Africa	 (Open	 Society	 Justice	 Initiative)	 pp18-22	 at	 p20	 [Online]	 Available:	
https://namati.org/resources/the-challenges-of-african-legal-dualism-an-experiment-in-sierra-leone	 [Accessed:	 16	
April	2016]	
75	Allen,	T.	and	MacDonald,	A.	(2013)	p3		
76	Chirayath,	L.,	Sage,	C.	and	Woolcock,	M.		(2005)	‘Customary	Law	and	Policy	Reform:	Engaging	with	the	Plurality	of	
Justice	 Systems’	 (a	 paper	 prepared	 as	 a	 background	 for	 the	 World	 Development	 Report	 2006:	 Equity	 and	
Development)	p2	
77	OECD	(2007)	Enhancing	the	Delivery	of	Justice	and	Security:	Governance,	Peace	and	Security	p22	para.	69	
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traditional	 and	 religious	 processes	 have	 been	written	 into	 national	 law,	 as	 in	 Sierra	
Leone,	 Rwanda,	 South	 Africa,	 Botswana,	 Malawi,	 Mozambique,78	 Lesotho	 and	
Swaziland,79	which	actually	can	make	it	difficult	to	distinguish	whether	the	traditional	or	
religious	process	is	a	state	or	a	non-state	justice	system.80		
	
A	comparative	study	of	15	African	legal	systems	in	1999	identified	that	‘for	the	majority	
of	Africans,	customary	law	is	the	most	important	source	of	law	with	which	they	are	likely	
to	 have	 first	 and	most	 frequent	 contact’.81	 	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 estimated	 that	 informal	 or	
traditional	law	governs	‘the	daily	lives	of	more	than	three-quarters	of	the	populations	
of	most	African	countries’.82	Others	suggest	that	for	up	to	90%	of	the	population	in	parts	
of	Africa,	the	dominant	form	of	regulation	and	dispute	resolution	are	AJMs	operating	
outside	 the	 state	 regime.83	 In	 Sierra	 Leone,	 for	 example,	 approximately	 85%	 of	 the	
population	falls	under	the	jurisdiction	of	customary	law,84	defined	in	the	Constitution	as	
“the	rules	of	law	which,	by	custom,	are	applicable	to	particular	communities	in	Sierra	
Leone”.85	 	 In	Somalia,	 the	xeer	 traditional	 justice	systems	was	 in	use	well	before	 the	
colonial	era	and	is	still	widely	used	to	regulate	inter-clan	relationships.86		In	Nigeria,	it	is	
estimated	that	up	to	90%	of	cases	are	settled	by	customary	courts	87	and	likewise,	 in	
Malawi,	 between	 80-90%	 of	 all	 disputes	 are	 processed	 through	 customary	 justice	
forums.88		It	 is	estimated	also	that	up	to	80%	of	Burundians	in	the	first	or	sometimes	
only	 instance	 take	 their	 cases	 to	 the	 Bashingantahe	 institutions.89	 Furthermore,	
customary	land	tenure	accounts	for	75%	of	land	in	most	African	countries,	affecting	90%	
of	 all	 land	 transactions	 in	 Mozambique	 and	 Ghana90	 	 and	 in	 Kenya,	 ‘where	 land	 is	
																																																						
78	Ibid;	It	is	similarly	the	case	in	the	South	American	countries	of	Peru,	Bolivia,	Columbia,	Ecuador,	Nicaragua,	Panama,	
Paraguay,	Peru	as	well	as	in	Yemen,	Indonesia,	Timor-Leste	and	Nepal.	
79	Odinkalu,	C.A.	 (2006)	 ‘Poor	 Justice	or	 Justice	 for	 the	Poor?	 	A	Policy	 Framework	 for	Reform	of	Customary	and	
Informal	 Justice	Systems	 in	Africa’	 in	WBLR:	Law,	Equity	and	Development	(WBLR)	 (Washington:	The	World	Bank)	
pp141-165	at	p151	
80	OECD	(2007)	p22	para.	69	
81	Odinkalu,	C.A.	(2006)	p143		
82	Ibid	
83	Chirayath	et.al	(2005)	p3	
84	Ibid	
85	The	Constitution	of	Sierra	Leone	(1991)	Chapter	XII	Article	170(3)	
86	Thorne,	K.	(2005)	‘Rule	of	Law	through	imperfect	bodies?		The	informal	justice	systems	of	Burundi	and	Somalia’	
(Geneva:	Centre	for	Humanitarian	Dialogue)	(pages	unnumbered)	
87	Odinkalu,	C.	A.	(2006)	p144	
88	Wojkowska,	E.	(2006)	‘Doing	Justice:	How	informal	justice	systems	can	contribute’	(UNDP)	p12	
89	Thorne,	K.	(2005)	fn.3	The	term	Bashingantahe	refers	to	men	of	integrity	who	seek	to	reach	amicable	resolutions	
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frequently	a	source	of	private	and	communal	disputes,	traditional	institutions	are	widely	
held	to	be	more	reliable	in	resolving	conflicts	than	the	state’.91	
	
Globally,	the	use	of	AJMs	is	equally	widespread,	for	example,	an	estimated	60-70%	of	
local	 disputes	 in	 Bangladesh	 are	 resolved	 through	 a	 traditional	 form	 of	 dispute	
resolution	known	as	the	Salish	92	and	in	Afghanistan,	the	Ministry	of	Justice	estimates	
that	‘90%	of	Afghans	rely	on	customary	law	due	to	a	lack	of	‘trust	and	confidence’	in	the	
nation’s	formal	justice	institutions	as	well	as	the	justice	institutions’	‘physical	absence	
and	 low	 capacity’’.93	 	 There	 are	 comparable	 estimates	 for	 Mozambique,	 Lesotho,	
Somalia,	Sudan,	Yemen,	Solomon	Islands,	Timor-Leste	and	Nepal.94	
	
In	Latin	America,	a	variety	of	AJMs	serve	the	poor	in	indigenous	rural	communities	and	
in	urban	areas,	in	the	large	shantytowns	that	surround	most	cities.95		Examples	include	
remote	 areas	 such	 as	 the	 Amazon	 area	 of	 Peru,	where	 AJMs	 flourish	 because	 state	
institutions	are	not	 there	 to	 interfere	with	 their	 activities.96	 	 Likewise,	 in	Bolivia,	 the	
Ayllus,	a	 peasant	 community	 living	 the	 high	 plateau	 region,	 have	 always	maintained	
their	 own	 customary	 law,	 which	 aims	 to	 re-establish	 harmony	 and	 re-integrate	 the	
accused	into	the	community,	because	the	state	courts	are	difficult	to	reach.97	
	
The	issue	of	remoteness	is	one	of	the	major	factors	accounting	for	the	durability	of	AJMs.		
Stevens	states	 that	 in	Africa,	 for	example,	 ‘the	vast	majority	continue	 to	 live	 in	 rural	
villages’	which	makes	access	to	formal	state	justice	very	difficult.98		The	formal	courts	
may	be	located	many	miles	away	and	the	physical	distance	and	cost	of	transport	can	be	
prohibitive	to	the	rural	poor,	particularly	as	formal	proceedings	are	often	protracted	and	
require	multiple	court	attendances.		Not	only	are	AJMs	more	accessible	to	those	living	
																																																						
91	Allen,	T.	and	MacDonald,	A.	(2013)	p3	
92	Wojkowska,	E.	(2006)	p12			
93	OECD	(2007)	p22,	para.71	
94	Ibid	
95	Faundez,	 J.	 (2006)	 ‘Should	Justice	Reform	Projects	 take	Non-State	Justice	Systems	Seriously?	Perspectives	 from	
Latin	America’	WBLR	pp113-139	at	p116		
96	Ibid	(It	could	also	be	argued	that	AJMs	flourish	because	people	do	not	have	access	to	a	state	alternative)	
97	Röder,	T.J.	(2012)	‘Informal	Justice	Systems:	Challenges	and	Perspectives’	in	Botero,	J.C.,	Janse,	R.,	Muller,	S.,	Pratt,	
C.	(eds.)	Innovations	in	Rule	of	Law:	A	Compilation	of	Concise	Essays	(HiiL	and	The	World	Justice	Project)	pp58-61at	
p60	
98	Stevens,	J.	(2001)	p1	
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in	 rural	 areas,	 they	 reflect	 prevailing	 community	 norms	 and	 values99	 and	 deal	 with	
matters	 of	 concern	 to	 them,	 particularly	 issues	 relating	 to	 family	 and	 land.100	 It	 is	
contended	that	for	these	communities,	traditional	justice	is	culturally	relevant	since	it	
‘draws	upon	authentic	indigenous	identities	and	rituals	and	“taps	into	profound	spiritual	
worlds”	 based	 on	 non-western	 concepts	 of	 community	 harmony	 and	 well-being.’101		
Therefore,	the	type	of	justice	AJMs	offer	can	be	more	appropriate	for	people	living	in	
close-knit	communities	where	a	breakdown	of	individual	social	relationships	may	result	
in	conflict	within	the	whole	community	and	detrimentally	affect	social	and	economic	co-
operation.102	 	 In	 comparison,	 it	 is	 argued,	 the	 retributive	 justice	 provided	 by	 formal	
courts	can	be	unsuitable	for	the	resolution	of	such	disputes	and	may	even	exacerbate	
tension	between	disputants.	
	
There	are	many	other	reasons	why	formal	justice	systems	can	be	unattractive	to	those	
living	in	poor,	rural	communities.	For	example,	unfamiliarity	and	awkwardness	with	the	
formal	 procedures	 and	 atmosphere	 of	 the	 court	 together	 with	 an	 absence	 of	
understanding	 due	 to	 language	 issues	 can	 give	 rise	 to	 feelings	 of	 intimidation	 and	
mistrust.103	 	 The	 formal	 courts	may	also	 lack	 legitimacy,	especially	 if	 they	have	been	
complicit	 in	past	oppression	or	conflict	or	 if	 they	are	tainted	with	corruption.104	 	The	
lengthy	duration	of	proceedings	and	the	requirement	for	legal	representation	may	also	
act	as	disincentives	to	use	the	formal	justice	system.105		In	contrast,	AJM	procedures	are	
familiar,	local,	swift,	cheap	and	relevant	to	the	communities	in	which	they	are	practiced,	
factors	which	will	be	expanded	upon	in	the	next	section.	
	
This	 and	 the	 previous	 section	 discussed	 how	 and	 why	 AJMs,	 despite	 having	 been	
‘adopted	 and	 then	 co-opted	 by	 colonial	 and	 post-colonial	 authorities’106,	 remain	 a	
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dominant	feature	in	the	lives	of	those	in	poor,	rural	communities	particularly.	 	 In	the	
next	 section,	 the	most	 common,	 positive,	 characteristics	 of	 AJMs	will	 be	 outlined	 in	
order	to	illuminate	their	relevance	and	appeal	to	those	communities.	
	
Key	Strengths	of	AJMs	
	
Within	one	country	there	can	exist	many	different	AJMs,	each	reflecting	the	norms	and	
values	of	the	particular	tribe	or	community	it	serves,	so	it	is	difficult	to	generalise	the	
features	of	AJMS.	 	However,	 in	this	section,	an	overview	of	some	of	the	more	typical	
positive	features	of	AJMs	will	be	discussed.	
	
First	and	foremost,	AJMs	are	usually	close	to	(or	at	least	within	walking	distance	of)	the	
homes	of	the	people	they	serve	and	they	are	normally	free	or	affordable	which	makes	
them	easily	accessible,	familiar	and	usable	by	those	seeking	dispute	resolution.107			
	
Another	common	feature	is	that	the	justice	process	is	transparent	and	open	and	involves	
the	whole	community.108		A	dispute	cannot	be	resolved	unless	both	the	victim	and	the	
offender	 accept	 the	 final	 decision	 which	 has	 been	 arrived	 at	 by	 the	 community	 at	
large.109	This	is	because	disputes	arising	in	traditional	communities	where	relationships	
are	‘based	on	past	and	future	economic	and	social	dependence	and	which	intersect	ties	
of	kinship’110	are	perceived	to	be	problems	affecting	the	whole	community.111		Stevens	
describes	how:	
	
[e]ach	member	of	the	community	is	tied	to	varying	degrees	to	each	of	the	
disputants	and,	depending	on	the	extent	of	these	ties,	will	either	feel	some	
sense	 of	 having	 been	 wronged	 or	 some	 sense	 of	 responsibility	 for	 the	
wrong.112		
	
Writing	about	dispute	resolution	procedures	among	the	Ibo-speaking	peoples	of	Eastern	
Nigeria,	 Igbokwe	describes	African	 law	as	 ‘group	 law	which	usually	applies	 to	micro-
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societies:	 families,	 lineages,	 clans,	 ethnic	 groups,	 living	 as	 a	 ‘closed	 circuit’.’113		
Therefore,	in	contrast	to	western	judicial	proceedings,	which	individualise	guilt:		
	
a	 law-breaking	 individual	 thus	 transforms	 his	 group	 into	 a	 law-breaking	
group,	 for	 in	his	dealings	with	others,	he	never	stands	alone.	 [Likewise]	a	
disputing	 individual	 transforms	 his	 group	 into	 a	 disputing	 group	 and	 it	
follows	that	if	he	is	wronged,	he	may	depend	upon	his	group	for	vengeance	
for	in	some	vicarious	manner,	they	too	have	been	wronged.114	
	
Resolution	of	the	dispute	is	thus	of	paramount	importance	if	communal	harmony	is	to	
be	 restored	 and	 the	 process	 normally	 entails	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 public	 participation.		
Chimango	describes	proceedings	in	traditional	courts	in	Malawi:	
	
[A]lthough	judgement	was	delivered	by	the	chief	on	the	advice	of	the	elders,	
everybody	had	the	right	to	speak	in	an	orderly	manner,	to	put	questions	to	
witnesses,	and	to	make	suggestions	to	the	court.	[…	]	The	chief	and	his	wise	
men	would	sit	for	hours	listening	to	what	by	Western	standards	might	be	
considered	a	mass	of	irrelevant	details.		This	was	done	to	settle	the	disputes	
once	and	 for	all	 so	 that	 the	society	could	 thereafter	continue	 to	 function	
harmoniously.115	
	
	
AJMs,	therefore,	in	contrast	to	the	formal	Western-style	court	proceedings,	involve	no	
formal	legal	representation	and	the	procedure	is	highly	flexible	with	no	strict	rules	of	
evidence:	the	disputants	give	their	versions	of	events	and	everyone	is	then	free	to	give	
their	evidence	and	their	opinion	on	even	seemingly	irrelevant	issues.116		Whilst	it	might	
be	argued	 that	 a	weaker	party	 could	be	placed	at	 a	disadvantage	 in	 the	negotiation	
process,	the	presence	and	bearing	of	the	mediator	and	the	participation	of	members	of	
the	community	act	as	moderating	influences	and	assist	in	achieving	a	settlement	that	is	
fair	and	reasonable.117	
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For	 the	 majority	 of	 AJMs,	 the	 emphasis	 during	 the	 negotiation	 process	 is	 not	 on	
punishment	of	the	wrongdoer	but	on	reconciliation	and	the	restoration	of	peace	and	
social	harmony.118	Accordingly,	the	aim	is	not	only	to	compensate	the	victim	for	their	
loss	 and	 prevent	 the	 accused	 from	offending	 again	 but	 also	 to	 reintegrate	 both	 the	
victim	 and	 the	 offender	 back	 into	 the	 community.119	 	 The	 consensual	 process	 also	
ensures	that	the	decision	reached	is	enforced	through	social	pressure,	since	disobeying	
a	 final	 ruling	effectively	means	disobeying	 the	whole	 community	which	 can	 result	 in	
social	ostracism.120	
	
Another	common	feature	of	AJMs	is	the	important	role	played	by	traditional	arbitrators	
in	the	conflict	resolution	process.		Chiefs	hold	their	position	by	virtue	of	their	gender,	
age,	 inherited	 status	 or	 influence	 within	 the	 community	 and	 they	 represent	 the	
community	in	expressing	the	consensus	on	shared	norms	and	values.121		Although	the	
exercise	 of	 their	 role	 does	 not	 equate	 with	 western	 views	 of	 ‘accountable	
government’,122	Bennett,	writing	in	the	context	of	South	Africa,	suggests	a	wise	leader	
would	not	dictate	to	his	subjects	since	‘anyone	who	attempted	tyrannical	rule	would	
soon	face	revolt	or	secession’	and	he	quotes	a	common	saying	‘kgosi	ke	kgosi	ka	bathoi’	
(a	chief	is	a	chief	through	his	people).123		
	
Having	been	appointed	from	within	the	community	on	the	basis	of	status	or	 lineage,	
therefore,	the	arbitrators	will	normally	be	familiar	with	the	disputants,	their	relationship	
history	and	the	facts	of	the	dispute	even	before	the	matter	is	brought	before	them.124		
They	 cannot,	 accordingly,	 be	 described	 as	 impartial	 although	 as	Merry	 states,	 ‘their	
impartiality	is	secured	by	crosscutting	ties	that	link	them	to	both	sides.’125	
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122	Murray,	C.	(2004)	‘South	Africa’s	Troubled	Royalty:	Traditional	Leaders	after	Democracy.		Law	and	Policy	Paper	23’	
(Federation	Press:	NSW/Centre	for	International	and	Public	Law:	Canberra)	p17	
123	Ibid	(quoting	Bennett,	T.W.	(2004)	Customary	Law	in	South	Africa	(Lansdowne:	Juta	Publishing	Co.	Ltd);	see	also	
Roberts,	S.	(1979)	p38	
124	Allott,	A.N.	(1968)	p137	
125	Merry,	 S.E.	 (1982)	 ‘The	 Social	 Organization	 of	Mediation	 in	 Nonindustrial	 Societies:	 Implications	 for	 Informal	
Community	Justice	in	America’	in	The	Politics	of	Informal	Justice,	Volume	2:	Comparative	Studies	(London:	Academic	
Press)	p31	
	 109	
A	mediator’s	neutrality	is	also	enhanced	by	his	position	as	representative	of	
an	 entire	 village	 or	 community	 or	 of	 an	 important	 component	 such	 as	 a	
lineage	or	age	group.126	
	
This	familiarity	also	makes	it	difficult	for	either	disputant	to	mislead	the	arbitrator	or	the	
community,	 thereby	 diminishing	 the	 ‘gap	 between	 legal	 truth	 and	 actual	 fact’.127		
However,	the	role	of	the	arbitrator	‘is	less	to	find	the	facts,	state	the	rules	of	law	and	
apply	them	to	the	facts	than	to	set	right	a	wrong	in	such	a	way	as	to	restore	harmony	
within	 the	 disturbed	 community.’128	 	 This	 appears	 to	 be	 borne	 out	 by	 Gluckman’s	
description	of	the	mediators	in	the	Nuer	(pastoral	nomads	of	the	Upper	Nile	region)129	
as:	
	
ritual	 experts	 who	 are	 called	 ‘men	 of	 the	 earth’.	 They	 have	 no	 forceful	
powers	of	coercion.		They	cannot	command	men	to	do	anything	and	expect	
them	to	obey;	but	they	are	political	as	well	as	ritual	functionaries.		If	a	fight	
breaks	 out,	 the	 ‘man	 of	 the	 earth’	 can	 restore	 peace	 …	 will	 negotiate	
between	 the	 two	 groups	 [in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 killing]	 and	 try	 to	 induce	 the	
deceased’s	 kin	 to	 accept	 compensation	 …	 [which]	 eventually	 they	 will	
[accept]	when	the	‘man	of	the	earth’	threatens	to	curse	them.130	
	
The	power	of	the	Nuer	mediator,	therefore,	is	the	threat	of	a	curse	that	supernatural	
forces	will	aid	an	intransigent	disputant’s	enemies	if	he	refuses	to	accept	a	reasonable	
settlement,	the	threat	acting	both	as	a	deterrent	to	further	violence	and	an	inducement	
to	settle	the	dispute.131	
	
Ordinarily,	 the	 AJM	 process	 is	 voluntary	 and	 parties	 confirm	 their	 consent	 to	 the	
procedure	 before	 it	 commences.132	 	 If	 one	 side	 then	 fails	 to	 appear	 or	 leaves	mid-
adjudication,	the	process	halts	and	unless	there	is	a	genuine	acceptance	of	the	ruling,	
the	matter	will	not	be	resolved,	although	in	practice,	non-acceptance	will	simply	lead	to	
further	negotiations	and	an	increase	in	the	compensation	to	be	paid.133		Formal	coercion	
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to	settle	is	rare	whereas	social	pressure	is	a	powerful	tool.134		Wilful	refusal	to	settle	or	
disobeying	a	final	ruling	can	result	in	being	ostracised	by	the	community,	a	situation	not	
to	 be	 desired,	 since	 it	 involves	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 social	 contact	 and	 economic	 co-
operation	 by	 other	members	 of	 the	 community,	which	 has	 been	 likened	 to	 a	 ‘living	
death’.135		Some	communities	employ	more	coercive	enforcement	methods,	however.	
For	example,	the	chief	of	the	Kgatla	people	of	Botswana	is	able	to	enforce	his	decisions,	
if	necessary,	by	means	of	corporal	punishment,	confiscation	of	stock	or	the	withdrawal	
of	land	allocations.136	
	
A	 further	 common	 key	 feature	 is	 that	 the	AJM	process	 is	 usually	 swift,	 avoiding	 the	
lengthy	procedures	and	delays	that	can	be	so	prevalent	in	formal	judicial	procedures.		
The	communities	 involved	are	 familiar	with	 local	problems	and	can	achieve	practical	
solutions,	sometimes	assisted,	as	seen	with	the	Nuer,	by	‘supernatural	powers	[which	
enhance]	their	capacity	to	resolve	local	disputes	and	ensure	enforcement’.137	Each	case	
is	decided	on	its	own	facts	and	circumstances	(a	considerable	divergence	from	the	‘rule-
based	adjudication’	of	formal	state	systems138)	and	will	take	into	account	not	only	the	
specific	issue	between	the	disputants	but	also	‘any	indirect	and	underlying	causes	of	the	
conflict	and	other	factors	which	have	a	bearing	on	successful	reconciliation	such	as	the	
history	of	the	relationship	between	the	parties.’139	This	clearly	leads	to	inconsistency,	a	
situation	which	 is	wholly	 incompatible	with	western	 ideals	of	 legal	certainty	and	due	
process	but	because	the	decision	is	specific	to	the	particular	parties,	it	is	highly	relevant	
and	contextual	and	reflects	the	importance	of	restoring	good	relations	between	them.			
	
Finally,	 it	 is	 a	 common	 feature	 of	 AJMs	 that	 once	 a	 decision	 has	 been	 reached	 by	
consensus	 and	 accepted	 by	 the	 parties,	 it	 is	 confirmed	 through	 rituals	 aimed	 at	
reintegration	such	as	cleansing	ceremonies,	eating	and	drinking	together	and/or	songs	
and	dance.140		These	rituals	are	intrinsic	to	the	African	AJM	process	and	reflect	the	focus	
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on	 reconciliation.141	 	 The	 whole	 community	 is	 involved	 thereby	 confirming	 “‘the	
communal	 element	 inherently	 present	 in	 any	 individual	 conflict”	 and	 […]	 their	
acceptance	of	the	offender	back	into	the	community’.142	In	Sierra	Leone,	for	example,	
rural	 communities	 use	 ceremonies	 based	 on	 practices	 that	 have	 been	 used	 for	
generations	 to	 restore	 relationships	 between	 the	 villagers	 and	 foster	 community	
cohesion:143		
	
During	the	dancing,	if	somebody	has	hurt	you	before,	during	that	time	you	
hug	yourselves,	you	eat	together	and	then	the	person	that	have	done	wrong	
will	feel	happy	–	that	the	brothers	that	I	hurt	still	love	me144	
	
In	Mozambique,	where	‘[t]o	talk	and	recall	the	past	is	not	necessarily	seen	as	a	prelude	
to	 healing	 or	 diminishing	 pain’,145	 instead,	 cleansing	 ceremonies	 are	 conducted	 by	
traditional	 healers	 (‘curandeiros’)	 who	 are	 found	 in	 every	 town	 and	 village	 and	 are	
widely	relied	upon	and	respected.146		Ceremonies	such	as	these	are	powerful	events	that	
bring	people	together	to	share	experience	and	initiate	a	process	of	social	recovery.147	
	
In	 this	 section,	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 common,	 positive	 features	 of	 AJMs	 has	 been	
discussed	and	in	the	following	section,	the	weaknesses	of	AJMs	will	be	identified.		These	
strengths	and	weaknesses	are	important	as	they	are	the	features	that	potentially	can	
satisfy	several	of	the	aims	of	ICJ	outlined	in	the	previous	chapter,	as	will	be	explored	in	
the	penultimate	section	of	this	chapter.	
	
The	Weaknesses	of	AJMs	
	
There	are	aspects	of	AJMs	which	fall	well	short	of	realising	the	aim	of	achieving	justice,	
even	to	the	satisfaction	of	the	people	within	the	communities	that	use	them.		AJMs	are	
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largely	 unregulated	 and	 often	 lack	 procedural	 safeguards	 and	 accountability,	 which	
raises	 questions	 about	 their	 ability	 to	 achieve	 the	 standards	 and	 norms	 of	 criminal	
justice	demanded	both	locally	and	by	the	international	community.		In	this	section,	the	
common	weaknesses	 of	 AJMs	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 order	 to	 ascertain	whether	 these	
weaknesses	are	insurmountable	from	the	perspective	of	satisfying	the	goals	of	ICJ.	
	
Whilst	their	proximity	to	the	community	they	serve	can	be	a	strength	of	AJMs,	 it	can	
also	be	one	of	their	main	weaknesses	as,	due	to	their	cultural	specificity,	they	operate	
effectively	within	homogenous	but	not	within	heterogeneous	societies,	where	they	can	
cause	conflict.148	For	example,	 the	Mozambique	gamba	 spirit	 ceremony	 is	a	 regional	
experience	disliked	by	local	Christians,	who	often	refuse	to	co-operate	with	it149	and	Alie	
surmises	 that	 in	 Sierra	 Leone,	 the	Mende	practices	 for	 settling	 disputes	may	 not	 be	
suitable	 for	 settling	 disputes	 between	 Mende	 and	 non-Mende	 people	 within	 the	
community.150	 Thus,	whilst	 AJMs	 such	 as	Gacaca	 in	 Rwanda	 and	Ubushingantahe	 in	
Burundi	cover	all	ethnic	groups,	others	are	limited	to	the	ethnic,	religious	or	regional	
communities	in	which	they	function.151			
	
This	last	point	is	clearly	demonstrated	by	the	situation	in	Northern	Uganda,	where	the	
Acholi	have	successfully	used	their	own	traditional	healing	mechanisms	to	cope	with	the	
effects	of	conflict	within	their	society.152	However,	the	LRA	insurgency	is	not	just	a	local	
Acholi	 affair	 but	 has	 national	 and	 international	 dimensions153	with	war	 crimes	being	
committed	between	the	Acholi	and	Langi,154	between	people	of	the	north	and	the	south	
of	the	country155	and	across	Uganda’s	borders	into	neighbouring	states,156	areas	where	
the	Acholi	rituals	have	no	relevance	or	meaning.157	Thus,	it	has	been	argued	that	many	
victims	and	perpetrators	are	beyond	the	ambit	of	these	ceremonies	as	‘the	dynamics	of	
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the	 conflict	 and	 its	 legacy,	 just	 as	 in	 Sierra	 Leone,	 go	 far	 beyond	 the	 territorial	 and	
personal	reach	of	domestic	tradition-based	mechanisms.’158		
	
A	cause	for	further	unease	with	AJMs	is	that	the	involvement	of	the	whole	community	
and	emphasis	on	social	harmony	can	lead	to	a	disregard	for	individual	rights	and	undue	
pressure	being	placed	on	the	parties	to	settle	disputes,	sometimes	to	the	detriment	of	
weaker	parties	 in	the	negotiating	process	and	to	the	reinforcement	of	discrimination	
against	minorities	and	women.159		AJMs	generally	do	not	work	effectively	where	there	
is	a	power	or	authority	imbalance	between	the	disputing	parties	because	the	weaker	
party	 is	 vulnerable	 to	 exploitation.160	 	 Flexible	 and	 uncertain	 rules	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
procedural	safeguards	can	add	to	the	particular	risks	facing	women,	young	people	and	
other	 vulnerable	 groups.161	 	 Also,	 the	 need	 for	 consensus	 can	 prevent	 effective	
resolution	and	‘the	language	of	consensus	when	not	reached	democratically	becomes	a	
means	 for	 suppressing	 dissent’.162	 Thus	 the	 ideal	 of	 consensus	 and	 social	 harmony	
frequently	translates	into	the	imposition	of	decisions	that	are	far	from	consensual.163		
While	public	participation	can	be	a	necessary	check	and	balance	to	the	administration	
of	 the	 process,	 therefore,	 the	 antithesis	 is	 that	 it	 can	 lead	 to	 coercion	 and	 the	
reinforcement	of	social	attitudes	that	support	inequalities	on	the	basis	of	age,	gender	
or	other	status.164			
	
This	 is	borne	out	by	a	 four-country	study	conducted	by	World	Bank	 Indonesia	which	
concluded	that	mediation	is	generally	backed	by	coercion	in	the	shape	of	social	sanction	
or	threats	of	violence	and	mediated	settlements	can	reflect	‘what	the	stronger	is	willing	
to	concede	and	the	weaker	can	successfully	demand’.165	It	found	that	the	Indonesian	
Musyawarah166	 is	 frequently	 an	 extremely	 patriarchal	 and	 elite-dominated	 process	
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‘where	the	weak	are	pushed	into	accepting	an	outcome	[favouring]	the	powerful	and	
are	then	coerced	into	not	complaining	about	the	decision.’167		
	
Two	 major	 concerns	 regarding	 AJMS	 are	 that	 they	 involve	 processes	 which	 are	
inconsistent	with	established	criminal	 justice	standards	and	human	rights	norms	and	
they	have	huge	potential	 for	discrimination.	 	Customary	norms	and	 justice	processes	
frequently	result	in	‘discriminatory	outcomes	and	can	reinforce	the	power	structure	that	
controls	and	administers	them.’168		Since	they	are	usually	dominated	by	local	male	elites	
or	 religious	 leaders,	 it	 is	often	the	case	that	women,	 the	poor,	 the	young	and	ethnic	
minorities	are	unable	to	gain	equal	access	or	fair	treatment.169	In	Burundi,	for	example,	
women	 are	 not	 allowed	 to	 become	members	 of	 the	Ubushingantahe,	 they	 can	 only	
participate	in	the	proceedings	as	the	wife	or	widow	of	a	member170	and	in	Sierra	Leone,	
the	justice	system	is	biased	against	women,	especially	 in	marital	relationships.171	The	
Mozambique	gamba	spirit	ceremony	also	carries	a	bias	against	women	as	only	the	spirits	
of	men	killed	in	the	conflict	are	permitted	to	return	to	seek	justice	in	the	world	of	the	
living172	and	in	Sierra	Leone,	young	people	often	are	excluded	from	traditional	processes	
because	 they	 ‘are	 considered	 immature	 and	 not	 yet	 versed	 in	 the	 ways	 of	 the	
community’.173			
	
Furthermore,	 although	 participation	 in	 an	 AJM	 is	 voluntary,	 it	 may	 be	 virtually	
impossible	 for	accused	women	and	the	young	to	refuse	to	submit	 themselves	 to	 the	
process	or	to	refuse	to	comply	with	its	decision.174	 	Sometimes	the	accused	does	not	
have	a	chance	to	be	heard	or	is	not	adequately	represented,175	for	example,	in	many	
AJMs,	women	have	no	right	of	representation	other	than	through	older	male	relatives	
who	are	expected	to	make	decisions	on	their	behalf.176	Additionally,	factors	such	as	the	
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accused’s	or	his	or	her	family’s	past	conduct	may	be	taken	into	account,	which	clearly	
compromises	the	principle	of	innocent	until	proven	guilty.177		
	
Discrimination	against	women	 is	a	major	 issue	because	of	AJM	male-domination	and	
cultural	beliefs	often	result	in	gender-based	decisions	and	the	application	of	customary	
or	religious	norms	which	are	heavily	biased	against	women.178		For	example,	in	many	
traditional	societies,	women	are	denied	rights	‘to	inherit	capital	assets’	and	a	husband’s	
domestic	abuse	is	‘generally	tolerated	unless	the	harm	becomes	so	physically	damaging	
or	persistent	that	it	is	socially	disruptive’.179			
	
An	additional	concern	is	that	decisions	can	be	made	which	are	inconsistent	with	basic	
principles	of	human	rights,	 for	example,	the	 imposition	of	cruel	or	 inhuman	forms	of	
punishment	such	as	flogging,	banishment	or	decisions	that	perpetuate	the	exploitation	
of	 children	 or	 subordination	 of	 women.180	 	 Some	 extremely	 harsh	 decisions	 and	
punishments	are	imposed	by	AJM	leaders	and	chiefs	on	women	and	girls	in	the	name	of	
culture	 and	 tradition.	 	 A	 recent	 example	 is	 an	order	 by	 a	 village	 council	 (or	 jirga)	 in	
Pakistan	that	a	16-year-old	girl	should	be	publicly	raped	as	punishment	for	her	brother	
having	raped	a	12-year-old	girl.181	In	Somalia,	a	woman	who	is	raped	is	often	forced	to	
marry	her	attacker	 ‘to	protect	her	honour’	and	serves	 to	ensure	 full	payment	of	her	
dowry	by	the	attacker’s	clan	to	the	victim’s	clan,	on	the	basis	that	marriage	solidifies	a	
bond	 between	 the	 clans	 of	 the	man	 and	woman	 and	 further	 violence	 is	 avoided.182		
Similarly,	the	swara	tradition	practiced	by	the	jirgas	in	parts	of	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan,	
also	involves	the	marrying	of	a	girl	to	the	man	who	raped	her	to	save	her	honour	and	
the	honour	of	her	family,	or	as	compensation	for	killing,	as	a	symbol	of	reconciliation.		
These	examples	give	cause	for	concern183	as	do	some	of	the	brutal	punishments	inflicted	
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on	women	from	Islamic	communities	who	have	been	accused	of	adultery,	particularly	
in	South	Asia.184	
	
Clearly,	AJM	 leaders	and	chiefs	 can	be	unfamiliar	or	 culturally	disengaged	with	basic	
human	 rights	 standards,	 such	 as	 the	 right	 to	 protection	 against	 cruel	 and	 unusual	
punishments,	with	the	result	that	violations	occur.		Other	rights,	including	the	right	to	
fair	trial,	legal	representation,	due	process	of	law,	protection	against	self-incrimination	
or	coerced	confession,	jury	trial	and	of	appeal	can	also	be	added	to	the	list	of	human	
rights	that	are	not	routinely	catered	for	in	AJMs.185			
	
Turning	to	the	role	of	traditional	mediators,	their	rulings	often	depend	on	the	knowledge	
and	moral	values	of	the	individual	concerned	and	there	can	be	criticism	that	they	rule	
arbitrarily,	with	 few	 checks	 and	 balances	 on	 their	 administration	 and	 that	 they	 give	
‘power	 considerations	 precedence	 over	 equity,	 fairness	 and	 overall	 justice.’186	
Generally,	there	are	no	minimum	standards	that	have	to	be	met	in	AJMs	and	the	fairness	
of	 proceedings	 depends	 on	 the	 person	 conducting	 them.187	 Thus,	 although	 the	 AJM	
involves	public	participation,	they	are	not	generally	accountable	and	frequently	there	is	
no	right	of	appeal.	
	
Areas	of	concern	regarding	the	exercise	of	the	leader’s	authority	are	that	in	resolving	
disputes,	they	may	favour	one	party	over	another	based	on	their	political	allegiance	or	
power	 allied	 to	wealth,	 education	or	 status,	 particularly	where	not	 to	do	 so	may	be	
threat	to	their	own	position.188	They	may	also	be	susceptible	to	bribery	because	often	
they	receive	insufficient	or	no	remuneration	and	therefore	rely	on	gifts	and	bribes	for	
income,	 which	 might	 then	 influence	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 hearing.189	 	 In	 Burundi,	 a	
traditional	gift	of	beer	or	other	things	is	asked	for	before	any	hearing	takes	place	which,	
it	has	been	suggested,	could	be	considered	corruption.190		However,	it	has	been	pointed	
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out	 that	 since	 the	 informal	 process	 is	 voluntary,	 traditional	 arbitrators	 cannot	 risk	
accepting	 bribes	 on	 a	wide	 scale	 since	 it	would	 affect	 the	 perception	 of	 their	 even-
handedness	and	further,	that	formal	justice	systems	are	more	susceptible	to	corruption	
due	to	‘the	lack	of	public	participation	and	involuntary	nature	of	proceedings.’191		
	
Once	 a	 decision	 has	 been	 reached,	 there	may	be	 no	 specific	means	 of	 enforcement	
beyond	 social	 pressure192	 which	 can	 benefit	 a	 stronger	 and	 discriminate	 against	 a	
weaker	disputant.		It	has	been	asserted	that	in	Somalia,	for	example,	a	militarily	strong	
clan	may	openly	refuse	to	comply	with	a	judgement	that	favours	a	militarily	weak	clan,	
which	serves	to	undermine	the	whole	xeer	decision-making	process.193	
	
The	final	area	of	concern	to	be	discussed	in	this	section	is	the	appropriateness	of	using	
AJMs	to	deal	with	the	crimes	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	ICC.		It	is	often	argued	that	
AJMs	are	used	effectively	within	communities	to	deal	with	a	relatively	small	number	of	
minor	crimes	and	disputes	where	their	informality	can	be	a	strength	but	that	they	are	
inappropriate	for	post-conflict	situations	where	heinous	crimes	have	been	committed	
and	where	 it	 is	 important	to	protect	the	rights	of	victim	and	offender.194	First,	critics	
insist,	 these	processes	 in	their	traditional	 form	were	not	designed	to	cope	with	huge	
numbers	of	returning	former	abductees	and	ex-combatants	who	have	committed	war	
crimes	 and	 crimes	 against	 humanity.195	 	 Second,	 victims	 often	 cannot	 identify	 the	
perpetrator	of	the	harm	done	to	them,	in	which	case	traditional	rituals	are	difficult	to	
perform.196		Even	if	the	victim	and	perpetrator	can	be	identified,	payment	of	reparation	
in	 order	 to	 restore	 the	 status	 quo,	 a	 fundamental	 principle	 of	 AJMs,	 will	 often	 be	
impossible	 given	 the	 total	 impoverishment	 the	 conflict	 has	 caused.197	 Finally,	 it	 is	
asserted	that	middle-	and	high-level	commanders	of	rebel	and	government	forces	may	
be	beyond	the	scope	of	AJMs.198					
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All	these	arguments	are	persuasive	but	AJMs	can	be	and	are	being	adapted	to	fit	western	
vision	of	fair	justice	and	in	some	instances,	cleansing	ceremonies	and	other	rituals	are	
already	setting	foundations	for	justice.199		For	all	the	criticism	that	has	been	levelled	at	
the	 top-down	 ‘corruption’	 of	 the	 Gacaca	 traditional	 process200	 (not	 least	 the	
government’s	removal	of	RPF	crimes	from	Gacaca	jurisdiction201	which	has	also	limited	
the	potential	for	long-term	reconciliation),	it	did	deal	with	huge	numbers	of	génocidaires	
in	a	relatively	short	time	and	indisputably	faster	than	the	formal	justice	system	could	
achieve.202		Also,	it	could	be	countered	that	if	an	AJM	cannot	identify	a	particular	victim	
and/or	perpetrator,	it	is	far	less	likely	that	formal	court	proceedings	will	have	greater	
success,	sufficient	to	achieve	a	conviction.		Further,	even	if	reparation	is	impossible,	the	
perpetrator	concerned	can	make	restitution	by	other	means,	for	example,	community	
service	geared	specifically	to	benefit	the	victims.		In	this	way,	the	prison	population	is	
kept	down,	the	money	that	would	be	spent	on	maintaining	a	prisoner	in	custody	can	be	
diverted	to	other	beneficial	social	projects	and	the	offender	is	returned	to	and	becomes	
a	useful	member	of	the	community	thus	avoiding	the	economic	and	social	dislocation	of	
family	life.203			
	
Regarding	middle-	and	top-level	commanders	of	either	rebel	or	government	forces,	it	is	
clearly	far	more	likely	that	they	would	be	prepared	to	submit	to	an	AJM	as	opposed	to	
a	formal	prosecution	and	whilst	blanket	amnesties	are	never	acceptable,	a	post-conflict	
society	may	refrain	from	prosecutions	if	certain	conditions	are	satisfied,	one	of	which	is	
that	the	AJM	must	have	an	accountability	dimension.	 	 It	has	been	established	 in	this	
chapter	that	many	AJMs	do	have	accountability	elements	and	the	offender	must	admit	
his	guilt	 and	express	 remorse:	 features	 commonly	absent	 from	defendants	 in	 formal	
trials.				
	
																																																						
199	Baines,	E.	(2005)	Roco	Wat	I	Acoli:	Restoring	Relationships	in	Acholi-land:	Traditional	Approaches	to	Justice	and	
Re-integration	(Gulu	District:	Lui	Institute	for	Global	Issues)	p72-3	
200	Bornkamm,	P.C.	(2012)	Rwanda’s	Gacaca	Courts:	Between	Retribution	and	Reparation	(Oxford:	OUP)	p106-107	
201	Ibid	p56-7	
202	Approximately	ten	per	cent	of	the	adult	male	Hutu	population	(130,000)	were	arrested	and	imprisoned	between	
July	and	September	1994	and	it	was	estimated	that	prosecutions	would	not	be	completed	within	113	years		
203	Stevens,	J.	(2001)	p126-7	
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Can	AJMs	satisfy	the	aims	of	International	Criminal	Justice?	
	
Traditional	 communal	 values	 inform	 practices	 that	 have	 been	 used	 for	 centuries	 to	
resolve	conflicts	and	heal	relationships.		Although	the	practices	differ	between	regions	
and	between	ethnic	 groups,	 they	 are	 all	 important	 elements	 in	 the	process	 of	 post-
conflict	resolution.		However,	as	discussed	below,	there	is	a	different	emphasis	with	the	
justice	dispensed	at	an	AJM	that	is	at	odds	with	the	western	liberal	view	of	justice	which	
is	promulgated	by	the	ICC.	
	
Western	 justice	 systems	 focus	 on	 accountability	 and	 to	 a	 much	 lesser	 extent	 on	
reparation	and	healing	and	critics	of	AJMs	point	to	their	inability	to	deal	adequately	with	
the	perpetrators	of	international	crimes,	due	to	their	common	aversion	to	retributive	
justice	 and	 emphasis	 on	 the	 restoration	 of	 social	 harmony.	 	 However,	 the	
restorative/retributive	 dichotomy	 is	 exaggerated	 as	 this	 chapter	 has	 demonstrated	
since	there	are	accountability	components	to	most	AJM	ceremonies	of	restitution	and	
reconciliation:	 the	 processes	 of	 Mozambique,	 Rwanda,	 Sierra	 Leone,	 Burundi	 and	
Uganda,	for	example,	all	tend	to	require	the	offender	to	openly	acknowledge	their	guilt	
before	 reconciliation	 can	 take	place.	 	 Indeed,	punitive	measures	are	 common	within	
some	AJMs	used	by	Acholi	people	of	Northern	Uganda,	depending	on	the	crime,	 the	
perpetrator	and	who	is	arbitrating.204	Thus,	it	has	been	argued	that	contemporary	AJMs	
pursue	the	same	ultimate	objectives	as	western	justice	systems	but	favour	a	different	
means	of	achieving	them.205		
	
AJMs	have	more	nuanced	approaches	to	accountability	than	formal	trials,	which	require	
an	unequivocal	plea	to	the	accusation,	a	yes/no	response	to	questions,	a	guilty	or	not	
guilty	verdict	and	clear	procedural	and	evidential	rules	to	enable	a	verdict	to	be	reached.		
Today’s	violent	conflicts	are	not	black	and	white	and	formal	 trials	are	 ill-equipped	to	
deal	with	the	complexities	of	the	grey	areas,	such	as	abducted	children	who	are	forced	
to	become	soldiers	and	 to	commit	brutal	 crimes	against	 their	 communities.206	These	
																																																						
204	Allen,	T.	and	MacDonald,	A.,	(2013)	p11	
205	Ibid	
206	Branch,	A.	(2017)	‘Dominic	Ongwen	on	Trial:	The	ICC’s	African	Dilemmas’	11	IJYJ	pp30-49	at	pp35,	38-41	
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guilty/not	guilty;	victim/perpetrator	dichotomies	are	sensitive	territory	for	criminal	law	
as	 they	 are	 difficult	 to	 categorise,	 can	 make	 reaching	 a	 clear	 verdict	 difficult,	 can	
misrepresent	a	situation	and	can	endanger	the	success	of	post-conflict	reconciliation.207			
In	contrast,	the	flexibility	of	AJM’s,	the	African	way	of	prolonging	discussions	and	the	
ritual	 elements	 create	 more	 opportunities	 for	 exploring	 issues	 of	 accountability,	
innocence	and	guilt	that	are	integral	to	the	legacy	of	violent	conflict.208		This	is	where	
AJMs	have	clear	advantages.		
	
The	issue	of	whether	AJMs	can	satisfy	the	deterrent	function	of	ICJ	is	debatable	although	
it	will	 be	 recalled	 that	 similar	 questions	 arose	 concerning	 the	 deterrent	 potential	 of	
criminal	 prosecutions.	 	 The	 fact	 of	 the	 perpetrator	 of	 the	 violations	 voluntarily	
undergoing	the	AJM	process	within	his	or	her	community	signals	confidence	regarding	
the	ending	of	the	violations	and	their	non-recurrence.		Further,	since	decisions	regarding	
the	outcome	of	the	procedures	are	usually	reached	by	agreement	between	the	victim,	
the	offender	and	the	whole	community,	there	is	social	pressure	for	compliance	which	
also	serves	to	ensure	non-recurrence	of	the	offending	behaviour.	As	with	all	criminal	
justice	processes,	however,	it	is	difficult	to	surmise	whether	international	acceptance	of	
AJMs	would	result	in	future	conflict	and	atrocities	being	averted.		
	
It	could	be	argued	that	the	transitional	justice	objective	of	achieving	justice	and	dignity	
for	victims	 is	more	assured	with	an	AJM	than	with	formal	trials	because	of	the	more	
flexible,	informal	approach	used	to	reach	agreement	and	the	focus	on	reparations	and	
restitution	for	the	victim.		Clearly	there	are	issues	in	patriarchal	societies	regarding	the	
protection	of	the	rights	of	women,	the	young	and	minorities	but	these	could	certainly	
be	overcome	through	reform	of	both	attitude	and	procedure.		
	
The	AJMs	discussed	in	this	chapter	do	not	satisfy	the	‘historical	record’	requirement	of	
ICJ,	although	it	is	unlikely	that	the	nature	of	the	atrocities	suffered	will	be	forgotten	and	
the	key	feature	of	AJMs	is	the	passing	down	of	traditions	through	the	centuries	by	word	
																																																						
207	 Ibid;	 see	 also	Baines,	 E.	 (2009)	 ‘Complex	political	 perpetrators:	 reflections	on	Dominic	Ongwen’	 47	 Journal	 of	
Modern	African	Studies	pp163-91;	Baines,	E.	(2007)	pp91-114		
208	Huyse,	L.	(2008a)	p15	
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of	mouth.		It	should	also	be	noted	that	for	some	communities,	not	only	is	recollection	of	
the	 past	 and	 establishing	 the	 truth	 not	 rooted	 in	 the	 local	 culture,	 it	 is	 positively	
discouraged	as	has	been	revealed	by	case	studies	in	Sierra	Leone,	Burundi,	Rwanda	and	
Mozambique.209				
	
Thus,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 many	 AJMs	 may	 have	 great	 potential	 for	 post-conflict	
accountability,	truth	telling,	healing	and	social	repair,210	surpassing	even	formal	truth	
commissions	in	societies	where	public	revealing	of	the	truth	is	not	strongly	rooted	in	the	
local	culture.211	Quinn,	for	example,	argues	that	‘acknowledging	past	crimes	can	lead	to	
participation	 and	 civic	 engagement,	 the	 generation	 of	 social	 capital,	 and	 ultimately	
social	cohesion	[and]	reconciliation.’212		Since	they	are	based	in	established	local	values	
and	 traditions,	 ritualistic	 communal	 ceremonies	 can	 be	more	 effective	 in	 creating	 a	
receptive	attitude	towards	reconciliation.213	 	Certainly,	the	gamba	spirit	ceremony	of	
Mozambique	is	a	powerful	demonstration	of	the	healing	of	community	relations	that	
can	be	achieved	with	victims	and	perpetrators	as	it	‘creates	social	spaces	where	past	can	
be	worked	through’.214	The	Bashingantahe	in	Burundi	are	also	considered	to	have	the	
same	potential	for	reconciliation	as	the	majority	of	the	population	see	the	institution	as	
a	 credible	 instrument	 of	 dispute	 resolution	 even	 in	 context	 of	 dealing	 with	 crimes	
committed	 during	 civil	 war.215	 	 Likewise,	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	 and	 Northern	 Uganda,	
reintegration	and	cleansing	ceremonies	particularly	for	former	child	soldiers	but	also	for	
ex-combatants	have	seen	successful	reconciliations	with	survivors.216			
	
A	difficulty	for	the	AJM	today,	however,	is	the	change	in	social	structure	brought	about	
particularly	by	violent	conflict.		Whatever	the	scale	of	violence	suffered,	the	potency	of	
the	 AJMs	 in	 the	 countries	 concerned	 has	 been	 detrimentally	 affected.217	 	 The	
																																																						
209	Huyse,	L.	and	Salter,	M.	(eds.)	(2008)	p187	
210	Huyse,	L.	(2008b)	p192	
211	Huyse,	L.	and	Salter,	M.	(eds.)	(2008)	p187	
212	Quinn,	J.R.	(2007)	‘Social	Reconstruction	in	Uganda:	The	Role	of	Customary	Mechanisms	in	Transitional	Justice’	8	
HRR	pp389-407	at	p392	
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214	Ibid	p188	
215	Naniwe-Kaburahe,	A.	(2008)	p168-9	
216	Huyse,	L.	(2008b)	p189	
217	Ibid	p185	
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breakdown	of	traditional	communities	resulting	from	family	displacement,218	the	mass	
migration	of	young	people	to	the	towns	 (as	 in	Sierra	Leone)219	and	 large	numbers	of	
survivors	and	perpetrators	still	living	in	refugee	camps	(as	in	Northern	Uganda)	have	all	
‘damaged	the	natural	biotope	of	traditional	practices.’220	 	Taboos	have	been	ignored,	
sacred	places	defiled	and	the	legitimacy	of	chiefs	and	elders	has	been	greatly	harmed,	
especially	in	the	eyes	of	the	youth.221	The	‘spontaneous	socialization	of	young	people’222	
has	 almost	 disappeared,	 particularly	 for	 abducted	 children	 and	 camps	 for	 displaced	
persons	 are	 not	 locations	 conducive	 to	 holding	 cleansing,	 reintegration	 and	
reconciliation	ceremonies	or	even	to	sit	around	the	fire	and	teach	the	young	the	customs	
and	traditions	of	the	community.		The	resources	needed	to	fulfil	the	reparative	elements	
of	the	rituals	are	also	missing	due	to	extreme	poverty	and	furthermore,	civil	war	and	
genocide	 have	 engendered	mutual	mistrust	 in	 small-scale	 communities	 which	 could	
affect	the	willingness	to	be	reconciled.223		These	factors	have	all	had	a	devastating	effect	
on	 the	 capacities	 of	 traditional	 leaders	 and	 chiefs	 to	 perform	 their	 justice	 and	
reconciliation	rituals	and	this	 in	turn	casts	doubt	on	their	ability	to	adapt	the	original	
design	of	the	AJM	to	the	intricate	task	of	dealing	with	mass	human	rights	violations.224	
	
While	it	has	been	suggested	that	AJMs	potentially	could	be	adapted	to	overcome	some	
of	 the	 concerns	 raised	 by	 critics	 and	 to	 enable	 them	 more	 readily	 to	 achieve	 the	
objectives	demanded	by	proponents	of	ICJ,225	imposing	‘reforms’	in	a	top-down	fashion	
risks	destroying	their	strengths	and	benefits.	
	
Conclusion	
	
In	 this	 chapter,	 some	of	 the	 common	 strengths	 and	weaknesses	of	AJMs	have	been	
outlined	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 AJMs	 to	 satisfy	 the	 aims	 of	 ICJ	 has	 been	 considered.		
																																																						
218	Alie,	J.A.D.	(2008)	p144	
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220	Huyse,	L.	(2008b)	p185	
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225	The	NGO,	Amnesty	International,	for	example,	actively	campaigns	for	criminal	prosecutions	and	against	amnesties.		
See	 ‘International	 Justice’	 [Online]	 Available:	 https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/international-justice/	
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Clearly,	AJMs	are	found	wanting	in	the	area	of	protection	of	human	rights	and	criminal	
justice	standards.		They	are	also	more	prone	to	discrimination	and	lack	of	due	process	
than	 formal	 courts	 but	 to	put	 this	 into	 context,	 there	 are	 countries	where	 the	 state	
justice	system	is	no	better	and	there	are	examples	of	non-discriminatory	AJMs	as	well	
as	of	discriminatory	formal	courts.		For	example,	in	a	number	of	countries	in	Africa	and	
Asia,	wife	beating	is	not	considered	to	be	a	crime	under	national	law	and	according	to	a	
2016	World	Bank	report	which	studied	173	countries,	approximately	155	have	at	least	
one	law	that	discriminates	against	women,	with	countries	in	the	Middle	East,	Asia	and	
Africa	 being	 the	 worst	 offenders.226	 It	 can	 be	 misleading,	 therefore,	 to	 attribute	
discrimination	to	AJMs	when	it	is	the	prevailing	attitudes	lying	behind	the	discriminatory	
customary	norms	and	laws	that	need	to	be	addressed.	
	
Furthermore,	 although	 very	 few	 women	 preside	 over	 AJMs,	 women	 are	 under-
represented	 on	 the	 formal	 benches	 in	 Africa	 and	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 world,	 so	 the	
difference	regarding	equality	of	sexes	should	be	seen	as	a	matter	of	degree.227		Just	as	
attitudes	towards	women	have	changed	over	the	last	century	and	formal	legal	systems	
in	many	parts	of	world	have	become	less	discriminatory	against	women,	change	has	also	
been	reflected	in	AJMs,	which	have	seen	improvements	in	attitudes	and	steps	to	redress	
the	gender	imbalance.	For	example,	in	Sierra	Leone	provision	is	being	made	for	female	
representation	 in	dispute	 settlement	 cases	and	 ‘some	 truth-seeking	mechanisms	are	
actually	headed	by	women’.228		In	Lesotho,	chiefs	have	been	delegating	their	authority	
to	 their	wives	 or	 sisters	 due	 to	male	 labour	migration	 and	 low	 pay	 and	 as	 a	 result,	
decisions	on	inheritance	issues	have	largely	favoured	women229		Unfortunately,	these	
progressive	 steps	 are	 so	 far	 not	 mirrored	 in	 Burundi	 where	 efforts	 to	 increase	 the	
participation	of	women	are	being	thwarted	by	the	conservative	attitudes	of	men.230	In	
Rwanda,	women	have	taken	up	an	important	role	in	the	reconstruction	efforts	although	
Gacaca	 remains	 ‘biased	 against	women	 because	 of	 its	 inadequacy	 [to]	 fully	 address	
sexual	crimes.	Provisions	have	been	made	to	allow	women	to	testify	on	sexual	crimes	
																																																						
226	World	Bank	Group,	(2015)	Women,	Business	and	the	Law	2016:	Getting	to	Equal	(Washington,	DC:	WBG)	p2,	3	
227	Wojkowska,	E.	(2006)	p21	
228	Alie,	J.A.D.	(2008)	p133	
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[…]	in	camera.	But	the	embedding	of	the	Gacaca	in	local	face-to-face	community	makes	
it	difficult	to	tackle	these	crimes.’231		The	experience	of	a	former	legal	officer	with	the	
International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	Rwanda	reveals	it	was	difficult	for	women	to	speak	
about	 sexual	violence	because	of	 the	stigma	attached	 to	 rape,	which	affected	 family	
relationships	and	marriage	prospects,	as	‘no	one	wanted	to	marry	or	have	anything	to	
do	with	a	rape	victim’.232		
	
However,	in	the	right	hands,	chiefs	and	elders	(who	should	comprise	males	and	females)	
are	custodians	of	customs	and	practices	and	serve	as	models	in	their	environments	for	
the	 promotion	 of	 virtues	 of	 mutual	 respect,	 dignity,	 integrity	 and	 truth.233	 As	 their	
communities	begin	to	recover	from	the	effects	of	violent	conflict	or	repressive	rule,	if	
they	 are	 able	 to	 adapt	 to	 changing	demands	 and	 conditions	 and	make	provision	 for	
wider	participation	and	the	 inclusion	of	women,	minorities	and	the	young,	 it	may	be	
possible	for	the	processes	of	AJMs	to	be	modified	sufficiently	so	as	to	enable	them	to	
deal	with	perpetrators	of	war	crimes	and	crimes	against	humanity.234			
	
In	his	2004	report	to	the	UNSC,	Kofi	Annan	argued	that	‘we	must	learn	to	eschew	one-
size-fits-all	 formulas	 and	 the	 importation	 of	 foreign	 models	 and	 instead,	 base	 our	
support	 on	 national	 assessments,	 national	 participation	 and	 national	 needs	 and	
aspirations.’235		Provided	that	an	AJM	is	the	democratic	choice	of	the	transitional	society,	
a	major	benefit	of	AJMs	is	their	proximity	to	victims	and	survivors	as,	in	contrast	to	trials	
at	The	Hague,	affected	communities	 can	be	 involved	 in	 their	process	of	 justice	being	
done	 and	 seen	 to	 be	 done.236	 	 The	 question	 remains,	 therefore,	 whether	 a	 state	
proposing	such	an	AJM	has	the	potential	to	persuade	the	ICC	to	defer	in	its	favour	under	
the	complementarity	regime	set	out	in	the	RSt.		This	question	will	be	discussed	further	
in	Chapter	Seven	when	the	Court’s	interpretation	to	date	of	the	RSt’s	complementarity	
provisions	will	be	examined	in	detail.	
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In	 the	 next	 chapter,	 to	 consider	 further	 the	 issues	 raised	 in	 this	 chapter	 from	 the	
viewpoint	 of	 a	 specific	 AJM,	Mato	 Oput,	 the	 Acholi	 ceremony	 traditionally	 used	 for	
conflict	 resolution	between	clans	 following	an	accidental	or	deliberate	killing,	will	be	
examined	in	depth	to	ascertain	whether	it	can	satisfy	the	goals	of	ICJ	and	would	be	a	
viable	alternative	to	prosecution	at	the	ICC.		
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CHAPTER	FIVE	
	
UGANDA’S	MATO	OPUT	AND	THE	REQUIREMENTS	OF	INTERNATIONAL	CRIMINAL	
JUSTICE	
	
	
Introduction	
	
For	 30	 years,	 from	 1986	 when	 Yoweri	 Museveni,	 leader	 of	 the	 National	 Resistance	
Army/Movement	 (NRA/M)	became	President	 of	Uganda,	 the	population	of	 northern	
Uganda	has	suffered	from	the	effects	of	a	brutal	civil	war.		Indeed,	conflict	and	violence	
have	plagued	much	of	Uganda	since	independence	from	Britain	in	1962,	which	has	had	
a	 profound	 effect	 on	 Ugandan	 politics	 and	 society.	 Museveni	 has	 faced	 at	 least	 27	
separate	insurgencies	since	he	seized	power1		but	the	war	which	started	in	1987	in	the	
Acholi	sub-region	of	northern	Uganda	between	the	Government	of	Uganda	(GoU)	and	
the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	(LRA)	led	by	Joseph	Kony,	has	been	the	deadliest	and	most	
protracted.		This	war,	which	has	spilled	over	Uganda’s	boundaries	into	South	Sudan,	the	
Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	(DRC)	and	the	Central	African	Republic	(CAR),	has	resulted	
in	more	than	one	hundred	thousand	civilian	deaths,2	the	abductions	of	between	24,000	
and	38,000	children	and	youth	for	forcible	recruitment	as	child	soldiers	and	of	women	
to	act	as	 ‘wives’	and	sex	slaves,3	 the	displacement	of	more	 than	1.8	million	people,4	
egregious	 crimes	 against	 civilians	 and	 the	 virtual	 destruction	 of	 social,	 cultural	 and	
economic	life	in	Acholiland.5			
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(Kampala:	UN	Development	Programme)	p96	
5	Lomo,	Z.	and	Hovil,	L.	(2004)	p1	
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The	 Acholi	 people,	 who	 arguably	 have	 suffered	most	 from	 the	 conflict,6	 have	 been	
vociferous	in	their	calls	for	peace.		In	an	effort	to	end	the	war,	Acholi	religious	leaders	
and	their	supporters	pressed	a	reluctant7	Museveni	to	pass	an	Amnesty	Act	(AA)	in	2000	
which	granted	a	blanket	amnesty8	to	‘any	Ugandan	who	has	at	any	time	since	the	26th	
day	of	January	1986,	engaged	in	or	 is	engaging	in	war	or	armed	rebellion	against	the	
government	of	the	Republic	of	Uganda’.9	 	Between	2000	and	2012	more	than	26,000	
rebels	emerged	from	the	bush	to	take	advantage	of	the	amnesty	provisions,	about	one-
half	of	whom	were	ex-LRA	combatants10	but	Kony	and	some	other	top	LRA	commanders	
have	not.			
	
In	 December	 2003,	 Museveni	 referred	 ‘the	 situation	 regarding	 the	 LRA’	 to	 the	
International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	and	warrants	for	the	arrest	of	five	top	leaders	of	the	
LRA	 were	 unsealed	 by	 the	 ICC	 in	 October	 2005.	 	 Many	 civil	 society	 organisations,	
traditional	and	 religious	 leaders,	politicians	and	 individuals	 in	northern	Uganda	were	
aghast	at	the	intervention	of	the	ICC,	pointing	out	that	Museveni’s	referral	was	contrary	
to	 the	provisions	of	 the	AA	and	would	endanger	peace	prospects.11	 	A	delegation	of	
Acholi	leaders	travelled	to	the	ICC	in	March	and	April	2005	to	appeal	to	the	Prosecutor	
of	the	ICC	to	allow	the	Acholi	to	deal	with	the	LRA	rebels	in	their	own,	traditional	way.12		
They	 argued	 that	 their	 traditional	 justice	 mechanisms	 were	 more	 appropriate	 and	
																																																						
6	War	crimes	have	also	been	committed	against	other	tribes	of	northern	Uganda,	such	as	the	Langi,	Madi	and	Teso,	
see	Huyse,	L.	(2008b)	‘Conclusions	and	recommendations’	in	Huyse,	L.	and	Salter,	M.	(eds.)	Traditional	Justice	and	
Reconciliation	after	Violent	Conflict:	Learning	from	African	Experiences	(Stockholm:	IDEA)	pp181-98	at	p189	
7	Baines,	E.	(2007)	‘The	Haunting	of	Alice:	Local	Approaches	to	Justice	and	Reconciliation	in	Northern	Uganda’	1	IJTJ	
pp91-114	at	p101	
8	Although	termed	a	‘blanket’	amnesty,	individual	applications	must	be	made	to	the	Amnesty	Commission	
9	The	Ugandan	Amnesty	Act	(Cap.	294,	Laws	of	Uganda),	Entry	into	force	21	January	2000,	Clause	(1)	The	act	stipulates	
that	it	must	be	renewed	every	six	months	by	Parliament	and	since	it	was	passed,	it	has	been	regularly	extended	(last	
renewed	for	two	years	in	June	2015)		
10	Lamunu,	G.	(2012);	see	also	Okiror,	S.	(2015)	‘Forgive	and	forget?	Amnesty	dilemma	haunts	Uganda’	IRIN	12	June	
11	Hovil,	L.	and	Lomo,	Z.	(2005)	Whose	Justice?	Perceptions	of	Uganda’s	Amnesty	Act	2000:	The	Potential	for	Conflict	
Resolution	and	Long-Term	Reconciliation	(Kampala:	RLP)	p22;		see	also	Branch,	A.	(2004)	‘International	Justice,	Local	
Injustice:	The	International	Criminal	Court	in	Northern	Uganda’	51	Dissent	pp22-26	at	p22;	RLP	(2004)	The	RLP	Position	
Paper	on	the	announcement	of	 formal	 investigations	of	 the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	by	the	Chief	Prosecutor	of	 the	
International	Criminal	Court	and	its	implications	on	the	search	for	peaceful	solutions	to	the	war	in	northern	Uganda	
pp1-12;	Apuuli,	K.P.	(2006)	‘The	ICC	Arrest	Warrants	for	the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	Leaders	and	Peace	Prospects	for	
Northern	 Uganda’	 4	 JICJ	 pp179-187	 at	 p180,	 184;	 Human	 Rights	Watch	 (HRW)	 (2005)	Uprooted	 and	 Forgotten:	
Impunity	and	HR	abuses	in	Uganda	9	Sept,	Vol	17	No	12A	p55		
12	Pham,	P.,	Vinck,	P.,	Wierda,	M.,	Stover,	E.,	di	Giovanni,	A.	(2005)	Forgotten	Voices:	A	Population-Based	Survey	of	
Attitudes	about	Peace	and	Justice	 in	Northern	Uganda	(ICTJ:	University	of	California,	Berkeley)	p19;	see	also	HRW	
(2005)	p55		
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relevant	to	the	local	community	than	international	trials.13		They	particularly	singled	out	
the	Acholi	 traditional	Mato	Oput	 ceremony	of	 reconciliation	 as	 the	means	 by	which	
accountability	and	reintegration	of	ex-LRA	fighters	would	be	achieved.14		
	
Despite	the	ICC	referral	and	outstanding	arrest	warrants,	the	GoU	signed	an	Agreement	
on	Accountability	and	Reconciliation	(AAR)	with	the	LRA	at	the	Juba	Peace	Talks	in	2007,	
which	provided	for	traditional	rituals,	including	Mato	Oput,	to	be	promoted,	following	
necessary	 (albeit	 unspecified)	modifications,	 as	 ‘a	 central	 part	 of	 the	 framework	 for	
accountability	 and	 reconciliation’	 following	 cessation	 of	 hostilities.15	 	 The	 LRA	 later	
refused	 to	 sign	 the	 Comprehensive	 Peace	 Agreement	whilst	 the	 ICC	 arrest	warrants	
remained	outstanding	but	the	Prosecutor	refused	to	accede	to	demands	to	withdraw	
the	warrants,	 arguing	 that	 the	 real	 threat	 to	 peace	was	 lack	 of	 enforcement	 of	 the	
Court’s	decisions:	
	
[A]llowed	to	remain	at	large,	the	criminals	ask	for	immunity	under	one	form	
or	another	as	a	condition	to	stopping	the	violence.		They	threaten	to	attack	
more	victims.		I	call	this	extortion,	I	call	it	blackmail.		We	cannot	yield.16	
	
When	asked	specifically	about	Mato	Oput,	the	Prosecutor	commented:	
	
If	someone	believes	that	the	traditional	system	is	enough	to	ensure	justice	
and	accountability,	they	can	challenge	the	admissibility	of	the	case.	It	is	the	
defendant	and	the	state	party	who	have	the	responsibility	for	this	and	the	
judges	will	make	the	final	decision.17	
	
	
The	question	 is	whether	 such	a	 challenge	 to	 the	admissibility	of	 a	 case	based	on	an	
alternative	 justice	mechanism	 (AJM)	 such	 as	Mato	Oput	 would	 have	 any	 chance	 of	
success.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter,	 therefore,	 is	 to	 consider	 whether	 the	Mato	 Oput	
																																																						
13	Allen,	T.	(2006)	Trial	Justice:	The	International	Criminal	Court	and	the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	(London/New	York:	
Zed	Books)	pp129,	132;	see	also	Baines,	E.	(2007)	p101	
14	Allen,	T.	(2006)	p134	
15	Agreement	on	Accountability	and	Reconciliation	between	the	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Uganda	and	the	Lord’s	
Resistance	Army/Movement,	Juba,	Sudan	29	June	2007	Clause	3.1.		
16	Moreno-Ocampo,	L.		(2007)	“Building	a	Future	on	Peace	and	Justice”	Nuremberg	Address	24/25	June	[Online]	
Available:	https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E466EDB-2B38-4BAF-AF5F-
005461711149/143825/LMO_nuremberg_20070625_English.pdf	[Accessed	26.08.17]	
17	Osike,	F.		(2007)	‘Kony	Must	Face	Trial	–	ICC’	New	Vision	July	12	[Online]	Available:	
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164-icc/28639.html	[Accessed	26.08.16]	
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ceremony	promoted	by	those	opposing	the	ICC	intervention	would	satisfy	the	goals	of	
international	 criminal	 justice	 identified	 in	 Chapter	 Two.	 The	 issue	 could	 become	
particularly	pertinent	if,	for	example,	the	outstanding	ICC	arrest	warrants	for	the	LRA	
leadership	 were	 executed18	 (or	 more	 were	 issued)	 and	 the	 GoU,	 referring	 to	 the	
provisions	of	the	AA	and	AAR,	challenged	admissibility	under	the	Rome	Statute’s	(RSt)	
complementarity	provisions.19		
	
To	 conduct	 an	 evaluation	 of	 Mato	 Oput	 and	 its	 capacity	 to	 satisfy	 the	 aims	 of	
international	 criminal	 justice	 (ICJ)	does	not	merely	entail	 a	 comparison	with	western	
ideals	of	justice	as	epitomised	by	trials	at	the	ICC	and	arguing	how	near	or	far	Mato	Oput	
comes	to	meeting	those	same	standards.		It	is	important	to	understand	something	of	
the	Acholi,	their	cosmology	and	spiritual	beliefs	in	order	to	place	Mato	Oput	into	context	
with	regard	to	the	LRA	conflict.	The	first	section	of	this	chapter	will	therefore	outline	the	
origins	of	the	Acholi	tribe	and	their	cultural	and	historical	background	and	will	discuss	
their	belief	systems	surrounding	spiritual	interaction	and	death.		The	Mato	Oput	ritual	
and	its	significance	in	conflict	resolution	for	Acholi	society	will	then	be	discussed.		The	
second	section	will	discuss	the	historical	and	political	background	to	the	war	and	will	
attempt	 to	establish	 its	 causes	and	effects	 from	 the	viewpoint	of	 the	Acholi.	 	 This	 is	
necessary	to	establish	whether	the	LRA	conflict	is	a	local,	Acholi	affair	which	demands	
local	Acholi	justice	or	whether	it	has	wider	dimensions	and	root	causes	which	may	make	
Acholi	justice	only	partially	legitimate	and	effective.		In	the	third	section,	the	steps	taken	
in	Northern	Uganda	to	establish	and	adapt	Mato	Oput	to	deal	with	ex-LRA	fighters	and	
formerly-abducted	persons	(FAPs)	will	be	outlined	and	in	the	fourth	section,	Mato	Oput	
in	its	original	and	adapted	forms	will	be	assessed	to	ascertain	whether	they	do	satisfy	
the	requirements	of	ICJ.	
	
	
																																																						
18	It	is	noteworthy	that	when	Dominic	Ongwen	was	arrested,	the	GoU	handed	him	over	to	the	ICC	and	did	not	attempt	
to	challenge	the	ICC’s	jurisdiction	in	favour	of	Mato	Oput	
19	Article	17	
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Section	One:		The	Acholi	People	of	Northern	Uganda	and	the	Mato	Oput	Process	
	
Identity	
	
The	1995	Constitution	of	Uganda	recognises	56	indigenous	communities	in	Uganda,20	of	
which	the	Acholi	are	the	eighth	largest	with	a	population	of	approximately	1.47	million	
in	a	total	population	of	over	34	million.21		The	Acholi	are	mainly	concentrated	in	four	
northern	districts	of	Uganda:	Amuru,	Gulu,	Kitgum	and	Pader,	an	area	of	approximately	
11,000	 square	miles,	 with	 Amuru	 and	 Kitgum	 bordering	 Sudan.22	 The	 origins	 of	 the	
Acholi	as	a	tribe	has	been	the	subject	of	considerable	debate,	some	arguing	that	their	
ethnic	 identity	 came	 about	 due	 to	 colonialism.23	 Finnström	 agrees	 that	 ‘colonial	
practices	were	powerful	instruments	in	the	making	of	more	rigid	ethnic	boundaries	and	
divides’,24	but	questions	the	premise	of	colonial	invention	on	the	grounds	that	‘historical	
forebears	 of	 the	 Acholi	 […]	 lived	 and	 socialised	with	 one	 another	 before	 Europeans	
discovered	their	land	and	put	a	name	to	it	in	writing	or	put	borders	on	the	map’.25			
	
Finnström	also	asserts	that	it	was	‘the	colonialists’	inability	to	identify	and	recognise	any	
indigenous	socio-political	organization’	that	motivated	them	to	impose	their	own	‘order	
and	meaning’	upon	northern	Uganda.26		Prior	to	colonial	rule,	there	were	approximately	
60	 chiefdoms	 in	 Acholiland,	 each	 ruled	 by	 a	 chief	 or	 rwot	 (rwodi	 pl.)	 of	 aristocratic	
descent	(kal)	who	were	anointed	with	oil	from	the	shea	butter	tree	and	known	as	rwodi	
moo.27	 	 Under	 the	 British	 colonial	 administration,28	 the	 hereditary	 rwodi	 moo	were	
																																																						
20	Article	10(a)	together	with	the	Third	Schedule	
21	National	Population	and	Housing	Census	2014,	Ugandan	Bureau	of	Statistics,	Kampala.		
22	Finnström,	S.	(2008)	Living	with	Bad	Surroundings	(Durham/London:	Duke	University	Press)	pp25,	33	
23	Branch,	A.	(2014)	‘The	Violence	of	Peace:	Ethnojustice	in	Northern	Uganda’	45	Development	and	Change	pp608-
630	at	p621;	 see	also	Allen,	T.	 (2007)	 ‘The	 International	Criminal	Court	and	 the	 invention	of	 traditional	 justice	 in	
Northern	Uganda’		3	Politique	Africaine	pp147-166	at	para.32	(pages	unnumbered);	Behrend,	H.	(1999)	Alice	Lakwena	
&	the	Holy	Spirits:	War	in	Northern	Uganda	1986-97	(Oxford:	James	Currey	Ltd)		(asserting	the	‘Acholi	did	not	exist	in	
precolonial	times.’)	p14;	Allen,	T.	(2006)	(stating	‘the	Acholi	did	not	exist	as	a	discrete	‘tribal’	group	until	the	early	
protectorate’)	p162	
24	Finnström,	S.	(2008)	p38	
25	Ibid	p54			
26	Ibid	p40		
27	Ibid	p42;	see	also	Latigo,	J.O.	(2008)	‘Northern	Uganda:	tradition-based	practices	in	the	Acholi	region’	in	Huyse,	L.	
and	Salter,	M.	(eds)	pp85-120	at	p102	
28	The	British	occupation	of	Acholi-land	began	in	1898	and	colonial	rule	proper	commenced	in	1910	after	they	finally	
defeated	the	Acholi	and	set	up	headquarters	in	Gulu	and	Kitgum	
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removed	from	power	and	the	British	ensured	that	their	elected	replacements	(who	were	
commoners,	labong),	were	willing	to	co-operate	with	the	colonial	administration.29			
	
The	heavy	recruitment	of	Acholi	into	the	army	during	the	colonial	period	has	led	to	the	
stereo-typing	 of	 the	 Acholi	 as	 a	warrior	 people	which,	 according	 to	 Finnström,	 ‘few	
scholars	 have	made	 any	 serious	 effort	 to	 question	 …	 and	 academic	 understandings	
continue	to	reinforce’.30	Latigo	contends	that	the	suggestion	of	the	British	viewing	the	
Acholi	as	a	warrior	people	and	recruiting	them	extensively	into	the	army	for	this	reason	
is	 an	 ‘unsubstantiated	 myth	 created	 by	 the	 British’	 which	 was	 ‘based	 entirely	 on	
prejudice	 and	 misrepresentation	 of	 facts	 and	 was	 used	 for	 political	 reasons.’31	
Nonetheless,	 ‘[a]ccount	 after	 account	 recapitulates	 the	 view	 that	 the	 Acholi	 have	 a	
militarised	ethnic	identity’,32	an	image	which	has	been	reinforced	by	the	GoU	in	order	
both	to	‘promote	[Acholi	ethnic	identity]	as	a	central	explanation	for	the	conflict	and	its	
violence’33	and	to	justify	its	military	rather	than	political	response	to	the	grievances	of	
the	Acholi	people.	
	
Cosmology	
	
To	 assist	 in	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 applicability	 and	 impact	 of	 the	 Mato	 Oput	
ceremonies	today	proposed	by	Acholi	Elders	to	deal	with	ex-LRA	fighters,	it	will	be	useful	
to	examine	Acholi	belief	systems	and	how	they	‘draw	on	local	cosmologies	in	times	of	
moral	crisis	to	interpret	and	navigate	the	way	forward’.34			
	
Although	the	 individual	practices	of	Acholi	clans	may	vary,	 there	 is	a	commonality	of	
principle	 and	belief,35	 the	 central	 theme	of	which	 is	 belief	 in	 the	existence	of	 spirits	
known	as	Jogi	(sing.	jok)	which	influence	and	affect	everyday	life.36	There	are	five	inter-
																																																						
29	Finnström,	S.	(2008)	p41	
30	Ibid	p61	
31	Latigo,	J.O.	(2008)	p86	
32	Finnström,	S.	(2008)	p80	
33	Ibid	p219	
34	Baines,	E.	(2010)	‘Spirits	and	Social	Reconstruction	after	Mass	Violence:	Rethinking	Transitional	Justice’	109	Africa	
Affairs	pp409-430	at	p411	
35	Baines,	E.	(2007)	p103	
36	For	a	full	and	detailed	discussion	on	the	history	of	religions	in	Acholi,	see	Behrend,	H.	(1999)	pp100-128		
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related	levels	of	social	and	political	systems	in	Acholi	society:	the	home,	hamlet,	village,	
domain	and	Acholiland.37		At	each	level	of	society,	the	spirits	live	among	the	Acholi	in	
their	 sacred	 shrines	 (abila)	 which	 form	 the	 ritual	 centre,	 watching	 over	 the	 moral	
order.38		For	the	Acholi,	the	jogi	are	human-like	with	needs	and	desires	that	have	to	be	
satisfied	by	the	living	on	their	behalf.39	Since	these	spirits	can	bring	trouble	to	the	clan	
if	they	are	offended,	of	fundamental	importance	to	the	Acholi	is	ascertaining	the	cause	
of	any	misfortune	and	rectifying	it.40		The	whole	clan	assumes	collective	responsibility	
for	righting	the	wrong,	with	Elders	conducting	traditional	rituals	at	the	level	required	to	
appease	ancestors	and	ensure	the	moral	order	is	upheld.41	
	
Jogi	are	divided	into	‘chiefdom’	and	‘clan	jogi’,	which	are	benevolent	spirits	that	enforce	
the	moral	code	and	punish	violations	but	are	responsible	for	the	clan’s	welfare	and	‘free	
jogi’	which	are	wandering	spirits,	unattached	to	a	particular	clan	or	area.42		Free	jogi	are	
vengeful	and	can	bring	misfortune	to	those	they	encounter	with	unexplained	illnesses	
and	 afflictions	 often	 being	 attributed	 to	 a	 free	 jok.43	 	 The	 Acholi	 have	 strict	 taboos	
associated	with	death,	 killing	and	 the	 interaction	with	dead	bodies	which	 require	an	
extensive	 series	 of	 funeral	 rites	 to	 be	 performed	 to	 appease	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	 dead	
person.44	 	Acholi	believe	spirits	of	the	person	who	either	died	badly	or	whose	corpse	
was	not	buried	properly	or	was	treated	disrespectfully	can	turn	into	cen,	a	‘vengeance	
ghost’	who	will	haunt	the	location	of	their	killing,	the	killer	or	the	person	who	mistreated	
the	 body	 and	 possibly	 even	 their	 family.45	 Since	 cen	 gather	 in	 places	 where	 death	
occurred	and	enter	passers-by,	any	person	passing	a	corpse	must	cover	it	with	leaves	of	
the	olwedo	 plant	 and	 immediately	 request	 the	Elders	 to	perform	 the	proper	 funeral	
																																																						
37	Lamony,	S.	(2007)	Approaching	National	Reconciliation	in	Uganda:	Perspectives	on	Applicable	Justice	Systems	UCICC	
p6	
38	Ibid;	See	also	Behrend,	H.	(1999)	p15	
39	Lonergan,	K.	(2012)	‘Gender	and	Generation	in	Acholi	Traditional	Justice	Mechanisms’	JRP	Field	Note	XVII	November	
(Gulu,	JRP)	p2	
40	Baines,	E.	(2010)	p417	
41	Lonergan,	K.	(2012)	p2	
42	Ibid	
43	Ibid		
44	Ibid	p3		
45	Baines,	E.	(2010)	p420		
	 133	
rites.46	 	 If	 this	 is	not	done,	 the	spirits	of	 the	dead	will	 seek	revenge	and	torment	the	
person(s)	who	mistreated	the	corpse.47				
	
Sometimes,	a	desire	for	revenge	leads	the	Acholi	to	act	in	ways	which	would	deliberately	
incur	the	wrath	of	the	spirit	world.	 	For	example,	Baines	describes	how	Acholi	buried	
those	murdered	by	government	soldiers	(the	Ugandan	People’s	Defence	Force	(UPDF))	
next	to	the	army	camp	instead	of	in	their	own	homesteads	to	encourage	the	spirts	to	
take	revenge	on	the	soldiers.48		Baines	also	describes	how	the	bones	of	those	killed	in	
an	ambush	on	a	 road	were	not	buried	but	were	 thrown	 into	 the	bush	 to	enable	 the	
spirits	to	exact	revenge	on	the	killers.		The	Acholi	have	suffered	terrible	abuses	at	the	
hands	of	the	UPDF	and	as	Baines	says,	‘[i]n	the	absence	of	state	accountability,	justice	is	
delivered	through	the	spirit	world.’49	
	
The	LRA	conflict	has	seriously	affected	these	traditional	customs	for	reasons	including	
abducted	persons	being	forced	to	kill	brutally,	civilians	fleeing	attacks	being	unable	to	
properly	bury	 their	dead	and	 life	 in	 internally	displaced	person	 (IDP)	 camps	 severely	
restricting	 the	 freedom	and	 resources	 to	perform	 traditional	 ceremonies.	Baines	has	
noted,	for	example,	that	formerly-abducted	persons	(FAPs)	who	have	unsuccessfully	re-
integrated	into	their	communities	often	quote	possession	by	cen	and	their	inability	to	
perform	 moyo	 kum,	 a	 ‘cleansing	 of	 the	 body’	 ritual	 to	 expel	 cen	 as	 the	 reason.50	
Furthermore,	she	notes	the	reluctance	of	some	people	in	IDP	camps	to	return	to	their	
villages	where	massacres	have	occurred	until	moyo	piny	rituals	to	cleanse	and	remove	
cen	from	the	area	in	and	around	their	villages	have	been	performed.51		
	
As	described	in	this	section,	Acholi	spiritual	and	cultural	moral	codes	commonly	involve	
acknowledgement	 of	 wrongdoing	 and	 reconciliation	 through	 rituals	 and	 spiritual	
appeasement,	according	to	the	level	and	seriousness	of	the	violation.		Whether	or	not	
																																																						
46	Lonergan,	K.	(2012)	p3;	see	also	Finnström,	S.	(2008)	p88	
47	Lonergan,	K.	(2012)	p3;	see	also	Baines,	E.	(2005)	Roco	Wat	I	Acoli:	Restoring	Relationships	in	Acholi-land:	
Traditional	Approaches	to	Reconciliation	and	Justice	(Roco	Wat)	(Gulu:	Liu	Institute	for	Global	Issues)	p12	
48	Baines,	E.	(2010)	p422	
49	Ibid	p423	
50	Ibid	p420	
51	Ibid	p421	
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perpetrators	 of	 crimes	 against	 the	 Acholi	 and	 other	 tribes	 are	 dealt	with	 by	way	 of	
formal	 trials,	 for	many	 Acholi	 there	may	 still	 be	 a	 need	 at	 grass-roots	 level	 for	 the	
traditional	 rituals	 and	 ceremonies	which	 invoke	 the	 spirit	world,	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	
some	form	of	accountability,	atonement	and	social	repair	in	a	population	devastated	by	
the	conflict.		
	
In	the	next	section,	the	Mato	Oput	ritual	and	its	cultural	and	spiritual	meaning	for	the	
Acholi	people	will	be	discussed.		
	
Mato	Oput		
	
Mato	 Oput	 (‘drinking	 the	 bitter	 roots’	 to	 wash	 away	 bitterness)	 is	 the	 ceremony	
traditionally	used	in	cases	of	inter-clan	deliberate	or	accidental	killings.52		Acholi	people	
believe	 that	 life	 is	 sacred	and	the	killing	of	a	human	being	 is	 strictly	 forbidden.53	 If	a	
killing	does	occur,	Acholi	believe	the	anger	of	the	jogi	of	the	victim’s	clan	will	be	invoked	
against	the	offender’s	clan	and	this	will	create	a	supernatural	barrier	between	the	two	
clans	 which	 will	 not	 disappear	 ‘until	 the	 killing	 is	 atoned	 for	 and	 a	 religious	 rite	 of	
reconciliation	has	been	performed,	to	cleanse	the	taint.’54	Mato	Oput	is	described	as	the	
final	act	in	the	process	of	reconciliation	which	involves	the	establishment	of	the	truth,	
accountability	and	acknowledgement	of	wrongdoing,	the	payment	of	compensation	for	
the	life	lost	(culo	kwor)	and	the	restoration	of	relationships.55		Accounts	of	Mato	Oput	
claim	 that	 culo	 kwor	 is	 an	 important	 feature	 of	 the	 process	 since	 it	 symbolises	
acceptance	of	the	suffering	caused	by	the	offender’s	act	and	works	as	a	deterrent	to	
prevent	a	similar	offence	in	the	future.56		
	
The	process	is	voluntary	and	until	the	ceremony	takes	place,	the	offender	is	treated	as	
unclean	and	is	excluded	from	the	homesteads	in	his	community	for	fear	that	any	cen	
																																																						
52	 Ibid	p104;	see	also	Anyeko,	K.,	Baines,	E.,	Komakech,	E.,	Ojok,	B.,	Ogora,	L.O.,	Victor,	L.	 (2012)	“The	Cooling	of	
Hearts’:	Community	Truth-Telling	in	Northern	Uganda’	13	HRR	pp107-124	at	p111	
53	Latigo,	J.O.	(2008)	p103	
54	Ibid	
55	Baines,	E.	(2007)	p104	
56	Lonergan,	K.	(2012)	p6	
	 135	
attached	 to	 him	 will	 pollute	 others.57	 	 Once	 the	 offender	 has	 freely	 confessed	 his	
wrongdoing	 to	 his	 village	 Elders,	 they	 report	 the	 offence	 to	 the	 clan	 Elders	 and	
responsibility	for	the	offence	now	lies	with	the	offender’s	whole	clan	which	can	have	no	
social	interaction	with	the	victim’s	clan	or	community.		‘Intermarriage,	trade	and	joint	
parties	between	 the	 conflicting	 clans	 [are]	made	 impossible	 and	 the	 clans	 [involved]	
cannot	socialise	or	share	food	or	drink’	until	a	process	of	reconciliation	is	completed.58		
This	social	exclusion	is	a	major	factor	in	persuading	the	offender’s	community	to	accept	
collective	guilt,	express	remorse	and	seek	reconciliation.59	
	
The	ultimate	goal	of	Mato	Oput	 is	the	restoration	of	relations	between	the	clans	and	
following	a	cooling-off	period,	a	negotiation	process	begins,	which	can	last	from	months	
to	 decades.60	 An	 impartial	 mediator	 or	 a	 reconciliation	 committee	 (kal	 kwaro)	 will	
conduct	 negotiations	 between	 the	 two	 clans	 for	 the	 payment	 of	 culo	 kwor	 and	 a	
reconciliation.61		When	the	compensation	amount	is	agreed,	a	contribution	is	made	by	
every	household	in	the	offender’s	clan	on	the	basis	of	collective	responsibility.62		Latigo	
states	that	after	culo	kwor,	the	ceremony	takes	place	‘in	an	uncultivated	field	which	is	
usually	 somewhere	between	 the	villages	or	 communal	 settlements	of	 the	 two	clans,	
away	from	any	footpath	or	any	place	commonly	frequented	by	women	and	children.’63	
	
The	Mato	Oput	ritual	itself	is	described	in	a	report	by	Stephen	Lamony	from	which	the	
following	has	been	summarised:	64	
	
In	preparation	for	the	ritual,	an	elder	will	dig	up	roots	from	the	oput	tree	and	
they	will	be	ground	into	a	powder	which	is	mixed	with	fruit	juice65	in	a	new	calabash	
carefully	placed	on	the	ground.		Each	clan	will	provide	a	sheep	which	will	be	sacrificed	
																																																						
57	Latigo,	J.O.	(2008)	p104	
58	Finnström,	S.	(2008)	p224	
59	Baines,	E.	(2005)	p55	explaining	that	in	communal	cultures	where	food,	water,	land	and	social	relations	are	shared	
between	families	of	respective	clans	and	chiefdoms	this	exclusion	is	highly	significant	
60	Anyeko,	K.	et	al.	(2012)	p111	
61	Ibid	
62	Compensation	is	usually	in	the	form	of	money	or	cattle.	 	Cattle	for	the	Acholi	are	‘the	most	prestigious	form	of	
wealth’,	see	Finnström,	S.	(2008)	p34	
63	Latigo,	J.O.	(2008)	p104	
64	Lamony,	S.	(2007)	p11;	For	other	descriptions	of	the	Mato	Oput	ceremony	see	e.g.	Baines,	E.	(2005)	p57-8,	Latigo,	
J.O.	(2008)	pp103-5;	Baines,	E.	(2007)	p104-5	
65	Sometimes	the	root	is	mixed	with	a	local	brew	called	kwete	
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at	the	site	of	reconciliation	by	the	elder	leading	the	ceremony	and	the	blood	of	both	will	
be	 added	 to	 the	 calabash	 containing	 the	 oput	 and	 fruit	 juice	 mixture	 to	 form	 a	
‘reconciliation	drink’.		The	close	relatives	of	the	victim	and	the	offender	gather	around	
the	 calabash	 in	 a	 gesture	 signifying	 the	 end	 of	 hostilities	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	
reconciliation.		In	an	act	symbolizing	the	swallowing	of	all	bitterness	between	the	clans,	
the	offender	and	a	close	relative	of	 the	victim	each	kneel,	 their	hands	 folded	behind	
their	backs	and	take	three	sips	of	the	drink	in	the	calabash	without	using	their	hands.		
Other	relatives	will	be	encouraged	to	drink	the	reconciliation	drink	too.				
	
Elders	 then	 check	 the	 compensation	 to	 ensure	 it	 is	 as	 agreed	 and	when	 it	 is	
declared	acceptable,	the	Elders	bless	the	compensation	by	smearing	the	chest	of	each	
person	present	with	the	entrails	of	the	sacrificed	sheep,	using	words	to	the	effect	of	“Let	
these	cows	produce	many	and	only	female	offspring.		We	all	make	mistakes.		May	peace	
and	calm	now	return	among	us”.66	
	
The	sacrificed	sheep	are	cooked	and	following	the	drinking	ceremony,	the	livers	
of	the	animals	are	cut	into	pieces	and	the	killer	feeds	pieces	to	the	close	relative	of	the	
victim	who	in	turn	feeds	pieces	of	the	liver	to	the	killer.		The	rest	of	the	sheep	is	then	
eaten	by	both	sides	to	confirm	full	reconciliation	between	the	clans	has	been	achieved.			
An	elder	will	beat	a	royal	bwola	drum	and	the	women	will	begin	to	sing	ululations	which	
will	encourage	people	from	the	area	to	join	the	reconciled	group	for	dancing	and	singing.		
The	 feasting	may	 continue	 for	 a	 second	 day	 and	may	 require	 further	 animals	 to	 be	
slaughtered	to	feed	the	celebrants.	
	
It	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 description	 of	 the	Mato	 Oput	 outlined	 above	 that	 the	 process	
contains	elements	of	 truth	and	accountability,	 the	payment	of	 compensation	and	an	
agreement	between	the	parties	for	reconciliation.		Mato	Oput	is	therefore	an	important	
justice	mechanism	for	the	Acholi	but	how	appropriate	 it	 is,	 in	the	context	of	the	war	
between	 the	 GoU	 and	 the	 LRA,	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 crimes	 that	 have	 been	 committed	
																																																						
66	Before	colonial	times,	the	compensation	was	a	girl	from	the	offender’s	clan	both	to	bind	the	families	together	and	
in	order	that	any	child	born	to	that	girl	would	replace	the	 life	of	the	victim	but	 in	1934,	the	British	outlawed	this	
practice	and	ordered	that	compensation	should	instead	be	ten	cows	
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against	civilians	will	be	considered	in	section	three	following	a	discussion	of	the	factors	
leading	to	the	LRA	conflict	in	the	next	section.			
	
Section	Two:		The	Background	and	History	of	Conflict	in	Northern	Uganda	
	
In	 this	 section,	 the	historical	background	 to	 the	ethnic	and	other	divisions	 that	have	
beset	Uganda	since	colonial	times	will	be	outlined	to	contextualise	the	complex	conflict	
in	Northern	Uganda	and	further	afield.		In	support	of	the	argument	for	local	(or	Acholi)	
justice,	 the	 war	 has	 been	 portrayed	 as	 an	 Acholi	 conflict,	 peripheral	 to	 the	 rest	 of	
Uganda,	which	the	Acholi	should	be	permitted	to	resolve	in	their	traditional	way,	using	
long	established	justice	mechanisms.		In	this	section,	the	background	of	the	LRA	conflict	
will	be	examined	to	see	if	this	interpretation	of	the	war	and	the	call	for	Acholi	traditional	
justice	as	the	appropriate	means	of	achieving	accountability	are	justified.	
	
Colonial	Rule	
	
When	 Uganda	 became	 a	 British	 protectorate	 in	 1894,	 it	 comprised	 many	 diverse	
nationalities	 and	 ethnic	 groups.	 	 To	 better	 and	 profitably	manage	 this	 diversity,	 the	
British	 exploited	 pre-existing	 ethnic	 tensions	 thereby	 undermining	 any	 potential	 co-
ordinated	 resistance.67	 Opting	 for	 a	 policy	 of	 ‘divide	 and	 rule’,	 the	 British	 favoured	
different	ethnic	groups	and	regions	for	their	perceived	attributes.68	They	imposed,	for	
example,	a	division	of	labour	which	ran	along	regional	lines,	with	the	Nile	dividing	the	
country	 not	 only	 geographically	 but	 also	 politically.69	 	 Those	 from	 the	 south	 were	
preferred	 for	agriculture	and	the	civil	 service	and	those	 in	 the	north,	particularly	 the	
Acholi,	for	the	military.70		
	
This	 resulted	 in	 significant	 political	 and	 economic	 division	 between	 north	 and	 south	
Uganda	which	was	deepened	by	religious	divisions	fostered	by	the	Catholic	and	Anglican	
																																																						
67	Lomo,	Z.	and	Hovil,	L.	(2004)	p10	
68	Latigo,	S.	(2008)	p89	
69	Mamdani,	M.	(1988)	‘Uganda	in	Transition:	two	years	of	the	NRA/NRM’	10	Third	World	Quarterly	pp1155-1181	at	
p1155	
70	Finnström,	S.	(2008)	p60	
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churches,	 so	 that	 ‘by	 the	 time	of	 independence	 in	1962,	 the	organising	principles	of	
ethnicity,	 sub-region,	 religion	and	politics	could	only	be	extricated	 from	one	another	
with	considerable	difficulty’.71				
	
Post-Colonial	Rule	
	
Following	independence	in	1962,	Milton	Obote,	a	Langi	from	the	north,	became	Prime	
Minister.	 	He	initiated	a	strategy	of	 ‘politicisation	and	militarisation	of	ethnicity’	 later	
replicated	by	successive	regimes,72	recruiting	more	troops	from	the	north	and	swiftly	
increasing	numbers	from	700	at	independence	to	9000,	over	one-third	of	which	were	
Acholi.73			
	
Idi	Amin	mounted	a	successful	coup	against	Obote	in	January	1971	and	‘introduce[d]	
competitive	 retaliation	on	an	ethnic	basis’,74	 	 systematically	 removing	 the	pro-Obote	
Acholi	 and	 Langi	 contingent	 from	 the	 army	 by	 means	 of	 mass	 executions.75	 	 Amin	
replenished	his	depleted	national	army	by	recruiting	the	urban	poor	from	his	own	West	
Nile	region	(Kakwa)	as	well	as	Nubian	Ugandans	and	mercenaries	from	South	Sudan.76	
Determined	 to	 exterminate	 all	 opposition,	 Amin’s	 forces	 slaughtered	 thousands	 of	
Acholi	political	leaders,	intellectuals	and	civilians.77			
	
Many	who	survived	Amin’s	purges	fled	into	exile	but	in	1979,	they	returned	and	assisted	
by	Tanzanian	forces,	captured	Kampala,	ousting	Amin	from	power.		Obote	returned	to	
power	 in	 1980	 and	 again	 reformed	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 national	 army,	 (now	 the	
Uganda	National	Liberation	Army	(UNLA))	to	reflect	his	northern	bedrock	of	support	by	
recruiting	heavily	from	the	Acholi	and	Langi.		The	new	army	took	violent	revenge	on	the	
people	of	the	West	Nile	region	for	their	own	sufferings	during	Amin’s	regime.	78		
	
																																																						
71	Dolan,	C.	(2005)	‘Understanding	War	and	Its	Continuation:	The	Case	of	Northern	Uganda’	PhD	thesis,	LSE)	p71	
72	Branch,	A.	 (2005)	 ‘Neither	Peace	nor	 Justice:	 Political	Violence	and	 the	Peasantry	 in	North	Uganda	1986-98’	 8	
African	Studies	Quarterly	pp1-31	p9	
73	Branch,	A.	(2011a)	Displacing	Human	Rights:	War	and	Intervention	in	Northern	Uganda	(Oxford:	OUP)	p56	
74	Van	Eyck,	F.	(2003)	p17	
75	Ibid	p16	
76	Ibid;	see	also	Mamdani,	M.	(1988)	p1158	
77	Mamdani,	M.	(1988)	p1158	
78	Finnström,	S.	(2008)	p65	
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During	Obote’s	second	period	in	power,	he	faced	many	insurgencies	and	one	rebel	group	
fighting	 the	 UNLA	 was	 the	 southern-based	 National	 Resistance	 Army	 (NRA),	 led	 by	
Yoweri	Museveni.	 	The	UNLA	began	 to	 factionalise79	which	 resulted	 in	a	coup	 led	by	
Acholi	General	Toto	Okello,	who	deposed	Obote	 in	1985	and	 immediately	 invited	all	
political	parties	and	insurgent	groups	to	join	a	Military	Council,	which	would	become	the	
new	government	of	Uganda.		The	NRA	refused	to	join	so	from	August	to	December	1985,	
Okello	and	the	NRA	held	peace	talks	which	concluded	in	a	power-sharing	agreement.80		
Throughout	 the	peace	process,	 however,	Museveni	 continued	his	military	 campaign,	
winning	considerable	support	from	the	civilian	population	of	the	Luwero	triangle	and	
recruiting	to	the	NRA	a	‘lumpen	militariat’.81	In	January	1986,	the	NRA	seized	Kampala	
and	Museveni	became	Uganda’s	sixth	President	in	seven	years.		For	many	northerners,	
the	NRA’s	annulment	of	the	power-sharing	agreement	was	a	betrayal	and	resentment	
against	Museveni	for	his	‘backstabbing’	has	persisted.82	
	
Museveni	and	the	National	Movement	Government	
	
The	NRA/M	victory	ended	the	colonial	division	of	labour	where	northerners	controlled	
the	army	and	government	and	southerners	dominated	in	the	civil	service	and	trade,	by	
concentrating	 control	 of	 all	 areas	of	 socio-economic,	 political	 and	military	 life	 in	 the	
south.	 	 The	 UNLA	 retreated	 north,	 robbing	 and	 plundering	 as	 they	 went,	 quickly	
followed	 by	 the	 NRA	 to	 whom	 the	 Acholi	 civilians	 looked	 for	 protection.	 	 The	 NRA	
successfully	defeated	the	retreating	UNLA	and	took	control	of	the	major	Acholi	towns	
of	Gulu	and	Kitgum.	 	Many	former	UNLA	soldiers	then	fled	to	Acholi	areas	of	Sudan,	
where	they	were	joined	by	Acholi	politicians	and	others	‘originating	from	the	leadership	
of	 previous	 regimes,	 particularly	 from	within	 the	 armed	 forces’.83	 Here	 they	 formed	
various	 anti-government	 groups,	 the	 best	 known	of	which	was	 the	Uganda	 People’s	
Democratic	Army	(UPDA).84		
																																																						
79	Mamdani,	M.	(1988)	p1159	
80	Lomo,	Z.	and	Hovil,	L.	(2004)	p5	
81	Ibid;	(a	lumpen	militariat	is	a	class	of	ill-trained	soldiers	and	officers	with	no	discernible	skills	and	very	low	discipline,	
given,	for	example,	to	plundering	and	looting).			
82	Ibid	
83	Mamdani,	M.	(1988)	p1169	
84	Ibid	
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Without	the	UNLA	to	fight	and	failing	to	perceive	the	lack	of	support	for	the	UNLA	among	
the	Acholi,	the	NRA/M	presumed	instead	an	enemy	united	in	its	ethnicity.85	The	NRM	
government,	 rather	 than	 consolidating	 their	 military	 successes	 by	 winning	 over	 the	
‘hearts	and	minds’	of	the	local	population,	committed	the	political	error	of	launching	‘a	
counterinsurgency	without	an	insurgency’,86	their	forces	perpetrating	violent	atrocities	
against	the	Acholi	civilians.	The	UPDA,	as	a	result,	built	up	considerable	Acholi	support,	
especially	as	it	called	upon	the	central	government	to	implement	in	the	north	the	same	
promises	made	to	the	south,	specifically	relating	to	security	and	ending	dictatorship.87		
Determined	to	destroy	this	support,	the	NRA	responded	by	killing	and	torturing	scores	
of	Acholi	civilians,	burning	down	their	villages	and	grain	stores	and	killing	or	stealing	
their	cattle,88	acts	which	were	seen	by	the	Acholi	as	a	deliberate	strategy	to	impoverish	
them.89	
	
For	the	Acholi,	therefore,	the	success	of	the	NRA/M	was	devastating.		They	resented	the	
loss	of	political	and	economic	power	as	a	result	of	Museveni’s	breaking	of	the	December	
1985	 power-sharing	 agreement	 and	 they	 also	 feared	 that	 Museveni’s	 government	
would	marginalise	them	after	their	earlier	dominance	in	the	Ugandan	government	and	
national	army.90		They	were	suffering	brutal	NRA	reprisals	and	unfortunately,	the	UPDA	
proved	 incapable	 of	 addressing	 their	 problems	 and	 of	 protecting	 them	 from	 NRA	
violence.	 	 Furthermore,	 its	 manner	 of	 replenishing	 supplies	 and	 recruits	 became	
increasingly	 coercive	 as	 Acholi	 support	 for	 the	 rebel	 force	 began	 to	 dwindle.91	 The	
political	vacuum	caused	by	the	successes	of	the	NRA/M	and	the	corresponding	decline	
of	 the	UPDA	(which	signed	a	peace	agreement	with	 the	NRA/M	government	at	Pece	
Stadium	 in	 198892)	 was	 fundamental	 to	 the	 emergence	 and	 popularity	 of	 social	
																																																						
85	Branch,	A.	(2011a)	p63	
86	Ibid	
87	Branch,	A.	(2005)	p11	
88	Ibid	
89	Finnström,	S.	(2008)	p72	
90	Lomo,	Z.	and	Hovil,	L.	(2004)	p5	
91	Finnström,	S.	(2008)	p70	
92	Latigo,	J.O.	(2008)	p88	
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movements	 such	 as	 the	Holy	 Spirit	Movement	 (HSM)93	 and	 ultimately	 the	 LRA,	 that	
reflected	the	anti-government	feelings	of	northerners.		
	
The	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	
	
Joseph	 Kony	 had	 fought	 Museveni	 with	 the	 UPDA	 before	 he	 established	 his	 new	
movement,	absorbing	ex-fighters	from	the	UPDA	and	the	HSM	forces.94		Kony	initially	
focussed	his	attacks	on	the	NRA	but	 the	Acholi	were	tired	of	 living	 in	a	 ‘rebel	versus	
government’	conflict	and	failed	to	give	Kony	the	popular	support	he	craved.95		Claiming	
to	 be	 defending	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 Acholi,	 Kony	 interpreted	 this	 as	 support	 for	 the	
government	and	disloyalty	to	his	cause	on	their	behalf	and	he	began	to	attack	Acholi	
civilians,	escalating	his	atrocities	in	the	belief	that	he	had	to	cleanse	the	Acholi	of	evil.96	
Far	from	protecting	the	Acholi	the	NRA	withdrew,	rarely	engaging	the	LRA	in	combat	or	
attempting	to	do	so.97			
	
Violence	 against	 Acholi	 civilians	 by	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 conflict	 continued,	 each	 side	
blaming	 the	 Acholi	 for	 supporting	 and	 collaborating	 with	 the	 other.98	 	 The	 LRA	
retaliatory	violence	included	murder,	cutting	off	limbs,	ears,	noses	and	lips99	and	forcible	
abductions	of	men,	women	and	children	for	use	as	soldiers,	sex	slaves	and	porters.		The	
NRA	 killed	 and	 tortured	 suspected	 LRA	 collaborators	 whilst	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
government	attempted	to	explain	its	failure	to	defend	the	Acholi	from	LRA	atrocities	by	
insisting	that	the	LRA	conflict	was	not	a	matter	for	the	NRA,	it	was	an	Acholi	problem	for	
the	 Acholi	 to	 deal	 with.100	 To	 further	 support	 their	 viewpoint,	 the	 government	
constantly	referred	to	the	LRA	rebels	as	criminals	and	murderers	and	perpetuated	the	
stereo-type	of	Acholi	people	being	violent	and	warlike.	 	For	example,	 in	an	 interview	
with	 HRW,	 Major	 General	 Kazini	 (UPDF	 commander	 and	 close	 military	 associate	 of	
																																																						
93	The	HSM	emerged	in	January	1985	and	by	December	1996	was	said	to	number	more	than	18,000	soldiers.		Led	by	
Alice	Lakwena,	the	military	manoeuvres	of	the	HSM	as	they	marched	south	towards	the	capital	were	highly	successful	
against	the	NRA	until	their	forces	were	routed	by	the	NRA	just	80	miles	from	Kampala	
94	Finnström,	S.		(2008)	p77	
95	Baines,	E.	(2005)	p13	
96	Branch,	A.	(2005)	p14	
97	Ibid	p15	
98	Lomo,	Z.	and	Hovil,	L.	(2004)	p9	
99	See	Branch,	A.	(2005)	p16-17	for	a	rebel	commander’s	explanation	for	these	atrocities		
100	Ibid	p14	
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Museveni)	blamed	the	Acholi	for	the	violent	abuses	inflicted	upon	them	by	government	
forces	stating	that	“[i]f	anything,	it	is	the	local	Acholi	soldiers	causing	the	problems.		It’s	
the	cultural	background	of	the	people	here;	they	are	very	violent.	It’s	genetic.”101		
	
‘Protected	Villages’	
	
In	September	1996,	the	GoU	mobilised	the	UPDF	(the	successor	to	the	NRA)	to	forcibly	
move	(through	a	campaign	of	murder,	threats,	bombing	and	burning	down	of	villages)	
the	 whole	 Acholi	 population	 into	 IDP	 camps	 which	 they	 euphemistically	 called	
‘protected	 villages’.102	 	 By	 2006,	 the	 population	 in	 the	 251	 camps	 northern	 Uganda	
totalled	1.84	million,	approximately	90%	of	 the	Acholi	population.103	 	Ostensibly,	 the	
camps	were	established	to	protect	the	Acholi	from	the	LRA	but	according	to	Dolan,	they	
were	 ‘primary	 sites	 of	 Social	 Torture,	 as	 evidenced	 in	 widespread	 violation,	 dread,	
disorientation,	dependency,	debilitation	and	humiliation,	 all	 of	which	are	 tactics	 and	
symptoms	typical	of	torture.’104		
	
In	the	camps,	Acholi	were	virtually	unprotected	by	the	UPDF	and	were	far	worse	off	than	
in	their	villages	where	they	were	largely	self-sufficient.105	The	GoU	had	created	what	Jan	
Egeland	(UN	Under-Secretary	for	Humanitarian	Affairs),	after	visiting	IDP	camps	in	the	
Kitgum	district,	 declared	 ‘one	 of	 the	worst	 humanitarian	 crises	 in	 the	world’.106	 The	
overcrowding,	severe	shortages	of	food,	water	and	medicine	and	deplorable	conditions	
of	hygiene	resulted	in	mortality	levels	in	the	camps	reaching	approximately	1000	people	
per	 week,	 predominantly	 due	 to	 starvation	 and	 treatable	 diseases.107	 	 The	 Acholi	
became	totally	dependent	on	food	aid	to	survive108	because	they	were	not	permitted	to	
leave	the	camps	to	work	on	their	own	land:	they	were	threatened	with	being	arrested	
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or	shot	as	suspected	rebels	if	they	were	found	outside	the	camps.109		The	UPDF	routinely	
subjected	camp	residents	 to	violent	assaults,	 torture	and	other	mistreatments,	often	
killing	 indiscriminately.110	With	 the	UPDF	 providing	 little	 or	 no	 protection,	 the	 camp	
residents	were	sitting	targets	for	the	LRA,	unable	to	escape	their	frequent	attacks	on	the	
camps	looting,	stealing	supplies	and	abducting.111		Indeed,	it	was	estimated	that	at	the	
height	of	the	conflict,	every	night	around	40,000	children	travelled	from	the	camps	to	
the	towns	where	they	felt	it	safer	to	sleep	in	shelters,	bus	stations,	schools,	hospitals	
and	on	the	streets	than	in	the	camps.112			Life	in	the	camps	was	so	bad,	some	abductees	
were	said	to	have	stayed	with	the	LRA	in	preference	to	camp	life.113			
	
International,	National	or	Local	Conflict? 
	
It	is	a	mainstream	view	that	the	nature	of	post-Cold	War	conflicts	reflect	‘increasingly	
intra-state	struggles	rather	than	clearly	delineated	international	conflicts.’114	While	this	
is	undoubtedly	correct,	it	is	questionable	whether	the	fighting	between	the	GoU	and	the	
LRA	can	accurately	be	termed	an	‘intra-state	struggle’	considering	the	incursions	into	
neighbouring	territories	by	both	sides.		For	example,	following	the	failure	of	the	Juba	
peace	talks	between	the	GoU	and	the	LRA	in	April	2008,	the	governments	of	Uganda,	
DRC,	South	Sudan	and	CAR	launched	‘Operation	Lightning	Thunder’,	an	attack	on	LRA	
bases	in	the	DRC	in	December	2008.		The	mission	failed	to	capture	senior	LRA	leaders	
but	resulted	 in	brutal	reprisals	by	the	LRA	on	the	civilian	populations	of	the	DRC	and	
South	Sudan.115	
	
The	logistic	and	military	equipment	support	provided	to	the	LRA	since	the	early	1990s	
by	 the	Sudanese	government	 in	 return	 for	LRA	help	 in	quelling	 rebel	 forces	 in	South	
Sudan,	which	in	their	turn	received	support	from	Museveni’s	government,	also	gives	the	
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conflict	an	international	dimension.116		It	is	believed	that	since	April	2012,	the	LRA	has	
moved	to	the	Darfur	region	of	Sudan	where	the	Sudanese	government	is	rumoured	to	
be	giving	it	safe	shelter.117		
	
Additionally,	the	continuation	of	the	war	has	allowed	Museveni	to	promote	himself	on	
the	international	stage,	both	as	an	ally	of	the	US	in	the	region	in	the	‘war	on	terror’	and	
with	 donor	 governments,	 which	 uphold	 Uganda	 as	 a	 ‘model	 of	 democracy	 and	
development’.118		
	
If	not	definitively	international,	a	more	accurate	description	of	the	war	could	be	what	
Ramsbotham	 and	Woodhouse	 term	 an	 ‘international-social	 conflict’(ISC),	 specifically	
‘neither	 inter-state	 nor	 contained	 within	 the	 resources	 of	 domestic	 conflict	
management	 [but]	between	the	two’.119	They	argue	that	 the	terms	 ‘internal	conflict’	
and	‘civil	war’	do	not	‘capture	the	further	twin	characteristics	of	ISCs’	which	are	‘rooted	
in	relations	between	communal	groups	[…	which	…break]	out	of	the	domestic	arena	and	
become	 a	 crisis	 for	 the	 state’,	 causing	 ‘massive	 human	 suffering	 and	 invit[ing]	
international	intervention.’120		This	appears	to	be	a	‘fit’	for	the	LRA	war	but	is	unlikely	to	
be	an	acceptable	definition	for	the	GoU	which,	in	the	past,	has	not	acknowledged	that	
the	 LRA	 conflict	 is	 even	 a	 civil	 war,	 frequently	 dismissing	 it	 as	 a	 minor	 problem	 of	
insecurity	in	the	north,	peripheral	to	the	rest	of	the	country.121		
	
Describing	the	LRA	as	‘nothing	but	criminals	and	murderers’,	‘bandits’,	‘hyenas’,	‘thugs’	
and	‘terrorists’122	and	portraying	Kony	as	a	mad	man	whose	aim	was	to	rule	Uganda	in	
accordance	 with	 the	 Ten	 Commandments,123	 the	 GoU	 for	 many	 years	 refused	 to	
countenance	peace	talks,	insisting	that	the	LRA	did	not	have	a	political	manifesto	and	
even	imprisoning	and	charging	with	treason	or	suspected	terrorism	those	who	argued	
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to	the	contrary.124	 	 In	 fact,	 the	LRA	has	published	at	 least	 three	manifestos	 (in	1996,	
1997/8	 and	 1999)	 each	 setting	 out	 a	 number	 of	 objectives125	 ranging	 from	 the	
restoration	of	multi-party	politics,	nationwide	socio-economic	balance,	 the	ending	of	
corruption	and	the	reform	of	parliament	to	empower	it	to	deal	with	the	critical	political	
and	economic	issues	of	the	country126	to	the	promotion	of	human	rights	(HR),	national	
unity	and	nationwide	peace	and	security.127		
	
Despite	 the	 LRA’s	 obvious	 abuse	 of	 HR,	 these	 manifesto	 objectives	 indicate	 the	
fundamental	socio-economic	and	political	problems	faced	by	the	Acholi	since	Museveni	
seized	power	in	1986.		For	decades,	they	have	been	caricatured	as	backward,	primitive	
and	violent,	a	stereo-type	from	colonial	times	which	has	persisted	and	has	been	used	by	
the	Museveni	government	to	justify	military	oppression	in	ethnic	terms.		The	colonial	
policy	of	divide	and	rule	is	adjudged	partly	responsible	for	the	turmoil	that	has	troubled	
the	 country	 since	 independence,	 every	 successive	 regime	 leader	 having	 applied	
‘politicised	 ethnicity	 as	 a	 means	 by	 which	 they	 can	 acquire	 and	 maintain	 political	
power’.128		
	
Since	2006,	the	situation	in	Acholiland	has	improved	somewhat	because	there	has	been	
a	cessation	of	rebel	and	military	violence.129	After	more	than	a	decade	of	living	in	IDP	
camps,	many	Acholi	have	returned	to	their	villages	(or	have	settled	in	new	areas)	to	try	
to	 rebuild	 their	 lives.130	 	 Although	 the	 fighting	 in	 northern	 Uganda	 appears	 to	 have	
ended,	however,	the	absence	of	war	does	not	mean	peace	has	been	achieved.131		The	
threat	of	resumption	of	the	LRA	conflict	in	Acholiland	is	ever-present132	and	the	issue	of	
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peace	and	justice	for	those	affected	by	the	conflict	remains	just	as	relevant	today	as	it	
was	ten	or	even	20	years	ago.		
	
Section	Three:		Viewpoints	on	the	Intervention	of	the	ICC	in	Uganda	
	
Whether	 the	 cessation	 of	 violence	 in	 northern	 Uganda	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	
intervention	 of	 the	 ICC	 is	 a	 debatable	 point.	 	 It	 certainly	 has	 been	 credited	 with	
encouraging	the	LRA	leadership	to	the	negotiating	table	but	it	was	equally	responsible	
for	the	breakdown	of	the	Juba	Peace	negotiations	when	the	Prosecutor	refused	to	agree	
to	 the	withdrawal	 of	 arrest	warrants	 for	 the	 LRA	 leadership.	 	 For	 the	GoU,	 the	 self-
referral	to	the	ICC	was	expedient	for	several	reasons.		First,	it	enabled	the	government	
to	garner	international	support	for	its	conflict	with	the	LRA	which	its	forces	had	been	
unable	to		defeat.133		The	failed	military	operations	and	the	highlighting	by	the	UN	of	the	
deplorable	conditions	suffered	by	Acholi	in	the	government’s	IDP	camps	had	tarnished	
the	GoU’s	reputation	and	resulted	in	pressure	for	a	peaceful	resolution	to	the	conflict,	
not	least	from	international	donors	who	funded	between	35	and	50	per	cent	of	Uganda’s	
budget.134			
	
The	self-referral	served	the	GoU	by	enabling	it	to	improve	its	image	on	the	international	
stage	 by	 projecting	 itself	 as	 a	 leader	 in	 international	 criminal	 justice	 (ICJ)	 fighting	 a	
criminal	organisation.		It	also	deflected	attention	from	the	human	rights	abuses	against	
the	Acholi	committed	by	government	forces,	as	the	OTP	was	unlikely	to	risk	antagonising	
the	 GoU,	 upon	 whose	 co-operation	 it	 relied,	 by	 investigating	 the	 UPDF.135	 	 The	
Prosecutor’s	decision	to	hold	a	joint	press	conference	with	Museveni	and	his	subsequent	
failure	to	charge	any	UPDF	members	certainly	fuelled	suspicions	that	the	ICC	was	being	
manipulated	 by	Museveni	 in	 his	 struggle	 against	 the	 LRA.136	 	 Another	 advantage	 for	
Museveni	was	that	the	referral	to	the	ICC	put	pressure	on	Sudan	to	end	its	support	for	
the	LRA	and	reports	suggested	that	the	government	of	Sudan	(GoS)	stopped	supplying	
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the	LRA	in	2006.137		As	mentioned	above,	the	issue	of	arrest	warrants	has	often	been	
credited	with	encouraging	the	LRA	to	attend	the	Juba	peace	negotiations.		Equally,	if	not	
more	 persuasive,	 however,	 was	 the	 loss	 of	 Sudan’s	 support	 following	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 Comprehensive	 Peace	 Agreement	 between	 the	 GoS	 and	 the	
Sudan	 People’s	 Liberation	 Army	 (SPLA).138	 	 The	 newly-formed	Government	 of	 South	
Sudan	 (GOSS)	 denied	 the	 LRA	 territorial	 sanctuary	 and	 encouraged	 LRA	 leaders	 to	
negotiate	with	the	GoU	or	face	military	attack	by	the	SPLA.139			
	
Museveni	 was	 also	 persuaded	 by	 the	 GOSS	 to	 attend	 the	 peace	 talks,	 despite	 his	
previous	reluctance	to	accept	the	LRA	as	an	equal	negotiating	partner.		The	immediate	
effect	of	the	intervention	of	the	ICC	had	been	renewed	attempts	by	the	UPDF	to	defeat	
the	LRA	which	had	failed	and	when	he	also	realised	that	the	ICC	arrest	warrants	had	not	
increased	the	likelihood	of	Kony’s	arrest	and	that	international	pressure	to	improve	the	
humanitarian	 situation	 in	 northern	 Uganda	 was	 increasing,	 the	 option	 to	 attend	
mediated	 talks	 became	 more	 attractive	 to	 Museveni.	 	 However,	 as	 stated	 in	 the	
Introduction	to	this	chapter,	the	talks	ultimately	failed	when	Kony	refused	to	sign	the	
Final	Peace	Agreement	unless	the	ICC	withdrew	the	arrest	warrants	whereas,	the	GoU	
used	the	ICC	to	put	pressure	on	Kony	and	would	only	agree	to	make	representations	to	
the	UNSC	and	ICC	after	Kony	had	signed.140	
	
Turning	to	those	in	northern	Uganda,	news	of	the	ICC’s	intervention	initially	received	a	
positive	response,	as	Kony’s	imminent	arrest	was	anticipated.		However,	major	concerns	
surfaced	when	it	was	realised	that	the	ICC	had	no	enforcement	powers	of	its	own	and	
would	be	relying	on	the	UPDF	to	effect	arrests	as	the	UPDF	had	demonstrated	for	many	
years	its	inability	to	apprehend	the	LRA	leadership.141		The	Acholi	feared	the	LRA	would	
mount	violent	reprisals	against	citizens	in	general	and	against	those	who	it	believed	to	
be	 co-operating	 with	 the	 Court’s	 investigation,	 in	 particular.142	 	 Further	 concerns	
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centred	 on	 the	 welfare	 of	 LRA	 abductees	 who,	 forced	 to	 become	 soldiers	 had	
themselves	perpetrated	crimes	against	northern	Ugandans,	as	it	was	feared	their	lives	
would	 be	 endangered	 by	 military	 attempts	 to	 execute	 the	 ICC	 arrest	 warrants.143			
Widespread	 Acholi	 support	 for	 the	 AA	 had	 been	 based	 on	 weakening	 the	 LRA	 by	
encouraging	defections	and	it	was	believed	that	that	ICC	arrest	warrants	undermined	
the	AA,	discouraged	defections	and	thereby	prolonged	the	conflict	and	the	horrors	of	
camp	life.144	
	
Traditional	 leaders,	supported	by	religious	 leaders	and	community	based	civil	society	
organisations	began	to	voice	their	opposition	to	the	intervention	of	the	ICC,	basing	their	
opposition	on	the	dangers	to	achieving	peace	 in	the	region	and	challenging	the	 ICC’s	
western	 notion	 of	 justice.	 	 They	 criticised	 the	 ICC	 for	 its	 selective	 justice	 in	 that	 it		
focussed	on	 the	 LRA	 leadership	 and	 ignored	 the	 abuses	 perpetrated	by	 government	
forces	 and	 those	 lower	 down	 the	 command	 chain.145	 	 ICC	 justice,	 they	 also	 argued,	
ignored	the	socio-economic	causes	of	 the	conflict	and	 failed	 to	address	 the	need	 for	
political	 solutions.146	 	 Furthermore,	 trials	 at	 the	 ICC	would	 not	 restore	 relationships	
between	victims	and	offenders	and	between	their	respective	clans	but	instead,	risked	
exacerbating	tensions.		Certainly,	ICC	trials	would	do	nothing	to	heal	the	cosmological	
rifts	between	offenders	and	the	spirit	world.		Finally,	even	punishment	by	the	ICC	was	
criticised	as	being	too	soft,	leaders	believing	that	a	more	severe	punishment	than	life	in	
an	air-conditioned	cell	with	plenty	to	eat	would	be	for	offenders	to	live	among	those	to	
whom	they	had	caused	suffering,	seeing	the	effects	of	their	actions.147	
	
Support	for	traditional	Acholi	justice	for	ex-LRA	fighters,	specifically	focussed	on	Mato	
Oput,	rather	than	trials	at	the	ICC.		Mato	Oput	had	not	traditionally	been	used	for	killings	
that	occurred	in	war	but	rather	for	inter-clan	deliberate	or	accidental	killings.148	In	the	
next	section,	local	and	national	efforts	for	the	establishment	of	Mato	Oput	to	deal	with	
issues	of	accountability	and	reconciliation	will	discussed.	
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Section	Four:	The	Establishment	and	Operation	of	Mato	Oput	
	
The	professed	Acholi	preference	for	Mato	Oput	over	formal	trials,	which	has	been	cited	
by	supporters	locally	and	by	some	international	aid	agencies	as	the	appropriate	way	to	
address	killing	and	other	crimes	committed	during	the	LRA	conflict,	has	been	facilitated	
by	the	GoU	in	two	ways.		First,	under	pressure	from	the	Acholi	Religious	Leaders	Peace	
Initiative	(ARLPI),	the	government	passed	the	AA	in	2000	granting	a	blanket	amnesty	to	
former	 combatants	 to	 encourage	 their	 return	 and	 reintegration,149	 and	 ‘borrowing	
largely	from	traditional	approaches	that	emphasise	‘forgiveness’.’150		Second,	the	GoU	
signed	the	AAR	with	the	LRA	on	29	June	2007	in	Juba.		The	AAR	aimed	to	strengthen	
domestic	 accountability	mechanisms	 by	 adopting	 a	 variety	 of	 strategies	 to	 facilitate	
peace,	justice	and	reconciliation:	
	
Traditional	 justice	mechanisms,	such	as	Culo	Kwor,	Mato	Oput,	Kayo	Cuk,	
Ailuc	and	Tonu	ci	Koka	and	others	as	practiced	in	the	communities	affected	
by	 the	 conflict,	 shall	 be	 promoted,	 with	 necessary	 modifications,	 as	 the	
central	part	of	the	framework	for	accountability	and	reconciliation.151	
	
It	 is	 difficult	 to	 envisage	 how	 this	 provision	 could	 be	 effected,	 however,	 given	 the	
widespread	 crimes	 committed	 by	 LRA	 fighters	 against	 different	 tribes	 in	 northern	
Uganda	 and	 across	 borders,	 which	 could	 potentially	 necessitate	 each	 identified	
perpetrator	undergoing	several	different		traditional	justice	rituals.152			
	
Furthermore,	despite	Mato	Oput	being	heavily	promoted	as	an	Acholi	traditional	form	
of	 justice,	 it	 is	debatable	how	prevalent	 the	practice	actually	has	been	within	Acholi	
society,	especially	since	the	outset	of	the	LRA	conflict.153		The	war	and	particularly	the	
forced	 removals	 to	 IDP	camps	severely	eroded	Acholi	 communal	 life	and	with	 it,	 the	
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foundation	upon	which	the	Acholi	traditional	values	and	beliefs,	cultural	knowledge	and	
social	institutions	were	based.154		The	roles	of	the	Rwodi	and	Elders	who	perform	the	
various	 traditional	 rituals	 and	 ceremonies,	 for	 example,	were	 severely	weakened	 by	
almost	 two	 decades	 of	 displacement.155	 	 No	 longer	 living	 in	 the	 centre	 of	 their	
chiefdoms,	many	 Rwodi	became	 distanced	 from	 their	 people	 and	 suffering	 extreme	
poverty	in	the	camps,	lost	their	significant	role	in	cultural	ceremonies,	conflict	resolution	
and	community	bonding.156		As	a	result,	Acholi	understanding	and	knowledge	of	them	
and	their	position	in	the	community	greatly	diminished,	particularly	among	the	young	
who	had	been	born	and	raised	in	the	camps.157			
Likewise,	the	Elders	who	survived	life	in	the	camps	often	found	themselves	isolated	from	
their	village	neighbours	who	were	scattered	and	intermingled	with	other	clans	 in	the	
grossly	overcrowded	camps.158	 	Like	the	Rwodi,	Elders	felt	disrespected,	especially	by	
the	youth	 raised	 in	 camps	who	had	never	experienced	 the	 role	and	duties	of	 village	
Elders.159	The	traditional	means	of	teaching	and	reinforcing	social	and	cultural	norms	
before	displacement	had	been	extended	families	sitting	around	the	communal	village	
fire	 (wang	 oo)	 in	 the	 evenings	 to	 talk,	 tell	 folktales,	 sing	 and	 dance	 but	 this	 was	
impossible	in	the	camps	due	to	curfews	and	fear	of	rebel	attack.160		Thus,	opportunities	
to	learn	about	and	experience	traditional	ceremonies	were	very	limited,	added	to	which,	
extreme	poverty	had	made	it	impossible	to	assemble	all	the	essential	components	for	
specific	 rituals.161	 	 High	 levels	 of	 drinking	 in	 the	 camps	 (even	 among	 the	 Elders	
themselves)162	as	well	as	prostitution	and	crimes	such	as	rape,	assault	and	theft	further	
disrupted	social	order	and	harmony	which	some	attributed	to	the	loss	of	guidance	and	
leadership	from	the	Elders.163			
	
																																																						
154	Lomo,	Z.	and	Hovil,	L.	(2004)	p27	
155	Baines,	E.	(2005)	p21	
156	Ibid	
157	Ibid	
158	Ibid	p22	
159	Ibid	
160	Finnström,	S.	(2008)	p146	
161	Latigo,	J.O.	(2008)	p107	
162	Baines,	E.	(2005)	p22	
163	Ibid	p22-3	
	 151	
It	was	to	address	this	cultural	and	societal	turmoil	that	several	conferences	known	as	
Kacoke	Madit	 (Big	Meeting)	 were	 held	 in	 London,164	 bringing	 together	 ‘a	 full	 cross-
section	of	Acholi’165	to	investigate	possible	ways	of	ending	the	LRA	conflict	peacefully.166		
After	the	first	conference,	anthropologist	Dennis	Pain	was	asked	to	canvass	the	views	of	
Acholi	‘opinion	leaders’	about	peace	and	reconciliation167	and	to	write	a	report	168	which	
became	 ‘the	 first	 major	 articulation	 of	 a	 traditional	 reconciliation	 agenda	 for	 the	
Acholi.’169	Pain’s	report	outlined	the	‘traditional	authority	structure	of	the	Acholi’	and	
concluded	that	the	conflict	had	led	to	the	‘collapse	of	traditional	networking	and	values’	
where	 ‘the	 Elders	 have	 failed	 to	 take	 on	 the	 responsibility	 which	 they	 should	 have	
taken’.170	 	 Unfortunately,	 by	 blaming	 the	 conflict	 on	 the	 breakdown	 of	 traditional	
authority,	Pain	endorsed	the	view	that	the	war	was	an	 intra-Acholi	problem171	which	
could	 be	 resolved	 via	 a	 ‘community-based	 approach	 drawing	 on	 Acholi	 values	 and	
institutions’.172			
	
In	Pain’s	opinion,	‘Acholi	traditional	resolution	of	conflict	and	violence	stands	among	the	
highest	 practices	 anywhere	 in	 the	 world’173	 and	 he	 argued	 that	 Western	 law	 was	
‘incapable	of	addressing	the	situations	of	human	rights	abuses	and	break-down	of	social	
order	which	have	arisen	in	Uganda’.174		Highlighting	Mato	Oput	as	‘the	ancient	rite	that	
allows	for	reconciliation	with	compensation	rather	than	revenge’,175	Pain	suggested	a	
‘twin-track	approach’	that	all	LRA	rebels	should	be	given	a	formal	amnesty	and	undergo	
a	Mato	Oput	ritual.176		He	urged	international	donors	to	fund	compensation	for	victims	
and	support	the	re-invigoration	of	Rwodi-moo,	whose	 influence,	he	stated,	had	been	
eroded	by	the	conflict	but	whose	moral	authority	remained	intact.177		
																																																						
164	Over	300	Acholi	from	Uganda	and	worldwide	attended	the	meeting,	including	government	ministers,	church	
leaders	and	LRA	representatives	
165	Pain,	D.	(1997)	“The	Bending	of	Spears”:	producing	consensus	for	peace	&	development	in	Northern	Uganda	p13		
166	Ibid;	see	also	Allen,	T.	(2007)	p4			
167	Allen,	T.	(2006)	p132	
168	Pain’s	report	was	commissioned	by	International	Alert,	London	
169	Branch,	A.	(2011a)	p155	
170	Pain,	D.	(1997)	p78	
171	Branch,	A.	(2011a)	p156	
172	Allen,	T.	(2006)	p132	
173	Pain.	D.	(1997)	p2	
174	Ibid	p58-9	
175	Allen,	T.	(2007)	p4	
176	Pain,	D.	(1997)	p60	
177	Ibid	p83,	86;	see	also	Allen,	T.	(2007)	p4	
	 152	
	
Research	 to	 follow	 up	 on	 Pain’s	 findings	 began	 in	 1999,	 funded	 by	 the	 Belgian	
government	and	administered	by	ACORD,	a	non-governmental	organisation	(NGO).178		
Unlike	 Pain,	 ACORD	 discovered	 ‘weak	 and	 fragmented’	 traditional	 structures,	 Elders	
unsure	how	to	perform	traditional	rituals	and	‘widespread	disagreement	over	who	the	
real	traditional	leaders	actually	were’.179	Assessing	Pain’s	report,	Dolan	concluded	it	is	
‘littered	 with	 cultural	 and	 political	 landmines’	 and	 ‘perpetuates/creates	 a	 highly	
sentimental	picture	of	Acholi	culture	rather	than	attempting	to	assess	either	the	extent	
to	which	that	picture	is	accurate	or	whether	the	cultural	institutions	identified	are	up	to	
the	task	of	bringing	peace	to	northern	Uganda.’180		Nonetheless,	the	concept	of	Acholi	
traditional	 leaders	promoting	 traditional	 reconciliation	began	to	garner	support	 from	
local	 HR	 campaigners,181	 the	 ARPLI	 and	 international	 NGO’s	 working	 in	 northern	
Uganda182	and	there	began	‘a	series	of	internationally	and	locally	supported	efforts	to	
bolster	the	roles	of	Chiefs	and	Elders	in	conflict	resolution’183			
	
One	such	effort	 in	furtherance	of	Pain’s	proposal	to	revive	Acholi	cultural	 institutions	
was	the	establishment	in	2000	of	Ker	Kwaro	Acholi	(KKA),	comprising	traditional	Acholi	
chiefs	 and	 Elders,	 which	 became	 recognised	 as	 the	 Acholi	 legal	 cultural	 institution.		
Baines’	 report	 for	 the	 Liu	 Institute,	 Roco	Wat,	 upheld	 the	 establishment	 of	 KKA	 as	
fundamental	 to	 the	 process	 of	 ‘rejuvenat[ing]	 traditional	 culture	 and	 restor[ing]	
relationships.’184		Mindful	that	many	Elders	were	unfamiliar	with	the	traditional	rituals,	
it	offered	to	assist	by	 ‘collecting	and	writing	down	practices,	rituals,	and	ceremonies,	
which	[will]	proceed	in	tandem	with	the	empowerment	of	KKA	as	the	privileged	body	
that	will	apply	this	formalised	traditional	justice	system.’185		Not	leaving	the	Acholi	to	
assimilate	 their	 own	 traditional	 practices	 prompted	 Branch	 to	 comment	 that	 ‘the	
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strangeness	of	foreign	organisations	teaching	Elders	how	to	be	proper	Acholi	Elders	is	
then	 compounded	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 Elders	 are	 then	 to	 teach	 recalcitrant	 youth	 and	
women	how	to	be	proper	Acholi.’186		Recalling	the	British	colonial	practice	of	‘indirect	
rule’	where	local	forms	of	adjudication	and	criminal	justice	were	tolerated	in	rural	areas	
but	which	‘underwent	a	dramatic	transformation’	due	to	colonial	interference,187	one	
might	fear	for	the	authenticity	of	such	documented	local	customs	and	tribal	procedures.	
	
Branch’s	reference	to	‘recalcitrant	youth	and	women’	highlights	the	attitudes	of	some	
of	the	male	Elders	in	KKA	who	retained	traditional	views	on	appropriate	gender	and	age	
roles	 and	 resented	 the	 emergent	 awareness	 of	 their	 rights	 among	 women	 and	 the	
young.188	 	 Elders	 criticised	 the	 expansion	 of	 these	 rights	 for	 preventing	 them	 from	
carrying	 out	 their	 ‘traditional	 roles’,	 including	 ‘disciplining	 a	 woman	 through	
beatings’.189		The	legitimacy	and	acceptability	of	the	KKA	is	weakened	by	the	fact	that	it	
is	elderly-male	dominated	and	does	not	represent	women	and	youth.		
	
For	some,	KKA’s	incorporation	had	more	sinister	connotations,	since	by	regularising	and	
institutionalising	the	Acholi	leadership,	the	government	had	indicated	an	‘intention	to	
circumscribe	 the	 authority	 of	 this	 body’	 and	 ‘to	 keep	 it	 non-political.’190	 	 As	 Latigo	
comments,	the	re-emergence	of	the	KKA:	
	
was	largely	based	on	the	blueprint	of	the	inherited	colonial	administrative	
structure	without	 the	necessary	anchoring	 in	 the	deep	 traditional	beliefs,	
culture	and	norms	that	had	been	practised	hitherto.		Thus	both	the	status	
and	 the	 popular	 authority	 of	 this	 cultural	 institution,	 once	 considered	 as	
‘providers’	and	guides	of	their	people,	have	been	severely	weakened.	191		
	
	
Efforts	were	 also	made	 to	 identify	 the	 true	descendants	of	 the	Rwodi	moo	 deposed	
during	the	colonial	period	and	in	2000,	traditional	Rwodi	were	formally	re-instated	in	52	
major	clans	of	Acholiland	.192	 	 In	an	unprecedented	move,	the	Rwot	of	Payira	 in	Gulu	
																																																						
186	Branch,	A.	(2011a)	p164	
187	Vogler,	R.	(2005)	A	World	View	of	Criminal	Justice	(Aldershot,	Ashgate	Publishing	Ltd)	p256	
188	Baines,	E.	(2005)	p32-3	
189	Ibid	p33	
190	Cline,	L.E.	(2013)	p3	
191	Latigo,	J.O.	(2008)	p103	
192	Baines,	E.	(2005)	p4	
	 154	
district	 was	 elected	 to	 become	 ‘paramount	 chief’	 or	 cultural	 head	 of	 the	 Acholi	
people.193		For	many	Acholi,	this	was	‘a	violation	of	traditional	customs’	as	traditionally	
there	had	never	been	a	paramount	chief	and	the	many	Rwodi	had	had	a	‘collaborative	
relationship	with	the	Elders	of	each	clan	associated	with	them.’194	
	
By	mid-2005,	dozens	of	ceremonies,	referred	to	as	Mato	Oput,	were	being	performed,	
sometimes	attended	by	aid	workers	and	journalists.		For	example,	Barney	Afako	refers	
to	a	group	Mato	Oput	ceremony	in	Pajule	in	November	2001	which	involved	‘about	20	
recently	returned	LRA	combatants	and	included	many	others	who	had	already	settled	in	
the	community’.195		The	ceremony	‘was	supported	by	non-governmental	organisations	
(NGOs),	churches,	the	amnesty	commissioners,	senior	army	commanders	in	the	region	
and	 several	 representatives	 of	 NGOs	 attended	 the	 function’.196	 Afako	 states	 that	
another	ceremony	had	taken	place	in	Pabbo,	Gulu	district	and	others	were	planned	in	
different	parts	of	Acholi.197		Latigo	confirms	the	United	States	Agency	for	International	
Development-funded	Northern	Uganda	Peace	Initiative,	through	KKA,	supported	54	of	
these	ceremonies	between	2004	and	2006.198	
	
However,	it	appears	that	rather	than	the	Mato	Oput	ceremony,	an	Acholi	cleansing	ritual	
called	Nyono	Tong	Gweno	(‘stepping	on	the	egg’)	had	been	adapted	for	LRA	returnees	
and	is	being	incorrectly	referred	to	as	Mato	Oput.	Nyono	Tong	Gweno	 is	traditionally	
performed	 before	 a	 community’s	 own	 sacred	 shrine199	 to	 welcome	 back	 to	 the	
homestead	those	who	have	been	away	for	an	extended	period	and	who	may	have	had	
experiences	which	have	made	them	unclean,	requiring	them	to	be	cleansed	before	they	
can	 re-enter	 the	 family	 homestead.200	 	 Since	 2003,	 in	 some	 big	 towns	 and	 in	 the	
presence	of	the	media,	communal	ceremonies	which	have	been	called	Mato	Oput,	have	
been	performed	by	the	paramount	chief	for	large	numbers	of	returning	fighters	living	in	
camps	 and	 also	 for	 former	 LRA	 commanders	who	have	 returned	 and	have	 accepted	
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amnesty.201		The	purification	ceremony	has	clearly	been	adapted	in	this	new	context	as	
a	ceremony	to	‘forgive’	the	LRA	but	it	is	not	Mato	Oput.		To	illustrate	this	point,	Allen	
refers	to	a	conversation	he	had	with	‘Brigadier’	Sam	Kolo	just	before	Kolo	went	through	
one	such	ceremony	which	he	called	Mato	Oput.		When	pressed	by	Allen	as	to	whether:	
	
he	 would	 really	 look	 into	 the	 faces	 of	 those	 he	 had	 harmed,	 request	
reconciliation	and	pay	compensation	for	what	he	had	done,	he	just	laughed,	
saying	 he	 would	 not	 do	 that,	 but	 would	 do	 the	 Mato	 Oput	 that	 the	
paramount	chief	performed.		I	asked	him	if	he	thought	the	ceremony	was	
really	something	serious.		He	laughed	again,	saying	nothing.202		
	
If	those	undergoing	the	ritual	could	be	dismissive,	then	some	Acholi	themselves	appear	
to	be	even	more	so.		Lamony	comments	on	the	paramount	chief	rituals:	‘[t]o	the	Acholi,	
all	these	are	just	political	shows	which	are	empty	of	all	religious	and	moral	contents.’203	
Allen	agrees,	stating	that	he	has	found	no	widespread	enthusiasm	for	the	so-called	Mato	
Oput	or	other	ceremonies	performed	by	the	paramount	chief.204		One	criticism	was	that	
the	performance	of	Mato	Oput	and	other	healing	ceremonies	should	be	done	at	domain	
and	chiefdom	level	by	Rwodi	moo	and	not	by	the	paramount	chief.205		Others	expressed	
concern	 that	 the	 ceremony	 should	 not	 be	 communally	 performed	 in	 the	 towns	 but	
separately	at	the	individual’s	homestead.		Some	Elders	have	argued	that	the	ceremonies	
provide	 an	 avenue	 for	 returnees	 to	 be	 forgiven	without	 having	 to	 repent	 or	 ask	 for	
forgiveness206	and	some	Acholi	are	adamant	that	large	public	rituals	like	those	in	Gulu	
were	‘useless	[and	could]	make	things	worse	by	concentrating	cen	in	the	urban	areas.’207		
Furthermore,	Madi,	Langi	and	Teso	were	even	more	dismissive	when	asked,	pointing	
out	that	they	had	suffered	too	so	why	should	it	be	Acholi	who	did	the	forgiving?208	
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Roco	 Wat	 offers	 a	 different	 viewpoint,	 however,	 stating	 that	 ‘communal	 cleansing	
ceremonies	were	started	within	camps	and	town	centres	as	a	means	of	addressing	the	
impact	of	the	conflict	and	forced	displacement	on	traditional	practices.’209	 	One	such	
ceremony	 held	 in	 Amuru	 involved	 800	 returnees	 and	 Roco	Wat	 comments	 that	 the	
ceremony	‘may	be	the	first	form	of	‘therapy’	for	them.’210	Returnees	‘often	felt	more	
accepted	 following	 a	 communal	 cleansing	 ceremony	 and	 they	 were	 better	 able	 to	
communicate	and	socialise	with	community	members’	and	the	majority	of	family	and	
neighbours	 of	 the	 returnees	 ‘were	 in	 favour	 of	 communal	 cleansing	 ceremonies’.211		
Roco	Wat	states	the	cleansing	ceremonies	are	also	an	important	communication	with	
remaining	 rebels	 and	 abductees	 in	 the	 bush	 since	 they	 give	 the	 message	 that	
communities	are	willing	to	receive	them	back	and	‘that	the	traditional	leaders	are	going	
to	be	their	guide	to	the	justice	and	reconciliation	process.’212		
	
As	for	the	‘real’	Mato	Oput	ritual,	Lamony	says	that	‘despite	the	extent	to	which	Mato	
Oput	has	become	known	inside	and	outside	Uganda,	its	performance	is	relatively	rare	in	
contemporary	 Acholi,	 especially	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 reintegration	 of	 former	 LRA	
combatants.’213	 	Allen	states	that	he	has	not	encountered	‘any	confirmed	instance	of	
Mato	Oput	being	performed	to	re-integrate	a	former	LRA	combatant,	although	this	is	
often	claimed	to	be	taking	place’.214	Finnström	does	describe	attending	four	Mato	Oput	
ceremonies	performed	by	Elders	during	the	course	of	his	1997-2002	fieldwork	but	none	
of	them	in	fact	involved	re-integrating	former	LRA	fighters.215		Likewise,	Roco	Wat	states	
that	 ‘researchers	 were	 partially	 able	 to	 record	 50	 cases	 of	Mato	 Oput	 taking	 place	
between	2000	and	2005’	and	details	one	in-depth	case	study	which	encompasses	‘the	
aspects	 of	 truth,	 compensation	 and	 ritual	 […]	 considered	 central	 elements	 of	 the	
process’	 but	 again	 that	 ceremony	 does	 not	 involve	 ex-LRA.216	 	 Even	 the	Mato	Oput	
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ceremonies	that	do	take	place	can	be	viewed	as	unsatisfactory.		For	example,	in	2005,	
Allen’s	team	attended	and	filmed	a	ceremony	which	they	showed	to	Finnström’s	Acholi	
collaborator,	Tonny	Odiya	Labol,	who	‘complained	that	it	was	not	a	‘real’	Mato	Oput	at	
all	[because]	the	Elders	[…]	did	not	even	know	how	to	cut	the	sheep	in	half	in	the	correct	
way.’217		Allen	comments	that	‘[f]or	Tonny,	people	are	just	playing	with	customs	and	do	
not	really	understand	them.’218				
	
The	scepticism	regarding	the	‘Mato	Oput’	ceremonies	among	the	ordinary	Acholi	can	be	
attributed	 to	many	 factors,	not	 least	 the	decline	 in	knowledge	and	understanding	of	
Acholi	culture	and	leadership	that	occurred	during	the	conflict	as	previously	described.		
Also,	the	ceremonies	have	been	promoted	by	Acholi	(male)	leaders	and	perhaps	a	lack	
of	consultation	and	involvement	among	all	sections	of	Acholi	society	is	also	responsible	
for	 the	dissatisfaction	and	disengagement	often	expressed.219	 	The	willingness	of	 the	
perpetrators	to	undergo	the	cleansing	ceremonies	does	not	necessarily	indicate	that	all	
has	 been	 forgiven	 and	 there	 certainly	 has	 been	 little	 evidence	 of	 ‘following	 up’	 the	
cleansing	ceremonies	at	grass	roots	level	in	terms	of	establishing	and	endorsing	truth	
and	forgiveness.220			
	
It	has	been	demonstrated	in	this	section	that	whilst	certain	sections	of	Acholi	society,	
namely	traditional	and	religious	leaders	and	their	national	and	international	supporters,	
have	vigorously	promoted	Acholi	justice	and	specifically	Mato	Oput	as	the	appropriate	
mechanism	for	achieving	accountability	and	reconciliation	in	the	LRA	conflict,	there	are	
fundamental	concerns	both	as	to	its	legitimacy	and	efficacy.			
	
However,	in	Chapter	4	it	was	noted	that	the	fluidity	and	adaptability	of	AJMs	is	one	of	
their	potential	strengths	so	the	fact	that	Acholi	cleansing	ceremonies	have	been	adapted	
and	re-named	Mato	Oput	by	Acholi	leaders	to	fit	the	situation	of	returning	LRA	fighters	
and	abductees	should	not	of	itself	make	them	irrelevant	and	inappropriate.		Traditional	
culture	need	not	be	rigid	and	unchangeable	to	maintain	its	fundamental	values.		In	the	
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next	section,	Mato	Oput	in	its	traditional	form	and	in	the	‘adapted’	communal	cleansing	
ceremonies	will	be	discussed	to	establish	whether	they	satisfy	the	requirements	of	ICJ.	
	
		
Section	Five:	Does	Mato	Oput	Satisfy	the	Aims	of	International	Criminal	Justice?	
	
By	way	of	reminder,	the	aims	of	 ICJ	were	 identified	 in	Chapter	2	and	summarised	by	
former	 UNSG,	 Kofi	 Annan,	 in	 his	 2004	 report,	 as	 being	 to	 bring	 to	 justice	 those	
responsible	 for	 serious	 violations	 of	 HR	 and	 humanitarian	 law,	 put	 an	 end	 to	 such	
violations	and	prevent	their	recurrence,	secure	justice	and	dignity	for	victims,	establish	
a	past	record	of	events,	promote	national	reconciliation,	re-establish	the	rule	of	law	and	
contribute	to	the	restoration	of	peace.221	
	
Before	analysing	Mato	Oput’s	capacity	to	satisfy	these	aims	of	ICJ,	it	is	necessary	to	deal	
briefly	with	 the	 question	of	whether	 amnesty	 and	 the	performance	of	 a	Mato	Oput	
ceremony	complies	with	Uganda’s	obligations	under	international	law	or	whether	the	
offences	for	which	the	LRA	leaders	have	been	indicted	must	be	prosecuted.		Of	the	five	
arrest	warrants	originally	issued	by	the	ICC	in	2005,	only	two	remain	outstanding:	Joseph	
Kony	and	Vincent	Otti	(now	believed	deceased).222	Kony	faces	charges	of	Crimes	against	
Humanity	and	War	Crimes.		Unlike	the	crime	of	Genocide	(which	is	jus	cogens,	creating	
obligatio	 erga	 omnes)	 and	 grave	 breaches	 of	 the	 Geneva	 Conventions	 (which	 are	
accepted	as	customary	 international	 law),223	which	both	 impose	a	duty	to	prosecute,	
the	position	 is	 less	 clear	 for	 crimes	against	humanity	and	non-grave	breaches	of	 the	
Geneva	Conventions,	since	no	treaty	expressly	imposes	a	duty	to	prosecute	these	crimes	
and	 there	 is	 substantial	 debate	 on	 their	 status	 in	 customary	 international	 law.224		
Accordingly,	there	appears	to	be	nothing	to	prevent	an	amnesty	and	Mato	Oput	being	
implemented	for	the	indicted	LRA	leadership.		However,	if	an	admissibility	challenge	is	
																																																						
221	The	rule	of	law	and	transitional	justice	in	conflict	and	post-conflict	societies.	Report	of	the	Secretary-General	23	
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223	Which	means	the	obligation	to	prosecute	extends	even	to	those	states	that	are	not	parties	to	the	treaties	
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to	be	successful,	the	GoU	must	persuade	the	ICC	that	Mato	Oput	will	achieve	justice	and	
accountability.		To	consider	this,	each	of	identified	goals	of	ICJ	will	be	considered	in	turn.			
	
Bringing	those	responsible	to	justice		
	
For	this	section,	the	issue	is	whether	Mato	Oput	in	its	traditional	form,	which	focusses	
on	 the	 restoration	of	 relationships	 through	dialogue	and	 inclusiveness	 to	uphold	 the	
principles	of	truth,	accountability	and	compensation,	can	potentially	be	endorsed	as	an	
appropriate	justice	mechanism	for	dealing	with	ex-LRA	leadership	and	fighters.	
	
For	their	report	entitled	Peace	First,	Justice	Later,	Hovil	and	Quinn	investigated	whether	
Acholi	justice	mechanisms	could	meet	the	procedural	and	accountability	standards	of	
western	models	of	justice	by	gauging	them	against	both	the	RSt	and	the	International	
Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	(ICCPR),	to	which	the	GoU	became	a	signatory	in	
1995.225		They	concluded	that	‘the	conditions	listed	in	Article	14	ICCPR	could	easily	be	
met’226	by	customary	mechanisms.		As	for	Article	17(1)(c)	of	the	RSt	which	deals	with	
issues	of	admissibility	‘where	a	person	has	already	been	tried	for	conduct	which	is	the	
subject	of	the	complaint’,	they	found	that	if	an	Acholi	investigation	‘were	to	be	carried	
out	using	agreed-upon	and	sufficiently	prosecutorial	traditional	means’,	the	case	would	
be	inadmissible	to	the	ICC.227	 	Considering	that	Mato	Oput	requires	that	the	truth	be	
established	during	 the	negotiation	phase	 (which	 takes	place	prior	 to	 the	 ritual	being	
performed),	by	means	of	shuttle	diplomacy	between	the	clans	(which	can	take	months,	
if	 not	 years,	 to	 conclude),	 perhaps	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 ‘sufficiently	 prosecutorial	
means’	 have	 been	 employed.	 	 However,	 whether	 such	 lengthy	 methods	 of	
accountability	and	negotiation	are	feasible	for	numerous	ex-LRA	fighters	and	given	the	
scale	and	gravity	of	the	offences	committed	is	a	debatable	point.	
	
Indeed,	when	interviewed	for	Roco	Wat,	most	Rwodi	were	reluctant	to	adapt	Mato	Oput	
to	‘address	crimes	committed	during	the	conflict,	and	to	rebuild	social	trust	and	restore	
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relationships’	stating	‘that	it	was	not	possible	with	current	Mato	Oput	procedures.’228		
As	 previously	mentioned,	Mato	Oput	 has	 always	 been	 used	 for	 inter-clan	 individual	
accidental	or	deliberate	killings,	not	for	the	type	of	grievous	atrocities	committed	during	
the	 LRA	conflict.	 	 There	are	questions,	 therefore,	over	how	 it	would	deal	with	other	
crimes	 such	 as	 rape,	 sexual	 and	 gender-based	 violence,	 abduction,	 arson	 and	mass-
looting.		Nor	was	Mato	Oput	designed	to	deal	with	large	scale	and	trans-border	crimes	
involving	thousands	of	victims	from	different	ethnic	groups	in	three	countries.		So	many	
have	been	killed	during	the	war,	it	is	often	impossible	to	know	who	killed	whom,	which	
then	makes	it	impracticable	for	the	perpetrator	to	confess	to	a	specific	crime,	ask	for	
forgiveness	from	the	victim’s	clan	and	for	the	perpetrator’s	clan	to	pay	compensation,	
all	fundamental	features	of	the	Mato	Oput	justice	process.229			
	
Another	difficulty	is	that	the	Acholi	traditional	and	religious	leaders’	promotion	of	Mato	
Oput	refers	only	to	the	LRA	and	not	also	UPDF	soldiers,	who	arguably	committed	crimes	
of	equal	scale	and	severity	against	the	Acholi	and	who	have	seldom,	if	ever,	been	held	
to	account.230	Nor	has	there	been	any	suggestion	of	involving	Museveni	in	a	Mato	Oput	
ceremony	to	acknowledge	and	ask	forgiveness	for	the	crimes	committed	by	the	GoU	
during	 the	 war.	 	 In	 a	 2010	 survey	 about	 peace,	 justice	 and	 social	 reconstruction	 in	
northern	Uganda,	of	2,498	adult	respondents,	84%	saw	accountability	as	important	and	
more	 than	 two-thirds	 said	 the	GoU	 should	be	among	 those	held	 responsible	 for	 the	
violence.231			
	
Putting	an	end	to	violations	and	preventing	their	recurrence		
	
The	 potential	 for	 Mato	 Oput	 to	 end	 the	 commission	 of	 crimes	 and	 prevent	 their	
recurrence	 certainly	 could	 be	 realised,	 since	 to	 go	 through	 a	Mato	Oput	 ceremony,	
either	real	or	adapted,	the	ex-LRA	fighter	must	emerge	from	the	bush	which	means	they	
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229	Roco	Wat	also	notes	that	‘the	same	Rwodi,	Mego	and	Elders	interviewed	agreed	that	the	LRA	should	be	forgiven	
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would	no	longer	be	involved	with	the	LRA.		Moreover,	for	FAPs,	deterrence	is	a	limited	
factor	as	they	were	coerced	into	joining	the	LRA	and	were	threatened	with	death	if	they	
tried	 to	 escape.	 	 However,	 for	 other	 LRA	 members,	 it	 is	 as	 difficult	 to	 gauge	 the	
deterrence	potential	of	Mato	Oput	as	it	is	for	criminal	trials,	where	deterrence	is	one	of	
their	fundamental	objectives.232		
	
Although	Mato	Oput	 focusses	on	restorative	justice,	deterrence	can	still	be	achieved,	
through	social	pressure	exerted	on	the	offender	and	their	clan	and	through	the	Acholi	
spiritual	and	cultural	moral	codes	which	involve	acknowledgement	of	wrongdoing	and	
reconciliation	through	rituals	and	spiritual	appeasement.	 	Fear	of	spiritual	revenge	 in	
the	form	of	cen	could	act	as	a	strong	incentive	not	to	offend	or	to	seek	forgiveness	and	
reconciliation	after	an	offence	has	been	committed.		The	requirement	of	compensation	
and	 the	 ostracising	 of	 the	 offender	 and	 their	 clan	 until	 it	 is	 paid	 and	Mato	Oput	 is	
performed	 could	 also	 be	 a	 powerful	 tool	 of	 societal	 control	 and	 deterrence.		
Additionally,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 whole	 clan	 normally	 contributes	 towards	 the	
compensation	amount	can	act	as	a	strong	deterrent	as	clearly	being	required	to	pay	for	
someone	else’s	crime	could	adversely	affect	relations	within	the	clan.		
	
However,	these	deterrent	factors	relate	to	the	traditional	Mato	Oput	ritual	and	would	
not	apply	in	the	case	of	returning	LRA	who	undergo	the	adapted	Mato	Oput	communal	
cleansing	ceremonies.		Whilst	Latigo	believes	the	‘open	nature	of	the	process	applied	is	
itself	 a	 deterrent	 to	 many	 who	 would	 have	 contemplated	 committing	 similar	
offences’,233	 it	 is	difficult	 to	see	how	such	ceremonies	have	the	potential	 to	end	and	
prevent	the	commission	of	future	crimes	since	they	appear	not	to	be	widely	respected	
by	 either	 the	 perpetrators	 or	 the	 onlookers.	 	 It	 might	 be	 argued	 instead,	 that	 the	
combination	of	the	AA	and	the	performance	of	the	communal	cleansing	ceremonies	by	
local	cultural	 leaders	has	encouraged	former	LRA	fighters	to	return	from	the	bush	by	
offering	 not	 only	 freedom	 from	 the	 risk	 of	 prosecution	 but	 also	 the	 potential	 for	
forgiveness	and	acceptance	back	into	the	community.		
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Securing	justice	and	dignity	for	victims		
	
In	its	traditional	form,	Mato	Oput	could	achieve	justice	and	dignity	for	the	families	of	
those	killed	deliberately	or	accidentally,	by	virtue	of	 the	negotiations	 that	 take	place	
prior	to	the	ritual	being	performed,	the	compensation	that	is	paid	to	acknowledge	the	
loss	suffered	by	the	victim’s	family	and	the	reconciliation	ritual	itself.		However,	it	has	
already	been	discussed	above	why	the	traditional	form	of	Mato	Oput	is	impracticable	
for	returning	LRA	fighters	and	abductees.		A	further	point	is	that	even	if	the	victim	and	
perpetrator	were	identifiable,	the	payment	of	compensation	(a	fundamental	element	of	
the	 justice	 and	 reconciliation	 process)	 may	 be	 unachievable	 due	 to	 the	 number	 of	
victims	to	be	compensated,	the	poverty	suffered	by	the	perpetrator’s	clan	and	the	fact	
that	they	may	have	been	FAPs	and	thus	are	also	victims.		Although	in	such	situations,	it	
could	 be	 possible	 to	 adapt	Mato	 Oput	 to	 hold	 ceremonies	 in	 the	 locations	 of	 the	
communities	 affected,	 where	 the	 truth	 can	 be	 told,	 forgiveness	 requested	 and	
compensation	paid	through	a	reparations	fund	established	by	the	government.			
	
Another	 serious	 weakness	 was	 noted	 in	 Roco	 Wat’s	Mato	 Oput	 case	 study,	 which	
concerns	the	minor	role	women	played	in	the	mediation	process.234		Nor	were	women	
consulted	during	evidence	gathering	and	‘important	factual	information	and	knowledge	
that	was	known	by	the	women	was	not	included	in	the	‘truth-finding’	period.’235	As	a	
result,	 ‘some	 individuals	 [were]	unsatisfied	with	 the	entire	process.’236	 	As	Roco	Wat	
comments,	‘if	left	up	to	men,	the	danger	remains	that	women	will	not	fully	enjoy	the	
process	and	benefits	of	Mato	Oput.’237		The	traditional	non-involvement	of	women	and	
girls	in	the	Mato	Oput		decision-making,	arbitration	or	negotiations,	also	is	incompatible	
with	recognising	and	acknowledging	the	sexual-	and	gender-based	abuses	they	suffered	
during	the	conflict.		Since	their	demands	and	expectations	from	a	justice	process	differ	
from	 those	 of	men,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	Mato	Oput	 can	 satisfy	 their	 interests	 without	
significant	 adjustment.238	 	 Equally,	 the	 youth	 (who	 form	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 Acholi	
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population)	are	often	unfamiliar	with	the	ceremonies	and	yet	frequently	they	are	both	
the	 main	 perpetrators	 and	 the	 main	 victims	 of	 the	 violence	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	
conflict.239		
	
As	for	the	communal	cleansing	ceremonies	performed	in	towns	to	welcome	returning	
LRA	abductees,	although	sometimes	called	Mato	Oput,	they	are	not	‘real’	Mato	Oput	
but	are	adapted	from	other	Acholi	rituals.	 	Whilst	they	may	play	an	important	role	in	
implementing	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 AA	 and	 the	 AAR,	 the	 ceremonies	 cannot	 be	
accurately	described	as	‘traditional’	in	the	manner	of	their	performance,	nor	as	a	‘unique	
system	of	Acholi	 justice’	as	 is	claimed	by	KKA	and	 its	adherents	but	more	as	a	public	
ceremony	of	re-integration	and	‘forgiveness’.240				
	
However,	 the	 adapted	 process	 can	 be	 less	 satisfactory	 for	 the	 families	 and	 clans	 of	
victims	 who	 are	 involved	 only	 as	 onlookers:	 there	 is	 no	 period	 of	 negotiation,	 no	
compensation,	no	killing	of	sheep,	no	drinking	of	the	bitter	root.241	In	fact,	the	payment	
of	compensation	has	become	a	sensitive	issue,	as	Baines	explains:	
	
[c]ultural	 leaders	 and	 elders	 are	 reluctant	 to	 request	 compensation	 from	
former	LRA	perpetrators,	believing	that	if	this	is	done	it	may	deter	other	LRA	
combatants	from	returning	home.		Worse,	it	may	make	the	LRA	doubt	the	
sincerity	of	the	amnesty	law	and	seek	revenge	on	local	leaders	for	failing	to	
uphold	the	principle	of	forgiveness	the	amnesty	appears	to	offer.242	
	
Participants	 are	 not	 required	 to	 face	 their	 victims,	 ask	 for	 forgiveness	 or	 to	 pay	
compensation,243	so	whilst	the	ceremonies	were	described	by	one	local	social	counsellor	
as	a	‘first	step	aimed	at	the	relieving	pain,	agony	and	traumatic	experiences	our	sons	
underwent	 […]	while	 in	 captivity’,244	 they	 appear	 to	 do	 nothing	 to	 relieve	 the	 ‘pain,	
agony	and	traumatic	experiences’	of	their	victims.		These	realities	should	not	be	ignored	
if	victims	are	to	feel	a	sense	of	justice	being	done.	A	survey,	Forgotten	Voices,	conducted	
																																																						
239	Ibid	
240	Allen,	T.	(2006)	p166	
241	Allen,	T.	(2007)	p7	
242	Baines,	E.	(2007)	p110	
243	Ssenyonjo,	M.	(2007)	‘The	International	Criminal	Court	and	the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	Leaders:	Prosecution	or	
Amnesty?’	51	Netherlands	ILR	pp51-80	at	p65	
244	Baines,	E.	(2007)	p94	
	 164	
in	 2005	 found	 that	 65%	 of	 respondents	 supported	 the	 amnesty	 process	 for	 LRA	
returnees	but	only	4%	said	 the	amnesties	should	be	granted	unconditionally.245	 	The	
majority	 wanted	 some	 form	 of	 acknowledgement	 and/or	 retribution	 from	 all	 those	
granted	amnesty.246		
	
The	2005	survey	reveals	 that	 the	pressure	exerted	by	Acholi	 traditional	and	religious	
leaders	on	the	ICC	to	withdraw	the	arrest	warrants	in	favour	of	Mato	Oput	did	not	reflect	
the	views	of	Acholi	people	at	grassroots	level.		Over	three-quarters	of	respondents	said	
those	responsible	for	abuses	should	be	held	accountable247	and	when	asked	how	the	
LRA	 should	 be	 dealt	 with,	 66%	 favoured	 punishment	 (trial,	 imprisonment,	 killing)	
whereas	only	22%	supported	forgiveness,	reconciliation	and	reintegration.248		In	2005,	
‘immediate	concerns’	for	the	respondents	were	food	(34%)	and	peace	(31%)	with	fewer	
than	1%	mentioning	justice.249	When	asked	‘What	is	Justice?’,	31%	said	trials,	18%	said	
reconciliation	and	19%	said	they	did	not	know;	only	7%	said	traditional	justice.250		When	
asked	specifically	who	best	represented	their	views,	only	6%	said	traditional	leaders	and	
the	same	low	percentage	thought	that	traditional	leaders	could	bring	justice	in	Northern	
Uganda.		Likewise,	only	10%	thought	Acholi	traditional	and	religious	leaders	could	bring	
peace	 to	 the	 region	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 GoU	 (43%)	 or	 the	 international	 community	
(26%).251	 	 These	 results	 show	 just	 how	 divided	 at	 that	 time	 community	 leaders	 and	
victims	were	on	topics	of	justice,	accountability	and	reconciliation.252			
	
The	population	survey	was	repeated	in	2007	and	the	report	entitled	When	the	War	Ends,	
reveals	how	the	views	of	victims	on	issues	of	peace	and	justice	can	soften	over	time	as	
by	 then,	 of	 the	 2,875	 interviewees,	 52%	 preferred	 forgiveness,	 reconciliation	 and	
reintegration	 for	 LRA	 leaders	 as	 opposed	 to	 41%	 who	 supported	 trials	 and/or	
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punishment	including	imprisonment	or	death.253	Although	70%	said	it	was	important	to	
hold	those	responsible	for	committing	crimes	accountable254	support	for	amnesty	was	
still	strong,	with	81%	saying	it	would	help	to	achieve	peace255	and	80%	choosing	peace	
with	 amnesty	 over	 peace	 with	 trials.256	 	 The	 apparent	 contradiction	 between	 the	
support	for	both	accountability	and	amnesties	can	perhaps	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	
the	Juba	peace	talks	were	in	progress	at	the	time	the	survey	was	conducted.		The	authors	
of	 the	 report	 surmise	 that	 the	 figures	may	 reflect	 respondents’	 fear	 that	 trials	 could	
hinder	the	peace	process.257	
	
Nonetheless,	when	 asked	 in	 2007	 how	 to	 deal	with	 the	 abuses	 committed,	 only	 3%	
chose	traditional	justice	with	the	highest	number	of	respondents	(28.7%)	choosing	the	
ICC	and	27.9%	preferring	Ugandan	national	courts.258		Regarding	traditional	ceremonies,	
57%	agreed	those	responsible	for	abuses	should	participate	in	traditional	ceremonies,	
with	Mato	Oput	receiving	the	most	support	from	the	Acholi	at	48%	but	understandably,	
not	from	the	Langi	(9%)	or	Teso	(16%).		Only	47%	felt	that	the	traditional	ceremonies	
were	necessary	to	bring	justice	to	northern	Uganda,	the	majority	(66.6%)	felt	they	were	
necessary	to	chase	away	bad	spirits	to	bring	peace.	
	
In	 2010,	 after	 almost	 four	 years	 of	 the	 absence	 of	 fighting,	 although	 respondents	
recognised	the	need	for	social	reconstruction	and	holding	perpetrators	accountable,	the	
provision	of	basic	needs	and	services	such	as	food	(28%),	land	access	(19%),	education	
(15%),	health	services	(13%),	was	more	of	a	priority.259		When	given	the	option	of	four	
transitional	 justice	mechanisms,	 45%	of	 respondents	 supported	 peace	with	 amnesty	
over	peace	with	a	truth	seeking	mechanism	(32%),	peace	with	trials	(15%)	and	peace	
with	traditional	ceremonies	(8%),	revealing	still	that	few	respondents	chose	traditional	
																																																						
253	Pham,	P.,	Vinck,	P.,	Stover,	E.,	Moss,	A.,	Wierda,	M.,	and	Bailey,	R.	(2007)	When	the	War	Ends:	A	Population-Based	
Survey	on	Attitudes	about	Peace,	Justice,	and	Social	Reconstruction	in	Northern	Uganda	(HRC,	Berkeley/Tulane/ICTJ)	
p36-7	
254	50%	said	LRA	leaders	should	be	held	accountable,	48%	said	all	the	LRA	and	55%	said	the	UPDF	should	be	put	on	
trial,	see	p4	
255	Pham,	P.	et	al.	(2007)	p42	
256	Ibid	p5,	38	
257	 Ibid	p5	 (76%	of	 those	who	had	heard	of	 the	 ICC	 (60%	of	all	 respondents,	an	 increase	 from	27%	 in	2005)	 said	
pursuing	trials	now	could	endanger	the	Juba	peace	talks)	
258	Ibid	p36	
259	Pham,	P.	and	Vinck,	P.	(2010)	p19-20	
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ceremonies	 over	 amnesty,	 truth-seeking	 or	 trials.260	 	 Nonetheless,	 53%	 viewed	
traditional	 ceremonies	 as	 useful	 to	 deal	with	 ex-LRA	 as	 they	 helped	 the	 community	
reconcile	(39%)	and	forgive	the	wrongdoer	(25%)	although	31%	said	they	did	not	achieve	
anything.261	
	
On	the	strength	of	these	figures,	the	argument	for	Mato	Oput	as	a	transitional	justice	
mechanism	 appears	 overstated	 by	 its	 supporters;	 not	 reflective	 of	 the	 demand	 for	
justice	expressed	by	many	Acholi	at	grass	roots	level.		As	Allen	states,	the	Acholi	are	not	
‘a	 race	 apart’	 and	 they	 want	 those	 responsible	 for	 terrible	 crimes	 to	 be	 held	 to	
account.262	This	appears	to	be	borne	out	 in	the	 interviews	conducted	by	HRW	where	
‘[v]ery	few	victims	of	LRA	abuses	[…]	in	the	camps	expressed	any	desire	for	‘forgiveness’	
–	many	asked	for	‘punishment’	of	the	commanders.’263	
	
Establishing	past	record	of	events	
	
In	 Chapter	 3	 the	 value	 and	 importance	 of	 a	 full	 and	 comprehensive	 record	 of	 the	
atrocities	 suffered	by	 the	 citizens	of	 a	 state	 transitioning	 from	conflict	 to	peace	was	
discussed	and	in	northern	Uganda,	there	is	considerable	support	for	a	written	historical	
record.	 	 In	 the	 afore-mentioned	 2007	 survey,	 95%	 of	 respondents	 said	 a	 written	
historical	record	of	what	had	happened	during	the	war	in	northern	Uganda	should	be	
prepared	and	89%	indicated	they	were	willing	to	talk	openly	about	their	experiences	in	
a	 court	 or	 public	 hearing.264	 	 Likewise,	 in	 the	 2010	 population	 survey,	 93%	 of	
respondents	believed	it	was	important	for	future	generations	to	remember	what	had	
occurred	 in	 northern	Uganda.	 	 The	majority	 suggested	 that	 books	 be	written	 (42%),	
children	be	educated	 (26%)	and	monuments	be	erected	 (13%)	 to	 commemorate	 the	
victims.265	
	
																																																						
260	Ibid	p3,	41	
261	Ibid	p3-4	
262	Allen,	T.	(2006)	p181	
263	HRW	(2005)	p60	
264	Ibid	pp4,	34		
265	Pham,	P.	and	Vinck,	P.	(2010)	p46	
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Historically,	traditional	processes	 leading	to	rituals	such	at	Mato	Oput	have	not	been	
recorded:	the	procedure	is	voluntary	and	all	negotiated	settlements	are	oral.		Primarily	
due	 to	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Liu	 Institute,	 many	 ceremonies	 and	 rituals	 have	 been	
documented,	 relying	 on	 the	 oral	 testimony	 of	 Elders,	 Rwodi,	 camp	 residents	 and	
documentation	from	other	NGOs.266	 	However,	 this	codification	of	select	rituals	does	
not	have	unqualified	support.		Allen	is	concerned	that	if	‘there	is	external	support	for	
doing	so,	and	figures	of	authority	are	created	to	perform	them,	then	they	may	become	
formalized	into	a	pseudo-traditional	system.’267			
	
Whilst	the	Liu	Institute	has	also	recorded	some	oral	testimonies	of	participants	in	Mato	
Oput	ceremonies	performed	between	2000-2005268	and	compiled	a	 list	of	communal	
cleansing	ceremonies	performed	by	the	KKA,269	the	records	do	not	amount	to	a	full	and	
accurate	history	of	the	conflict.		They	do	provide	basic	information	and	are	thus	helpful	
to	demonstrate	the	efforts	that	have	been	made	to	perform	and	adapt	ceremonies	to	a	
communal	 level.	 	 Interestingly,	no	accounts	of	Mato	Oput	being	currently	performed	
with	ex-LRA	or	FAPs	appear	to	be	available	and	whether	this	is	because	no	ceremonies	
are	being	performed	or	that	they	are	not	being	recorded	is	not	clear.			
	
However,	what	is	clear	is	that	a	comprehensive	historical	record	of	all	abuses	suffered	
by	the	population	in	Northern	Uganda	during	the	LRA	conflict	is	desired	by	most	Acholi	
and	 should	 be	 prepared	 either	 through	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 GoU	 or	 some	 other	
institution,	 such	 as	 a	 truth	 commission	 and	 this	must	 be	 on	 a	 national	 basis,	 not	 a	
regional	or	ethnic	one.	
	
Promoting	national	reconciliation	
	
It	 is	 difficult	 to	 see	 how	Mato	 Oput	 can	 promote	 national	 reconciliation	 for	 three	
predominant	 reasons.	 	 First,	 Acholi	 justice	 is	 not	 national	 justice	 and	 in	 Uganda,	
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267	Allen,	T.	(2008)	‘Ritual	(Ab)use?		Problems	with	Traditional	Justice	in	Northern	Uganda’	in	Wadell,	N.	and	Clark,	P.	
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reconciliation	and	peace	building	must	be	developed	as	a	national	programme,	not	a	
regional	or	ethnic	one,	for	reasons	already	outlined	in	this	chapter.		It	has,	of	course,	
been	extremely	useful	for	Museveni	to	appear	to	be	acceding	to	the	Acholi	demands	for	
their	 traditional	 justice	to	deal	with	the	LRA.	 	Not	only	does	 it	serve	to	reinforce	the	
GoU’s	 insistence	that	the	war	was	an	Acholi	affair,	 it	 relieves	the	government	of	any	
responsibility	to	address	the	causes	of	the	conflict	from	a	national,	socio-economic	and	
political	 standpoint.270	 	 Furthermore,	 support	 for	 traditional	 justice	 protects	 the	
government	‘from	the	full	implications	of	public	trials	at	The	Hague	[where]	competent	
defence	 counsel	 for	 the	 accused	 could	 raise	 very	 embarrassing	 issues,	 including	
government	implication	in	atrocities.’271	
	
Second,	Mato	Oput	 is	a	ceremony	that	 is	culturally	specific	 to	the	Acholi,	although	 it	
does	 have	 some	 equivalence	 to	 conflict	 resolution	 practices	 of	 other	 ethnic	 groups	
affected	by	the	LRA	conflict.272	These	groups	have	their	own	ceremonies	of	forgiveness	
and	 reconciliation,	 however	 and	 it	 is	 questionable	 whether	 they	 would	 accept	 that	
justice	has	been	done	if	ex-LRA	are	subjected	to	a	justice	system	that	is	not	their	own.		
If	Mato	Oput	becomes	the	established	AJM,	these	other	tribes	may	resent	the	fact	that	
their	own	justice	system	has	been	ignored,	which	could	cause	inter-tribal	tensions.		
	
Third,	within	the	Acholi	community,	traditional	ceremonies	have	lost	their	significance	
and	relevance	due	to	the	breakdown	of	traditional	Acholi	society	during	displacement	
and	 therefore	 their	 ability	 to	 effect	 forgiveness	 and	 reconciliation	 may	 have	 been	
severely	diminished.	 	 Indeed,	Acholi	 communities	often	display	 little	evidence	of	 the	
forgiveness	which,	according	 to	Acholi	 Elders	and	Chefs	who	promote	Mato	Oput,	 is	
inherent	in	the	Acholi	psyche.273		For	example,	in	2005,	Roco	Wat	noted	worrying	signs	
that	 forgiveness	 and	 reconciliation	 had	 not	 been	 achieved	 successfully	 between	
community	members	in	camps	and	returnees,	referring	to	‘stigmatization,	resentment,	
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[and]	insecurities	in	camp	settings’.274	This	stigmatisation	reveals	that	while	the	return	
of	 ex-LRA	 and	 FAPs	may	 have	 been	 accepted,	 individually	 they	may	 not	 have	 been	
accepted	as	members	of	 the	community,	which	perhaps	 is	understandable	given	 the	
abuses	suffered	by	civilians	who	now	live	alongside	their	former	abusers.		The	outcome,	
however,	is	that	many	returnees	try	to	conceal	their	identity	and	do	not	participate	in	
the	communal	cleansing	ceremony	even	if	they	are	inclined	to	do	so,	for	fear	of	being	
persecuted	by	their	victim’s	clan	and	stigmatised	by	the	community.275	
	
Roco	Wat	further	noted	that	‘[y]oung	mothers	and	orphaned	returnees	are	a	particularly	
vulnerable	 category	 among	 returnees.	 	 Acholi	 society	 tends	 to	 discriminate	 against	
[them]’.276		While	KKA	‘acknowledged	the	difficulties	facing	returnee	mothers,	no	official	
policy	exists	for	how	culture	might	facilitate	their	reintegration,	thus	the	problems	they	
encounter	are	not	supported	in	a	cultural	fashion.’277		In	fact,	KKA	appears	to	have	done	
very	little	to	address	the	problem	of	re-integration	of	ex-LRA	and	FAPs	in	the	intervening	
years	despite	the	worrying	escalation	of	stigmatisation.		In	April	2015,	the	JRP	conducted	
an	opinion	survey	on	regional	reconciliation	across	seven	communities	of	the	Acholi	and	
Lango	sub-regions.278		Their	report	notes	that	in	2012,	5%	of	respondents	‘frequently’	
and	8%	‘occasionally’	observed	stigmatisation	in	their	communities,	whereas	by	2015,	
these	 figures	 had	 risen	 to	 12.4%	 and	 52.8%	 respectively.279	 	 Again,	 in	 2012,	 62%	 of	
respondents	 ‘never’	witnessed	 stigmatisation	whereas	 in	 2015,	 this	 figure	 fell	 to	 0%	
meaning	 that	every	 respondent	was	aware	of	widespread	 ‘practices	and	attitudes	of	
stigmatisation	in	their	community,	which	seek	to	dangerously	undermine	reconciliation	
efforts.’280		
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In	2015,	the	majority	of	respondents	(68%)	noted	poor	relations	due	to	the	war	within	
their	own	community281	and	75%	blamed	the	war	for	adversely	affecting	relations	across	
sub-regions.282		Within	the	Acholi,	stigmatisation283	was	the	most	frequently	cited	cause	
of	conflict	(43%)	with	FAPs,	victims	of	sexual	or	gender-based	violence,	children	born	of	
war,	 the	families	of	missing	persons	and	survivors	of	mass	killings	being	 identified	as	
those	most	severely	stigmatised	within	communities.284		Regarding	FAPs,	for	whom	the	
Mato	Oput	cleansing	ceremonies	have	been	especially	targeted,	the	JRP	survey	reveals:	
	
Hostile	 relationships	 between	 community	 members	 and	 FAPs	 amidst	 a	
vicious	cycle	of	accusations,	bitterness	and	stigma	permeates	through	most	
communities	in	the	region.		Community	members	usually	ostracise	FAPs	and	
blame	them	for	their	sufferings	during	the	brutal	war[.]285	
	
Further	and	specific	research	conducted	in	2015	by	JRP	in	Gulu	town	into	the	plight	of	
children	born	to	LRA-abducted	girls	over	a	three-year	period	reveals	that	children	born	
to	LRA-abducted	girls	‘exist	on	the	margins	of	their	society,	stigmatised	and	with	limited	
life	 opportunities’.286	 The	 main	 research	 findings	 were	 that	 these	 children	 ‘face	
significant	stigma	from	communities,	peers,	and	even	at	times	from	family	members,	
including	violent	abuse	from	stepfathers’	and	‘those	whose	fathers	are	top	commanders	
still	at-large	fear	for	their	safety	if	their	fathers	are	captured.’287		For	these	children,	the	
Mato	Oput	ritual	is	not	appropriate	as	they	have	not	killed	but	no	ceremony	of	cleansing	
and	reconciliation	has	been	adapted	to	acknowledge	their	situation	in	the	community,	
so	from	a	transitional	justice	perspective,	the	daily	tribulations	they	suffer	have	been	
overlooked.	
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Since	Mato	Oput	seemingly	has	been	ineffective	in	promoting	widespread	reconciliation	
within	the	Acholi	tribe,	it	can	only	be	less	effective	at	promoting	reconciliation	regionally	
and	nationally,	where	reconciliation	is	of	prime	importance	but	the	ritual	has	no	cultural	
resonance.		Across	the	northern	Ugandan	sub-regions,	the	stereotyping	of	the	LRA	war	
as	an	ethnic	conflict	waged	by	Acholi	to	further	Acholi	nationalism	in	the	area	has	deeply	
affected	 relationships,	 with	 interactions	 revealing	 deep-rooted	 suspicion,	 grievances	
and	prejudices.288		In	the	2015	JRP	survey,	65%	of	non-Acholi	respondents	blamed	the	
Acholi	‘highly’	or	‘moderately’	for	instigating	the	war	and	62%	agreed	that	the	war	had	
adversely	affected	the	relationship	between	Acholi	and	Lango.289		Other	neighbouring	
regions	 also	 blame	 the	 Acholi	 for	 the	 war	 and	 suffering	 experienced,	 for	 example,	
‘eastern	regions	in	the	past	have	been	hostile	to	the	Acholi	as	the	LRA	high	command	is	
largely	Acholi.’290		Indisputably,	in	South	Uganda	there	has	long	been	the	misconception	
that	 the	 war	 in	 the	 north	 is	 the	 fault	 of	 Acholi	 and	 further	 afield,	 South	 Sudanese	
attending	 the	 Juba	 peace	 talks	 ‘asked	 Acholi	 leaders	 what	 they	 had	 ‘allowed	 their	
children	to	do,’	thereby	ascribing	responsibility	to	the	group	as	a	whole.’291	
	
Clearly	there	is	a	great	need	to	address	the	issue	of	reconciliation	locally,	regionally	and	
nationally	but	Mato	Oput	appears	not	to	be	the	answer,	for	in	the	years	since	the	idea	
of	traditional	Acholi	justice	for	ex-LRA	fighters	first	garnered	support,	little	appears	to	
have	 been	 achieved	 by	 way	 of	 forgiveness	 and	 reconciliation	 within	 the	 Acholi	
community	 itself,	 let	alone	between	neighouring	 tribes	and	nationally.	 	Traditionally,	
reconciliation	between	tribes	was	achieved	by	the	performance	of	Gomo	Tong	(‘bending	
of	the	spear’),	a	‘profound	ritual	of	reconciliation’	which	‘evokes,	manifests	and	remakes	
greater	political	alliances	among	peoples	 in	northern	Uganda’.292	 	The	ceremony	 is	a	
highly	 sacred	 act,	 evoking	 ancestors	 and	 vowing	 that	 no	 more	 blood	 will	 be	 shed	
between	the	tribes.293	Few	recorded	practices	of	Gomo	Tong	exist294	but	there	is	clearly	
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no	point	 in	the	ritual	being	performed	to	effect	reconciliation	regionally	or	nationally	
whilst	there	is	any	risk	of	the	LRA	resuming	their	violence	in	northern	Uganda.		
	
Re-establishing	Rule	of	Law	
	
	
It	 has	 already	 been	 argued	 above	 that	 if	Mato	 Oput	 were	 accepted	 as	 the	 justice	
mechanism	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 ex-LRA	 fighters,	 this	 would	 effectively	 give	 the	 GoU	
impunity	for	all	the	crimes	committed	against	the	Acholi	by	government	forces	during	
the	conflict	which	‘reinforces	the	very	forms	of	injustice	that	gave	rise	to	the	war	and	
that	will	need	to	be	rectified	if	the	legacy	of	war	is	to	be	overcome.’295	Furthermore,	as	
Baines	 asserts,	 rituals	 presided	 over	 by	 male	 lineage-based	 Acholi	 authorities	 are	
inadequate	to	deal	with	other	crimes	commonly	committed	during	the	conflict,296	such	
as	rape,	arson,	looting	and	abduction,	which	are	excluded	because	Mato	Oput	is	a	ritual	
traditionally	used	for	killings.	
	
A	 further	 important	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 KKA,	 which	 was	 established	 with	 the	
support	of	the	GoU	and	foreign	donors	to	resurrect	and	promote	Acholi	culture	and	to	
revive	traditional	 rituals	and	restore	relationships	will	 receive	universal	support	 from	
Acholi	society.		Quinn’s	research	has	revealed	an	impression	among	some	Acholi	that	
the	GoU	‘has	somehow	tainted	[traditional]	processes.’297	Quinn	states	that	as	the	KKA	
has	‘only	a	tenuous	grasp’	on	the	use	of	customary	practices,	the	government	is	now	
‘set	to	attempt	to	codify	and/or	formalise	[them]	without	much,	if	any,	input’298		from	
the	 KKA	 and/or	 the	 traditional	 leaders.	 	 This,	 of	 course,	 could	 seriously	 impact	 the	
manner	in	which	these	rituals	operate.		Additionally,	Quinn	notes	that	the	government	
has	effectively	co-opted	the	KKA,	‘playing	a	significant	role’	and	‘far	from	being	arms-
length	regulators	 […]	has	 inserted	 itself	 into	[their]	day-to-day	workings’,299	 including	
‘rely[ing]	on	[the	KKA]	to	assist	in	implementing	their	policies.’300	Whether	Acholi	society	
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in	the	long	term	will	accept	as	legitimate	a	cultural	institution	headed	by	a	paramount	
chief	crowned	by	Museveni	and	regarded	by	some	as	an	anathema,	led	by	a	council	of	
chiefs	supported	by	foreign	aid	and	a	manipulative	government	remains	to	be	seen.	
	
The	reputation	and	standing	of	Acholi	Chiefs	and	Elders,	already	seriously	diminished	
during	 the	 conflict	 and	 almost	 two	 decades	 of	 displacement,	may	 not	 be	 enhanced	
either	by	the	raison	d’ȇtre	of	KKA	and	its	supporters,	which	is	to	reinstate	the	former	
authority	of	male	Elders	and	Rwodi	in	order	that	they	could	preside	over	re-constructed	
traditional	societies.		In	effect,	the	intention	is	to	re-establish	traditional	ritual	practices	
that	 ensure	 harmony	 and	 social	 order,301	 where	 traditional	 leaders	 would	 have	 the	
‘exclusive	 role	 of	 regulating	 Acholi	 society	 through	 their	 access	 to	 the	 spiritual	
domain.’302	 	 Once	 back	 in	 their	 village	 environment,	 the	 revival	 of	 the	 traditional	
authority	of	men	and	Elders	‘would	take	place	by	imposing	discipline	at	the	family	and	
clan	levels	through	warnings,	fines,	corporal	punishment	and,	if	all	else	fails,	expulsion	
from	the	clan	and	curses.’303	
	
The	 re-assertion	 of	 ‘patriarchal,	 gerontocratic	 power	 within	 clan	 and	 household	
structures’	may	not	be	universally	welcomed.304		Women	whose	‘economic,	social	and	
political	 authority	 and	 status’	 has	 risen	 due	 to	 opportunities	 made	 possible	 during	
displacement	and	young	people	who	 ‘sometimes	 found	ambiguous	empowerment	 in	
the	rebel	groups	and	paramilitaries’	may	be	unwilling	to	defer	to	older	men	who	‘assert	
their	power	under	the	guise	of	tradition	and	[..]	dismiss	challenges	to	that	power	as	non-
traditional	and	non-authentic.’305	Attempts	to	impose	pre-conflict	forms	of	domination	
and	inequality	would	neither	be	practical	nor	fair	and	could	give	rise	to	conflict,	since	
‘although	local	mechanisms	emphasise	reconciliation	in	a	way	that	punitive	approaches	
do	not,	it	could	potentially	increase	violence	rather	than	restore	relationships.’306	
	
																																																						
301	Branch,	A.	(2014)	p613-4	
302	Ibid	p622	
303	Ibid	p623	
304	Ibid	p617	
305	Ibid	p622	
306	Baines,	E.	(2009)	‘Complex	Political	Perpetrators:	Reflections	on	Dominic	Ongwen’	47	JMAS	pp163-191	at	p184	
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Contributing	to	restoration	of	peace		
	
The	 traditional	 objective	 of	 an	 AJM	 is	 primarily	 to	 seek	 assistance	 from	 Elders	 to	
facilitate,	 acknowledge	 and	 resolve	 conflicts	 arising	 from	 the	 violation	 of	 a	 code	 of	
behaviour	common	to	all	members	of	the	community.		Mato	Oput	has	been	successful	
in	restoring	peace	following	an	inter-clan	killing,	not	least	because	the	period	of	shuttle	
diplomacy	between	the	respective	clans	affords	a	‘cooling-off’	period	for	both	sides	of	
the	conflict	which	forestalls	vengeful	violence.		Accountability	is	achieved	through	the	
truth-telling	process	and	payment	of	compensation	acknowledges	the	wrongdoing	and	
elicits	forgiveness.		In	the	final	stage	of	the	process,	the	drinking	of	the	bitter	roots	ritual	
re-establishes	broken	relationships	which	in	turn	brings	peace	and	social	harmony	back	
to	the	tribe.		
	
Previous	sections	in	this	chapter	have	demonstrated	the	deficiencies	of	Mato	Oput	both	
in	its	original	form	and	as	adapted	to	achieve	the	goals	of	ICJ	within	the	context	of	the	
war	between	the	GoU	and	the	LRA.		Without	repeating	them	here,	it	is	argued	that	whilst	
Mato	Oput	has	some	strengths,	Uganda	needs	a	national	policy	framework	on	peace-
building	and	conflict	prevention	and	Mato	Oput	alone	cannot	achieve	that	goal.		
	
Conclusion	
	
In	this	chapter	 it	has	been	demonstrated	that	there	are	numerous	causes	of	the	LRA	
conflict,	some	of	which	stem	from	deep-rooted	ethnic	and	regional	divides	which	pre-
date	but	were	exploited	during	the	colonial	period.	After	independence,	these	divides	
were	exacerbated	by	successive	regimes	to	bolster	and	maintain	their	own	power	by	
means	of	military	violence	and	repression.	It	could	be	argued	that	the	catalyst	for	the	
Acholi	insurgency	was	the	NRA	abuses	of	the	Acholi	in	the	Gulu	and	Kitgum	districts	but	
it	was	 fed	and	nurtured	by	historical	divisions	 in	Ugandan	society	that	permeated	all	
areas	of	social,	economic	and	religious	life	to	the	extent	that	the	north	was	stigmatised	
by	Museveni’s	government	as	backward,	primitive	and	violent	and	the	south	lauded	as	
modern,	cultural	and	forward-looking.			
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Therefore,	far	from	the	conflict	being	a	peripheral	matter,	a	local	trouble	involving	the	
Acholi	for	the	Acholi	to	sort	out	amongst	themselves	as	the	Museveni	government	has	
insisted,	this	conflict	must	be	viewed	from	a	wider	perspective.		It	is	a	national	conflict,	
a	 violent	 manifestation	 of	 the	 long-term	 grievances	 endured	 by	 the	 Acholi	 and	
northerners	 generally,	 arising	 out	 of	 their	 daily-lived	 experience	 of	 neglect,	
discrimination	 and	 mistrust.	 	 This	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 applicability	 of	 a	 local,	 or	
specifically,	 Acholi,	 justice	 system	 as	 the	 appropriate	 means	 of	 dealing	 with	
accountability	since	to	do	so	defines	the	conflict	as	an	Acholi,	not	a	national	problem	
and	absolves	the	GoU	from	any	responsibility	for	the	insurgency.	
	
By	calling	 for	 traditional	 justice	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	Mato	Oput	 ritual	as	 the	means	of	
addressing	the	gross	violations	of	HR	committed	by	the	LRA,	it	could	be	suggested	that	
the	Acholi	Elders	and	their	supporters	are	 ignoring	the	wider	context	of	 this	conflict,	
particularly	 the	 abuses	 committed	 by	 the	 government	 military	 forces,	 the	 abuses	
committed	outside	Acholiland	and	the	conflict’s	national	dimensions,	as	epitomised	by	
the	socio-economic	and	political	divide	between	the	north	and	the	south	of	Uganda.	
	
In	this	chapter,	Mato	Oput	has	been	examined	in	depth	to	establish	if	it	could	satisfy	the	
goals	of	ICJ.		The	examination	has	concluded	that	although	‘real’	Mato	Oput	has	features	
of	accountability,	truth-telling,	reparation	and	rehabilitation,	it	does	not	meet	other	ICJ	
goals	 because	 it	 is	 culture-specific	 and	 it	 fails	 to	 include	 abuses	 perpetrated	 by	
government	 forces.	 	 It	 has	 also	 been	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 communal	 cleansing	
ceremonies	conducted	by	traditional	leaders	in	towns	and	camps	for	returning	ex-LRA	
and	FAPs	do	not	meet	the	aims	of	ICJ	and	cannot	accurately	be	described	as	a	justice	
mechanism.	 	 Although	 referred	 to	 as	 Mato	 Oput	 and	 intended	 to	 ‘help	 facilitate	
reintegration,	 and	 stimulate	 the	 process	 towards	 reconciliation	 […]	 they	 must	 be	
considered	 as	 a	 first	 step	 only,	 and	 are	 not	 sufficient	 for	 reconciliation	 in	 the	
community’.307			
	
																																																						
307	Baines,	E.	(2005)	p69	
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In	his	2004	report,	Kofi	Annan	called	for	‘local’	solutions	to	issues	of	transitional	justice	
and	Mato	Oput’s	inclusion	in	the	AAR	establishes	it	as	part	of	the	Ugandan	strategy	of	
achieving	 justice	and	accountability	post-conflict,	which	could	potentially	 require	 the	
ICC	to	decide	whether	the	AJM	meets	the	complementarity	principle.	This	chapter	has	
argued,	however,	that	Mato	Oput	does	not	achieve	either	accountability	or	justice	for	
victims	 of	 the	 LRA	 conflict	 and	 concludes	 that,	 as	 an	 AJM	 to	 deal	 with	 ex-LRA	
combatants,	 it	 does	 not	 satisfy	 the	 aims	 of	 ICJ	 either	 in	 Acholiland	 or	 nationally.		
Accordingly,	 its	 advocates	 should	 not	 be	 successful	 in	 challenging	 the	 ICC	 under	 the	
complementarity	provisions	of	the	RSt.	
	
In	the	next	chapter,	the	South	African	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	(SATRC)	will	
be	assessed	for	its	retrospective	capacity	to	satisfy	the	aims	of	ICJ	in	order	to	consider	
the	parallels	between	the	ICC,	Mato	Oput	and	the	SATRC.	
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CHAPTER	SIX	
	
THE	TRUTH	AND	RECONCILIATION	COMMISSION	OF	SOUTH	AFRICA	AND	
INTERNATIONAL	CRIMINAL	JUSTICE	
	
	
Introduction	
	
During	the	last	quarter	of	the	20th	Century,	many	countries	transitioning	from	a	period	
of	repressive	rule	or	internal	conflict	to	democratic	governance	confronted	the	issue	of	
how	 to	 address	 their	 recent	 history	 and	 the	 human	 rights	 (HR)	 abuses	 perpetrated	
against	their	people.		It	is	commonly	argued	that	enabling	an	emerging	nation	and	its	
society	 to	move	 forward	 in	 unity,	 peace	 and	 stability	 necessitates	 the	 rebuilding	 of	
shattered	 lives,	 effective	 reconciliation	 between	 former	 enemies	 and	 some	 form	 of	
acknowledgement	of	the	suffering	caused	in	order	to	ensure	that	similar	atrocities	do	
not	occur	in	the	future.1		The	alternative	of	not	addressing	these	issues,	it	is	argued,	risks	
unresolved	 bitterness	 and	 desire	 for	 revenge	 erupting	 into	 conflict	 and	 damaging	 a	
fragile	democracy.2		In	deciding	how	to	deal	with	those	responsible	for	HR	abuses,	the	
choices	facing	the	new	government	can	vary	according	to	the	nature	of	the	transition.		
For	example,	if	the	former	regime	was	defeated,	prosecutions	may	be	viable3	but	where	
political	transition	has	resulted	from	dialogue	and	negotiation	and	the	former	regime	
retains	a	strong	presence	in	the	institutions	of	state,	the	reality	may	be	that	the	new	
democratic	government	must	be	more	circumspect	about	prosecuting	former	leaders	
and	agents	of	the	oppressive	regime.4	
	
It	was	this	latter	situation	that	faced	the	African	National	Congress	(ANC)	between	1990	
and	1993	during	its	negotiations	with	the	ruling	National	Party	(NP)	for	the	transition	
from	the	apartheid	regime	to	democracy	 in	South	Africa	(SA).	 	For	decades,	with	the	
																																																						
1	Asmal,	K.	(1992)	‘Victims,	Survivors	and	Citizens	–	Human	Rights	Reparations	and	Reconciliation’	8	SAJHR	pp491-511	
at	pp494-8	
2	Ibid	
3	As	in	the	case,	for	example,	of	the	Nuremberg	trials	after	World	War	2	
4	Brahm,	E.	(2007)	‘Uncovering	the	Truth:	Examining	Truth	Commission	Success	and	Impact’	8	International	Studies	
Perspectives	pp16-35	at	p17;	see	also	Cassese,	A.	(1998)	‘Reflections	on	International	Criminal	Justice’	61	The	Mod	LR	
pp1-10	at	p4	
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support	 of	 the	 minority	 white	 population,	 the	 NP	 had	 fought	 to	 protect	 its	 white	
supremacist	 rule	 against	 an	 increasingly	 defiant	 and	 violent	 black	 national	 liberation	
movement	within	SA.5		The	catalyst	for	the	commencement	of	talks	between	the	NP	and	
the	ANC	in	the	late	1980s	was	the	stalemate	in	which	they	each	found	themselves,	with	
neither	able	to	overcome	the	other.6		This	led	to	the	realisation	on	both	sides	that	the	
only	possibility	of	achieving	lasting	peace	was	through	a	negotiated	settlement.7				
	
The	 ANC,	 as	 the	 largest	 party	 within	 the	 SA	 national	 liberation	 movement,	 led	
negotiations	with	 the	NP	during	which	 long	process	both	sides	were	 forced	to	adapt	
their	 demands,	 particularly	 over	 the	 question	 of	 amnesty.8	 	 From	 the	 outset	 of	
negotiations,	 the	NP9	had	argued	strenuously	 that	 to	achieve	reconciliation,	 the	past	
should	 be	 forgotten	 and	 a	 blanket	 amnesty	 given	 to	 all	 leaders	 and	 agents	 of	 the	
apartheid	regime.10	This	was	unacceptable	to	the	ANC	which	insisted	that	accountability	
was	a	‘pre-requisite	for	a	human	rights	culture’	to	be	nurtured	in	the	new	SA,	not	only	
‘for	the	sake	of	 justice,	for	stability	and	the	restoration	of	dignity	to	victims’	but	as	a	
‘deterrent	to	those	who	might	be	tempted	in	the	future	to	engage	in	gross	human	rights	
violations.’11	 On	 18th	 November	 1992,	 however,	 the	 ANC	 leadership	 pragmatically	
adopted	 a	 discussion	 document	 entitled	 ‘Strategic	 Perspectives’,12	 which	 not	 only	
committed	an	elected	government	to	a	power-sharing	arrangement	with	the	NP	for	five	
years	and	protected	the	posts	of	white	civil	servants	but	also	recognised	the	desirability	
of	a	general	amnesty	from	prosecution	for	politicians,	civil	servants	and	security	forces	
																																																						
5	Theissen,	G.	(1999)	Common	Past,	Divided	Truth:	The	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	in	South	African	Public	
Opinion	(Paper	presented	at	the	Workshop	on	‘Legal	Institutions	and	Collective	Memories’	at	the	International	
Institute	for	the	Sociology	of	Law,	Oñati,	Spain,	22-24	September)	pp21-28	
6	Wilson,	R.A.	(2001a)	The	Politics	of	Truth	and	Reconciliation	in	South	Africa:	Legitimizing	the	Post-Apartheid	State	
(Cambridge:	CUP)	p5	
7	Bundy,	C.	(2001)	‘The	Beast	of	the	Past:	History	and	the	TRC’	in	James,	W.	and	Van	de	Vijver,	L.	(eds.)	After	the	
TRC:	Reflections	on	Truth	and	Reconciliation	in	South	Africa	(Athens:	Ohio	UP)	p11;	see	also	F.W.	de	Klerk’s	speech	
at	the	opening	of	Parliament,	2	February	1990	[Online]	Available:	
https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02104/06lv02105.htm	
[Accessed	09.11.16]	
8	Bundy,	C.	(2001)	p11	
9	Supported	by	the	Inkatha	Freedom	Party	(IFP)	led	by	Chief	Buthelezi	
10	Nyatsumba,	K.		(2001)	‘Neither	Dull	nor	Tiresome’	in	James,	W.	and	Van	de	Vijver,	L.	(eds.)	p88	
11	Boraine,	A.	(2000a)	A	Country	Unmasked	(Oxford:	OUP)	p7	
12	See	‘Negotiations:	The	strategic	debate’		African	Communist	Journal	Extracts	–	No	131	–	Fourth	Quarter	1992	
[Online]	Available:	
https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03005/06lv03006/07lv0304
1/08lv03043.htm	[Accessed	09.11.16]	
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members	‘because	such	individuals	have	the	power	to	obstruct	the	transition’	(emphasis	
added).13		
	
Nonetheless,	the	amnesty	issue	proved	extremely	difficult	to	resolve	until	the	ANC	and	
the	NP	agreed	a	limited	amnesty	which	Simpson	describes	as	‘a	last	minute	compromise	
struck	so	 late	 in	the	negotiation	process	that	 it	had	to	be	 included	 in	a	“post-amble”	
tacked	on	to	the	end	of	the	Constitution	–	almost	as	an	after-thought’.14	Indeed,	Boraine	
talks	of	the	extraordinary	difficulty	the	negotiating	parties	had	in	agreeing	the	wording	
of	 the	 amnesty	 provision	 and	 of	 the	 time	 constraints	 which	 precluded	 having	 the	
postamble	drafted	in	technical,	legal	language.	15	It	is	difficult	to	see	the	commitment	to	
the	amnesty	(limited	or	otherwise)	as	‘an	after-thought’,	however,	especially	given	the	
initial	polar	positions	of	the	negotiating	parties	and	the	importance	of	the	issue	to	SA’s	
smooth	transition	to	democracy.			
	
Mamdani	argues	that	the	negotiated	settlement	‘began	with	an	attempt	to	articulate	a	
notion	of	 justice	within	the	broader	framework	of	 ‘reconciliation’’	but	ultimately	 ‘de-
emphasised	 justice	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 reconciliation	 and	 realism,	 both	 local	 and	
international.’16		While	this	may	be	true,	the	SA	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	
(SATRC)	 reflected	a	compromise	which	attempted	 to	balance	demands	 for	 truth	and	
justice	with	the	existing	amnesty	commitment.		It	has	been	suggested,	therefore,	that	
the	SATRC	‘was	not	merely	a	legal	by-product	of	the	political	settlement,	but	in	a	more	
fundamental	sense	a	crucial	element	of	the	settlement.’17			
	
The	question	 to	be	considered	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	whether,	 if	 a	 similar	 situation	arose	
today,	a	Truth	Commission	(TC)	could	be	adjudged	a	viable	alternative	to	formal	trials	
																																																						
13	Berat,	L.	(1995)	‘Negotiating	Change?’	in	Roht-Arriaza,	N.	(ed)	Impunity	and	Human	Rights	in	International	Law	and	
Practice	(Oxford:	OUP)	p273-4	
14	Simpson,	G.	(1998)	 ‘A	Brief	Evaluation	of	South	Africa’s	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission:	Some	lessons	for	
societies	 in	 transition’.	 	 The	 Centre	 for	 the	 Study	 of	 Violence	 and	 Reconciliation	 [Online]	 Available:	
http://www.csvr.org.za/index.php/publications/1724-a-brief-evaluation-of-south-africas-truth-and-reconciliation-
commission-some-lessons-for-societies-in-transition.html	 [Accessed	 09.11.16]	 (For	 the	wording	 of	 the	 postamble,	
see	Appendix	Two)	
15	Boraine,	A.	(2000a)	p39	
16	Mamdani,	M.	(1996a)	‘Reconciliation	Without	Justice’	46	Southern	African	Review	of	Books	[Online]	Available:	
http://web.archive.org/web/20010715032454/http://www.uni-ulm.de/~rturrell/antho3html/Mamdani.html	
[Accessed	09.01.17]	(unnumbered	pages)	
17	Bundy,	C.	(2001)	p10		
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for	those	guilty	of	the	crimes	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	
(ICC),	 thus	making	 the	 cases	 inadmissible	 to	 the	Court.	 	Despite	 17	 TCs	having	been	
established	globally	between	1974	and	1998,18	the	 impact	of	the	 ICC	on	TCs	was	not	
given	much	consideration,	either	during	the	statute	drafting	negotiations	or	at	the	Rome	
Conference.		Although	there	was	considerable	debate	at	the	Rome	Conference	on	TCs	
and	 national	 amnesties,19	 the	 difficulties	 surrounding	 the	 issue	 of	 alternative	 justice	
mechanisms	 (AJMs)	 generally,	 were	 resolved	 by	 the	 adoption	 of	 provisions	 that	
reflected	‘creative	ambiguity’20	and	TCs	are	nowhere	mentioned	in	the	Rome	Statute	
(RSt).		Since	1998,	a	further	23	TCs	have	been	established,21	during	which	time	the	issue	
of	 whether	 they	 are	 an	 acceptable	 alternative	 to	 trials	 as	 a	 means	 of	 dealing	 with	
international	crimes,	has	been	strenuously	debated.22	The	two	systems	are,	of	course,	
distinct	 in	 that	 TCs	 emphasise	 restorative	 (truth-seeking)	 justice	with	 the	 procedure	
focusing	 on	 victims	 whereas	 trials	 emphasise	 retributive	 (criminal)	 justice,	 with	 the	
defendant	and	the	trial’s	rules	of	procedure	and	evidence	being	the	focus.			
	
The	 ICC	 has	 not	 yet	 investigated	 a	 situation	 where	 a	 TC	 has	 been	 adopted	 as	 the	
nationally-preferred	 justice	 mechanism23	 but	 given	 the	 evident	 popularity	 of	 TCs	 in	
transitional	 societies,	 it	 is	 foreseeable	 that	 the	Court	will	 be	 forced	 to	adjudicate	on	
whether	a	TC	satisfies	its	inadmissibility	criteria.		An	indication	of	the	Prosecutor’s	view	
appeared	 in	 a	 2007	 Policy	 Paper,	 which	 endorsed	 the	 role	 of	 truth-seeking	 not	 as	
alternative	but	complementary	to	prosecutions	at	the	ICC,	in	the	‘pursuit	of	a	broader	
justice.’24	There	has	not,	therefore,	been	a	focussed	discussion	on	whether	a	specific	TC	
could	successfully	challenge	the	admissibility	of	a	case	before	the	ICC	on	the	grounds	
that	the	TC	satisfies	the	same	goals	in	the	pursuit	of	international	criminal	justice	(ICJ)	
that	are	required	of	trials	at	the	ICC.			
																																																						
18	Hayner,	P.B.	(2011)	Unspeakable	Truths.	Transitional	Justice	and	the	Challenge	of	Truth	Commissions	(Abingdon,	
Routledge)	pxi	
19	See	pp48-49	ante	
20	Scharf,	M.P.	(1999)	‘The	Amnesty	Exception	to	the	Jurisdiction	of	the	International	Criminal	Court’	32	Cornell	ILJ	
pp507-527	at	p522	
21	Hayner,	P.B.	(2011)	ppxi-xii	
22	 See,	 for	example,	Robinson,	D.	 (2003)	 ‘Serving	 the	 Interests	of	 Justice:	Amnesties,	 Truth	Commissions	and	 the	
International	Criminal	Court’	14	EJIL	pp481-505;	Villa-Vicencio,	C.	(2000b)	‘Why	Perpetrators	should	not	always	be	
prosecuted:	Where	the	International	Criminal	Court	and	Truth	Commissions	Meet’	49	Emory	Law	Journal	pp202-222		
23	Although	internationalised	trials	have	operated	alongside	TCs	in,	e.g.	Sierra	Leone,	Kenya	and	East	Timor	
24	Policy	Paper	on	the	Interests	of	Justice,	ICC-OTP-2007,	September	2007	p8	
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To	this	end,	this	chapter	will	examine	the	SATRC	(or	TRC)	because	internationally	it	is	
held	up	as	one	of	the	most	successful	 in	terms	of	 its	size	and	reach	and	because	it	 is	
credited	with	facilitating	a	peaceful	transition	from	an	abusive	regime	to	a	democracy.		
Assessment	of	 the	SATRC	and	highlighting	 its	 strengths	and	weaknesses	 from	the	 ICJ	
viewpoint	will	 also	 facilitate	 the	 formation	of	 a	 framework	 for	 future	TCs	wishing	 to	
challenge	admissibility	at	 the	 ICC.	 	Notwithstanding	 such	a	 framework,	however,	 the	
jurisprudence	 of	 the	 ICC	 in	 admissibility	 challenges	made	 to	 date25	 reveals	 that	 the	
provisions	relating	to	complementarity	are	interpreted	very	narrowly	by	the	Judges	and	
that,	as	it	currently	stands,	even	a	well-constituted	TC	would	be	unlikely	to	persuade	the	
Court	 to	 defer	 in	 its	 favour.	 	 For	 a	 TC	 to	make	 a	 situation	 inadmissible	 to	 the	 ICC,	
therefore,	would	require	the	Judges	to	apply	the	ICJ	framework	formulated	herein	and	
then	to	adopt	a	more	flexible	interpretation	of	the	provisions	of	Article	17	of	the	RSt.		
Given	the	growing	interest	in	the	holistic,	contextual	nature	of	transitional	justice,	if	such	
flexibility	is	not	demonstrated	by	the	ICC,	the	only	alternative	would	be	for	the	Assembly	
of	State	Parties	to	amend	the	RSt	to	allow	for	AJMs	that	satisfy	the	aims	of	ICJ	to	trump	
trials	at	the	ICC.		
	
In	the	first	section	of	this	chapter,	the	status	of	apartheid	in	international	criminal	law	
(ICL)	will	be	examined	to	establish	whether	there	is	a	duty	to	prosecute	or	whether	an	
AJM	such	as	a	TC	 is	viable.	 	 In	 the	second	section,	 the	emergence	 in	 ICL	of	 the	 legal	
concept	 of	 the	 ‘right	 to	 truth’	 will	 be	 discussed.	 	 The	 right	 to	 truth	 is	 a	 precept	
fundamental	to	the	creation	of	a	TC,	frequently	cited	by	advocates	of	TCs	to	support	
their	 pressure	 on	 governments	 to	 establish	 an	 effective	 TC.	 	 Section	 three,	 to	
contextualise	 SA’s	 decision	 to	 eschew	 trials	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 TRC,	 briefly	 outlines	 SA’s	
history	of	repression	and	resistance	under	the	apartheid	regime	and	the	negotiations	
that	brought	about	its	demise.		The	fourth	and	fifth	sections	discuss	the	establishment,	
structure	 and	 processes	 of	 the	 SATRC,	 highlighting	 the	 nationwide	 discussion	 and	
participation	these	involved.		In	the	sixth	section,	the	SATRC	will	be	assessed	against	the	
aims	of	 ICJ	 identified	 in	Chapter	Three	to	ascertain	whether	a	TRC	can	achieve	those	
																																																						
25	For	a	full	discussion,	please	see	Chapter	Seven	
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aims.		If	it	is	demonstrated	that	the	SATRC	does	satisfy	ICJ	goals,	it	will	be	argued	that	
the	ICC	should	defer	to	a	state	wishing	to	deal	with	perpetrators	of	international	crimes	
by	way	of	a	TRC	based	on	the	SATRC	model	and	declare	the	case	inadmissible.	
	
Section	One:	The	Status	of	Apartheid	in	International	Law	
	
Although	the	Act	establishing	the	SATRC	did	not	 include	the	crime	of	apartheid	 in	 its	
mandate,	before	beginning	the	discussion	on	the	SATRC,	the	‘status’	of	apartheid	in	ICL	
and	whether	there	was	a	duty	to	prosecute	leaders	and	agents	of	an	apartheid	regime	
will	be	established.		‘Apartheid’	is	an	Afrikaans	word	meaning	‘separation’	and	apartheid	
was	enforced	 in	SA	by	 the	governing	NP	 from	1948,	when	the	party	narrowly	won	a	
Parliamentary	majority,	until	it	was	abandoned	in	1990.		Under	the	apartheid	system,	
the	rights	of	the	black	majority	were	curtailed	and	the	rule	of	the	white	minority	was	
maintained	 with	 successive	 governments	 enacting	 national	 laws	 to	 legitimise	 their	
repressive	policies.		In	1948,	the	year	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR)	
was	adopted	by	the	UN,	the	NP	was	just	beginning	its	policy	of	legal	racial	discrimination,	
segregation	 and	 political	 repression	which	 violated	 almost	 every	 right	 upheld	 in	 the	
UDHR.		
	
Between	1952	and	1990,	the	UN	General	Assembly	(UNGA)	annually	condemned	SA’s	
apartheid	 regime	and	after	1960,	 the	UN	Security	Council	 (UNSC)	 regularly	added	 its	
own	condemnation.		In	1965,	international	condemnation	of	apartheid	resulted	in	the	
International	 Convention	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 All	 Forms	 of	 Racial	 Discrimination26	
which	 committed	 its	 signatories	 to	 eliminating	 racial	 discrimination	 and	 promoting	
understanding	 between	 all	 races.27	 	 In	 1966,	 the	 UNGA	 declared	 apartheid	 a	 crime	
against	humanity	(CAH)28	and	despite	some	opposition	which	argued	that	it	was	already	
covered	by	the	1965	Convention,	on	30th	November	1973,	adopted	the	 International	
																																																						
26	GA	Res	2106	(XX)	21	December	1965	In	force	4	January	1969	
27	Ibid	Article	2	
28	GA	Res	2202	A	(XXI)	16	December	1966	
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Convention	on	the	Suppression	and	Punishment	of	the	Crime	of	Apartheid.29		In	1984,	
the	UNSC	endorsed	the	UNGA’s	determination.30				
	
The	Apartheid	Convention	declared	apartheid	unlawful	because	it	violated	Articles	55	
and	56	of	 the	UN	Charter;	 it	 criminalised	 the	system.31	As	Article	V	of	 the	Apartheid	
Convention	provided	that	a	person	charged	may	be	tried	‘by	a	competent	tribunal	of	
any	 State	 Party	 […]	 or	 by	 an	 international	 penal	 tribunal’,	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 special	
international	court	to	try	individuals	for	the	crime	of	apartheid	was	considered	in	1980.32		
However,	it	was	decided	that	as	individual	states	could	enact	legislation	permitting	them	
to	 prosecute	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 universal	 jurisdiction	 if	 the	 accused	 was	 within	 their	
jurisdiction,	 such	 a	 court	was	 unnecessary.33	 In	 1998,	 the	 RSt	 included	 the	 crime	 of	
apartheid	as	a	CAH	within	its	jurisdiction.				
	
In	 fact,	no-one	has	ever	been	prosecuted	 for	 the	 crime	of	apartheid,	either	 in	 SA	or	
elsewhere.34	Apartheid	was	ended	in	SA	by	negotiations	between	the	government	and	
liberation	parties	and	 the	agreement	provided	 for	 the	establishment	of	a	TRC	 rather	
than	prosecutions.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	Five,	no	treaty	expressly	imposes	a	duty	to	
prosecute	CAH	and	there	is	substantial	debate	on	their	status	with	regard	to	customary	
international	law	so	the	existence	of	a	duty	to	prosecute	the	crime	of	apartheid	as	a	CAH	
is	questionable.35		Certainly,	the	UN	did	not	‘suggest	or	even	consider	the	establishment	
of	an	ad	hoc	tribunal’	to	try	the	leaders	and	agents	of	the	apartheid	regime,	despite	the	
many	CAH	committed	during	the	nation’s	struggle.36	Accordingly,	SA	was	able	to	decide	
for	itself	how	to	proceed	and	after	wide	consultation,	opted	for	a	TRC	with	conditional	
amnesties.		At	the	time,	this	decision	was	lauded	by	the	international	community	and	in	
a	 similar	 situation	 today,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 the	 state	would	 be	 under	 no	 ICL	 duty	 to	
																																																						
29	Annexed	to	GA	Res	3668	(XXVIII)	In	force	18	July	1976			
30	Res	556	(1984)	23	October	1984	
31	Article	1	declares	apartheid	a	CAH	and	‘inhuman	acts	resulting	from	the	policies	and	practices	of	apartheid	and	
similar	policies	and	practices	of	racial	segregation	and	discrimination’	are	international	crimes	
32	E/CN.4/1426	(1981)	
33	Articles	4	and	5	
34	Post-apartheid	SA	has	not	ratified	the	Apartheid	Convention.			
35	See	p158	ante	
36	Dugard,	J.	(1998)	‘Reconciliation	and	Justice:	The	South	African	Experience’	8	Transnational	Law	and	Contemporary	
Problems	pp277-311	at	p278	
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prosecute	apartheid	or	other	CAH,	leaving	it	free	in	theory	to	deal	with	these	crimes	by	
way	of	a	TC.		
	
Section	Two:	The	Right	to	Truth	
	
The	primary	aim	of	a	TC	is	to	establish	an	accurate	record	of	a	county’s	history,	clarify	
uncertain	events	and	to	expunge	silence	and	denial	from	its	painful	past.37		While	some	
argue	forgetting	is	best,	for	others,	only	learning	about	what	happened	and	why,	can	
facilitate	recovery.38		This	need	for	information	has	been	acknowledged	as	‘the	right	to	
truth’,	a	term	which	originates	from	the	efforts	of	families	of	the	‘disappeared’	in	Latin	
America	to	compel	their	governments	to	disclose	information	about	their	relatives.39	
	
The	right	to	truth	is	linked	to	the	ICJ	aim	of	securing	justice	and	dignity	for	victims	and	
has	 gained	 prominence	 as	 a	 legal	 concept	 in	 international	 law	 over	 the	 last	 three	
decades,	 alongside	 the	development	of	 transitional	 justice.	Closely	 connected	 to	 the	
ascendancy	of	the	international	HR	movement,	the	1980s	onwards	‘witnessed	renewed	
global	enthusiasm	for,	and	confidence	in,	the	idea	of	truth	as	the	basis	of	justice	and	
stability.’40	 It	 is	 discussed	 as	 a	 separate	 section	within	 this	 chapter	 to	 illustrate	 that	
investigating	and	making	public	the	truth	about	past	violations	has	been	established	as	
a	general	state	obligation	by	international	courts	and	re-affirmed	in	UN	policy	papers	
and	 resolutions	 and	 various	 inter-governmental	 institutions.41	 	 It	 demonstrates,	
furthermore,	that	TCs	are	ideally	placed	to	achieve	the	ICJ	aim	of	securing	justice	and	
dignity	for	victims.	
	
At	 regional	 level,	 the	 Inter-American	Commission	 on	HR	 (IACommHR)	 and	 the	 Inter-
American	Court	of	HR	(IACtHR)	pioneered	the	development	of	jurisprudence	on	the	right	
to	truth	of	the	victim,	their	next-of-kin	and	indeed,	society	as	a	whole.42		In	1986,	the	
																																																						
37	Hayner,	P.	(2011)	p20	
38	Ibid	p2	
39	Groome,	D.		(2011)	‘The	Right	to	Truth	in	the	Fight	against	Impunity’	29	Berkeley	JIL	pp175-199	at	p177	
40	Posel,	D.	(2008)	‘History	as	Confession:	The	Case	of	the	South	African	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission’	20	
Public	Culture	pp119-141at	p125	
41	Hayner,	P.	(2011)	p23	
42	de	Greiff,	P.	(2013)	Report	of	the	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	promotion	of	truth,	justice,	reparation	and	guarantees	
of	non-recurrence,	A/HRC/24/42,	28	August	para.	19	
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Commission	declared	‘every	society	has	the	inalienable	right	to	know	the	truth	about	
past	events,	as	well	as	the	motives	and	circumstances	in	which	aberrant	crimes	came	to	
be	committed	in	order	to	prevent	repetition	of	such	acts	in	the	future.’43	In	1988,	the	
IACtHR	 confirmed	 a	 state	 has	 a	 duty	 to	 investigate	 the	 fate	 of	 the	 disappeared	 and	
disclose	the	information	to	relatives.44		Later,	in	a	2003	case,	the	IACtHR	imposed	a	more	
positive	obligation	on	the	state,	finding	that	‘the	next	of	kin	of	the	victims	and	society	
as	a	whole	must	be	informed	of	everything	that	has	happened	in	connection	with	the	
said	violations’.45			
	
An	early	example	of	the	right	to	truth	appearing	in	an	international	convention	is	the	
1977	First	Additional	Protocol	to	the	Geneva	Conventions	which,	‘prompted	mainly	by	
the	 right	 of	 the	 families	 to	 know	 the	 fate	 of	 their	 relatives’,	 detailed	 a	 state	 party’s	
obligations	 concerning	missing	 and	 dead	 persons.46	 In	 1991,	 the	UN	Commission	 on	
Human	Rights	(UNCHR)	Sub-Commission	on	Prevention	of	Discrimination	and	Protection	
of	Minorities	requested	its	Special	Rapporteur,	Louis	Joinet,	to	undertake	a	study	on	the	
impunity	of	perpetrators	of	HR	violations.		In	his	final	report,	Joinet	formulated	a	set	of	
50	principles,47	updated	by	Diane	Orentlicher	 in	2005	at	the	UNCHR’s	request,	which	
were	 ‘intended	 as	 guidelines	 to	 assist	 states	 in	 developing	 effective	 measures	 for	
combating	impunity.’48		Joinet’s	principles	covered	the	victims’	right	to	know,	right	to	
justice	and	 right	 to	 reparations	and	established	 state	 responsibility	 and	 the	 inherent	
right	of	redress	for	individual	victims	of	grave	HR	violations.	The	principles	also	identified	
‘mechanisms,	 modalities,	 and	 procedures	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 existing,	 legal	
obligations	under	international	humanitarian	law	and	international	HR	law.’49		
	
																																																						
43	IACommHR	Annual	Report,	1985-86,	AS	Doc.	No.	OEA/Ser.L/V/II.68,	Doc.8	rev.	1	(26	September	1986)	p193	
44	Velásquez	Rodríguez	vs	Honduras,	IACtHR,	(Ser.	C)	No.	4,	29	July	1988		
45	Myrna	Mack	Chang	v	Guatamala,	IACtHR,	(Ser.	C)	No.101,	25	November	2003	(Merits,	Reparations	and	Costs)	p128,	
para.274	(emphasis	added)	
46	Protocols	Additional	to	the	Geneva	Conventions	of	12	August	1949,	and	Relating	to	the	Protection	of	Victims	of	
International	Armed	Conflicts	(Protocol	I)	of	8	June	1977,	Articles	32-34	
47	Joinet,	L.	 (1997)	The	Administration	of	Justice	and	the	Human	Rights	of	Detainees:	Question	of	the	Impunity	of	
Perpetrators	of	Human	Rights	Violations	(Civil	and	Political)	E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1	2	October	p5	
48	 Orentlicher,	 D.	 (2005)	 Report	 of	 the	 independent	 expert	 to	 update	 the	 Set	 of	 principles	 to	 combat	 impunity,	
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1,	8	February	p5				
49	Sisson,	J.	(2010)	‘A	Conceptual	Framework	for	Dealing	with	the	Past’	3	Politorbis	Nr.	50:	Dealing	with	the	Past	pp11-
16		
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For	 Joinet,	 this	 right	applied	not	only	 to	 individual	victims	and	their	 families	but	also	
collectively,	‘drawing	on	history	to	prevent	violations	from	recurring	in	the	future’.50		He	
argued	the	corollary	of	this	right	was	the	state’s	duty	to	remember:	
	
to	 guard	 against	 the	 perversions	 of	 history	 that	 go	 under	 the	 names	 of	
revisionism	or	 negationism;	 the	 knowledge	of	 the	oppression	 it	 has	 lived	
through	 is	 part	 of	 a	 people’s	 national	 heritage	 and	 as	 such	 must	 be	
preserved.		These,	then,	are	the	main	objectives	of	the	right	to	know	as	a	
collective	right.51			
	
Orentlicher	 affirmed	 Joinet’s	 ‘right	 to	 know	 the	 truth’52	which	 ‘imprescriptible	 right’	
applied	 irrespective	 of	 any	 legal	 proceedings53	 and	 obliged	 states	 to	 ‘ensure	 the	
preservation	 of,	 and	 access	 to,	 archives	 concerning	 violations	 of	 human	 rights	 and	
humanitarian	 law.’54	 The	 UNCHR	 then	 adopted	 a	 resolution55	 recognising	 ‘the	
importance	 of	 respecting	 and	 ensuring	 the	 right	 to	 the	 truth	 so	 as	 to	 contribute	 to	
ending	impunity	and	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights’.56	The	resolution	requested	
the	Office	of	 the	High	Commissioner	 for	Human	Rights	 (OHCHR)	 to	prepare	a	 report	
‘including	information	on	the	basis,	scope	and	content	of	the	right	under	international	
law’.		The	2006	report	stated	the	right	to	truth	was	‘recognized	in	several	international	
treaties	and	instruments	as	well	as	by	national,	regional	and	international	jurisprudence	
and	numerous	 resolutions	of	 intergovernmental	bodies	at	 the	universal	and	 regional	
levels.’57	
	
Since	 the	 1990s,	 therefore,	 the	 UN	 HR	 policy	 body58	 has	 passed	 several	 resolutions	
reiterating	the	right	to	truth	and	all	the	reports,	resolutions	and	jurisprudence	indicate	
that	the	right	to	truth	has	become	a	generally	accepted	legal	concept.		Whilst	there	are	
many	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 state	 could	 meet	 its	 obligations	 to	 provide	 access	 to	
																																																						
50	Joinet,	L.	(1997)	para.17	
51	Ibid		
52	Orentlicher,	D.	(2005)	Principle	2	
53	Ibid	Principle	4	
54	Ibid	Principle	5	
55	Right	to	the	truth,	Human	Rights	Resolution,	E/CN.4/RES/2005/66,	20	April	
56	Ibid	para.	1			
57	Study	on	the	right	to	the	truth:	Report	of	the	Office	of	the	UN	HCHR,	UN	Doc.	E/CN.4/2006/91,	8	February	2006,	
para.	55	
58	In	2006	the	UNCHR	was	replaced	by	the	UN	Human	Rights	Council	
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information,59	for	those	wishing	to	persuade	their	government	to	establish	an	effective	
TC,	it	is	this	right	and	obligation	that	is	most	often	cited.60		
	
In	the	next	section,	to	contextualise	the	emergence	of	the	TRC	as	the	preferred	means	
of	 accountability,	 the	 background	 and	 history	 of	 the	 apartheid	 system	 in	 SA	will	 be	
considered	 to	 discover	 how	 and	why	HR	 became	 a	 dominant	 feature	 of	 the	 nation-
building	project	during	the	peace	talks	between	1985	and	1994.		
	
Section	Three:		Background	and	History	of	Apartheid	in	South	Africa	
	
Colonial	rule	 in	SA,	 in	common	with	much	of	the	rest	of	Africa,	 involved	segregation,	
racial	 discrimination	 and	 repression	 in	 the	 form	 of	 dispossession,	 denial	 and	
subordination.	 	 Thus,	 by	 1948	when	 the	 Afrikaner	 NP	 led	 by	 Daniel	Malan	won	 the	
whites-only	 general	 election	 and	 introduced	 apartheid,	 racism	 and	 oppression	were	
already	firmly	established	across	SA’s	societal,	political	and	legal	landscapes,	including	
housing,	jobs,	education	and	welfare.61	
	
In	the	1950s,	the	ANC62	organised	marches,	meetings,	boycotts	and	strikes	to	protest	at	
the	 increasingly	harsh	treatment	of	 the	blacks.63	However,	 the	government	 ‘violently	
crushed	 [all]	 peaceful	 methods	 of	 struggle’	 leading	 to	 the	 realisation	 among	 ANC	
leadership	that	non-violent	resistance	to	apartheid	would	not	succeed.64	In	December	
1961,	the	ANC’s	military	wing,	Umkhonto	we	Sizwe	(‘the	Spear	of	the	Nation’	also	‘MK’)	
was	formed	to	organise	and	co-ordinate	an	armed	struggle.65	 	The	NP	reacted	to	the	
unrest	in	the	early	1960s	by	enacting	increasingly	oppressive	legislation,	banning	leading	
anti-apartheid	movements,	 imprisoning	their	 leaders	and	granting	the	police	and	the	
military	comprehensive	powers	to	arrest	and	detain	without	trial.66	
																																																						
59	 Hayner,	 P.	 (2011)	 suggesting,	 for	 example,	 de-classification	 of	 state	 documents,	 exhumations	 of	mass	 graves,	
parliamentary	enquiries	p24	
60	Ibid		
61	Bundy,	C.	(2001)	p17	
62	Founded	in	1912	
63	Mandela,	N.	(1996)	Long	Walk	to	Freedom	(Abridged	Edition)	(London:	Little,	Brown	and	Co.	Ltd.)	p27	
64	Ibid	p54	
65	Ibid	p56	
66	Berat,	L.	(1995)	p267	
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The	government’s	repressive	legislation	in	the	mid-1960s	effected	a	decade	of	outward	
relative	calm	in	the	resistance	movement	which	ended	on	the	morning	of	16th	June	1976	
when,	 without	 warning,	 police	 shot	 at	 unarmed	 Soweto	 schoolchildren	 who	 were	
peacefully	protesting	against	the	imposition	of	lessons	being	taught	in	Afrikaans.67		After	
the	Soweto	Uprising,	the	need	for	a	united	opposition	to	apartheid	began	to	be	realised	
and	in	1983,	the	United	Democratic	Front	(UDF),	a	broad-based	umbrella	organisation,	
was	formed.68		It	incorporated	over	600	anti-apartheid	groups	and	had	strong	links	to	
the	ANC.69		Initially,	conceived	as	a	peaceful	movement	for	change,	in	the	mid-1980s,	
some	organisations	within	the	UDF	became	more	militant	and	anti-government	protests	
‘succeeded	 in	 ‘making	 the	 townships	 ungovernable’	 through	 rent	 boycotts,	 school	
boycotts,	 demonstrations,	 strikes	 and	 other	 means.’70	 	 The	 perceived	 threat	 to	 the	
government	of	then-President	P.W.	Botha,	became	so	severe	that	a	nationwide	state	of	
emergency	was	declared	on	12th	June	1986	and	the	security	forces	were	elevated	to	a	
new	 level	 of	 authority	 within	 the	 government.71	 	 Crimes	 committed	 by	 police	 and	
military	hit	squads,	allegedly	with	the	knowledge	of	the	leaders	of	the	apartheid	regime,	
included	 ‘a	 campaign	 of	 assassinations,	 bombings	 and	 torture’	 of	 those	 who	 were	
believed	to	be	the	regime’s	opponents.72	
	
Thus,	by	the	mid-1980s,	there	was	a	general	state	of	emergency	in	SA,	thousands	were	
in	prison,	detained	without	trial	(including	children	as	young	as	eight	years73)	and	almost	
every	opposition	party	was	banned.74		Although	SA	was	not	a	military	dictatorship,	the	
military	had	been	given	extreme	powers	to	keep	the	black	population	under	control	and	
troops	were	everywhere	on	the	streets	of	the	black	townships.75		President	P.W.	Botha	
																																																						
67	Estimates	for	the	number	killed	range	from	176	to	700	with	hundreds	more	injured	during	the	ensuing	chaos		
68	Berat,	L.	(1995)	p267	
69	Mandela,	N.	(1996)	p117	
70	Wilson,	R.	A.	(2001b)	‘Justice	and	Legitimacy	in	the	South	African	Transition’	in	Barahona	de	Brito,	A.,	González-
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74	Boraine,	A.	(2000a)	p24	
75	Berat,	L.	(1995)	p267	
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was	virtually	running	the	country	‘from	the	white	citadel	of	Pretoria’	with	the	support	
of	the	SA	Defence	Force	(SADF).76	
	
By	the	end	of	the	1980s,	the	armed	conflict	between	the	apartheid	regime	and	the	anti-
apartheid	movement	 had	 reached	 stalemate	 or	what	 Gump	 describes	 as	 ‘a	 state	 of	
violent	equilibrium’.77		Neither	could	overcome	the	other:		the	state	could	not	govern	
without	maintaining	a	state	of	emergency	and	the	black	majority	could	not	overthrow	
the	state	by	violence.78	 	ANC	 leaders	realised	that	even	 if	 they	won	the	battle,	 there	
would	be	little	left	of	the	country’s	infra-structure	to	carry	forward	to	a	new	multi-racial	
society.79	Meanwhile,	the	collapse	of	the	Berlin	Wall	and	the	breakdown	of	communist	
regimes	in	Eastern	Europe,	resulted	in	the	NP	softening	its	rigid	anti-communist	stance,	
which	for	so	long	had	been	its	justification	for	the	repression	of	the	blacks.	
	
Tentative	talks	between	the	NP	and	the	black	leadership	began	in	1985	and	gathered	
pace	until	on	2nd	February	1990,	President	F.W.	De	Klerk	announced	in	Parliament	that	
the	ANC,	 the	Pan-African	Congress	 (PAC),	 the	SA	Communist	Party	and	other	groups	
were	 unbanned	 and	 political	 prisoners	 (including	 Nelson	 Mandela)	 were	 to	 be	
released.80	 In	 June	 1990,	 De	 Klerk	 announced	 the	 lifting	 of	 the	 four-year	 state	 of	
emergency	and	 the	ANC	 responded	by	abandoning	 the	armed	struggle.81	 	De	Klerk’s	
announcements	were	greeted	with	great	resentment	by	the	Security	Forces	who	felt	
betrayed	by	the	NP	whose	repressive	policies	 they	had	enforced,	putting	themselves	
now	in	danger	of	being	prosecuted	for	the	gross	violations	of	HR	they	had	committed	in	
the	name	of	the	state.82		
	
Initial	euphoria	following	the	release	of	Mandela83	soon	gave	way	to	frustration	as	it	was	
realised	that	blacks	still	had	no	vote,	the	NP	remained	firmly	in	political	control	and	the	
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Vijver,	L.	(eds)	p67	
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legislation	that	upheld	the	policy	of	apartheid	remained	in	force.84		By	the	end	of	1990,	
SA	was	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 collapse,	 plunged	 into	 internecine	 violence	within	 the	 black	
community,85	allegedly	with	the	assistance	of	complicit	security	forces,	that	threatened	
to	destroy	the	country.86		Despite	the	violence	that	sometimes	derailed	the	‘talks	about	
talks’	during	1990	and	1991,87	progress	was	made	and	in	September,	a	National	Peace	
Accord	 was	 signed	 by	 the	 government,	 ANC	 and	 IFP.	 	 On	 20th	 December	 1991,	 a	
negotiating	 forum	 comprising	 delegations	 from	 18	 political	 organisations	 (the	
Convention	 for	 a	 Democratic	 SA	 (CODESA))	 assembled	 at	 the	 World	 Trade	 Centre	
outside	 Johannesburg	 to	begin	 ‘real’	 talks88	which	 the	NP	 intended	would	produce	a	
settlement	 favourable	 to	 its	 interests.89	 Wilson	 suggests	 that	 initially,	 the	 NP	
government:	
	
wanted	to	tinker	with	apartheid,	to	create	a	system	of	power-sharing	that	
would	 entrench	 white	 ‘minority’	 rights,	 ensure	 an	 NP	 veto	 on	 the	
introduction	of	 key	 legislation,	 and	 thereby	 allow	whites	 to	 cling	 to	 their	
historical	 political	 privileges.	 	 Their	 strategy	 was	 to	 use	 negotiations	 to	
destablilise	 the	 ANC	 politically	 and	 undermine	 its	 bargaining	 position	
through	violence.90	
	
After	months	of	heated	debate,	a	format	for	the	new	constitution	was	agreed	by	the	
groups	who	attended	the	CODESA	talks	and	it	then	only	required	ratification	by	the	NP-
led	SA	Parliament.91		Interestingly,	the	Interim	Constitution	which	was	to	remain	in	force	
until	a	new	parliament,	to	be	elected	in	April	1994,	could	draft	a	new	one,	provided	for	
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minority	rule.’		
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majority	rule	and	protection	for	minority	rights	but	made	no	provision	for	amnesty.92		
During	all	 the	months	of	negotiations,	 the	 focus	had	been	 the	 shape	of	 the	political	
system	in	the	new	SA	and	its	economic	structure	because	the	question	of	how	to	deal	
with	 the	 HR	 abuses	 committed	 during	 the	 apartheid	 regime	 was	 so	 divisive	 and	
controversial,	it	had	effectively	been	pushed	down	the	list	of	priorities.93		Nor	did	there	
appear	 to	 be	much	 ‘popular	 or	 open	political	 party	 debate	 on	 amnesty’	 outside	 the	
talks.94	Thus,	on	17th	November	1993	when	the	CODESA	talks	concluded,	the	issue	of	
amnesty	remained	unresolved.95			
	
From	 the	outset	of	 talks,	 the	NP	 (supported	by	 the	 SADF)	had	argued	 strongly	 for	 a	
blanket	amnesty.		They	had	tried	to	link	the	question	of	a	general	amnesty	to	the	freeing	
of	 the	remaining	political	prisoners	and	had	also	attempted	to	extend	the	 indemnity	
granted	to	ANC	exiles	to	the	SADF.96		Both	attempts	were	rebuffed	by	the	ANC	which	
suspended	all	discussion	on	the	amnesty	question,	declaring	in	a	press	release	on	13th	
August	 1992	 that	 ‘the	 discussion	 of	 amnesty	 should	 be	 reserved	 for	 “an	 interim	
government	of	National	Unity”	and	 that	 such	amnesty	 should	only	be	granted	 if	 the	
people	agreed.’97		
	
The	ANC	had	resisted	the	idea	of	a	blanket	amnesty	as	being	unacceptable	to	the	victims	
of	gross	HR	violations	committed	during	the	apartheid	regime	and	for	the	purposes	of	
future	deterrence.98		Realpolitik	won	through,	however,	when	the	Police	Commissioner	
and	the	recently	retired	head	of	the	National	Intelligence	Service	approached	Mandela	
with	 the	 offer	 that	 in	 exchange	 for	 amnesty,	 ‘the	 security	 forces	 would	 ‘guarantee	
stability’	during	the	transition	period.’99		The	ANC	leadership	realised	that	to	prosecute	
the	offenders	could	lead	to	more	bloodshed	and	the	failure	of	a	peaceful	transition	to	a	
multi-racial	democracy.			Thabo	Mbeke,	when	Deputy	President	of	SA,	later	reflected:		
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‘Within	the	ANC	the	cry	was	to	‘catch	the	bastards	and	hang	them’	but	[h]ad	there	been	
a	 threat	 of	 Nuremberg-style	 trials	 for	 the	 members	 of	 the	 apartheid	 state	 security	
establishment,	we	would	never	have	undergone	a	peaceful	change’.100	Pragmatically,	
trials	were	unfeasible	because	the	existing	justice	system,	comprising	white	judges	and	
predominantly	white	prosecutors,	was	ill-equipped	to	undertake	the	task	and	would	be	
for	many	years,	given	the	time	it	takes	to	train	lawyers	under	a	Common	Law	system.		
For	Asmal,	the	limited	resources	available	to	prosecute	and	punish	were	at	risk	of	being	
‘misspent	[and]	sabotaged’	by	supporters	of	the	former	regime	who	still	dominated	the	
judicial	and	policing	systems.101				
	
Thus,	after	the	conclusion	of	the	CODESA	talks,	in	the	period	between	approval	of	the	
Interim	Constitution	and	 its	adoption	by	Parliament	at	the	end	of	1993,	the	amnesty	
issue	again	came	to	the	fore.		Negotiators	from	the	ANC	and	the	NP	drafted	a	postamble	
to	 the	 Constitution	 entitled	 ‘National	 Unity	 and	 Reconciliation’	 which	 contained	 an	
amnesty	clause.102	The	interim	Constitution	with	postamble	was	ratified	by	Parliament	
in	December	1993	and	the	first	non-racial	elections	in	SA	were	held	on	27th	April	1994.		
The	 newly-elected	 ‘Government	 of	 National	 Unity’	 was	 dominated	 by	 the	 ANC	 and	
Nelson	Mandela	became	President	of	SA.		
	
Pressure	from	churches,	the	judiciary	and	HR	groups	meant	the	question	of	how	to	deal	
with	the	HR	violations	from	the	apartheid	era	needed	to	be	addressed	promptly	by	the	
newly-elected	government.103	The	proposal	for	a	SATRC	had	originally	come	from	the	
ANC	National	Executive	Committee	(NEC)	which	had	met	in	October	1993	to	discuss	the	
findings	of	an	 internal	 inquiry	 into	torture	and	killing	 in	 its	military	camps	 in	Zambia,	
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Angola,	Tanzania	and	Uganda.104		At	that	meeting,	Asmal	argued	that	SA	needed	a	TC	to	
look	at	‘all	the	violations	of	human	rights	on	all	sides	by	whatever	party’.105		The	NEC	
agreed	that	 the	violations	should	be	seen	against	a	culture	of	HR	violations	 that	had	
pervaded	SA	society	for	decades106	and	called	upon	the	government	‘to	agree,	following	
discussions	with	 the	ANC,	 to	 set	up	without	delay,	a	Commission	of	 Inquiry	or	Truth	
Commission	into	all	violations	of	human	rights	since	1948’.107		The	approach	of	the	ANC	
appears	to	have	been	a	desire	both	to	discover	the	truth	about	the	crimes	committed	
by	the	apartheid	state	as	well	as	to	repudiate	the	system	of	apartheid.			
	
In	the	next	section,	the	process	of	establishing	the	SATRC	will	be	outlined	and	the	nature	
of	the	limited	amnesty	will	be	discussed	to	establish	whether	the	decision	to	eschew	
prosecutions	in	favour	of	the	TRC	was	widely	supported	by	the	victims	(who	comprised	
the	majority	 of	 the	 SA	 population),	whether	 dissent	was	 heeded	 and	 respected	 and	
whether	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 TRC	 can	 justifiably	 be	 termed	 the	 democratically-
expressed	will	 of	 society.	 	 These	 factors	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 ICJ	 aim	of	 obtaining	
justice	and	dignity	for	victims	and	it	will	be	argued	that,	when	considering	the	issue	of	
inadmissibility,	as	well	as	assessing	the	capacity	of	the	TRC	to	satisfy	the	aims	of	ICJ,	the	
ICC	must	take	account	of	the	public	support	for	the	proposed	AJM	and	of	the	political	
constraints	outlined	in	this	section.	
	
Section	Four:		The	Establishment	and	Process	of	the	SATRC	
	
On	 27th	 May	 1994,	 the	 new	 government	 announced	 to	 Parliament	 its	 decision	 to	
establish	a	TRC	to	enable	SA	to	address	its	past	and	to	deal	with	the	issue	of	amnesty,	
to	which	the	government	was	bound	by	the	postamble	to	the	Interim	Constitution.		After	
setting	out	its	proposals	for	the	TRC,	the	government	invited	‘individuals,	organisations,	
religious	bodies	and	members	of	the	public	to	submit	their	comments	and	proposals	by	
30th	June	1994,	before	the	legislation	was	finalised.’108	 	 It	had	been	decided	from	the	
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outset	to	 involve	as	much	of	society	as	possible	 in	the	framing	of	the	 legislation	that	
would	bring	the	TRC	into	effect.109.			
	
With	 the	 assistance	of	 SA	non-governmental	 organisations	 (NGOs)	 such	 as	 Justice	 in	
Transition	 (JIT),	 the	government	made	great	efforts	 to	ensure	 there	was	widespread	
participation	in	the	preparatory	steps	for	the	TRC.		It	circulated	the	proposed	legislation	
to	 leading	 NGOs	 throughout	 SA,	 many	 of	 which	 organised	 over	 30	 seminars	 and	
numerous	workshops	to	discuss	and	promulgate	the	theory	behind	the	commission.110	
JIT	printed	150,000	booklets	entitled	‘The	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission’	in	six	
languages	for	distribution	throughout	SA	and	produced	four	radio	programmes,	also	in	
six	languages,	which	were	broadcast	on	national	radio	with	recordings	made	available	
to	organisations	throughout	the	country.111	
	
The	Portfolio	Committee	on	Justice	which	was	tasked	with	drafting	the	final	Bill,	spent	
many	weeks	 sifting	 through	 and	 publicly	 debating	 the	many	 submissions	 and	 issues	
before	the	draft	Bill	was	ready	to	be	introduced	to	Parliament.	 	Wilson	describes	the	
intervention	of	victims’	families	when	‘it	seemed	congressional	deputies	would	balk	at	
‘naming	names’	 in	 the	 final	 report’,	which	 they	successfully	opposed	on	 the	grounds	
they	had	the	right	to	know	the	names	of	the	killers	of	their	kin.112		Another	controversial	
area	 where	 civil	 society	 influenced	 the	 Committee	 was	 over	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	
amnesty	hearings	would	be	open	 to	 the	public.	 	 Initial	 proposals	were	 that	hearings	
would	be	in	camera	but	NGOs	argued	this	would	compromise	the	purpose	and	intention	
of	the	Commission’s	work.113		It	was	agreed,	therefore,	that	all	committees	would	sit	in	
public	although	there	was	discretion	to	hold	some	or	parts	of	hearings	in	camera	where	
there	was	a	likelihood	of	harm	or	in	the	interests	of	justice.114	
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The	Bill	was	introduced	into	Parliament	on	17th	May	1995	whereupon	parliament	held	
over	150	hours	of	hearings,115	during	which	over	300	amendments	were	made	to	the	
draft	legislation.116		In	the	final	vote,	the	Bill	received	the	support	of	all	political	parties,	
save	 for	 the	 IFP	which	abstained,	unconvinced	 that	 ‘even-handedness	would	prevail’	
and	the	extreme	right-wing	Freedom	Front	which	voted	against	because	it	had	argued	
unsuccessfully	 for	 the	 6th	 December1993	 cut-off	 date	 to	 be	 extended	 to	 10th	 May	
1994.117		The	Bill	was	signed	into	law	on	19th	July	and	The	Promotion	of	National	Unity	
and	Reconciliation	Act	(PNURA	or	‘the	Act’)	came	into	effect	on	15th	December,	the	same	
day	the	names	of	the	appointed	commissioners	were	announced.118	
	
The	procedure	 for	 appointing	 the	 commissioners	 had	been	 equally	 participative	 and	
transparent,	as	the	committee	established	by	President	Mandela	to	draw	up	a	short	list	
from	which	he	would	make	the	appointments	publicly	invited	nominations	of	suitable	
persons	 to	 serve.119	 The	 committee	 received	 299	 nominations	 and	 following	 public	
interviews,	 a	 final	 list	 of	 25	 names	was	 submitted	 to	Mandela	who	 selected	 15	 and	
added	Archbishop	Desmond	Tutu	as	Commission	Chairperson	and	Alex	Boraine	as	his	
deputy.120			
	
The	TRC’s	objectives	were	clearly	outlined	in	the	PNURA	and	Hayner	describes	it	as	‘the	
most	 complex	 and	 sophisticated	 mandate	 for	 any	 truth	 commission	 to	 date,	 with	
carefully	balanced	powers	and	an	extensive	investigatory	reach.’121		The	main	objectives	
of	the	TRC	were	to	promote	national	unity	and	reconciliation	through:		
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• establishing	as	complete	a	picture	as	possible	of	 the	nature,	causes	and	
extent	 of	 the	 gross	 violations	 of	HR	between	 1st	March	 1960122	 and	 5th	
December	1993123		
• facilitating	the	granting	of	amnesties	to	persons	making	full	disclosure	of	
all	relevant	facts	relating	to	acts	associated	with	a	political	objective		
• establishing	and	making	known	the	fate/whereabouts	of	victims		
• taking	 measures	 aimed	 at	 granting	 reparations,	 rehabilitating	 and	
restoring	human	and	civil	dignity	to	victims						and		
• compiling	a	report	providing	as	comprehensive	an	account	as	possible	of	
the	activities	and	findings	of	the	TRC	and	containing	recommendations	of	
measures	to	prevent	future	violations	of	HR124	
	
‘Gross	violation	of	HR’	was	defined	in	the	Act	as	‘killing,	abduction,	torture	or	severe	ill-
treatment	of	any	person’	which	 limited	 the	 investigation	 to	acts	which	were	already	
crimes	under	the	apartheid	state.	The	restriction	to	gross	HR	violations	meant	that	the	
‘everyday,	mundane	bureaucratic	enforcement’125	of	the	abusive	but	‘legal’	practices	of	
apartheid,	which	affected	every	member	of	 the	black	 community,	 such	as	detention	
without	trial,	pass	laws,	racial	segregation	of	public	amenities	and	forced	removals	of	
millions	of	blacks	from	their	homes,	were	excluded	from	the	investigation.		Excluding	
evidence	of	these	injustices	may	have	been	expedient	to	avoid	overwhelming	the	TRC	
with	work	but	the	TRC	was	accused	of	distorting	the	‘truth’	of	HR	violations	 in	SA	by	
concentrating	on	offences	that	were	already	crimes	under	SA	criminal	law	rather	than	
the	injustices	suffered	under	the	apartheid	regime.126		The	decision	also	ignored	all	the	
UN	Resolutions	 passed	 annually	 between	 1952	 and	 1990	 condemning	 the	 apartheid	
regime	 and	 the	 1973	 Apartheid	 Convention	 (to	 which	 SA	 is	 not	 a	 party)	 which	
internationalised	apartheid	as	a	CAH.	
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Dugard	 suggests	 two	 explanations	 for	 the	 decision:	 first,	 ‘the	 desire	 to	 avoid	 the	
suggestion	of	 ‘victor’s	 justice’’	 by	addressing	 crimes	 committed	on	both	 sides	of	 the	
struggle	and	second,	to	demonstrate	a	commitment	to	legality	and	the	rule	of	law	by	
avoiding	 the	 invalidation	 of	 apartheid	 laws	 retrospectively.127	 He	 bases	 the	 latter	
explanation	on	the	argument	that	‘the	apartheid	order	was	a	legal	order’,	so	most	of	the	
injustices	 were	 committed	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 law,	 notwithstanding	 they	 breached	
international	 HR	 norms	 and	 international	 criminal	 law.128	 	 This	 latter	 argument	 is	
controversial,	however,	given	that	crimes	committed	by	the	Nazi	regime	were	‘legal’	but	
nonetheless	were	tried	as	CAH	at	Nuremberg.	
	
PNURA	decreed	 that	 the	 granting	 of	 amnesties	was	 to	 be	 facilitated	 by	 an	Amnesty	
Committee	(AC),	which	was	established	after	the	main	commission,	independently	of	it	
and	 without	 the	 same	 transparent	 process.129	 The	 amnesty	 legislation	 faced	 some	
dissent,	due	to	its	‘opaque	origins	and	the	understandable	desire	for	retribution’	which	
made	it	‘the	most	controversial	legislation	of	post-apartheid	SA.’130		In	a	challenge	made	
to	the	Constitutional	Court,	the	Azanian	People’s	Organization	(AZAPO)	and	the	relatives	
of	some	of	the	most	well-known	victims	of	apartheid131	sought	to	set	aside	the	provision	
for	amnesty	in	PNURA	on	the	ground	that	it	was	inconsistent	with	s22	of	the	Interim	
Constitution	which	 provided	 that	 everyone	 should	 have	 the	 right	 to	 have	 justiciable	
disputes	settled	by	a	court	of	law.		Furthermore,	the	applicants	argued	‘the	State	was	
obliged	 by	 international	 law	 to	 prosecute	 those	 responsible	 for	 gross	 human	 rights	
violations	and	that	the	provisions	of	s20(7)	which	authorized	amnesty	for	such	offences	
constituted	a	breach	of	international	law.’132		
	
In	 his	 ‘beautifully	 scripted’	 judgment,	Mahomed	 DP	 held	 that	 the	 postamble	 to	 the	
Constitution	 trumped	 s22,	 thus	 the	 s20(7)	 PNURA	 authorisation	 of	 criminal	 and	 civil	
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amnesty	was	constitutional.133	Agreeing	with	this	finding,134	Dugard	notes	this	was	the	
first	 time	the	Constitutional	Court	had	been	asked	to	 interpret	 the	Constitution	such	
that	the	setting	aside	of	a	statute	enacted	by	a	democratically	elected	Parliament	would	
result.135	Asmal	comments	‘[d]issent,	however	much	in	the	minority,	should	always	be	
taken	 seriously	 particularly	 when	 it	 is	 expressed	 by	 victims	 against	 so	 traumatic	 a	
choice.’136	 	However,	he	cautions	dissent	should	not	 ‘prevent	new	democracies	 from	
deciding	democratically	how	they	wish	to	deal	with	their	shameful	pasts.’137	
	
Unfortunately,	the	judgment	did	not	address	either	the	applicant’s	claim	that	SA	had	a	
duty	 under	 customary	 international	 law	 to	 prosecute	 the	 gross	 HR	 violations	 of	 the	
previous	regime	or	the	compatibility	of	the	postamble	amnesty	with	both	conventional	
and	customary	international	law.138	To	reiterate	an	earlier	observation,	as	SA	was	not	a	
party	 to	 relevant	 treaties	 (e.g.	 the	 Apartheid	 and	 Torture	 Conventions)	 at	 the	 time	
violations	 were	 committed,	 treaty	 law	 obligations	 did	 not	 arise.	 	 Clearly,	 gross	 HR	
violations	committed	during	the	apartheid	era,	which	were	also	crimes	under	SA	 law	
(e.g.	murder,	rape,	torture,	assault,	disappearances)	are	CAH	but	as	Dugard	suggests,	
any	enquiry	‘would	probably	have	revealed	state	practice	is	too	unsettled	to	support	a	
rule	 obliging	 states	 to	 prosecute’	 such	 crimes	 in	 customary	 international	 law	 and	
accordingly	there	was	no	legal	impediment	to	the	granting	of	amnesty	in	circumstances	
such	as	prevailed	in	SA	at	that	time.139	
	
In	this	section,	the	public	consultation	and	participation	in	the	process	of	establishing	
the	TRC	has	been	outlined	to	demonstrate	that	the	SATRC	was	not	merely	a	‘top-down’	
appointment	 but	 a	 commission	 established	 by	 a	 democratically-elected	 Parliament	
which	encouraged	the	full	 involvement	of	civil	society.		This	is	a	positive	factor	which	
should	also	 influence	any	determination	by	 the	 ICC	when	 considering	a	 challenge	 to	
admissibility	based	on	a	TC.		In	the	next	section,	the	structure	and	working	processes	of	
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the	SATRC	will	be	outlined	to	indicate	how	the	PNURA	which	established	the	SATRC	was	
put	into	effect.	
	
Section	Five:	The	Structure	and	Process	of	the	SATRC	
	
The	 PNURA	 established	 a	 TRC	 comprising	 three	 committees:	 the	 Human	 Rights	
Violations	 Committee	 (HRVC),	 the	 AC	 and	 the	 Reparations	 and	 Rehabilitation	
Committee	(R&RC).140		Two	principal	differences	between	the	committees	were	that	the	
HRVC	and	R&RC	focussed	on	victims;	the	AC	on	perpetrators	and	the	ACs	decisions	were	
binding	 on	 the	 TRC	 and	 the	 government	 whereas	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 other	 two	
committees	were	recommendations	only.141		This	latter	difference	had	the	unfortunate	
effect	of	giving	preferential	treatment	to	perpetrators	who	could	be	granted	amnesty	
as	soon	as	a	decision	was	made	whereas	victims	had	to	wait	for	parliament	to	decide	
whether	to	accept	the	committees’	recommendations.142			
	
The	TRC	commenced	work	in	December	1995	with	a	staff	of	approximately	300.143		It	
was	 supported	 by	 an	 Investigative	 Unit	 which	 collaborated	 with	 the	 Research	
Department,	 conducting	 enquiries	 to	 establish	 the	 identity	 of	 victims	 and	
perpetrators,144	 and	 a	 sophisticated	witness-protection	 programme.145	 	 The	 TRC	had	
four	large	offices	nationwide	and	a	budget	of	US$18	million	for	its	first	two	and	a	half	
years,	making	it	larger	than	any	previous	TC	in	terms	of	size	and	reach.146		PNURA	gave	
the	 TRC	 power	 to	 subpoena	 witnesses,	 search	 premises	 and	 seize	 evidence.147		
Unfortunately,	often	it	chose	not	to	use	these	powers,	even	in	the	face	of	deliberate	
delay	 or	 obstruction	 from	 key	 individuals148	 or	 institutions,	 which	 sometimes	 led	 to	
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criticism	 that	 the	 TRC	 held	 ‘the	 mission	 of	 reconciliation	 above	 that	 of	 finding	 the	
truth.’149	
	
Each	of	the	three	committees	had	its	designated	area	of	responsibility.		The	HRVC	was	
responsible	 for	 investigating	gross	violations	of	HR:	 it	 could	 initiate	enquiries,	 gather	
information,	determine	facts	and	record	allegations	and	complaints.	 	The	SATRC	took	
21,298	statements	concerning	almost	38,000	gross	violations	of	HR,150	more	statements	
than	any	previous	TC.151	Trained	statement-takers	worked	from	one	of	the	four	offices,	
or	in	public	buildings	such	as	halls	or	churches	within	communities	throughout	SA	or	in	
people’s	homes.	 	Clearly,	 time	constraints	prevented	all	statement-givers	 from	giving	
evidence	in	public	hearings	so	2000	were	selected	as	‘an	appropriately	representative	
sample	of	the	whole	–	but	only	symbolically,	not	statistically.’	152	Posel	states	this	was	
achieved	 in	 two	 ways:	 those	 appearing	 in	 the	 hearings	 ‘had	 to	 instantiate	 the	
demography	of	the	rainbow	nation	in	an	appropriate	mix	of	race,	gender	and	political	
affiliation	and	the	violations	of	which	they	spoke	had	to	be	rendered	as	exemplars	of	
wider	patterns	of	abuse.’153		
	
The	 AC	 considered	 applications	 for	 amnesty	 and	 SA	 was	 the	 only	 state	 to	 link	 the	
granting	of	amnesties	with	a	TC.154	 	 There	were	 three	conditions	before	an	amnesty	
could	be	granted:	the	abuses	had	to	have	been	committed	in	or	outside	SA	between	1st	
March	1960	and	10th	May	1994;	the	motive	had	to	be	political	(not	personal,	malice	or	
spite)	and	the	perpetrator	had	to	make	full	and	frank	admissions,	including	the	chain	of	
command.155		However,	the	applicant	did	not	have	to	express	remorse.156	When	granted	
amnesty,	 perpetrators	were	 exempted	 from	 criminal	 prosecutions	 and	 civil	 suits	 for	
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damages,	however,	if	amnesty	was	refused	the	perpetrator	then	was	at	risk	of	criminal	
and/or	 civil	 proceedings.157	 	 In	 a	 situation	 which	 caused	 some	 strain	 between	 the	
Commission	and	the	offices	of	the	Attorney	General,158	perpetrators	often	waited	until	
they	were	targeted	for	prosecution	by	the	special	investigations	teams	(formed	in	1994	
to	examine	prominent	cases	of	political	violence)	before	 immediately	applying	to	the	
TRC	for	amnesty.159		
	
Of	 the	 7116	 applications	 for	 amnesty	 received	 by	 the	 AC,	 4500	 were	 refused	 after	
administrative	 review	 mainly	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 political	 motive.160	 	 Those	 requesting	
amnesty	 for	 gross	 HR	 violations	 (as	 opposed	 to	 other	 forms	 of	 politically	motivated	
crimes	e.g.	criminal	damage)	had	to	appear	at	a	public	hearing	to	answer	questions	from	
the	 AC	 and	 the	 victims,	 their	 families	 or	 their	 legal	 representatives.161	 Sarkin	 has	
analysed	the	statistics	and	notes	‘[p]ublic	hearings	were	heard	on	2548	incidents,	which	
took	place	on	1888	days	at	267	venues	around	the	country,	using	1538	interpreters	who	
interpreted	 for	 11,680	 hours	 	 [which]	 translates	 into	 1973	 hearings.’162	 	 Of	 those	
appearing	before	public	hearings,	 1167	people	were	granted	amnesty	and	806	were	
refused	because	they	did	not	satisfy	the	above-mentioned	conditions,163	although	145	
of	those	refused	were	granted	partial	amnesty.164	 	 It	has	been	estimated	that	for	HR	
violations	 where	 a	 public	 hearing	 was	 required,	 amnesty	 was	 granted	 in	 84.3%	 of	
cases.165		
	
The	 R&RC	 reviewed	 cases	 referred	 to	 it	 by	 the	 HRC	 and	 AC	 for	 reparations	 and	
rehabilitation	to	victims.		It	had	no	money	of	its	own	to	disburse	and	could	only	make	
recommendations	to	the	Government	regarding	the	payment	of	reparations	to	victims,	
medical	expenses	and	memorialization.166		It	also	made	recommendations	regarding	the	
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prevention	of	future	abuses	and	the	steps	necessary	to	create	a	culture	of	respect	for	
HR	in	SA,	including	institutional,	administrative	and	legislative	initiatives	to	achieve	this	
aim.167	 In	 its	 final	 report	 of	 1998,	 the	 TRC	 recommended	 that	 approximately	 22,000	
victims	should	receive	a	grant	of	approximately	US$2800-3500	per	annum	for	six	years.		
Unfortunately,	however	the	reparations	issue	was	very	low	down	the	list	of	priorities	for	
the	new	government	which	did	not	act	on	the	recommendation	until	January	2000	when	
President	Mbeki	announced	it	would	offer	victims	only	token	compensation	of	several	
hundred	US	dollars	per	person	in	total.168			
	
The	 HRVC	 held	 its	 first	 hearing	 on	 16th	 April	 1996	 in	 East	 London,	 Eastern	 Cape.169		
Throughout	1996	and	early	1997,	it	held	fifty	hearings	in	Town	Halls,	hospitals,	churches	
and	other	public	buildings	all	over	the	country.170	Following	a	decision	taken	during	the	
Act’s	drafting	stage,	all	meetings	were	open	to	the	public	and	the	media	coverage	of	the	
hearings	was	 intense.	To	ensure	all	citizens	could	follow	the	proceedings,	there	were	
daily	newspaper,	television	and	radio	news	reports	and	four	hours	of	daily	live	coverage	
broadcast	on	 the	 radio	plus	 a	 ‘Truth	Commission	 Special	 Report’	 on	 television	every	
Sunday,	which	became	the	most-watched	news	programme	in	SA.171	
	
As	well	as	general	hearings,	the	commission	held	special	hearings	focussing	on	key	social	
institutions172	 and	 individuals173	 and	 their	 response	 to	 or	 participation	 in	 abusive	
practices.174		Other	special	hearings	dealt	with	issues	such	as	the	use	of	chemical	and	
biological	 weapons	 against	 opponents	 of	 the	 apartheid	 government,	 compulsory	
military	service,	political	party	policies	and	how	youth	and	women	were	affected	by	the	
violence.175	 Wilson	 states	 that	 these	 ‘event	 hearings’	 were	 the	 TRC’s	 attempt	 to	
‘transcend	some	of	the	limitations	of	its	narrow	human	rights	mandate’	which	excluded	
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investigation	of	crimes	that	were	legal	under	apartheid	and	address	the	social	context:	
‘the	normal,	everyday,	banal	and	mundane	violent	reality	of	apartheid.’176			
	
The	special	hearings	for	women	demonstrate	the	flexibility	of	the	SATRC	process.		It	had	
become	clear	after	the	first	few	weeks	of	hearings	in	1996	that	of	204	witnesses,	60%	
were	women	and	75%	of	 them	talked	about	abuses	suffered	by	men,	with	only	17%	
giving	 evidence	 about	 abuses	 suffered	 by	 women.177	 	 Despite	 encouragement,	
therefore,	women	were	giving	‘scant	account	of	their	own	suffering	or	experiences	of	
violence,	 least	 of	 all	 of	 sexual	 violation.’178	 The	 TRC	was	 thus	 portraying	 women	 as	
grieving	wives	and	mothers,	not	as	sufferers	of	numerous	abuses	themselves.179		Active	
pressure	 from	women’s	 organisations	 to	 ‘create	 an	 empowering	 and	non-victimising	
environment	 for	 women	 to	 describe	 their	 experiences’180	 led	 the	 TRC,	 in	 an	
unprecedented	move,	to	examine	gender	issues	by	organising	workshops	on	gender	and	
instituting	women-only	hearings	chaired	by	female	commissioners	to	hear	from	women	
who	wanted	an	all-female	forum.181	
	
An	early	problem	faced	by	the	TRC	related	to	the	naming	of	perpetrators	by	those	giving	
evidence.		The	Commission	was	challenged	in	Court	on	its	failure	to	give	advance	notice	
to	those	expected	to	be	named.182		Although	the	TRC	argued	that	no	findings	were	being	
made	at	the	public	hearings,	the	Appeal	Court	ruled	that	in	the	interests	of	due	process,	
prior	notice	must	be	given	so	that	those	named	could	‘submit	representations	to	the	
Commission	within	a	specified	time	with	regard	to	the	matter	under	consideration	or	to	
give	evidence	at	a	hearing	of	the	Commission’	in	accordance	with	s30	PNURA.183	This	
ruling	also	had	a	direct	impact	on	the	publication	of	the	Commission’s	final	report:	the	
considerable	administrative	work	and	notice	required	limited	how	many	were	named	in	
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the	Commission’s	 final	 report,	with	one	 commissioner	 estimating	 approximately	 600	
names	were	removed.184	
	
The	TRC	submitted	its	five-volume	Report	to	President	Mandela	on	29th	October	1998.185		
The	 days	 before	 its	 final	 release	were	 filled	with	 controversy	 as,	 in	 accordance	with	
required	 procedures,	 the	 Commission	 sent	 more	 than	 400	 notices	 to	 individuals,	
institutions	and	organisations	that	were	adversely	mentioned	in	the	report	giving	them	
21	days	to	reply	in	writing	if	they	wished	to	take	issue	with	the	TRC	findings.186	De	Klerk	
immediately	sought	to	prevent	his	name	being	published	in	the	Report,	arguing	in	a	two-
thousand-page	complaint	that	the	Commission	had	acted	in	bad	faith.187	The	ANC	tried	
to	 stop	publication	of	 the	Report	 altogether	due	 to	 its	dissatisfaction	with	 the	TRC’s	
findings	on	its	past	actions.188		Fortunately,	the	Court	found	against	the	ANC	just	hours	
before	the	report’s	release.		Several	months	after	release,	the	Report	was	considered	in	
Parliament	and	Thabo	Mbeki,	Deputy	President	of	SA	and	President	of	the	ANC,	stated	
that	the	ANC	had	‘serious	reservations’	about	the	TRC’s	process	and	report	since	‘the	
net	effect	of	[its]	findings	is	to	delegitimise	or	criminalise	a	significant	part	of	the	struggle	
of	 our	 people	 for	 liberation.’189	 	 After	 days	 of	 debate,	 there	 was	 no	 government	
commitment	to	implement	the	TRC’s	many	recommendations.	
	
The	AC	held	public	hearings	until	December	2000	and	was	not	officially	dissolved	until	
31st	May	2001.		Its	final	two-volume	report	was	submitted	to	the	government	in	2003,	
publication	having	been	delayed	by	a	legal	action	brought	by	the	IFP	and	Chief	Buthelezi	
over	disagreements	with	the	Commission’s	findings.		The	AC	also	presented	a	list	of	300	
names	to	the	National	Prosecuting	Authority	 for	 investigation	and	prosecution.190	 	 In	
2015,	after	years	of	inaction,	the	former	national	director	of	public	prosecutions,	Vusi	
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Pikoli,	 stated	 that	 ‘‘political	 interference’	was	 the	 reason	 that	 investigations	 in	 cases	
recommended	 for	 prosecution	 by	 the	 commission	 were	 ‘effectively	 barred	 or	
delayed’.’191		Controversially,	just	two	months	after	the	release	of	the	final	two	volumes,	
President	Mbeki	had	used	his	constitutional	powers	to	pardon	33	convicted	prisoners	
(predominantly	ANC	and	PAC	members)	who	had	been	refused	amnesty	by	the	AC.192	
The	 government	 also	 tried	 to	 introduce	 an	 expanded	 amnesty	 programme	 but	 was	
prevented	by	legal	action	taken	by	victims	and	civil	society.193			
	
In	this	section,	the	establishment	of	the	SATRC	has	been	discussed	and	it	has	been	seen	
the	SATRC	had	many	commendable	 features	which	could	be	emulated	by	 future	TCs	
intending	 to	 challenge	 the	 ICC.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 SATRC	 was	 well-financed	 and	
resourced	and	was	highly	accessible	to	the	public	in	terms	of	victims	giving	statements,	
public	hearings	taking	place	across	the	country	and	extensive	media	coverage.	Further,	
the	 process	 was	 flexible	 and	 adaptable	 enabling	 changes	 to	 be	 made	 as	 required.	
However,	 the	 SATRC’s	 failure	 often	 to	 use	 its	 substantial	 powers	 to	 obtain	 evidence	
which	was	 viewed	 by	 some	 as	 prioritising	 reconciliation	 over	 truth.	 The	 discrepancy	
between	AC	decisions	taking	effect	immediately	and	being	binding	on	the	government	
whereas	 decisions	 of	 the	 HRVC	 and	 R&RC	were	 recommendations	 only	 also	 caused	
widespread	 frustration.	 	 However,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 the	 government’s	 failure	 to	
implement	 R&RC	 recommendations,	 particularly	 regarding	 reparations	 caused	 the	
greatest	 dissatisfaction	 among	 victims	 and	 this,	 plus	 its	 failure	 to	 follow-up	 with	
prosecutions	of	those	who	did	not	apply	or	were	refused	amnesty,	should	be	avoided	
by	any	future	TC	model	intending	to	show	the	ICC	that	it	will	uphold	the	ICJ	aim	of	justice	
for	victims.		
	
In	the	next	section,	 in	order	to	consider	whether	a	TC	modelled	on	the	SATRC	would	
make	prosecutions	at	the	ICC	inadmissible,	the	performance	of	the	SATRC	in	satisfying	
the	ICJ	requirements	discussed	in	Chapter	Three	will	be	discussed.		
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Section	Six:		Does	the	SATRC	satisfy	the	Requirements	of	ICJ?	
	
In	this	section,	following	assessment	of	the	SATRC,	it	will	be	suggested	that	if	it	can	be	
demonstrated	 that	 the	 SATRC	 does	 satisfy	 these	 aims,	 this	 will	 give	 weight	 to	 the	
argument	that	the	ICC	should	declare	a	case	inadmissible	when	a	State	intends	to	deal	
with	past	offending	by	means	of	a	TC	rather	than	prosecutions.	
	
Bringing	those	responsible	to	Justice	
	
Assessment	of	the	SATRC’s	retributive	capacity	clearly	indicates	that	by	not	having	the	
power	to	punish	perpetrators	of	gross	HR	violations	and	by	granting	amnesties,	it	could	
justifiably	 be	 accused	 of	 denying	 justice	 by	 preventing	 victims	 from	 seeking	 justice	
through	civil	or	criminal	courts.		To	counter	this	accusation,	it	could	be	argued	that	given	
the	transitional	context	in	which	the	SATRC	was	established,	insisting	that	the	grant	of	
amnesty	be	 subject	 to	 strict	 rules	was	 the	best	 justice	 that	 could	be	achieved	 in	 the	
prevailing	circumstances.		Furthermore,	if	justice	is	perceived	as	restorative	rather	than	
retributive,	then	a	TC	has	advantages	that	outweigh	trials	at	the	ICC.			
	
Restorative	justice	has	been	defined	in	the	Chapter	One	but	in	the	words	of	the	SATRC	
report:		
	
[It]	 seeks	 to	 redefine	 crime:	 it	 shifts	 the	primary	 focus	of	 crime	 from	 the	
breaking	of	laws	or	offences	against	a	faceless	state	to	a	perception	of	crime	
as	violations	against	human	beings	 […].	 [It]	encourages	victims,	offenders	
and	the	community	to	be	directly	involved	in	resolving	conflicts.		Rather	than	
providing	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 established	 justice	 system,	
restorative	justice	seeks	to	recover	certain	neglected	dimensions	that	make	
for	a	more	complete	understanding	of	justice.194	
	
	
Justice	at	the	SATRC	sought	to	prioritise	the	needs	of	victims	and	the	question	is	whether	
the	SATRC	lived	up	to	its	own	rhetoric.		For	some	victims	and	witnesses,	the	TRC	setting,	
with	its	emphasis	on	healing	and	belief	in	the	restorative	power	of	truth-telling,	could	
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have	been	a	welcome	alternative	to	courts	which	had	infamously	upheld	the	injustices	
of	the	apartheid	regime.195	PNURA	gave	all	citizens	the	right	to	give	statements	to	the	
TRC196	 and	 having	 someone	 listen	 to	 and	 acknowledge	 their	 pain	 may	 have	 been	
cathartic	for	many	of	the	thousands	who	did	so.197		Minow	states	that	telling	one’s	story	
and	 being	 heard	without	 interruption	 or	 scepticism	 is	 ‘nowhere	more	 vital	 than	 for	
survivors	 of	 trauma’198	 although	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 this	 view	 is	 based	 on	 a	
‘Eurocentric	discourse	about	‘post-traumatic	stress’’199	and	does	not	take	into	account	
‘[a]ll	 cultural	 traditions	 have	 their	 own	 systems	 of	 psychological	 thought	 and	
practice.’200		
	
Despite	 its	best	 intentions,	however,	 the	SATRC	may	not	have	 fulfilled	 its	 restorative	
justice	aims.	 	Many	perpetrators	who	could	have	applied	to	the	TRC	for	amnesty	 for	
their	 crimes	 failed	 to	do	 so,	possibly	 in	 the	belief	 that	 it	was	unlikely	 they	would	be	
prosecuted	in	any	event.201	As	Ash	states,	‘[w]ithout	that	stick,	the	carrot	of	amnesty	is	
useless.’202	The	TRC’s	report	notes	that	no	application	was	received	from	any	member	
of	 the	 former	 national	 intelligence	 service,	 for	 example.203	 	 The	 PNURA	 terms	 of	
reference	 provided	 the	 potential	 for	 including	 high-ranking	 intellectual	 authors	 of	
atrocities,	as	they	included	‘an	attempt,	conspiracy,	incitement,	instigation,	command	
or	procurement	 to	 commit	 an	act.’204	 	 Yet	many	of	 those	 in	high	office	 failed	 to	 co-
operate	with	the	Commission,	which	the	report	referred	to	as	‘one	of	the	most	shameful	
aspects	of	the	process’205	and	the	Indemnity	Acts	of	1990	and	1992	granted	indemnity	
to	thousands	who	might	otherwise	have	been	impelled	to	apply	for	amnesty.	Several	
political	parties	and	institutions	did	not	support	the	amnesty	process	and	some	urged	
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their	 supporters	 not	 to	 apply,	 for	 example,	 applications	 from	 IFP	 and	 SADF	 were	
particularly	low.206			
	
For	those	perpetrators	who	did	successfully	apply,	although	amnesty	allowed	them	to	
escape	 prosecution,	 the	 requirement	 of	 full	 and	 frank	 admissions	 required	 them	 to	
confirm	 important	 truths	 about	 the	 past	 and	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 new	 information	 was	
learned	 from	 their	 hearings.207	 	 Unfortunately,	 there	 were	 often	 doubts	 about	 the	
‘fullness	and	frankness’	of	their	evidence208	but	victims	or	their	 lawyers	were	at	least	
able	to	cross-examine	and	challenge	‘rationalizations	and	[…]	reformulations	of	events,	
which	contributed	to	the	contesting	of	impunity’.209				
	
The	 concept	 of	 justice	 for	 victims	 was	 undoubtedly	 stretched	 when	 unrepentant	
perpetrators	were	 granted	 amnesty	without	 expressing	 remorse	 and	 in	 some	 cases,	
quoted	‘ideological	justifications	for	their	acts	with	little	self-reflection	and	analysis.’210	
Theissen	 argues	 that	 public	 acceptance	 of	 the	 TRC	 would	 have	 increased	 and	 its	
decisions	would	have	been	compatible	with	international	law	if	the	AC	could	have	taken	
into	account	genuine	 remorse,	not	as	a	pre-condition	 for	amnesty	but	as	 criteria	 for	
what	 he	 suggests	 should	 be	 ‘graded’	 amnesty	 decisions,	 for	 example,	 the	 AC’s	
imposition	of	non-criminal	sanctions	or	a	reduced	or	suspended	sentence.211	Theissen	
also	suggests	 that	amnesty	should	not	have	resulted	 in	perpetrators	being	protected	
from	civil	claims	for	compensation,	especially	given	the	time	taken	by	the	government	
to	decide	on	its	reparations	programme.212		These	proposals	could	be	incorporated	into	
any	future	TC	model.	
	
The	TRC’s	approach	to	 justice	was	to	minimise	prosecution	by	advocating	restorative	
justice	as	 the	 ‘morally	superior	choice.’213	Whether	victims	understood	and	accepted	
this	view	of	justice	or	whether	they	would	have	preferred	retributive	justice	is	unclear	
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although	Theissen’s	review	of	public	opinion	surveys	undertaken	in	SA	between	1994	
and	2000	reveals	that	‘[m]ost	South	Africans	accepted	the	sacrifice	of	punishment	for	
the	truth.’	214	A	study	of	those	who	testified	at	hearings	revealed	that	20%	‘mentioned	
justice’215	by	which	they	appeared	to	mean	retributive	justice.216		This	group	apparently	
fell	mainly	within	white	and	‘higher	status’	survivors	e.g.	higher	level	of	education	and	
basic	 needs	 satisfied.217	 However,	 findings	 cannot	 be	 generalised	 because	 survivors’	
perceptions	 of	 justice	 were	 influenced	 by	 numerous	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 extent	 of	
discrimination,	 deprivation	 of	 economic	 opportunity	 and	 the	 reality	 and	 treatment	
experienced	during	apartheid.218			
	
In	 Chapter	 Three,	 the	 ineffectiveness	 of	 criminal	 trials	 to	 deal	 with	 widespread,	
systematic	 abuses	 of	 HR	 was	 discussed	 and	 it	 was	 pointed	 out	 that	 trials	 focus	 on	
individual	rather	than	collective	culpability	and	can	take	events	out	of	social	context.		An	
International	Commission	of	Inquiry,	reporting	on	the	situation	in	Darfur	but	making	a	
point	which	has	wider	relevance,	stated:		
	
[A]	TRC	could	play	an	important	role	in	ensuring	justice	and	accountability.		
Criminal	 courts,	by	 themselves,	may	not	be	suited	 to	 reveal	 the	broadest	
spectrum	of	 crimes	 that	 took	place	during	a	period	of	 repression,	 in	part	
because	 they	 may	 convict	 only	 on	 proof	 beyond	 reasonable	 doubt.	 	 In	
situations	of	mass	crime	[…]	a	relatively	limited	number	of	prosecutions,	no	
matter	how	successful,	may	not	completely	satisfy	victims’	expectations	of	
acknowledgment	of	their	suffering.		What	is	important	[…]	is	a	full	disclosure	
of	the	whole	range	of	criminality.219	
	
	
Despite	its	limited	mandate,	the	SATRC	sought	to	achieve	justice	for	victims	and	their	
families	 by	 identifying	 the	 wider	 implications	 of	 apartheid,	 including	 collective	
responsibility	 for	 its	 implementation.	 	 It	 sought	 to	 identify	 patterns	 of	 abuses,	
institutional	failings	that	allowed	crimes	to	occur.220		The	special	hearings	highlighted	a	
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range	of	criminality	that	may	not	have	become	apparent	in	individual	criminal	trials,	in	
particular,	 identifying	 those	 elements	 of	 society	 who	 gained	 from	 ‘corrupting	 the	
system,	who	were	able	to	turn	links	to	public	power	to	private	advantage’.221		The	special	
hearing	on	the	business	community,	for	example,	enabled	the	TRC	to	report	that	‘a	vast	
body	 of	 evidence	 points	 to	 a	 central	 role	 for	 business	 interests	 in	 the	 elaboration,	
adoption,	implementation	and	modifications	of	apartheid	policies	throughout	its	dismal	
history’.222	 	 This	 finding	 motivated	 victims	 and	 their	 lawyers	 to	 look	 to	 businesses	
(including	multinational	corporations)	as	an	additional	source	of	reparations,	a	welcome	
move	given	the	government’s	delay	in	dealing	with	the	issue.223		
	
The	extensive	media	coverage	of	the	TRC	proceedings	arguably	reached	a	far	greater	
section	of	society	than	would	a	series	of	lengthy	criminal	trials,	thereby	educating	the	
public	regarding	events	and	identities	and	contributing	to	the	attainment	of	justice	and	
dignity	for	victims	through	dissemination	and	acknowledgment.224			
	
However,	it	is	clear	from	the	surveys	that	have	been	conducted	in	SA	that	the	drawing	
of	conclusions	on	whether	the	SATRC	achieved	justice	for	victims	is	constrained	by	lack	
of	detailed	information	about	deponents	225	which	prompts	the	question:	why	did	the	
SATRC	itself	not	question	the	victims	on	this	issue?	
	
Putting	an	end	to	violations	and	preventing	their	recurrence	
	
The	 abuses	 suffered	 by	 the	 black	 majority	 in	 SA	 stemmed	 from	 a	 political	 regime	
enforced	 and	 supported	 by	 the	white	minority	who	 believed	 in	 the	 rightness	 of	 the	
apartheid	system	for	SA.226	 	The	negotiated	political	agreement	ended	apartheid	and	
the	 abuses	 associated	with	 it,	 so	 the	 SATRC	was	 not	 tasked	with	 putting	 an	 end	 to	
violations.	 	 Central	 to	 the	 SATRC’s	mission	was	 replacing	 the	deep-seated	 culture	of	
racism	with	a	respect	for	HR	and	thereby	to	prevent	future	violations.227	 It	sought	to	
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achieve	these	aims	by	exposing	the	details	of	widespread	abuses	and	identifying	who	
perpetrated	them.		To	this	end,	the	decision	to	hold	public	hearings	and	allow	media	
coverage	was	crucial	as	it	ensured	that	the	details	uncovered	reached	a	broad	spectrum	
of	 society,	 potentially	 leading	 to	 pressure	 for	 change	 and	 the	 evolution	 of	 social	
norms.228		For	de	Gruchy:		
	
the	painful	dissecting	of	apartheid	during	the	hearings	of	the	TRC	…	has	given	
us	vivid	intimations	of	the	kind	of	society	we	should	strive	for:	a	society	that	
cares	 ...	 about	 the	 truth,	 …	 about	 justice,	 …	 about	 victims,	 …	 about	 the	
healing	of	its	wounds	and	the	flourishing	of	human	life.229				
	
In	Chapter	Three,	it	was	suggested	that	the	deterrent	nature	of	international	criminal	
trials	is	questionable	given	the	motivation	of	the	perpetrators	where	overriding	interests	
such	 as	 avoiding	 defeat,	 territorial	 control	 and	 survival	 can	 outweigh	 the	 threat	 of	
prosecution	regardless	of	its	certainty.230	These	factors	did	not	apply	in	SA	as	apartheid	
ended	 by	 negotiation	 but	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 SATRC	 was	 established,	 its	
functionality	and	independence	did	enhance	its	credibility	and	many	perpetrators	were	
reluctant	to	be	identified	precisely	because	evidence	of	their	criminality	could	result	in	
them	being	discredited,	publicly	 censored	and	deprived	of	power;	 a	potential	 future	
deterrent	factor.231	Furthermore,	it	was	argued	in	Chapter	Three	that	‘offenders	commit	
more	atrocities	in	weak	states	because	they	have	more	opportunities	to	do	so	and	not	
because	 they	have	 a	 greater	 inclination	 to	 commit	 such	 atrocities’.232	 	 By	 examining	
apartheid	institutions,	publicising	the	past	abuses	and	suggesting	reforms,	by	identifying	
and	 discrediting	 the	 perpetrators	 of	 those	 abuses	 and	 by	 assisting	 to	 educate	 and	
inculcate	a	respect	for	HR	into	these	institutions	and	society	at	large,	the	SATRC	sought	
to	reduce	the	risk	of	their	recurrence.	
	
Proponents	of	 restorative	 justice	argue	 that	a	 transformation	of	 society	 such	as	 that	
envisaged	by	the	TRC	can	only	be	achieved	when	all	stakeholders	(victims,	perpetrators	
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and	beneficiaries)	 come	 together	 to	 confront	 the	past	and	 identify	means	 for	 future	
peaceful	cohabitation.233	This	is	an	area	where	TCs	arguably	can	better	criminal	trials	in	
the	fulfilment	of	ICJ	aims.		As	de	Greiff	notes	in	his	report:	
	
the	wide-ranging	analysis	undertaken	by	TCs	seems	to	invite	similarly	wide-
ranging	transformation	proposals	in	the	name	of	prevention.		Thus	TCs	have	
proposed	the	transformation	of	various	institutions	including	the	judiciary,	
security	forces,	education,	media,	civil	registries,	electoral	systems	and	land	
tenure	patterns.234	
	
The	R&RC	was	tasked	with	recommending	measures	to	prevent	future	violations	of	HR	
and	with	suggesting	steps	necessary	to	create	a	culture	of	respect	for	HR	in	SA.		The	final	
TRC	 report	 contained	 over	 40	 pages	 of	 such	 recommendations235	 including	 ‘legal,	
administrative	 and	 institutional	 measures	 designed	 to	 prevent	 the	 recurrences	 of	
human	 rights	 abuses’236	 and	 suggested	 that	 ‘services	 developed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 [this]	
policy	 should	be	 responsive	 to	 the	 religious	 and	 cultural	 beliefs	 and	practices	of	 the	
community	in	which	the	services	are	provided’.237	
	
Thus,	although	the	SATRC	was	unable	to	deter	by	punishing	the	perpetrators	of	gross	
HR	violations,	it	did	effectively	highlight	the	pervasive	disregard	for	the	HR	of	the	black	
community	in	SA	and	contributed	to	instilling	a	culture	of	respect	for	HR	in	SA.			
	
Securing	Justice	and	Dignity	for	victims	
	
Central	 to	 the	healing	mission	of	 the	SATRC	was	a	commitment	 to	a	 ‘victim-centred’	
approach,	giving	victims	and	witnesses	space	to	tell	their	stories	in	their	own	words	and	
language,	 in	order	 ‘to	restore	the[ir]	human	and	civil	dignity.’238	HRVC	hearings	were	
designed	to	‘engender	an	atmosphere	that	would	be	welcoming,	friendly	and	affirming’	
for	victims	and	witnesses239	and	‘many	found	the	public	hearing	process	psychologically	
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beneficial.’240	 The	Commission	prevented	witnesses	being	 ‘traumatised	and	upset	by	
insensitive	cross-examination’	by	refusing	demands	of	those	named	as	perpetrators	to	
be	allowed	to	cross-examine.241		As	a	result,	many	victims	reported	that	HRVC	hearings	
offered	them	the	opportunity	to	‘re-validate’	themselves,	‘affirming	the	sense	“you	are	
right,	 you	 were	 damaged,	 and	 it	 was	 wrong”’	 which	 satisfied	 their	 conception	 of	
justice.242		
	
Unfortunately,	however,	some	found	testifying	before	the	SATRC	did	not	so	much	heal	
as	 re-victimise	 them.243	 	 When	 questioned	 after	 their	 appearance,	 some	 described	
having	insufficient	time	to	tell	their	story,	others	that	their	views	and	needs	were	not	
properly	taken	into	account.244		For	others,	reliving	the	memories	caused	them	to	be	re-
traumatised	which	resulted	in	ill-health.245	However,	the	SATRC	‘went	further	than	any	
other	 TC	 at	 that	 time	 in	 incorporating	 psychological	 support	 into	 its	 operational	
structures’,	by	hiring	four	mental	health	professionals,	training	statement-takers	how	to	
respond	 to	 signs	 of	 trauma	 and	 hiring	 ‘briefers’	 to	 give	 constant	 support	 to	 those	
testifying	at	public	hearings.246		
	
It	 is	 difficult	 to	 imagine	 that	 testifying	 before	 a	 formal	 criminal	 court	would	 be	 less	
traumatic	than	before	a	TRC	especially	since	trials	require	victims	to	undergo	the	ordeal	
of	 potentially	 hostile	 cross-examination.	 	 Furthermore,	 victims	 are	witnesses	 for	 the	
prosecution,	rarely	permitted	to	narrate	their	story,	 instead	obliged	to	give	yes	or	no	
answers	 to	questions	designed	 to	establish	 the	 guilt	 or	 innocence	of	 the	 accused.247		
Worse,	 acquittals	 can	 exacerbate	 the	 trauma	 suffered	 by	 victims,	 compounding	 the	
sense	of	low	self-worth,	of	not	being	believed.		Minow	argues	that	the	‘failure	to	address	
damage	to	individual	dignity	and	to	the	very	idea	that	members	of	targeted	groups	are	
persons	with	dignity	ensures	that	the	consequences	of	mass	violation	will	persist	and	
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may	give	rise	to	new	rounds	of	revenge.’248	For	Minow,	TCs	offer	more	potential	than	
prosecutions	‘[i]f	the	goals	of	repairing	human	dignity,	healing	individuals	and	mending	
societies	after	the	trauma	of	mass	atrocity	are	central’.249		
	
De	Greiff	 agrees	 the	 contribution	of	 TCs	 to	 the	 restoration	of	 dignity	 and	 justice	 for	
victims	has	proved	 to	be	 significant	 in	many	of	 the	 countries	where	 they	have	been	
implemented.250	In	his	report,	he	notes	that:		
	
Giving	 a	 “voice”	 to	 and	 empowering	 victims	 […]	 to	 tell	 their	 stories	 […]	
thereby	giving	them	a	place	in	the	public	sphere	for	the	very	first	time	[…]	is	
part	 of	 the	 process	 of	 affirming	 the	 status	 of	 victims,	 often	members	 of	
socially	marginalised	groups,	as	equal	rights	holders.251		
	
	
Another	 factor	 when	 considering	 justice	 and	 dignity	 for	 victims	 is	 the	 role	 of	 the	
beneficiaries	 of	 apartheid	 and	 their	 collective	 responsibility.	 	 The	 extensive	 media	
coverage	 of	 the	 TRC	 proceedings	 obliged	 whites	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 truth	 of	 the	
widespread	horrors	of	the	system	they	had	reinforced	and	supported	for	decades.		They	
could	not	ignore	or	justify	apartheid’s	crimes	which	was	fundamentally	important	to	the	
dignity	of	victims,	to	the	potential	for	reconciliation	and	to	the	creation	of	a	culture	of	
respect	for	HR	and	democracy.		As	Neier	states,	‘[b]y	knowing	what	happened,	a	nation	
is	able	to	debate	honestly	why	and	how	dreadful	crimes	came	to	be	committed	[…]	and	
to	 identify	 the	 victims,	 and	 recall	 how	 they	 were	 tortured	 and	 killed,	 ‘is	 a	 way	 of	
acknowledging	their	worth	and	dignity.’’252		
	
Whilst	the	offer	of	amnesty	to	perpetrators	of	the	apartheid	crimes	committed	in	SA	
could	be	seen	to	deny	victims	of	dignity	and	justice,	it	could	be	argued	that	unsuccessful	
prosecutions	can	be	far	more	traumatic	for	them	and	as	far	as	the	ICJ	principle	of	the	
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right	 to	 truth	 is	 concerned,	 the	 amnesty	 process	 allowed	 victims	 greater	 access	 to	
information	than,	for	example,	the	failed	prosecutions	of	Malan	and	his	cohorts.253	
	
One	 important	 element	of	 securing	 justice	 and	dignity	 for	 victims	 is	 the	payment	of	
reparations,	 the	 aim	 of	 which	 is	 ‘to	 empower	 individuals	 and	 communities	 to	 take	
control	 of	 their	 own	 lives.’254	 	 Reparations	 include	 not	 only	 monetary	 payments	 to	
victims	 but	 health	 and	 social	 services,	 memorials	 and	 other	 acts	 of	 symbolic	
commemoration.		The	ICC	can	order	a	convicted	person	to	pay	compensation	and	make	
other	reparation	to	victims255	and	a	Trust	Fund	has	been	established	for	cases	where	the	
offender	 has	 insufficient	 resources.256	 Given	 the	 number	 of	 victims	 involved	 in	 ICC	
crimes,	the	Court	may	prioritise	collective	(not	individual)	reparations	e.g.	the	building	
of	victim	centres	or	symbolic	measures257	which,	though	welcome,	would	not	alleviate	
individual	victims’	financial	difficulties.	
	
In	 contrast,	 the	 SATRC’s	 report	 contained	 detailed	 and	 comprehensive	
recommendations	 for	a	 reparations	programme	specifically	 geared	 to	 the	needs	and	
aspirations	 of	 the	 whole	 victim	 community.	 	 In	 advance	 of	 its	 publication,	 the	
Commission	met	the	government	to	discuss	its	proposals	and	obtain	the	government’s	
commitment	 to	 implement	 them.258	 	 Having	 done	 so,	 the	 Commission	 publicised	
advance	information	about	their	recommendations.	
	
Unfortunately,	 this	 action	 backfired	 on	 the	 TRC	 when	 victims	 were	 left	 angry	 and	
frustrated	 by	 the	 government’s	 delay	 in	 implementing	 the	 reparation	 proposals,	
especially	 when	 they	 saw	 how	 swiftly	 successful	 applications	 for	 amnesty	 were	
granted.259	 Five	 years	 after	 the	 TRC’s	 first	 report,	 the	 government	 implemented	 a	
significantly	more	modest	reparations	programme,	blaming	a	depressed	economy	and	
other	 pressing	 social	 needs	 on	 its	 token	offer	 of	 several	 hundred	dollars	 per	 person	
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rather	 than	 the	$21,000	 recommended	by	 the	 TRC	and	no	additional	 recommended	
services.260	Sarkin	states	that	the	issue	of	reparations	was	crucial	as	‘for	many	victims	
the	reparations	aspect	of	the	TRC’s	work	was	fundamental’	so	the	government’s	stance	
led	 not	 only	 to	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 amount	 to	 be	 paid	 but	 with	 the	 entire	 TRC	
process.261		Clearly	the	intention	of	the	SATRC	was	creditable	but	it	was	let	down	by	the	
failure	of	the	government	to	implement	the	recommendations,	a	factor	to	be	addressed	
by	any	government	wishing	to	persuade	the	ICC	to	defer	prosecutions	in	favour	of	a	TC.	
	
Finally,	as	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter,	the	SATRC’s	mandate	has	been	criticised	for	
its	 limitation	 to	 gross	 HR	 violations	 rather	 than	 all	 the	 routine	 degradations	 and	
humiliations	suffered	by	the	black	community	under	the	apartheid	regime.	Posel	states	
that	‘the	apartheid	system	itself	was	not	the	subject	of	the	TRC’s	investigations;	rather,	
it	was	the	‘background’,	the	‘political	landscape’	on	which	the	picture	of	gross	human	
rights	 violations	 was	 to	 be	 painted.’	 262	 Mamdani	 heavily	 criticised	 the	 TRC	 for	 not	
addressing	the	issue	of	justice	for	the	black	majority	‘who	understandably	expect	to	gain	
from	reconciliation	and	healing’	arguing:	
	
Victims	of	apartheid	are	now	narrowly	defined	as	those	militants	victimised	
as	they	struggled	against	apartheid,	not	those	whose	lives	were	mutilated	in	
the	day-to-day	web	of	regulation	that	was	apartheid.		We	arrive	at	a	world	
in	which	reparations	are	for	militants,	those	who	suffered	jail	or	exile,	but	
not	for	those	who	suffered	only	forced	labour	and	broken	homes.263		
	
This	criticism	can	be	countered	to	some	extent	by	recalling	the	nine	institutional	and	
special	 hearings	 held	 by	 the	 TRC	 which	 heard	 evidence	 on	 the	 maintenance	 and	
environment	in	which	HR	violations	could	thrive.		This	is	a	feature	that	could	be	built	
into	a	generic	model	for	future	TCs.		Every	black	South	African	knew	about	the	everyday	
injustices	they	had	suffered	under	apartheid	so	perhaps	they	did	not	need	the	TRC	to	
specifically	identify	these	abuses,	rather	they	needed	a	change	in	the	culture	to	one	of	
respect	for	their	HR,	to	which	the	SATRC	did	contribute.		
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Establishing	a	past	record	of	events	
	
The	SATRC	was	given	an	exceptionally	demanding	brief	which	required	it	to	establish:	
	
as	complete	a	picture	as	possible	of	 the	nature,	causes	and	extent	of	 the	
gross	human	rights	violations	…	including	the	antecedents,	circumstances,	
factors	and	context	of	such	violations,	as	well	as	the	victims	and	the	motives	
and	 perspectives	 of	 the	 persons	 responsible	 for	 the	 commission	 of	 the	
violations.264		
	
At	the	outset,	the	TRC	invited	all	South	Africans	wishing	to	do	so	to	make	a	statement	
to	 the	 Commission	 thereby	 providing	 the	 potential	 for	 ‘an	 infinitely	 detailed,	
comprehensive	and	multi-vocal	account	of	past	traumas.’265	Accordingly,	expectations	
of	the	SATRC’s	report	were	high:	this	was	the	opportunity	for	the	Commission	to	compile	
a	full	and	detailed	account	of	the	conflict	as	well	as:	
	
to	clarify	exactly	who	had	been	responsible	for	past	traumas,	how	and	why	
these	had	been	inflicted,	and	to	dispel	any	lingering	doubts	about	who	had	
or	had	not	been	an	informer,	which	for	many	communities	was	a	particularly	
divisive	and	sensitive	issue.266		
	
Unfortunately,	however,	the	report	has	been	subject	to	considerable	criticism.		Bundy	
argues	that	the	SATRC,	 ‘charged	with	writing	an	official	history’,	failed	to	get	to	grips	
with	its	brief	and	presented	‘a	structurally	fragmented	historical	account,	in	which	the	
contradictory	 pulls	 of	 the	 TRC’s	 mandate	 exact	 a	 toll	 both	 epistemological	 and	
methodological.’267	For	Wilson,	the	report	is	‘a	multi-layered	document	drawing	upon	
many	different	types	of	material,	from	the	quantitative	sociological	analysis	of	findings	
to	the	testimonies	of	victims	at	hearings.’	268	He	considers	it	has	no	central	narrative	or	
overarching	truth	and	that	by	grouping	cases	together	under	themes	(detention,	deaths	
in	custody,	banishment,	for	example),	it	presented	fragmented	and	de-contextualised	
accounts	of	historical	incidents.269		
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To	 this	 criticism	 can	 be	 added	 that	 of	 Mamdani	 who,	 because	 the	 TRC	 ‘ignor[ed]	
everything	that	was	distinctive	about	apartheid	and	its	machinery	of	violence’270	derides	
the	TRC’s	‘diminished	truth’	as	having	been	‘established	through	narrow	lenses,	crafted	
to	 reflect	 the	experience	of	a	 tiny	minority’	of	victims	and	perpetrators.271	Mamdani	
does,	however,	acknowledge	the	TRC	for	discrediting	the	apartheid	regime	in	the	eyes	
of	its	beneficiaries	although	he	is	concerned	that	by	leaving	the	majority	of	victims	out	
of	its	version	of	history,	the	TRC	may	have	unwittingly	fomented	resentment	between	
them	and	the	white	community.272	
	
Posel	considers	there	is	a	primary	narrative	and	overriding	structure,	however,	arguing	
the	 report	 reads	 ‘less	as	a	history,	more	a	moral	narrative	about	 the	 fact	of	a	moral	
wrongdoing	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 spawned	 by	 the	 overriding	 evil	 of	 the	
apartheid	 system’.273	 	 The	 difficulty	 for	 the	 TRC	 was	 that	 expectations	 for	 a	
comprehensive,	detailed	narrative	of	individual	and	community	histories	conflicted	with	
its	 goals	 of	 nation-building	 and	 of	 creating	 a	 shared	 national	 history	which	 required	
merely	a	sample	of	the	truth;	just	enough	to	demonstrate	past	violations	and	achieve	
the	 desired	 consensus.274	 Accordingly,	 the	 historical	 exercise	 became	 primarily	 to	
narrate	the	moral	truth	about	wrongdoing,	conflict	and	injustice	by	selecting	a	relatively	
small	number	of	cases	to	exemplify	collective	‘truths’.275		
	
Another	 difficulty	 was	 the	 TRC’s	 mandate	 to	 reveal	 truths	 in	 the	 interests	 of	
‘reconciliation’	 conflicted	 with	 the	 awareness	 that	 rather	 than	 forgiveness	 and	
reconciliation,	 revelation	 could	 provoke	 further	 discord.276	 The	 requirement	 to	
document	the	whole	truth	was	tempered,	therefore,	by	the	realisation	that	a	detailed	
account	of	the	violent	past	could	endanger	the	fragile	new	state’s	peaceful	future.277	
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Notwithstanding	 the	 criticisms,	 the	 five-volume	 report	 produced	 by	 the	 SATRC	 was	
more	 comprehensive	 and	 detailed	 than	 any	 historical	 record	 that	 could	 have	 been	
produced	by	an	ICC	trial.	The	potential	for	trials	at	the	ICC	to	provide	a	comprehensive	
record	of	past	events	was	discussed	in	Chapter	Three	and	it	will	be	recalled	that	the	lens	
is	narrow,	focussed	on	the	offender’s	actions	and	mens	rea	 in	the	particular	incident.		
Minow	asserts	that	the	aspiration	of	producing	a	meaningful	record	of	the	past	is	better	
met	 by	 TCs	 than	 prosecutions	 because	 TCs	 ‘widen	 the	 lenses,	 sifting	 varieties	 of	
evidentiary	materials	and	drafting	syntheses	of	factual	material	that	usually	does	not	
accompany	a	 trial.’278	 	A	TRC	can	 focus	 its	enquiries	on	 the	 ‘role	of	entire	 sectors	of	
society	…in	enabling	and	failing	to	prevent	mass	violence.’279		Furthermore,	the	‘sheer	
narrative	project	of	a	TC	makes	it	more	likely	than	trials	to	yield	accounts	of	[the]	entire	
regime’.280	
	
For	Villa-Vicencio,	the	TRC	was	not	tasked	with	writing	an	‘official	history’	but	rather	a	
‘comment	from	its	perspective	on	a	given	period	of	history.	And	even	then,	the	voice	or	
perspective	of	the	Commission	was	rarely	a	single,	homogenous	one.’281		Far	more	than	
being	an	historical	comment,	therefore,	the	TRC’s	report	was	a	nation-building	chronicle	
of	moral	wrong-doing	prepared	with	the	intent	of	constructing	a	new	moral	unity	and	
as	such,	 it	can	be	argued	that	 it	did	 fulfil	 the	 ICJ	aim	of	establishing	a	past	 record	of	
events.	
	
Promoting	national	reconciliation	
	
One	rationale	for	TCs	is	that	by	revealing	and	officially	acknowledging	the	truth	about	
past	injustices,	cycles	of	resentment	and	mistrust	can	end,	general	social	reintegration	
is	fostered	and	reconciliation	is	facilitated.282	Chapter	Three	discussed	research	which	
identified	 ‘no	 direct	 link	 between	 criminal	 trials	 […]	 and	 reconciliation’	 because	
‘survivors	 rarely,	 if	ever,	connected	retributive	 justice	with	reconciliation’	which	they	
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viewed	 as	 ‘mostly	 a	 personal	matter	 to	 be	 settled	 between	 individuals’.283	 	With	 its	
emphasis	on	restorative	justice,	this	section	will	explore	whether	the	SATRC	achieved	
more.	
	
The	 PNURA	 gave	 the	 SATRC	 its	 overarching	 goal	 of	 promoting	 national	 unity	 and	
reconciliation	and	the	Act’s	silence	on	the	precise	meaning	of	this	aspect	of	its	mandate	
allowed	the	commission	considerable	interpretative	flexibility.	Unfortunately,	the	TRC’s	
approach	to	this	aspect	of	its	mandate	displayed	some	fundamental	shortcomings,	due	
inter	alia	to	its	failure	to	develop	a	clear	definition	or	understanding	of	the	meaning	of	
reconciliation	 within	 the	 context	 of	 its	 work.284	 In	 late	 1996,	 an	 official	 view	 of	
‘reconciliation’	had	been	formulated	by	the	TRC’s	Research	Unit	Director,	Charles	Villa-
Vicencio,	who	argued	that	instead	of	promoting	reconciliation	at	individual	level	(that	
is,	between	victim	and	perpetrator	or	between	social	groups),	the	TRC	should	enhance	
reconciliation	at	the	level	of	the	SA	nation,	viewing	the	nation	as	having	‘a	single	psyche,	
a	 collective	 conscience,	which	 is	 the	 repository	 of	 a	 collective	memory.’285	 A	 lack	 of	
internal	 agreement,	 however,	 resulted	 in	 Commissioners	 adopting	 divergent	 and	
sometimes	conflicting	approaches	to	reconciliation.286	Contrary	to	its	official	mandate,	
the	TRC	emphasised	interpersonal	reconciliation	rather	than	national	reconciliation287	
to	the	extent	that	during	the	early	HRVC	hearings,	Commissioners	‘made	the	mistake	of	
almost	demanding’	that	people	forgive	and	reconcile	before	realising	it	had	no	right	to	
make	such	a	demand.288		
	
The	SATRC	was	presented,	therefore,	as	a	means	to	reconcile	the	broken	nation	with	
signs	 and	 pamphlets	 at	 public	 meetings	 proclaiming	 ‘Truth,	 The	 Road	 to	
Reconciliation’.289	 	 Even	 the	 AC	 was	 influenced	 by	 the	 comprehensive	 theme	 of	
reconciliation,	often	basing	its	decisions	on	what	would	achieve	that	goal.290	Although	
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some	 hearings	 witnessed	 moving	 examples	 of	 forgiveness	 and	 reconciliation	 at	
individual	 and	 community	 level,	 particularly	 where	 perpetrators	 showed	 real	
remorse,291	after	the	TRC	concluded	 its	work,	the	general	 feeling	was	 it	had	failed	to	
achieve	widespread	 reconciliation,	national	or	 inter-personal.	 	 Indeed,	 long	before	 it	
delivered	its	final	report,	the	TRC	acknowledged	that	this	aim	had	been	unrealistic	and	
amended	 it	 to	 the	 ‘promotion’	 of	 reconciliation,	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 title	 of	 the	
PNURA.292		
	
Van	Zyl	Slabbert	says	the	TRC	‘was	doomed	from	the	start	to	fight	an	uphill	battle	as	an	
instrument	of	national	reconciliation’	because	the	‘indescribable	cruelty,	torture,	pain,	
confusion	and	senseless	suffering	experienced	by	victims	was	never,	other	than	in	highly	
exceptional	instances,	answered	with	confession	and	accountability.’293		He	argues	‘the	
willingness	to	forgive	on	the	one	hand,	without	confession	on	the	other,	makes	national	
reconciliation	almost	impossible.’294	This	criticism	equally	applies	to	criminal	trials	but	
unlike	trials,	the	SATRC	at	least	obliged	perpetrators	who	applied	for	amnesty	to	admit	
their	crimes.		The	TRC	also	caused	the	whole	nation	to	examine	its	past	and	to	recognise	
the	legitimacy	of	their	opponents’	claims	to	HR	abuses	which	arguably	is	a	pre-requisite	
of	reconciliation.295	
	
A	random	survey	on	the	TRC	conducted	by	MarkData	in	June/July	1997	found	that	of	
2240	people,	40%	thought	the	TRC	would	bring	SA	closer	together,	17%	expected	it	to	
make	people	more	willing	to	forgive,	27%	said	it	would	create	hostility	and	23%	that	it	
would	 make	 no	 difference.296	 The	 researchers	 state	 these	 findings	 suggested	 ‘fairly	
widespread	scepticism’	about	the	effectiveness	of	 the	TRC's	attempts	to	assist	South	
Africans	 in	 coming	 to	 terms	 with	 the	 past.297	 	 Theissen’s	 1999	 research	 revealed	
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‘consistent	racial	divisions	in	relation	to	key	questions	about	the	past,	about	the	TRC,	
and	about	the	way	South	Africans	view	the	need	to	address	the	legacy	of	apartheid.’298		
	
However,	 a	 representative	 survey	 of	 3700	 ‘ordinary	 South	 Africans’	 conducted	 by	
Gibson	in	2001	led	him	to	conclude	that	the	TRC	‘contributed	to	at	least	some	forms	of	
reconciliation	among	at	least	some	groups’	and	that	‘there	is	no	evidence	whatsoever	
that	the	“truth”	proclaimed	by	the	SATRC	damaged	reconciliation,	as	so	many	feared.’299	
Gibson	suggests	that	the	truth	process	facilitated	reconciliation	because	it	apportioned	
blame	to	all	sides	in	the	struggle	over	apartheid.300		The	‘most	certain	conclusion	of	this	
research	is	that	truth	did	not	undermine	reconciliation’	and	‘relatively	certain	is	[…]	that	
those	 subscribing	 to	 the	 TRC’s	 truth	 are	more	 likely	 to	 be	 reconciled.’301	 From	 this,	
Gibson	deduces	that	getting	people	to	accept	the	TRC’s	version	of	the	truth	is	the	key	
issue	for	societal	transformation.302		
	
Including	 the	 word	 ‘reconciliation’	 in	 the	 TC’s	 title	 possibly	 created	 unrealistic	
expectations	that	reconciliation	would	be	achieved	solely	by	the	Commission’s	work.303	
Healing,	 national	 unity	 and	 reconciliation	 depend	 on	 a	 state’s	 political,	 social	 and	
economic	 future	and	are	processes	achieved	by	 the	whole	community,	possibly	over	
decades.304	 SA	 has	 experienced	 over	 20	 years	 of	 democracy,	 transitioning	 from	
apartheid	 with	 remarkably	 little	 bloodshed,	 a	 crucial	 factor	 being	 the	 TRC,	 which	
provided	 a	 framework	 within	 which	 steps	 for	 societal	 change	 could	 be	 taken.	 A	
comprehensive	 evaluation	 of	 the	 SATRC’s	 contribution	 towards	 reconciliation	would	
require	 assessment	 of	 a	 far	 wider	 range	 of	 activities	 and	 sources,	 305	 however,	 a	
fundamental	requirement	for	any	future	TC	should	be	that	it	is	framed	to	provide	the	
opportunity	 for	 national	 debate	 in	 pursuit	 of	 the	 goal	 of	 promoting	 national	
reconciliation.306	
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Re-establishing	the	Rule	of	Law	
	
One	primary	argument	in	support	of	criminal	trials	is	they	encourage	respect	for	the	rule	
of	law,	essential	for	a	state	transitioning	from	conflict	to	democracy.	However,	in	SA	the	
system	of	apartheid	was	lawful	and	the	state	had	the	institutional	means	to	enforce	it.		
SA	experienced	a	breakdown	of	law	and	order	in	the	late	1980s	and	before	the	1994	
election,	due	to	the	unwillingness	of	political	parties307	and	certain	elements	of	society	
to	accept	the	outcome	of	the	negotiations.		After	the	election,	however,	the	incidence	
of	such	extreme	violence	greatly	decreased	and	there	was	relative	calm.		
	
Clearly,	during	the	apartheid	era	the	legal	order	did	not	uphold	international	standards	
and	the	black	community	hated	all	the	repressive	institutions	that	upheld	the	apartheid	
state.		Referring	to	the	ANC	government’s	need	to	suppress	township	‘vigilantes’	and	
lynch	mobs,	Wilson	states	‘the	SATRC	was	part	of	a	general	and	long-term	orientation	
within	 state	 institutions	which	 asserted	 the	 state’s	 ability	 to	 rein	 in	 and	 control	 the	
informal	adjudicative	and	policing	structures	in	civil	society.’308	Acknowledging	that	‘any	
form	of	amnesty’	was	not	unjustifiable	and	perhaps	even	‘politically	indispensable	at	the	
time’,	he	then	argues	that:		
	
drawing	upon	international	HR	to	reinforce	trials	[…]	would	not	only	have	
the	advantage	of	fortifying	the	rule	of	law	and	indirectly	addressing	wider	
criminalisation	 in	 society	 but	 would	 have	 linked	 HR	 to	 popular	
understandings	 of	 justice	 and	 accorded	 HR-orientated	 institutions	 much	
greater	legitimacy	in	the	process.309	
	
	
However,	although	the	legal	system	was	functional,	the	predominance	of	white	judges	
and	prosecutors,	who	remained	in	place	after	the	1994	election,	meant	that	it	was	ill-
equipped	for	this	task,	as	the	trial	of	Magnus	Malan	had	demonstrated.		
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Most	 South	 Africans	 believed	 that	 the	 TRC	 fulfilled	 its	 aim	 of	 uncovering	 past	
atrocities.310	The	white	community	could	not	deny	the	truth	of	the	horrors	of	apartheid	
because	the	confessions	of	the	perpetrators	of	gross	HR	violations	against	the	blacks	
were	extensively	reported	in	the	media.311	It	is	unlikely	that	an	ICC	trial	would	have	been	
as	effective	in	this	regard,	since	a	finding	of	guilt	can	still	provide	space	for	denial.		
	
The	SATRC	contributed	to	the	aim	of	establishing	respect	for	the	law	by	proposing	the	
reforms	necessary	for	the	recognition	of	victims	as	right-holders,	for	fostering	civic	trust	
and	 for	preventing	 future	HR	violations.312	Only	when	the	need	 for	 reform	had	been	
accepted	and	put	into	effect	in	the	institutions	of	state	that	enforced	and	upheld	the	
law	could	respect	for	the	rule	of	law	permeate	through	the	whole	of	society.		
	
Contributing	to	the	restoration	of	peace	
	
SA’s	 transition	 from	 authoritarianism	 to	 democracy	 was	 different	 from	many	 states	
because	 although	 it	 had	 suffered	 extreme	 political	 violence,	 apartheid	 ended	 by	
negotiation.	 	 However,	 had	 a	 TRC	 not	 been	 agreed	 as	 the	 acceptable	 means	 of	
addressing	the	HR	violations	committed	under	apartheid,	peace	talks	may	have	failed	
and	the	risk	of	prolonged	violence	in	SA	would	have	heightened.		Once	apartheid	ended	
and	 the	 country	 had	 a	 democratically-elected	 president,	 the	 need	 for	 politically	
motivated	violence	ended.		It	would	be	fair,	therefore,	to	credit	some	of	the	success	of	
the	 transition	 to	 the	 establishment	 and	 operation	 of	 the	 TRC.	 	 Further,	 the	 reforms	
proposed	 by	 SATRC	 contributed	 to	 fostering	 social	 integration	 and	 the	 official	
acknowledgment	of	abuses	assisted	curtailment	of	resentment	and	mistrust.	
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Conclusion	
	
In	this	chapter,	the	SATRC	has	been	appraised	to	ascertain	whether	it	satisfied	the	same	
ICJ	goals	established	for	the	ICC.	 	The	aim	is	to	find	a	generic	model	TC	based	on	the	
SATRC,	which	would	persuade	the	ICC	to	declare	a	case	inadmissible.		It	is	obvious	that	
no	one	system	of	justice	is	perfect	and	in	the	case	of	a	country	transitioning	from	conflict	
or	authoritarian	rule,	justice	may	require	more	than	prosecutions	and	punishment.		In	
political	 transitions,	 justice	 is	defined	by	 the	nature	of	 the	 injustices	 suffered	 in	 that	
State,	 so	 it	 is	 always	 contextual,	 a	 factor	 which	 the	 ICC	 must	 acknowledge.	 	 SA	
experienced	decades	of	oppression	and	violent	HR	abuses	which	left	its	society	deeply	
polarised,	 resentful	 and	 distrustful.	 	 Justice	 had	 to	 include	 a	 nationwide	
acknowledgement	of	the	illegitimacy	of	apartheid	which	necessitated	not	only	victims	
and	perpetrators	but	also	the	beneficiaries	of	the	apartheid	regime	being	involved	in	the	
process.		Justice	required	the	de-criminalisation	of	those	who	resisted	apartheid	and	the	
establishment	of	equality	of	rights	and	before	the	law.		SA	society	needed	to	experience	
reconstruction	and	reconciliation	if	it	was	to	enjoy	the	peace,	unity	and	well-being	of	all	
its	citizens	as	called	for	in	its	Constitution.	
	
There	are	 features	of	 the	 SATRC	 that	 should	be	 improved,	 lessons	 to	be	 learned	 for	
future	TCs,	some	of	which	were	beyond	the	control	of	the	Commission.		The	failure	to	
deal	properly	with	the	issue	of	reparations,	for	example,	was	a	serious	mistake	of	the	
government,	 leading	 to	antipathy	 towards	 the	TRC,	as	 for	many	 ‘the	main	motive	 in	
coming	forward	was	simply	the	hope	of	material	compensation’.313	 	Additionally,	 the	
criteria	for	selecting	the	2000	witnesses	who	gave	evidence	at	the	public	hearings	from	
the	over	21000	who	gave	statements	was	never	publicised,	 leading	to	‘a	hierarchy	of	
victimhood	experience’	and	criticism	of	the	TRC	for	‘insensitivity	towards	the	fact	that	
exclusion	 could	 compound	 injuries	 and	experience	of	marginalizaton.’314	 	Clearly	 the	
SATRC	could	not	hear	from	everyone	who	provided	a	statement	but	giving	details	of	the	
reasons	for	witness	selection	could	have	prevented	these	negative	responses.			
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The	 impact	of	 testifying	differed	between	witnesses,	with	some	benefitting	 from	the	
acknowledgment	 and	 support	 the	 TRC	 gave	 them	 and	 others	 having	 a	 negative	 or	
detrimental	experience.		Whether	testifying	at	an	ICC	trial	would	be	less	traumatic	for	
the	 latter	 group	 is	 unlikely	 but	 certainly	 future	 TCs	 should	 offer	 improved	 support	
(including	follow-up	contact)	for	witnesses,	to	ensure	their	physical	and	psychological	
well-being.	 	Another	 area	 for	 improvement	 is	 the	 SATRC’s	 limited	gender	 sensitivity,	
acknowledged	 in	 its	 report,	 which	 Kashyap	 states	 is	 ‘particularly	 significant	 as	 it	
reiterates	the	TRC’s	commitment	to	gender	issues	and	its	influences	in	SA	politics.’315		
To	its	credit,	the	SATRC	did	respond	to	calls	for	the	hearings	to	be	gender	conscious	but	
of	course,	this	initial	oversight	should	be	avoided	by	future	TCs.		
	
The	situation	of	offenders	waiting	until	they	were	the	subject	of	a	police	investigation	
before	applying	for	amnesty	also	should	be	avoided	in	any	future	TC	proposal,	possibly	
by	 imposing	 a	 condition	 that	 once	 a	 criminal	 investigation	 has	 commenced,	 the	
opportunity	 to	 apply	 for	 amnesty	 is	 withdrawn,	 a	 condition	 which	 could	 have	 the	
primary	effect	of	encouraging	early	applications	for	amnesty.		Clearly,	the	political	will	
to	follow	through	with	prosecutions	of	those	who	did	not	apply	or	were	refused	amnesty	
was	lacking	in	South	Africa	and	this	is	also	something	that	would	have	to	be	addressed	
by	a	future	TC	model.	
	
Sarkin	has	identified	numerous	deficiencies	in	the	amnesty	process	which	would	need	
to	be	addressed	by	any	generic	TC	model.	 	These	 included	the	superficial	nature	and	
minimal	number	of	investigations	undertaken	to	test	the	veracity	of	evidence;316	grave	
inequalities	between	respective	groups	regarding	access	to	legal	representation;317	an	
inconsistent	approach318	and	 insufficient	efforts	to	ensure	victim	participation.319	 	He	
also	assesses	the	extent	and	types	of	inconsistencies	arising	from	the	TRC’s	assessment,	
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methodology	and	application	of	amnesty	provisions	relating	to	full	disclosure,	political	
objective	 and	 ‘proportionality’.320	 	 He	 concludes	 that	 amnesty	 hearings	 achieved	
accountability	 through	 the	 democratic	 legislative	 process	 and	 criteria	 for	 granting	
amnesty	but	with	research	suggesting	that	applicants	tailored	their	evidence	specifically	
to	fit	the	criteria	for	amnesty	and	within	this	context,	to	achieve	their	political	objectives,	
whether	this	culpability	was	meaningful	is	debatable.321		
		
Notwithstanding	 these	 issues,	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 SATRC	 demonstrated	 a	
willingness	to	explore	an	alternative	way	of	addressing	the	inequities	of	the	past	which	
was	 rooted	 in	 restorative	 rather	 than	 retributive	 justice	 and	 this	 was	
contemporaneously	 lauded	 by	 the	 international	 community.	 	 Whether	 today	 there	
would	be	an	international	call	for	prosecutions	is	interesting	to	speculate.		Clearly	it	is	
very	disappointing	that	many	perpetrators	of	gross	violations	of	HR	did	not	apply	for	
amnesty	and	that	SA	did	not	proceed	with	prosecutions	against	them	subsequently.		A	
future	 TC	 would	 have	 to	 address	 these	 issues,	 to	 satisfy	 the	 ICC’s	 demands	 for	
accountability	and	justice.		Whether	the	existence	of	the	ICC	and	threat	of	international	
prosecution	would	 encourage	more	 amnesty	 applications	 is	 a	 pertinent	question.	 	 It	
certainly	might	discourage	leaders	from	wilfully	obstructing	and/or	failing	to	co-operate	
with	the	TC	as	occurred	in	SA.	
	
Any	ICC	assessment	of	a	TC	would	necessitate	a	thorough	examination	of	the	situation	
which	led	to	the	atrocities	being	committed	because	TCs	do	not	work	in	every	context.		
For	example,	research	conducted	in	Ghana,	Sierra	Leone	and	Liberia	reveals	that	‘[t]ruth	
Commissions	 face	 greater	 challenges	 carrying	 out	 their	mandates	 in	 post-conflict	 as	
opposed	 to	 post-authoritarian	 societies’	 where	 the	 state	 has	 perpetuated	 abuses	
against	its	citizens.322		In	post-conflict	societies,	weak	institutions	combined	with	huge	
numbers	 of	 victims	 and	 perpetrators	 can	 overwhelm	 a	 TC323	 whereas	 SA	 possessed	
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strong	institutions	to	support	the	TRC.324		Also,	the	need	for	truth	held	great	significance	
because	‘deception	[was]	so	central	to	the	abuses.’325		In	post-conflict	contexts,	abuses	
normally	have	been	committed	openly	so	truth	holds	less	significance.326		Thus,	the	ICC	
should	 acknowledge	 that	 transitional	 context	 can	 determine	 the	 transitional	 justice	
mechanism	chosen	by	the	state	to	deal	with	its	past.	
	
Accordingly,	 the	 ICC’s	 assessment	 should	 acknowledge	 national	 support,	 particularly	
from	victims,	for	a	state’s	proposal	that	a	TC	address	past	HR	violations.		It	should	ensure	
that	 the	 national	 consensus	 was	 achieved	 following	 widespread	 consultation	 and	
participation	and	that	dissent	has	been	respected.		It	should	ascertain	that	the	TRC	is	
well-resourced	and	its	commissioners	democratically	appointed	as	this	contributes	to	
moral	authority	of	its	leadership.		Once	the	ICC	has	satisfied	itself	on	these	fundamental	
concerns,	it	should	examine	the	capacity	of	the	TC	to	attain	the	goals	of	ICJ	outlined	in	
this	 thesis	by	examining	 the	TC’s	mandate	and	 investigating	 its	capacity	 for	attaining	
those	goals.	
	
In	his	graduation	address	(Honorary	Doctor	of	Laws)	to	Witwatersrand	University	on	1st	
September1998	when	talking	of	the	proposed	ICC	and	the	SATRC,	Kofi	Annan	stated:	
	
The	purpose	of	the	clause	in	the	Statute	[which	allows	the	Court	to	intervene	
where	the	State	is	‘unwilling	or	unable’	to	exercise	jurisdiction]	is	to	ensure	
that	mass-murderers	and	other	arch-criminals	cannot	shelter	behind	a	State	
run	by	themselves	or	their	cronies	or	take	advantage	of	a	general	breakdown	
of	law	and	order.		No	one	should	imagine	that	it	would	apply	to	a	case	like	
SA’s,	where	the	regime	and	the	conflict	that	caused	the	crimes	have	come	
to	an	end	and	the	victims	have	inherited	power.	
	
It	is	inconceivable	that,	in	such	a	case,	the	Court	would	seek	to	substitute	its	
judgment	for	that	of	a	whole	nation	that	 is	seeking	the	best	way	to	put	a	
traumatic	past	behind	it	and	build	a	better	future.327		
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This	chapter	has	attempted	to	show	that	in	some	contexts,	ICJ	can	be	achieved	other	
than	by	trials	at	the	ICC	and	in	such	situations,	it	should	be	inconceivable	that	the	ICC	
would	 intervene.	 	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 situations	 like	 SA	 require	 flexibility	 of	
interpretation	 of	 the	 RSt	 and	 ICC	 judges	 should	 be	 prepared	 to	 accede	 to	 a	 state’s	
genuine	intention	to	uphold	ICJ	goals	by	alternative	means.			
	
In	the	next	chapter,	the	accuracy	of	Kofi	Annan’s	statement	at	Witwatersrand	University	
is	 examined.	 	 The	 procedure	 for	 a	 state	 challenge	 to	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 ICC	 is	
discussed	and	the	jurisprudence	of	the	court	is	scrutinised	to	establish	the	criteria	used	
by	ICC	judges	to	determine	the	admissibility	of	a	case	and	whether	this	criteria	reflects	
the	ICJ	aims	discussed	in	this	thesis.	
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CHAPTER	SEVEN	
	 	
THE	CHALLENGING	REGIME	AT	THE	INTERNATIONAL	CRIMINAL	COURT	
	
Introduction	
	
The	 preceding	 three	 chapters	 have	 discussed	 the	 ability	 of	 alternative	 justice	
mechanisms	(AJMs)	to	satisfy	the	requirements	of	international	criminal	justice	(ICJ),	in	
support	of	the	central	argument	that	if	a	state	has	selected	an	AJM	which	can	fulfil	the	
same	ICJ	goals	that	are	attributed	to	trials	at	the	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC),	the	
Court	 should	 defer	 prosecutions.	 The	 outstanding	 questions	 now	 arising	 from	 this	
enquiry	are:	if	a	state	challenges	the	admissibility	of	a	case	based	on	an	AJM,	will	the	
Court	 assess	 the	 AJM’s	 potential	 to	 attain	 ICJ	 goals	 that	 are	 attributed	 to	 criminal	
prosecutions	and	following	such	an	assessment,	 if	 the	AJM	is	 found	to	be	capable	of	
satisfying	the	same	goals,	will	the	ICC	will	defer	prosecutions	in	favour	of	that	AJM?			
	
In	this	chapter,	to	answer	these	questions,	the	ICC’s	regime	from	a	situation	first	coming	
to	 the	 Prosecutor’s	 attention	 to	 the	 commencement	 of	 a	 trial	 will	 be	 examined,	 to	
establish	the	procedural	steps	required	and	obstacles	facing	a	state	wishing	to	challenge	
the	intervention	of	the	ICC.		The	Rome	Statute	of	the	ICC	1998	(RSt)	and	the	ICC’s	Rules	
of	Procedure	and	Evidence	2002	(RPE)	will	be	scrutinised	as	part	of	this	process.		The	
jurisprudence	of	 the	Court	will	 be	 examined	 to	discover	 the	 factors	 ICC	 judges	have	
applied	to	date	when	considering	admissibility	challenges	and	to	gauge	the	likelihood	of	
a	 challenge	 to	 the	 admissibility	 of	 a	 case	 before	 the	 ICC	 based	 on	 an	 AJM	 being	
successful.	
	
It	is	argued	that	in	these	days	of	substantial	African	disenchantment	with	the	ICC,	it	is	
more	 important	 than	 ever	 that	 the	 Court	 should	 demonstrate	 flexibility	 in	 its	
interpretation	of	 its	mandate,	especially	as	 it	was	anticipated	by	the	delegates	at	the	
Rome	Conference	in	1998	that	‘creative	ambiguity’	would	give	space	for	it	to	do	so	in	
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the	case	of	AJMs.1		Article	17(1)(a),	states	that	the	Court	shall	determine	that	a	case	is	
inadmissible	where:	
	
The	case	is	being	investigated	or	prosecuted	by	a	State	which	has	jurisdiction	
over	 it,	unless	 the	State	 is	unwilling	or	unable	genuinely	 to	 carry	out	 the	
investigation	or	prosecution	
	
Stahn	suggest	this	provision	‘appears	to	allow	some	flexibility	for	deference	in	the	case	
of	parallel	and	ongoing	investigations	in	a	domestic	forum.’2		Other	commentators	have	
suggested	that	the	ICC	should	defer,	for	example,	to	TC	initiatives	‘where	such	initiatives	
are	legitimate	and	necessary	mechanisms	for	a	transition	from	repression	or	violence	to	
a	stable	democracy.’3		This	chapter	will	investigate	whether	there	is	any	evidence	that	
the	ICC	would	give	effect	to	this	suggestion.	
	
The	Jurisdiction	of	the	ICC	
	
Before	considering	admissibility,	the	ICC	must	establish	that	it	has	jurisdiction	to	deal	
with	the	alleged	crimes	and	their	perpetrators	since	 if	 jurisdiction	does	not	exist,	the	
question	 of	 admissibility	 does	 not	 arise.	 	 The	 ICC’s	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 crimes	 of	
genocide,	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 and	 war	 crimes4	 came	 into	 effect	 when	 the	 RSt	
entered	into	force	on	1st	July	2002,5	does	not	apply	retrospectively6	and	no	statute	of	
limitations	 applies	 to	 its	 jurisdiction.7	 	 Ratification	 of	 the	 RSt	 confirms	 a	 state’s	
acceptance	of	the	Court’s	jurisdiction,8	which	extends	to	nationals	of	State	Party’s	(SP)	
to	the	RSt	9	or	of	states	that	have	accepted	the	ICC’s	jurisdiction10	and	to	persons	who	
																																																						
1	See	p48-49	ante	
2	Stahn,	C.	(2005)	‘Complementarity,	Amnesties	and	Alternative	Forms	of	Justice:	Some	Interpretative	Guidelines	for	
the	International	Criminal	Court’	3	JICJ	pp695-720	at	p710	
3	Robinson,	D.	(2003)	‘Serving	the	Interests	of	Justice:	Amnesties,	Truth	Commissions	and	the	International	Criminal	
Court’	14	EJIL	pp481-505	at	p482	
4	Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	1998,	Article	5	(defined	in	Articles	6,	7	and	8	respectively)	
5	Article	11(1)	
6	Article	24	
7	Article	29	
8	Article	12(1)	
9	Article	12(2)(b)	
10	In	accordance	with	Article	12(3)	
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have	committed	crimes	on	the	territory	of	an	SP,11	provided	in	all	cases	the	offender	is	
over	18	at	the	time	of	the	alleged	crime12	and	regardless	of	any	official	capacity	held.13	
	
The	Admissibility	of	Cases	before	the	ICC	
	
Once	the	Court	has	established	it	has	the	required	jurisdiction,	it	must	examine	whether	
the	case	is	admissible.		Article	17	of	the	RSt	deals	with	issues	of	admissibility	and	the	
reverse	wording	of	 the	article	makes	 it	 clear	 that	 all	 cases	are	admissible	 to	 the	 ICC	
unless	 the	 exceptions	 outlined	 in	 paragraphs	 (a)	 to	 (d)	 apply.	 	 One	 exception	 to	
admissibility	is	the	legal	principle	ne	bis	in	idem,14		which	states	the	same	person	shall	
not	be	tried	twice	for	the	same	crime,	either	in	the	same	court	or	another	court,	whether	
convicted	or	acquitted,	provided	the	earlier	proceedings	were	genuine.15		
	
A	second	exception	to	admissibility	is	that	the	crime	is	not	of	sufficient	gravity	to	justify	
prosecution	by	the	ICC.16		The	issue	of	gravity	has	led	to	some	ICC	judicial	debate	and	
disagreement.		In	Lubanga,	Pre-Trial	Chamber	1	(PTC1)	declared	that	because	all	crimes	
within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	ICC	are	serious	per	se,	when	determining	admissibility,	their	
gravity	should	be	assessed	separately	using	three	questions	to	establish	whether	the	
gravity	threshold	is	satisfied:17			
	
1. Is	the	conduct	which	is	the	object	of	a	case	systematic	or	large	scale	(due	
consideration	 should	 also	 be	 given	 to	 the	 social	 alarm	 caused	 to	 the	
international	community	by	the	relevant	type	of	conduct)?	
2. Considering	 the	 position	 of	 the	 relevant	 person	 in	 the	 State	 entity,	
organisation	or	armed	group	to	which	he	belongs,	can	it	be	considered	
																																																						
11	Article	12((2)(a)	‘Territory’	includes	a	vessel	or	aircraft	registered	to	an	SP	
12	Article	26	
13	Article	27	(Nor	do	immunities	or	special	procedural	rules	attaching	to	the	official	capacity	of	a	person		
bar	the	Court	from	exercising	its	jurisdiction	over	that	person)	
14	Articles	17(1)(c)	and	20(1)-(3).			
15	Article	20(3)(a)-(b)	
16	Article	17(1)(d)	
17	The	Prosecutor	v.	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo	(Lubanga)	ICC-01/04-01/06,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	for	
a	warrant	of	arrest,	Article	58	10	February	2006	(Arrest	warrant	decision)	
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that	such	a	person	falls	within	the	category	of	most	senior	leaders	of	the	
situation	under	investigation?				
3. Does	the	relevant	person	fall	within	the	category	of	most	senior	leaders	
suspected	of	being	most	responsible,	considering	(i)	the	role	played	by	
the	relevant	person	through	acts	or	omissions	when	the	State	entities,	
organisations	or	armed	groups	to	which	he	belongs	commit	systematic	
or	large-scale	crimes	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	and	(ii)	the	role	
played	 by	 such	 state	 entities,	 organisations	 or	 armed	 groups	 in	 the	
overall	commission	of	crimes	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	in	the	
relevant	situation?18		
	
The	Appeal	Chamber	(ACh),	however,	held	this	three-pronged	test	was	incorrect	as	the	
‘distinction	between	the	jurisdictional	requirements	for	war	crimes	and	crimes	against	
humanity’	was	blurred	by	the	requirement	that	conduct	be	either	systematic	or	large	
scale19	and	that	‘social	alarm’	depends	on	‘subjective	and	contingent	reactions	to	crimes	
rather	than	upon	their	objective	gravity’	which	‘is	not	a	consideration	that	is	necessarily	
appropriate	 for	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 admissibility	 of	 a	 case’.20	 	 The	 ACh	 also	
disapproved	of	PTC1’s	focus	on	the	most	senior	perpetrators	as	potentially	having	the	
greatest	deterrent	effect,21	arguing	that	the	fact	that	any	perpetrator	could	be	brought	
before	the	Court	would	have	the	greatest	deterrent	effect.22	
	
PTC1	subsequently	took	the	ACh’s	comments	to	be	obiter	dicta,23		leaving	the	factors	to	
be	 considered	when	 assessing	 gravity	 in	 connection	with	 the	 admissibility	 of	 a	 case	
rather	unclear.		Reference	to	the	travaux	préparatoires	provides	some	guidance	since	
during	 International	 Law	 Commission	 discussions	 in	 1994,	 it	was	 suggested	 that	 the	
Court	 could	 have	 the	 power	 to	 stay	 a	 prosecution	 if	 ‘the	 acts	 alleged	 were	 not	 of	
																																																						
18	Ibid	para.	63	
19	Situation	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	(DRC)	ICC-01/04	Judgment	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Appeal	Against	the	
Decision	of	PTC1	Entitled	‘Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	for	Warrants	of	Arrest,	Article	58’	13	July	2006,	
para.	70	(DRC	Arrest	warrant	judgment)	
20	Ibid	para.	72	
21	Lubanga	Arrest	warrant	decision	paras.	54-55	
22	DRC	Arrest	warrant	judgment	para.	73	
23	Situation	in	Darfur,	Sudan	ICC-02/05-01/09	Decision	on	the	Prosecution’s	Application	for	a	Warrant	of	Arrest	
against	Omar	Hassan	Ahmad	Al	Bashir	4	March	2009	(Bashir)	para.	48,	fn51	
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sufficient	gravity	to	warrant	trial	at	international	level.	 	Failing	such	power,	the	Court	
might	 be	 swamped	 by	 peripheral	 complaints	 involving	 minor	 offenders,	 possibly	 in	
situations	where	the	major	offenders	were	going	free.’24	This	would	suggest	that	PTC1’s	
interpretation	 of	 the	 gravity	 provision	 is	 correct,	 although	 deGuzman	 states	 PTC1’s	
‘exceptionally	high	gravity	threshold	risked	detracting	from	the	Court’s	ability	to	fulfil	its	
most	important	objectives’.25		However,	given	that	all	crimes	within	the	jurisdiction	of	
the	 ICC	 are	 serious,	 the	 question	 arises	why	 the	 additional	 gravity	 requirement	was	
included	as	an	exclusion	to	admissibility	by	the	drafters	of	the	RSt	if	it	were	not	intended		
to	be	a	separate	assessment?		
	
This	appears	to	be	PTC1’s	view	since,	ignoring	the	ACh’s	obiter	dictum,	it	held	in	the	Abu	
Garda	 case	 that	 the	 ‘‘sufficient	 gravity’	 threshold	 […]	 ‘is	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 [Statute]	
drafters’	careful	selection	of	crimes	included	in	articles	6	to	8	of	the	Statute’.’26		Hence,	
PTC1	continued,	‘‘the	fact	that	a	case	addresses	one	of	the	most	serious	crimes	for	the	
international	community	as	a	whole	is	not	sufficient	for	it	to	be	admissible	before	the	
Court’.’27		PTC1	also	commented	that	when	assessing	the	gravity	of	a	case,	‘‘the	issues	
of	the	nature,	manner	and	impact	of	the	[alleged]	attack	are	critical’.’28	Further:	
			
the	gravity	of	a	given	case	should	not	be	assessed	only	from	a	quantitative	
perspective,	i.e.	by	considering	the	number	of	victims;	rather	the	qualitative	
dimension	 of	 the	 crime	 should	 also	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration	 when	
assessing	the	gravity	of	a	given	case.29	
	
	
The	qualitative	factors	to	be	taken	into	consideration	appear	in	RPE	145(1)(c)30	and	assist	
the	 Court	 in	 determining	 sentence.	 	 PTC1	 viewed	 them	 as	 useful	 guidelines	 when	
																																																						
24	YBILC	1994,	vol	1	UN	Doc.	A/CN.4/SR.2330	Summary	record	of	the	2330th	meeting,	para.	9			
25	deGuzman,	M.M.	(2008)	‘Gravity	and	the	Legitimacy	of	ICC’	Fordham	ILJ	pp1400-1465	at	p1428	
26	The	Prosecutor	v.	Bahar	Idriss	Abu	Garda	(Abu	Garda)	ICC-02/05-02/09	Decision	on	the	Confirmation	of	Charges	8	
February	2010	(Decision	on	Charges)	para.	30	(quoting	Lubanga	Arrest	warrant	decision	para.	41)	
27	Ibid	
28	Ibid	para.	31	
29	Ibid		
30	PTCs	have	consistently	held	that	factors	listed	in	RPE	145(1)(c)	may	assist	in	evaluating	gravity,	see	e.g.	The	
Prosecutor	v.	Charles	Blé	Goudé	ICC-02/11-02/11	Decision	on	the	Defence	challenge	to	the	admissibility	of	the	case	
against	Charles	Blé	Goudé	for	insufficient	gravity	12	November	2014,	para.	12;	Situation	in	the	Republic	of	Côte	
D’Ivoire	ICC/02/11	Decision	Pursuant	to	Article	15	of	the	Rome	Statute	on	the	Authorisation	of	an	Investigation	into	
the	Situation	in	the	Republic	of	Côte	d’Ivoire	3	October	2011,	para.	204	
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evaluating	the	gravity	threshold	required	by	Article	17(1)(d)31	as	they	refer,	inter	alia,	to	
‘the	extent	of	the	damage	caused,	in	particular	the	harm	caused	to	the	victims	and	their	
families,	the	nature	of	the	unlawful	behaviour	and	the	means	employed	to	execute	the	
crime’.			In	proceedings	relating	to	the	situation	in	Kenya,32	PTC2	added	‘[r]egarding	the	
qualitative	dimension,	it	is	not	the	number	of	victims	that	matter	but	rather	the	existence	
of	some	aggravating	or	qualitative	factors	attached	to	the	commission	of	crimes,	which	
makes	 it	 grave.’33	 	PTC2	also	 relied	on	 the	aggravating	circumstance	 to	be	 taken	 into	
account	on	determining	sentence	 listed	 in	RPE	145(2)(b)(iv)	which	specifies	 the	crime	
being	committed	with	particular	cruelty	or	there	being	multiple	victims.		The	Chamber	
went	on	to	list	the	factors	to	be	considered	as:	
	
1. The	 scale	of	 the	alleged	crimes	 (including	assessment	of	geographical	 and	
temporal	intensity)	
2. The	nature	of	the	unlawful	behavior	or	of	the	crimes	allegedly	committed	
3. The	employed	means	for	the	execution	of	the	crimes	(i.e.	the	manner	of	their	
commission	
4. The	impact	of	the	crimes	and	the	harm	caused	to	victims	and	their	families34	
	
The	jurisprudence	of	the	PTCs	therefore	sets	the	bar	quite	high	for	gravity,	which	could	
assist	 the	 state	 relying	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 complementarity	 to	 retain	 jurisdiction	 in	
preference	 for	 an	 AJM.	 	 Although	 the	 PTCs	 seem	 all	 to	 agree,	 there	 is	 unresolved	
disagreement	between	the	PTCs	and	the	ACh	regarding	the	test	to	be	applied	and	this	
uncertainty	perhaps	could	be	used	to	the	state’s	advantage	in	a	challenge.		The	state	
potentially	could	argue	that	despite	the	alleged	crimes	coming	within	the	jurisdiction	of	
the	ICC,	their	gravity	does	not	fulfil	the	Court’s	strict	criteria	and	therefore	the	case	is	
inadmissible	and	can	be	dealt	with	nationally	by	means	of	an	AJM.	
	
																																																						
31	Abu	Garda	Decision	on	Charges	para.	32	
32	Situation	in	the	Republic	of	Kenya	ICC-01/09	Decision	Pursuant	to	Article	15	of	the	Rome	Statute	on	the	
Authorization	of	an	Investigation	into	the	Situation	in	the	Republic	of	Kenya	31	March	2010,	para.	62	(Kenya	
Investigation	Authority)	
33	Ibid.	In	making	this	comment,	PTC2	noted	the	observations	of	Schabas,	W.A.	(2009)	‘Prosecutorial	Discretion	and	
Gravity’	in	Stahn,	C.	and	Sluiter,	G.	(eds.)	The	Emerging	Practice	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(Leiden,	Boston:	
Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers)	pp245-6	
34	Kenya	Investigation	Authority	para.	62		
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Notwithstanding	these	two	exceptions	to	the	admissibility	of	a	case	to	the	ICC,	by	far	
the	most	significant	provisions	for	a	state	wishing	to	retain	jurisdiction	for	the	purpose	
of	an	AJM	are	those	contained	in	Article	17(1)(a)	which,	by	way	of	reminder,	provides	
that	where	a	case	‘is	being	investigated	or	prosecuted	by	a	State	which	has	jurisdiction	
over	it’	the	case	is	inadmissible	to	the	ICC	and	17(1)(b)	which	provides	that	a	case	is	also	
inadmissible	if	it	has	been	investigated	by	the	State	with	jurisdiction	and	‘the	State	has	
decided	not	to	prosecute	the	person	concerned’.	
	
Article	17	confirms,	 therefore,	 that	 the	Court’s	 function	 is	 complementary	 to	 that	of	
national	jurisdictions,	which	means	it	is	a	state	with	jurisdiction	and	not	the	ICC	that	has	
the	first	and	overriding	right	and	responsibility	to	investigate	and	prosecute	a	case	and	
this	 right	 can	 only	 be	 overridden	 by	 the	 ICC	 if	 the	 state	 is	 inactive	 or	 if	 the	 Court	
determines	that	the	state	is	not	exercising	its	right	with	the	genuine	purpose	of	bringing	
the	 accused	 to	 justice.	 	 The	 Article	 17	 exception	 to	 the	 supremacy	 of	 national	
jurisdictions	 therefore	 states	 a	 case	 is	 inadmissible	 to	 the	 ICC	 unless	 ‘the	 State	 is	
unwilling	or	unable	genuinely	to	carry	out	the	investigation	or	prosecution’.35	Likewise,	
if	 a	 state	 has	 investigated	 the	 case	 and	 has	 decided	 not	 to	 prosecute,	 the	 case	 is	
inadmissible	to	the	ICC	unless	that	decision	resulted	from	‘an	unwillingness	or	inability	
of	the	State	genuinely	to	prosecute’.36			
	
The	 RSt	 provides	 guidance	 on	 what	 constitutes	 ‘unwillingness’	 and	 ‘inability’	 to	
investigate	or	prosecute	‘genuinely’.	 	Unwillingness	is	demonstrated	by	proceedings37	
undertaken	 in	 order	 to	 shield	 the	offender	 from	 criminal	 responsibility,	 or	 taking	 an	
inordinate	length	of	time	to	bring	proceedings	(thereby	indicating	a	lack	of	intention	to	
bring	the	offender	to	justice)	and/or	conducting	proceedings	which	are	not	independent	
and	impartial	or	in	a	manner	which	is	deemed	inconsistent	with	bringing	the	offender	
to	justice.38	Inability	is	demonstrated	by	a	‘total	or	substantial	collapse	or	unavailability’	
																																																						
35	Article	17(1)(a)	(emphasis	added)	
36	Article	17(1)(b)	(emphasis	added)	
37	The	term	‘proceedings’	covers	both	investigations	and	prosecutions,	see	‘Decisions	taken	by	the	PrepCom	at	its	
session	held	from	4-15	August	1997’	UN	Doc.	A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev.1	fn25	
38	Article	17(2)(a)-(c)	
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of	 the	 national	 judicial	 system	 which	 prevents	 the	 state	 obtaining	 the	 accused	 or	
evidence	and	testimony	or	being	otherwise	unable	to	conduct	the	proceedings.39	
	
Crucially	 for	 a	 state	 wishing	 to	 mount	 a	 challenge,	 the	 ICC	 is	 the	 sole	 arbiter	 of	
jurisdictional	 and	 admissibility	 issues	 and	 the	 Court	 ‘shall	 satisfy	 itself	 that	 it	 has	
jurisdiction	in	any	case	brought	before	it’	and	‘may,	on	its	own	motion,	determine	the	
admissibility	of	a	 case’.40	This	 suggests	 that	 the	Court	may	 ‘use	 its	own	autonomous	
criteria	and	standards	to	assess’	whether	an	AJM	satisfies	the	requirements	of	ICJ	and	is	
compatible	with	the	RSt,	which	could	result	in	the	Court	deciding	that	the	state’s	AJM	is	
irrelevant	 in	 its	decision-making	process.41	 	 The	 issue	becomes	particularly	pertinent	
given	that	the	wording	of	Article	17	refers	to	investigations	and	prosecution	since	even	
if	the	term	‘investigation’	were	satisfied	by	the	state’s	AJM,	the	Court	may	insist	on	a	
narrow	interpretation	of	the	word	‘prosecution’	and	refuse	the	challenge.	
	
A	 further	difficulty	arises	because	even	 if	 the	 ICC	accepts	a	state	has	 investigated	by	
means	of	e.g.	a	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	(TRC),	it	would	be	difficult	for	the	
state	to	argue	that	after	it	has	investigated,	a	decision	has	been	made	not	to	prosecute,	
as	is	required	by	Article	17(1)(b).		Even	if	it	is	accepted	by	the	Court	that	this	decision	
was	made	genuinely	as	part	of	the	state’s	national	policy	for	an	AJM,	the	decision	not	to	
prosecute	would	have	been	taken	by	the	state	at	the	time	it	decided	to	proceed	by	way	
of	an	AJM	rather	than	criminal	prosecutions.	 	One	possible	way	around	this	difficulty	
could	be	for	the	state	to	show	that	individual	perpetrators	are	given	amnesty	conditional	
upon	their	full	and	frank	admissions	to	the	AJM	and	that	the	question	of	prosecution	or	
amnesty	is	decided	after	evidence	has	been	given,	with	domestic	prosecution	a	certainty	
if	there	is	reasonable	doubt	about	the	veracity	of	the	perpetrator’s	evidence.			
	
In	 reaching	 their	 decision	 on	 admissibility,	 the	 ICC	 judges	may	 be	 influenced	 by	 the	
argument	that	although	amnesties	are	not	prohibited	per	se,	for	the	crimes	within	the	
Court’s	jurisdiction,	they	are	incompatible	with	ICJ.42	 	Of	course,	the	Court	would	not	
																																																						
39	Article	17(3)	
40	Article	19(1)	
41	Stahn,	C.	(2005)	p700	
42	Ibid	p701	
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accept	 any	 attempt	 by	 a	 state	 to	 avoid	 its	 duty	 to	 prosecute	 genocide	 and	 grave	
breaches	of	 the	Geneva	Conventions	by	means	of	an	AJM	but	there	has	been	a	shift	
from	 an	 international	 endorsement	 of	 blanket	 amnesties	 to	 a	 rejection	 of	 them	 for	
serious	 international	crimes.43	 	Furthermore,	 the	RSt’s	Preamble	recalls	 that	 ‘it	 is	 the	
duty	 of	 every	 state	 to	 exercise	 its	 criminal	 jurisdiction	 over	 those	 responsible	 for	
international	 crimes’44	 which	 undoubtedly	 would	 have	 some	 bearing	 on	 the	 Court’s	
decision	on	whether	to	defer	in	favour	of	an	AJM.		However,	the	fact	that	an	amnesty	is	
conditional	and	must	be	warranted	by	the	giving	of	full	and	frank	admissions	should	be	
a	positive	factor	in	the	Courts	assessment.	
	
The	RSt	is	drafted	in	a	manner	which	enables	the	issue	of	admissibility	to	be	considered	
at	different	stages	of	the	proceedings	i.e.	from	preliminary	examination	where	there	is	
a	 general	 ‘situation’	 under	 consideration,	 to	 the	 ‘case’	 stage	where	 individuals	 have	
been	identified	for	prosecution.45		In	this	section,	it	has	been	seen	that	there	are	several	
factors	arising	from	both	treaty	 (including	the	RSt	 itself)	and	customary	 international	
law	which	the	ICC	will	have	to	consider	when	asked	to	adjudicate	on	whether	to	defer	
prosecutions	 in	 favour	 of	 an	 AJM	 before	 it	 begins	 consideration	 of	 the	 AJM	 and	 its	
capacity	to	satisfy	the	requirements	of	ICJ.			
	
In	the	next	two	sections,	the	process	leading	to	the	ICC	commencing	an	investigation	
into	a	situation	is	outlined	and	the	steps	the	state	needs	to	take	to	challenge	the	Court	
will	be	examined,	from	which	it	will	be	noted	that	these	vary	according	to	the	stage	the	
proceedings	have	reached	at	the	ICC.	
	
																																																						
43	For	example,	upon	the	signing	of	the	Lomé	Peace	Agreement	which	provided	for	blanket	amnesties,	the	United	
Nations	 (UN)	Special	Representative	added	a	 reservation	stating	 that	 the	UN	did	not	 recognise	 the	application	of	
amnesty	to	genocide,	crimes	against	humanity,	war	crimes	and	other	serious	violations	of	international	humanitarian	
law.		Seventh	Report	of	the	Secretary-General	on	the	UN	Observer	Mission	in	Sierra	Leone,	UN	Doc.	S/1999/836	30	
para.	7	
44	Paragraph	6	(emphasis	added)	
45	Articles	53,	18	and	19	
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State	Challenges	to	Admissibility	Pre-Investigation	Stage	
	
There	are	three	mechanisms	by	which	the	jurisdiction	of	the	ICC	may	be	activated.		First,	
a	situation	can	be	referred	to	the	Prosecutor	by	a	SP,46	second	the	UN	Security	Council	
(UNSC)	can	refer	a	situation	acting	under	Chapter	VII	of	the	UN	Charter47	and	third,	the	
Prosecutor	can	initiate	an	investigation	proprio	motu	(on	her	own	initiative)48	based	on	
information	received	from	other	sources.49		
	
None	 of	 these	 three	 trigger	 mechanisms	 automatically	 activates	 an	 investigation,	
however,	 since	when	a	 situation	 comes	 to	 the	Prosecutor’s	 attention,	 she	must	 first	
conduct	a	preliminary	examination	to	assess	 its	 seriousness50	and	then	persuade	the	
PTC	that	there	is	a	‘reasonable	basis	to	proceed	with	an	investigation’.51	For	the	PTC,	
this	 is	a	evidential	test	rather	than	of	the	appropriateness	of	bringing	a	case	and	the	
focus	is	whether	the	Prosecutor	should	be	permitted	to	investigate	a	situation,	not	‘if	
one	 or	 more	 specific	 individuals	 should	 be	 liable	 to	 criminal	 responsibility	 and	
punishment’.52		
	
After	completion	of	the	preliminary	examination,	the	procedural	steps	differ	according	
to	the	particular	trigger	mechanism	used.		Clearly,	if	the	Prosecutor	has	determined	that	
there	 is	 no	 reasonable	 basis	 to	 proceed	 because,	 for	 example,	 a	 state	 has	 issued	
conditional	amnesties	in	combination	with	a	TRC,	which	she	considers	has	satisfied	the	
‘investigation’	element	of	Article	17	and	diminished	the	necessity	for	ICC	prosecutions,	
the	ICC	intervention	stops.		The	PTC	can	review	the	Prosecutors	decision	at	the	request	
of	the	state	making	the	referral	under	Article	14	or	the	UNSC	making	the	referral	under	
Article	13	but	cannot	oblige	the	Prosecutor	to	change	her	decision,	only	request	her	to	
																																																						
46	Articles	13(a)	and	14	
47	Article	13(b)	
48	Articles	13(c)	and	15	
49	E.g.	individuals,	Human	Rights	organisations	and	non-governmental	organisations	
50	Article	15(2)	
51	Article	15(4)	To	assist	the	Prosecutor	and	the	Court,	Article	53(1)(a)-(c)	details	factors	to	be	considered	
52	Bergsmo,	M.	&	Pejić,	J.	(2008)	‘Prosecutor’	in	Triffterer,	O.	(ed.)	Commentary	on	the	Rome	Statute	of	the	
International	Criminal	Court	–	Observers’	Notes,	Article	by	Article	(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing)	p589	
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reconsider.53	 	 If,	 however,	 the	 Prosecutor’s	 decision	 is	 based	 on	 it	 not	 being	 in	 the	
interests	 of	 justice	 to	 proceed	 with	 an	 investigation,54	 for	 example,	 because	 the	
Prosecutor	has	been	persuaded	by	the	state	that	the	context	of	its	transition	justifies	
restorative	rather	than	retributive	justice,	the	PTC	can	review	her	decision	on	its	own	
initiative	and	can	oblige	the	Prosecutor	to	initiate	an	investigation.55			
	
If	 the	Prosecutor	decides	 that	 the	preliminary	examination	does	 reveal	 a	 reasonable	
basis	to	proceed	with	an	investigation,	she	does	not	need	to	inform	the	PTC	unless	she	
initially	acted	proprio	motu,	 in	which	case,	 she	must	obtain	 the	authority	of	 the	PTC	
before	commencing	the	investigation.56		The	PTC	must	agree	that	there	is	a	reasonable	
basis	 to	 proceed	with	 an	 investigation	 and	 that	 the	 case	 ‘appears	 to	 fall	 within	 the	
jurisdiction	of	the	Court’57	before	it	grants	authorisation,	which	is	‘without	prejudice	to	
subsequent	 determinations	 […]	with	 regard	 to	 the	 jurisdiction	 and	 admissibility	 of	 a	
case.’58		The	court	has	full	discretion	in	determining	whether	or	not	this	‘appearance’	
exists	and	will	exercise	its	discretion	by	examining	the	supporting	material59	provided	
by	 the	 Prosecutor	 with	 the	 application.60	 	 Should	 the	 application	 be	 refused,	 the	
Prosecutor	can	renew	it	if	new	facts	or	evidence	subsequently	come	to	light.61	
	
Before	commencing	her	investigation,	Article	18(1)	requires	the	Prosecutor	to	notify	all	
SPs	 as	 well	 as	 those	 states	 who	 would	 normally	 have	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 crimes	
concerned	(i.e.	a	non-SP)	of	her	 intention	to	commence	an	 investigation	proper.	This	
notification	may	provide	only	limited	information	(to	protect	persons	and	evidence	or	
prevent	 people	 absconding)	 but	 it	 must	 be	 sufficient	 to	 enable	 a	 state	 to	 identify	
whether	it	can	respond	by	informing	the	Court	that	it	is	itself	investigating	the	matters	
of	which	it	has	received	notification	from	the	Prosecutor,	or	has	already	done	so.		
																																																						
53	Article	53(3)(a)	
54	Articles	53(1)(c)		
55	Article	53(3)(b)	
56	Article	15(3)	
57	Article	15(4)	(Emphasis	added)	
58	Ibid	
59	Supporting	material	includes	‘materials	from	governmental	sources,	international	organisations,	NGOs	and	the	
media’.		See	Decision	Pursuant	to	Article	15	of	the	Rome	Statute	on	the	Authorisation	of	an	Investigation	into	the	
Situation	in	the	Republic	of	the	Côte	d’Ivoire	3	October	2011	ICC-02/11-14	para.18	
60	Article	15(4)	The	Court	will	also	take	account	of	representations	made	by	victims	(Article	15(3))	who	have	been	
informed	by	the	Prosecutor	of	the	intention	to	seek	authorisation	from	the	PTC	pursuant	to	RPE	50(1)	
61	Article	15(5)	
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Article	18’s	early	notification	provision	is	extremely	useful	for	the	state	wishing	to	rely	
on	the	principle	of	complementarity	to	deal	with	offenders	itself	by	means	of	an	AJM	
since	there	is	no	requirement	in	the	RSt	that	the	investigation	conducted	by	the	state	
be	a	criminal	investigation62	and	at	this	early	stage,	since	no	specific	crime	or	offender	
has	been	identified	by	the	Prosecutor,	the	response	of	the	state	to	the	notification	can	
be	equally	general.		Therefore,	a	state	wishing	to	rely	on,	for	example,	a	TRC	could	argue	
that	this	AJM	equates	to	an	investigation	into	the	crimes	within	the	Court’s	jurisdiction.	
	
From	the	date	of	 receiving	 the	Prosecutor’s	notification,	 the	state	has	one	month	 to	
inform	the	Court	that	it	is	investigating	or	has	investigated	those	matters	detailed	in	the	
notification	and	is	requesting	the	Prosecutor	to	defer	her	investigation.63		The	response	
must	be	in	writing	and	provide	information	regarding	the	state’s	 investigation.64	 	The	
state	can,	in	the	meantime,	request	further	information	from	the	Prosecutor	to	assist	in	
preparing	 its	 response	 but	 this	 will	 not	 extend	 the	 one-month	 time-limit	 so	 the	
Prosecutor	 is	 required	 to	 deal	 with	 any	 such	 request	 ‘on	 an	 expedited	 basis’.65	 The	
Prosecutor	also	is	entitled	to	request	further	information	from	the	state	relating	to	its	
investigation,	 if	 necessary.66	 At	 this	 stage,	 however	 it	 is	 the	 investigation	 being	
conducted	by	the	state	that	is	under	review,	not	the	outcome	of	the	investigation.			
	
When	 the	Prosecutor	 receives	 information	 from	the	 state	 that	 it	 is	 investigating	and	
requests	 the	 ICC	 to	 defer,	 it	 seems	 (although	 it	 is	 not	 explicit	 in	 the	 RSt)	 that	 her	
investigation	must	cease	immediately	in	deference	to	the	national	proceedings,	that	is,	
the	 case	 becomes	 inadmissible	 to	 the	 ICC.	 	 There	 is,	 however,	 provision	 for	 the	
Prosecutor	 to	 apply	 to	 the	 PTC	 for	 authorization	 to	 commence	 an	 investigation	
notwithstanding	 the	 state’s	 request	 to	 defer,67	 for	 example,	 where	 the	 Prosecutor	
believes	the	state	is	not	making	the	deferral	request	for	genuine	reasons	but	instead	is	
attempting	to	obstruct	international	justice.		If	the	Prosecutor	does	decide	to	make	such	
																																																						
62	Stahn,	C.	(2005)	p697	
63	Article	18(2)	
64	RPE	53	
65	RPE	52(2)	
66	Ibid	
67	Article	18(2)	
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an	application,	the	state	is	informed	and	is	provided	with	a	summary	of	the	basis	of	the	
application68	so	that	it	may	submit	observations	to	the	PTC	for	consideration.69	
	
Additionally,	pending	a	ruling	by	the	PTC	following	such	an	application,	or	indeed	at	any	
time	when	an	investigation	has	been	deferred,	the	Prosecutor	may	‘on	an	exceptional	
basis,	seek	authority	from	the	PTC	to	pursue	necessary	investigative	steps’	relating	to	
the	preservation	or	obtaining	of	evidence	where	 there	 is	 a	 ‘significant	 risk	 that	 such	
evidence	 may	 not	 be	 subsequently	 available’.70	 The	 hearing	 by	 the	 PTC	 of	 this	
application	for	authority	is	held	ex	parte	and	in	camera	and	the	PTC’s	ruling	has	to	be	
expedited.71	 This	 provision	 clearly	 overrides	 the	 jurisdictional	 primacy	 of	 the	 state,	
which	has	no	right	to	attend	or	make	representations.	
	
Even	when	the	Prosecutor	has	acceded	to	the	state’s	request	for	deferral	of	the	Court’s	
investigation,	the	state	may	still	be	requested	‘periodically’	to	provide	the	Prosecutor	
with	information	of	the	progress	of	its	investigation	and	any	‘subsequent	prosecutions’,	
information	which	must	be	provided	‘without	undue	delay’.72	Furthermore,	the	decision	
to	defer	can	be	reviewed	after	six	months	from	the	date	of	deferral	or	at	any	time	if	
there	has	been	a	significant	change	of	circumstances	relating	to	the	state’s	willingness	
or	 ability	 to	 carry	 out	 its	 investigation	 genuinely.73	 These	 provisions	 give	 the	 ICC	 a	
continuing	right	to	monitor	the	state’s	investigation	and	to	step	in	if	the	Court	considers	
the	 state	 is	 not	 acting	 genuinely.	 	 It	 also	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 assessment	 of	
complementarity	 is	 an	 on-going	 process,	 kept	 under	 review	 by	 the	 ICC	 and	with	 an	
emphasis	on	the	outcome	being	prosecutions	rather	than	AJMs.	
	
State	Challenges	to	Admissibility	Post-Investigation	Stage		
	
Whereas	Article	18	enables	a	 state	 to	 request	 the	deferral	of	an	 investigation	 into	a	
situation	by	the	Prosecutor	before	an	investigation	proper	is	commenced	(and	therefore	
																																																						
68	RPE	54(2)	
69	RPE	55(2)	
70	Article	18(6)	
71	RPE	57	
72	Article	18(5)	
73	Article	18(3)	
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before	crimes	and	offenders	have	been	identified),	Article	19	provides	the	opportunity	
for	 the	 State	 to	 challenge	 jurisdiction	 and	 admissibility	 after	 the	 Prosecutor’s	
investigation,	where	a	‘case’	has	been	identified	against	specific	suspect(s)	for	specific	
conduct.	To	reflect	the	on-going	nature	of	the	principle	of	complementarity,	even	if	a	
State	 has	 unsuccessfully	 challenged	 the	 Court’s	 intervention	 under	 Article	 18,	 it	 is	
entitled	 to	 make	 a	 further	 challenge	 under	 Article	 19	 on	 grounds	 of	 ‘additional	
significant	facts	or	significant	change	of	circumstances’.74	
	
A	challenge	under	Article	19	must	be	made	at	the	‘earliest	opportunity’75	and	only	once,	
prior	to	or	at	the	commencement	of	the	trial	unless,	in	exceptional	circumstances,	the	
Court	grants	leave	for	a	subsequent	and/or	later	challenge.76			Challenges	to	admissibility	
made	at	the	commencement	of	the	trial	(or	later	if	permitted)	may	only	be	based	on	the	
principle	ne	bis	in	idem	since	it	is	only	after	confirmation	of	the	charges	that	this	issue	
can	be	properly	considered.77	The	burden	of	proof	regarding	inadmissibility	lies	with	the	
State	making	 the	 challenge	 since	 it	will	 have	 all	 the	 information	 as	 to	why	 the	 case	
should	be	deemed	inadmissible	to	the	Court.78		
	
Prior	to	the	commencement	of	the	trial,	therefore,	a	state	wishing	to	rely	on	an	AJM	
could,	for	example,	argue	that	its	chosen	method	of	accountability	attains	the	goals	of	
																																																						
74	Article	18(7)	
75	Article	19(5)	
76	Article	19(4)		For	the	purposes	of	Article	19(4),	Trial	Chamber	(TCh)	2	has	stated	that	the	trial	commences	“as	soon	
as	 the	 Chamber	 is	 constituted”,	 see	 The	 Prosecutor	 v	 Germain	 Katanga	 and	Matthieu	 Ngudjolo	 Chui	 (Katanga)	
Reasons	for	the	Oral	Decision	on	the	Motion	Challenging	the	Admissibility	of	the	Case	(Article	19	of	the	Statute)	ICC-
01/04-01/07-1213-tENG	16	June	2009,	para.	49;	whereas	TCh1	in	Lubanga,	decided	that	“[…]	the	true	opening	of	the	
trial	 [is]	when	opening	statements,	 if	any,	are	made	prior	 to	 the	calling	of	witnesses”,	 see	Decision	on	the	status	
before	the	TCh	of	the	evidence	heard	by	the	PTC	and	the	decisions	of	the	PTC	in	trial	proceedings	and	the	manner	in	
which	evidence	shall	be	submitted,	ICC-01/04-01/06-1084	13	December	2007,	para.	39.		See	also	Lubanga	Reasons	
for	Oral	Decision	lifting	the	stay	of	proceedings,	holding	that	‘’the	‘commencement’	of	the	trial	was	not	when	the	
Chamber	was	 constituted	…	 or	when	 the	 charges	were	 confirmed	…	 but	 on	 the	 date	 fixed	 for	 trial	…	when	 the	
proceedings	by	way	of	opening	statements	and	the	introduction	of	evidence	commence.’	ICC-01/04-01/06-1644	23	
January	2009,	para.	36.		TCh1’s	interpretation	was	favoured	by	PTC3	in	The	Prosecutor	v	Jean-Pierre	Bemba	Gombo	
Decision	on	the	Admissibility	and	Abuse	of	Process	Challenges,	ICC-01/05-01/08-802	24	June	2010,	para.	210.		The	
ACh	in	its	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	of	Mr	Germain	Katanga	against	the	Oral	Decision	of	TCh2	of	12	June	2009	on	the	
Admissibility	of	the	Case,	ICC-01/04-01/07-1497	25	September	2009	declined	to	pronounce	on	whether	TCh2	was	
correct	 in	 its	 interpretation	 of	 the	 term	 ‘commencement	 of	 trial’	 stating,	 however,	 that	 this	 decision	 did	 not	
‘necessarily	mean	that	it	agrees	with	the	TCh’s	interpretation’,	para.	38			
77	Schabas,	W.A.	(2010)	The	International	Criminal	Court.		A	Commentary	on	the	Rome	Statute	(Oxford:	OUP)	p369		
78	The	Prosecutor	v.	Francis	Kirimi	Muthaura,	Uhuru	Muigai	Kenyatta	and	Mohammed	Hussein	Ali,	Judgment	on	the	
appeal	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya	against	the	decision	of	PTCII	of	30	May	2011	entitled	“Decision	on	the	Application	by	
the	Government	of	Kenya	Challenging	the	Admissibility	of	the	Case	Pursuant	to	Article	19(2)(b)	of	the	Statute”	ICC-
01/09-02/11-274,	30	August	2011,	para.61	
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ICJ	and	provide	detailed	information	of	how	this	would	be	achieved.		Later	challenges	
would	require	the	state	to	show	that	the	person	accused	by	the	Court	had	been	dealt	
with	by	the	state’s	AJM	and	therefore	the	principle	ne	bis	in	idem	applies	and	further,	
would	 have	 to	 satisfy	 the	 Court	 of	 the	 genuineness	 of	 the	 AJM	 process	 and	 that	 it	
provided	 both	 accountability	 and	 justice	 for	 victims.	 	 Prior	 to	 confirmation	 of	 the	
charges,	 the	 decision	whether	 the	 AJM	 satisfies	 Article	 17	 rests	 with	 the	 PTC,	 after	
confirmation,	with	the	Trial	Chamber	(TCh)79	and	decisions	may	be	appealed	to	the	ACh	
in	accordance	with	Article	82.80		
	
The	Chamber	receiving	the	state	challenge	has	discretion	on	how	and	when	to	deal	with	
it,	although	there	must	not	be	undue	delay	and	the	challenge	must	be	dealt	with	before	
any	other	proceedings	are	heard.81	Details	of	 the	challenge	must	be	provided	 to	 the	
Prosecutor	and	the	accused82	both	of	whom	may	submit	written	observations	within	a	
time-limit	imposed	by	the	Chamber.83		The	Prosecutor	can	only	request	a	review	of	a	
decision	 that	 a	 case	 is	 inadmissible	 if	 new	 facts	 arise	which	negate	 the	basis	of	 that	
decision84	 in	 which	 case,	 the	 state	 whose	 challenge	 to	 admissibility	 resulted	 in	 the	
decision	 must	 be	 notified	 of	 the	 review	 request	 and	 must	 be	 given	 time	 to	 make	
representations.85	
	
When	a	challenge	is	submitted	by	a	state	under	Article	19,	the	Prosecutor	must	suspend	
the	investigation	until	‘such	time	as	the	Court	makes	a	determination	in	accordance	with	
Article	17’.86		Pending	the	Court’s	determination	of	the	state’s	challenge,	the	Prosecutor	
may	seek	the	Court’s	authority	to	take	investigative	and	other	additional	steps	deemed	
necessary87	‘to	preserve	the	Court’s	jurisdiction	or	its	ability	to	render	a	fair	decision’88	
																																																						
79	Article	19(6)	
80	Ibid	
81	RPE	58(2)	
82	 The	wording	 of	 RPE	 58(2)	 suggests	 only	 an	 accused	who	 has	 been	 surrendered	 to	 the	 Court	 or	 has	 appeared	
voluntarily	already	i.e.	there	is	no	requirement	to	notify	an	accused	who	has	been	detained	by	a	national	authority	
but	is	awaiting	transfer	to	the	Court	or	a	person	who	is	intending	to	voluntarily	surrender	themselves	at	some	point	
in	the	future	
83	RPE	58(3)	
84	Article	19(10)	
85	RPE	62(2)	
86	Article	19(7)	
87	Article	19(8)	
88	Hall,	C.K.	(2008)	‘Challenges	to	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	or	the	admissibility	of	a	case’	in	Triffterer,	O.	(ed)	p662	
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as	is	also	permitted	under	Article	18(6)	but	without	there	needing	to	be	an	‘exceptional	
basis’	for	the	application.	
	
The	preceding	two	sections	have	outlined	the	formal	requirements	with	which	a	state	
and	the	Prosecutor	must	comply	when	challenges	to	the	admissibility	of	a	case	before	
the	 ICC	 are	 made	 and	 it	 has	 been	 noted	 these	 differ	 depending	 on	 the	 stage	 the	
proceedings	 have	 reached	 at	 the	 ICC	 and	 that	 having	 deferred	 to	 the	 state,	 the	
Prosecutor	has	the	right	to	keep	the	state’s	progress	under	review	and	to	step	in	if	there	
is	doubt	about	the	genuineness	of	the	state’s	investigation.		This	demonstrates	the	on-
going	nature	of	complementarity.	
	
In	the	next	section,	the	jurisprudence	of	the	Court	in	admissibility	challenges	that	have	
been	made	to	date	will	be	examined	to	ascertain	the	factors	the	judges	consider	when	
deciding	admissibility	issues.	
	
Challenging	Admissibility	in	Practice	
	
Several	admissibility	challenges	to	the	Court	have	been	made	to	the	ICC,89	the	decisions	
of	which	have	contributed	to	the	understanding	of	complementarity	and	which,	in	turn,	
have	 significantly	 restricted	 the	potential	 for	 success	of	any	challenge	mounted	by	a	
state	ultimately	desiring	to	deal	with	offenders	who	have	committed	crimes	within	the	
jurisdiction	of	the	ICC	by	mean	of	AJMs.		Before	considering	these	challenges,	the	first	
point	 to	 establish	 is	whether	 a	 case	would	 be	 admissible	 if	 the	 state	 issued	 blanket	
amnesties	and	did	nothing	to	investigate	or	prosecute	offenders.		Alternatively,	if	the	
state	did	 investigate	abuses	but	not	to	prosecute	offenders	but	 instead	as	part	of	an	
AJM	and	conditional	amnesty	programme,	could	this	lead	to	the	Court	arguing	that	the	
State	was	inactive,	thus	making	the	case	admissible	to	the	ICC?		
	
																																																						
89	By	Kenya	in	relation	to	the	cases	against	William	Samoei	Ruto,	Henry	Kiprono	Kosgey,	Joshua	Arap	Sang,	Frances	
Kirimi	Muthaura,	Hussein	Ali	 and	Uhuru	Kenyatta;	 Côte	d’Ivoire	 relating	 to	 the	 case	 against	 Simone	Gbagbo	 and	
Charles	Blé	Goudé	and	Libya	relating	to	the	case	against	Saif	Al-Islam	Gaddafi	and	Abdullah	Al-Senussi	
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The	ICC	has	ruled	that	the	inactivity	of	a	state	having	jurisdiction	does	not	prevent	a	case	
being	admissible	to	the	Court.90		This	may	seem	obvious,	given	the	wording	of	Article	
17(1)(a)	which	states	“the	Court	shall	determine	that	a	case	is	inadmissible	where:	(a)	
The	case	 is	being	investigated	or	prosecuted	by	a	State	which	has	jurisdiction	over	 it,	
unless	 the	 State	 is	 unwilling	 or	 unable	 genuinely	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 investigation	 or	
prosecution”91	 but	 the	 point	 has	 led	 to	 considerable	 academic	 debate,	 with	 some	
commentators	 contending	 if	 a	 state	 is	 inactive	 for	 reasons	 other	 than	 that	 they	 are	
‘unwilling’	or	‘unable’,	then	the	case	should	be	inadmissible.92		Arsanjani	and	Reisman,	
for	example,	argue	that	it	was	the	intention	of	the	drafters	of	the	RSt	that	‘the	ICC	[…]	
would	decide	to	take	up	the	cases,	on	the	basis	of	its	assessment	of	the	unwillingness	or	
inability	 of	 the	 state	 in	 which	 the	 crimes	 had	 occurred	 to	 undertake	 to	 prosecute	
them.’93		Likewise,	Sheng	writes	‘a	case	is	inadmissible	unless	the	elements	of	unwilling	
or	unable	are	present’94	and	Schabas	contends	that	‘the	legal	difficulty	with	proceeding	
on	the	basis	that	a	case	is	admissible	when	simply	no	State	is	actively	prosecuting	or	has	
actively	prosecuted	the	matter	 is	that	the	text	of	article	17	does	not	appear	to	allow	
this.’95		
	
This	 was	 not,	 however,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 Article	 17	 put	 forward	 in	 the	 Informal	
expert	paper	prepared	at	the	request	of	the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor	(OTP)	in	2003.	The	
experts	advised	that	although	it	was	common	to	concentrate	on	the	‘unwilling	or	unable’	
aspects	 of	 Article	 17,	 the	 wording	 provided	 for	 three	 contingencies:	 inactivity,	
unwillingness	and	inability,	the	most	straightforward	of	these	being	where	no	State	has	
initiated	any	investigation.	In	this	case,	the	experts	stated,	none	of	the	alternatives	of	
Article	17(1)(a)-(c)	are	satisfied	and	there	is	no	impediment	to	admissibility.96	
	
																																																						
90	Lubanga,	Arrest	Warrant	decision	paras.	29,	40	
91	Emphasis	added	
92	Schabas,	W.A.	(2010)	p341;	see	also	Schabas,	W.A.	(2008)	‘Prosecutorial	Discretion	v.	Judicial	Activism	at	the	
International	Criminal	Court’	6	JICJ	pp731-761	at	p757	
93	Arsanjani,	M.H.	and	Reisman,	W.M.	(2005)	‘The	Law-in-Action	of	the	International	Criminal	Court’	99	AJIL	pp385-
401at	p387	(emphasis	in	original)	
94	Sheng,	A.Y.	(2006)	‘Analyzing	the	International	Criminal	Court	Complementarity	Principle	Through	a	Federal	
Courts	Lens’	bepress	Legal	Series	Working	Paper	1249	[Online]	Available:		
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1249	[Accessed:	22.04.17]	p5	(emphasis	in	original)	
95	Schabas,	W.A.	(2010)	p341	
96	Informal	Expert	Paper,	The	Principle	of	Complementarity	in	Practice’2003,	ICC-01/04-01/07-1008-AnxA	paras.17-
18	
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This	interpretation	was	followed	in	Lubanga,	by	PTC1	which	stated	that	the	concept	of	
unwillingness	or	inability	is	only	considered	by	the	Court	if	national	proceedings	exist	
because	otherwise,	the	genuineness	of	those	proceedings	cannot	be	scrutinised.97	Since	
Lubanga,	the	ACh	has	confirmed	a	two-stage	test,	where	it	has	first	to	be	established	
whether	the	State	is	actually	investigating	or	prosecuting	the	case,	or	has	already	done	
so	 and	 only	 if	 such	 proceedings	 exist,	 is	 the	 question	 of	 unwillingness	 and	 inability	
examined.98		Thus,	contrary	to	the	opinions	of	some	academics	and	in	a	decision	which,	
according	to	Schabas,	‘defies	common	sense’99	case	law	states	that	the	inactivity	of	a	
State	means	that	the	case	is	admissible	to	the	ICC.	100	
	
The	concern	with	this	two-stage	test	 is	that	 it	emanated	from	Lubanga,	a	case	which	
arose	from	a	self-referral	made	by	the	DRC	where	the	defendant	was	in	custody	awaiting	
trial	before	the	domestic	court	on	charges	more	serious	than	the	child	soldier	offences	
for	which	he	was	brought	before	the	ICC.101		Since	it	could	not	be	argued	that	the	DRC	
was	unwilling	or	unable	to	 investigate	and/or	prosecute	this	defendant,	the	ICC	side-
stepped	 the	 issue	 by	 finding	 that	 the	 DRC	 had	 been	 inactive	 regarding	 child	 soldier	
offences	and	therefore	the	case	was	admissible	before	the	ICC	without	the	need	for	an	
analysis	of	unwillingness	or	inability.			
	
It	 is	 argued,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 interpretation	 of	 Article	 17(1)(a)	 was	 a	 matter	 of	
pragmatism,	 developed	 out	 of	 the	 Court’s	 need	 to	 start	 work	 on	 the	 first	 and	 only	
situations	before	the	Court,	all	of	which	had	been	self-referrals.102		The	problem	arises	
																																																						
97	Lubanga,	Arrest	warrant	decision	para.	32	
98	Katanga,	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	25	September	2009	para.	78;	See	also	Prosecutor	v.	William	Samoei	Ruto,	Henry	
Kiprono	Kosgey	and	Joshua	Arap	Sang	Judgement	on	the	appeal	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya	against	the	decision	of	Pre-
Trial	Chamber	II	of	30	May	2011	entitled	‘Decision	on	the	Application	by	the	Government	of	Kenya	Challenging	the	
Admissibility	of	the	Case	Pursuant	to	Article	19(2)(b)	of	the	Statute’	30	August	2011,	ICC-01/09-01/11-307	(OA)	(Ruto)	
para.	41;	The	Prosecutor	v.	Francis	Kirimi	Muthaura,	Uhuru	Muigai	Kenyatta	and	Mohammed	Hussein	Ali	Judgment	
on	the	appeal	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya	against	the	decision	of	Pre-Trial	Chamber	II	of	30	May	2011	entitled	‘Decision	
on	the	Application	by	the	Government	of	Kenya	Challenging	the	Admissibility	of	the	Case	Pursuant	to	Article	19(2)(b)	
of	the	Statute’	30	August	2011,	ICC-01/09-02/11-274	(OA)	(Muthaura)	para.	40	
99	Schabas,	W.A.	(2010)	p341	
100	“Interpretation	a	contrario	of	article	17,	paras.	1	(a)	to	(c)	of	the	Statute”	appears	as	footnote	19	after	the	words	
‘in	relation	to	that	case’	in	Lubanga,	Arrest	warrant	decision		
101	Lubanga,	Arrest	warrant	decision	para.	39.		Lubanga	was	under	State	arrest	for	genocide	and	war	crimes	including	
murder,	illegal	detention	and	torture	but	not	the	conscription	or	use	of	child	soldiers.	
102	ICC	Press	Release,	President	of	Uganda	refers	situation	concerning	the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	(LRA)	to	the	ICC,	ICC-
CPI-200440129-44,	29	January	2004;	ICC	Press	Release,	Prosecutor	receives	referral	of	the	situation	in	the	Democratic	
Republic	of	Congo,	ICC-OTP-20040419-50,	19	April	2004;	ICC	Press	Release,	Prosecutor	receives	referral	concerning	
Central	African	Republic,	ICC-OTP-20050107-86,	7	January	2007	
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when	the	same	test	is	applied	to	a	state	opposed	to	the	intervention	of	the	ICC	on	the	
basis	that	a	domestic	 investigation	prior	to	national	prosecutions	or	potentially	to	an	
AJM	is	being	undertaken.		This	situation	is	completely	different	from	self-referrals	and	
some	 commentators	 argue	 that	 the	 challenging	 state	 should	 be	 evaluated	 on	 its	
willingness	and	ability	 to	deal	with	the	offenders	and	not	on	the	 judge-made	criteria	
concerning	the	existence	of	national	proceedings.103	
	
The	ACh’s	most	recent	decision	following	a	State’s	admissibility	challenge	relates	to	Côte	
d’Ivoire’s	challenge	in	the	case	against	Simone	Gbagbo.104		The	background	to	the	case	
is	that	Côte	d’Ivoire	had	been	notified	by	the	Court	of	the	arrest	warrant	for	Mrs	Gbagbo	
on	19th	March	2012	and	had	been	requested	to	arrest	and	surrender	her	to	the	Court.105	
Côte	d’Ivoire	 lodged	an	admissibility	challenge	with	PTC1	on	30th	September	2013,106	
submitting	that	on	6th	February	2012	domestic	proceedings	had	been	instituted	against	
Mrs	Gbagbo	based	on	allegations	similar	to	those	in	the	case	before	the	Court.107		Côte	
d’Ivoire	 also	 confirmed	 that	 it	 was	 willing	 and	 able	 to	 try	 Mrs	 Gbagbo	 for	 those	
offences.108	 	 On	 11th	 December	 2014,	 PTC1	 rejected	 Côte	 d’Ivoire’s	 challenge,	
concluding	that	Côte	d’Ivoire	was	not	taking	‘tangible,	concrete	and	progressive	steps’	
aimed	 at	 ascertaining	whether	Mrs	Gbagbo	was	 criminally	 responsible	 for	 the	 same	
conduct	alleged	in	the	case	before	the	ICC.109		Recalling	the	jurisprudence	of	the	ACh	in	
a	challenge	to	admissibility	brought	by	Libya,110	PTC1	commented:	
	
[E]ven	when	the	alleged	domestic	proceedings	are	still	at	an	early	stage	of	
investigation,	[the	State]	must	be	able	to	show	the	contours	or	parameters	
																																																						
103	Hansen,	T.O.	(2012)	‘A	Critical	Review	of	the	ICC’s	recent	practice	concerning	Admissibility	Challenges	and	
Complementarity’	13	Melbourne	JIL	p217-235	at	p222	
104	The	Prosecutor	v.	Simone	Gbagbo	Judgment	on	the	appeal	of	Côte	d’Ivoire	against	the	decision	of	Pre-Trial	
Chamber	1	of	11	December	2014	entitled	“Decision	on	Côte	d’Ivoire’s	challenge	to	the	admissibility	of	the	case	
against	Simone	Gbagbo”	(Simone	Gbagbo)	ICC-02/11-01/12	OA		27	May	2015	(Admissibility	Judgment)	
105	‘Demande	d’arrestation	et	de	remise	de	Simone	Gbagbo’	ICC-02/11-01/12-6	
106	‘Requête	de	la	République	de	Côte	d’Ivoire	sur	la	recevabilité	de	l’Affaire	Le	Procureur	c.	Simone	Gbagbo,	et	
demande	de	sursis	à	exécution	en	vertu	des	articles	17,	19	et	95	du	Statut	de	Rome’	30	September	2013,	ICC-02/11-
01/12-11-Conf	and	annexes	
107	Ibid	paras.	23-38	
108	Ibid	paras.	39-56	
109	‘Decision	on	Côte	d’Ivoire’s	challenge	to	the	admissibility	of	the	case	against	Simone	Gbagbo’	ICC-02/11-01/12-
47-Red	11	December	2014,	para.	65	
110	The	Prosecutor	v.	Saif	Al-Islam	Gaddafi	and	Abdullah	Al-Senussi	ICC	01/11-01/11-547-Red	Judgment	on	the	appeal	
of	Libya	against	the	decision	of	Pre-Trial	Chamber	1	of	31	May	2013	entitled	“Decision	on	the	admissibility	of	the	case	
against	Saif	Al-Islam	Gaddafi”	21	May	2014	paras.	83-4	
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of	that	investigation	in	order	to	determine	the	subject	matter	of	the	national	
investigation.111	
	
	
On	17th	December	2014,	Côte	d’Ivoire	filed	its	appeal	against	PTC1’s	decision112	and	on	
27th	 May	 2015,	 the	 ACh	 unanimously	 dismissed	 the	 appeal,	 confirming	 that	 ‘the	
presumption	in	favour	of	domestic	jurisdictions	only	applies	where	it	has	been	shown	
that	there	are	(or	have	been)	investigations	and/or	prosecutions	at	the	national	level.’113	
	
In	 rejecting	 Côte	 d’Ivoire’s	 appeal,	 the	 ACh	 re-confirmed	 the	 two-step	 analysis	
requirement	 of	 Article	 17(1)(a)	 and	 further,	 that	 the	 expression	 ‘the	 case	 is	 being	
investigated’	requires	the	‘taking	of	steps’	directed	at	ascertaining	whether	the	person	
is	 responsible	 for	 the	 alleged	 conduct,	 for	 instance	 ‘by	 interviewing	 witnesses	 or	
suspects,	collecting	documentary	evidence,	or	carrying	out	forensic	analyses’.114	 	This	
requirement	 had	 been	 established	 in	 Ruto,	when	 the	 ACh	 explained	 ‘For	 assessing	
whether	the	State	is	indeed	investigating,	the	genuineness	of	the	investigation	is	not	at	
issue,	what	is	at	issue	is	whether	there	are	investigative	steps.’115	
	
The	 RSt	 offers	 no	 assistance	 on	 what	 constitutes	 ‘investigative	 steps’	 although,	
acknowledging	the	vagueness	of	information	provided	by	the	Prosecutor	to	a	state	at	
the	preliminary	examination	stage,	RPE	52(1)	provides	that	‘subject	to	the	limitations	
provided	 for	 in	 article	 18’,	 the	 notification	 submitted	 by	 the	 State	 shall	 contain	
‘information	about	the	acts	that	may	constitute	crimes	referred	to	in	article	5,	relevant	
for	the	purposes	of	article	18,	paragraph	2’.		However,	PTC2,	in	its	decision	to	authorise	
the	Prosecutor	to	open	an	investigation	into	the	post-election	violence	in	Kenya	in	2007-
8,	demonstrated	that	the	Court	is	more	demanding	at	the	Article	18	stage	than	the	RPE	
appear	to	require:	
	
																																																						
111	Simone	Gbagbo	Judgement	on	Admissibility	Appeal	para.	76	
112	‘Appeal	of	the	Republic	of	Côte	d’Ivoire	against	PTC1’s	Decision	on	Côte	d’Ivoire	challenge	to	the	admissibility	of	
the	case	against	Simone	Gbagbo’	17	December	2014	ICC-02/11-01/12-48-tENG	(OA)		
113	Ibid	para.	2	
114	Simone	Gbagbo	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	28;	Ruto	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	41;	Muthaura	Admissibility	
Judgment	para.	40	
115	Ruto	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	41	
	 250	
Admissibility	 at	 the	 situation	 phase	 should	 be	 assessed	 against	 certain	
criteria	defining	a	‘potential	case’	such	as:	(i)	the	groups	of	persons	involved	
that	are	likely	to	be	the	focus	of	an	investigation	for	the	purpose	of	shaping	
the	 future	 case(s);	 and	 (ii)	 the	 crimes	within	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	Court	
allegedly	committed	during	the	incidents	that	are	likely	to	be	the	focus	of	an	
investigation	for	the	purpose	of	shaping	the	future	case(s).116	
	
	
The	Court	requires	the	 information	provided	by	a	state	to	be	even	more	precise	 in	a	
challenge	at	 the	Article	19	 ‘case’	 stage,	as	by	now,	a	 suspect	has	been	 identified	 for	
specific	conduct.		PTC1	in	Lubanga	defined	the	concept	of	‘case’	as	including	‘specific	
incidents	during	which	one	or	more	crimes	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	seems	to	
have	been	committed	by	one	or	more	identified	suspects’.117		The	ACh	has	also	clarified	
that	it	is	the	challenging	state	which	‘bears	the	burden	of	proof	to	show	that	the	case	is	
inadmissible’118	 by	 demonstrating	 that	 it	 is	 conducting	 ‘a	 genuine	 investigation	 or	
prosecution’.119		The	‘mere	preparedness	to	take	such	steps	or	the	investigation	of	other	
suspects	is	not	sufficient’.120		Nor	is	it	sufficient	merely	to	assert	that	investigations	are	
ongoing,	the	ACh	stressed,121	the	state	must	provide	‘evidence	of	a	sufficient	degree	of	
specificity	and	probative	value’	to	demonstrate	that	the	state	is	indeed	investigating	the	
case.122	 This	 means,	 the	 ACh	 clarified,	 the	 state	 must	 demonstrate	 a	 conflict	 of	
jurisdiction	 i.e.	 show	 the	 same	 case	 is	 being	 investigated	by	both	 the	Court	 and	 the	
state.123		
	
In	 Lubanga,	PTC1	 held	 that	 ‘same	 case’	 requires	 the	 state	 to	 show	 that	 its	 national	
proceedings	‘encompass	both	the	person	and	the	conduct	which	is	the	subject	of	the	
case	before	the	Court’.124	The	ACh	tempered	this	requirement	slightly	by	ruling	that	the	
national	 investigation	 must	 cover	 the	 same	 individual	 and	 substantially	 the	 same	
																																																						
116	Kenya	Authorisation	of	Investigation	para.	50	
117	Lubanga	Arrest	warrant	decision	para.	31	
118	Simone	Gbagbo	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	29;	Ruto	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	62;	Muthaura	Admissibility	
Judgment	para.	61;	Al-Senussi	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	166		
119	Simone	Gbagbo	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	29;	Al-Senussi	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	166	
120	Ibid	(Simone	Gbagbo	para.	41;	Al-Senussi	para.	40)	(emphasis	in	original)	
121	Simone	Gbagbo	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	41;	Ruto	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	62;	Muthaura	Admissibility	
Judgment	para.	61		
122	Ibid	
123	Ruto	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	37;	Muthaura	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	36)	(emphasis	added)	
124	Lubanga	Arrest	warrant	decision	para.	31;	see	also	The	Prosecutor	v.	Mathieu	Ngudjolo	Chui	ICC-01/04-01/07-
262	Decision	on	the	evidence	and	information	provided	by	the	Prosecutor	for	the	issuance	of	a	warrant	of	arrest	for	
Mathieu	Ngudjolo	Chui	6	July	2007,	para.	21	
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conduct	as	alleged	in	the	proceedings	before	the	Court.125	It	refused	to	accept	Kenya’s	
submission	that	‘it	cannot	be	right	that	in	all	the	circumstances	in	every	Situation	and	in	
every	 case	 that	 may	 come	 before	 the	 ICC,	 the	 persons	 being	 investigated	 by	 the	
Prosecutor	must	be	exactly	the	same	as	those	being	investigated	by	the	State	if	the	State	
is	to	retain	jurisdiction.’126		
	
Nor	will	the	ACh	accept	a	state’s	assertion	that	investigations	into	the	crimes	committed	
were	 ongoing	 at	 the	 time	 the	 admissibility	 challenge	was	 lodged	 at	 the	 ICC	 and	 are	
continuing,	 together	 with	 promises	 of	 reports	 to	 be	 provided	 to	 the	 Court	 as	 the	
investigations	progress.127		Furthermore,	the	Court	will	not	allow	a	state	to	amend	an	
admissibility	 challenge	 or	 to	 submit	 additional	 supporting	 evidence	 just	 because	 the	
state	made	 the	challenge	prematurely.128	The	ACh	noted	 that	despite	PTC2	having	a	
broad	 discretion	 regarding	 the	 procedure	 to	 be	 followed	 ‘for	 the	 proper	 conduct	 of	
proceedings’129	which	could	have	allowed	for	the	filing	of	additional	evidence,	‘it	was	
not	obliged	to	do	so	and	nor	could	Kenya	expect	to	be	allowed	to	present	additional	
evidence’.130	
	
The	argument	(submitted	by	both	Kenya	and	Libya	in	support	of	their	challenges)	that	
since	Article	19(5)	requires	the	state	to	‘make	a	challenge	at	the	earliest	opportunity’,	
the	state	(especially	a	state	in	transition	which	is	the	process	of	implementing	steps	to	
stabilise	the	country)	may	not	be	able	fully	to	disclose	its	investigative	progress	at	the	
time	of	filing	its	admissibility	challenge,	was	also	rejected	by	the	Court:	
	
[A]dmissibility	proceedings	should	not	be	used	as	a	mechanism	or	process	
through	which	a	State	may	gradually	inform	the	Court,	over	time	and	as	its	
investigation	progresses,	 as	 to	 the	 steps	 it	 is	 taking	 to	 investigate	a	 case.		
Admissibility	proceedings	 should	 rather	only	be	 triggered	when	a	State	 is	
ready	and	able,	in	its	view,	to	fully	demonstrate	a	conflict	of	jurisdiction	on	
the	basis	that	the	requirements	set	out	in	article	17	are	met.131	
																																																						
125	Ruto	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	40;	Muthaura	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	39	(emphasis	added)	
126	Ibid	(Ruto	para.	42;	Muthaura	para.	39)	
127	Ruto	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	62	
128	Ibid	para.	146;	see	also	Gaddafi	Admissibility	Judgment	paras.	164-7	
129	RPE	58(2)	
130	Ruto	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	98;	Muthaura	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	96	
131	Gaddafi	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	164;	see	also	Simone	Gbagbo	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	35	
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It	 is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising,	 given	 the	 rulings	 on	 admissibility	 challenges,	 that	 the	
attitude	of	the	Court	to	states	seeking	to	assert	their	judicial	primacy	has	been	described	
as	obstructive	to	the	point	of	hostile.		In	Katanga,	the	Defence	contended	that	the	ICC’s	
interpretation	of	complementarity:	
	
[N]egates	the	concerns	raised	by	States	at	the	Rome	Conference,	defeats	the	
principle’s	objects	and	purpose	and	turns	it	on	its	head;	the	current	regime	
–	 as	 developed	 by	 the	 Court’s	 early	 practice	 …	 is	 de	 iure	 one	 of	
complementarity	but	de	facto	is	nothing	less	than	primacy	of	the	ICC	over	
national	courts.132	
	
In	this	section,	it	has	been	seen	that	ICC	judges,	far	from	demonstrating	flexibility	in	their	
interpretation	 of	 the	 RSt	 relating	 to	 admissibility,	 have	 been	 prescriptive.	 At	 the	
preliminary	examination	stage,	 they	have	demanded	evidence	of	 ‘tangible,	 concrete,	
progressive	steps’	taken	by	states	to	investigate	the	situation	before	the	ICC	and	at	the	
case	 stage,	 information	 detailing	 the	 ‘specificity	 and	 probative	 value’	 of	 the	 state’s	
investigation	must	be	provided	to	confirm	to	the	Court’s	satisfaction	that	precisely	the	
same	person	is	being	investigated	for	substantially	the	same	conduct.		Furthermore,	by	
refusing	 to	 allow	 the	 amendment	 of	 an	 admissibility	 challenge	 or	 the	 submission	 of	
additional	supporting	material,	the	judges’	decisions	also	appear	to	undermine	the	on-
going	nature	of	the	assessment	of	admissibility.	
	
In	the	next	section,	the	question	of	whether	these	judicial	demands	make	a	challenge	to	
the	ICC	based	on	an	AJM	untenable	will	be	addressed.	
	
Unchallengeable	Admissibility	in	Practice?	
	
The	examination	of	the	ICC’s	jurisprudence	in	the	preceding	section	reveals	that	it	has	
deviated	from	the	RSt’s	fundamental	principle	that	national	jurisdictions	have	primacy	
over	 the	 investigation	 and	 prosecution	 of	 the	 crimes	within	 the	 Court’s	 jurisdiction.		
Since	 the	 demands	 made	 of	 states	 challenging	 admissibility	 are	 so	 exacting	 and	 its	
																																																						
132	Motion	Challenging	Admissibility	of	the	Case	by	the	Defence	of	Germain	Katanga,	pursuant	to	Article	19(2)(a)	of	
the	Statute	11	March	2009,	para.	19	
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decisions	so	robust	when	national	prosecutions	are	a	state’s	intention,	how	much	more	
difficult	would	it	be	for	a	state	intending	to	proceed	by	way	of	an	AJM	to	persuade	the	
Court	to	defer	in	its	favour?		The	Court’s	same	person	and	(substantially)	same	conduct	
requirement	and	the	very	narrow	definition	of	a	‘case’	makes	it	onerous	for	the	state	to	
show	 it	 is	 acting	 in	 relation	 to	 that	 same	 matter	 and	 easier	 for	 the	 ICC	 to	 assert	
admissibility.133	Additionally,	the	Court’s	refusal	to	permit	amendments	or	the	filing	of	
additional	 documentation	 to	 support	 a	 challenge	 presents	 huge	 obstacles	 for	 states	
wishing	to	retain	jurisdiction,	especially	a	transitioning	state	which	is	seeking	to	uphold	
the	requirements	of	ICJ	by	means	other	than	prosecutions.	
	
The	judges’	inflexibility,	it	is	argued,	is	contrary	to	the	intention	of	the	drafters	of	the	RSt	
that	the	assessment	of	admissibility	should	be	an	on-going	process,	dependent	on	the	
investigative	and	prosecutorial	steps	taken	by	the	state,	which	may	change	over	time.		
As	the	ACh	in	Katanga	stated,	 ‘a	case	that	was	originally	admissible	may	be	rendered	
inadmissible	by	a	change	of	circumstances	in	the	concerned	states	and	vice	versa.’134		Yet	
there	 is	 little,	 if	 any,	 evidence	 of	 the	 Court	 accepting	 admissibility	 as	 an	 on-going	
assessment	in	practice.	
	
In	1997,	following	much	deliberation,	consensus	was	achieved	by	the	PrepCom	that	the	
Court	 ‘would	not	 take	 jurisdiction	unless	 the	State	with	 criminal	 jurisdiction	over	 the	
offence	was	unable	or	unwilling	to	carry	out	the	 investigation	or	prosecution’135	 	This	
consensus	was	replicated	at	the	Rome	Conference	and	without	complementarity,	‘there	
would	have	been	no	agreement’	leading	to	the	adoption	of	the	RSt.136		It	is	argued	that	
the	jurisprudence	of	the	court	to	date	does	not	honour	the	spirit	of	this	consensus:		the	
requirement	for	co-operation	between	State	and	Court	working	in	unison	to	attain	the	
aims	of	ICJ	identified	earlier	in	this	thesis.			
	
																																																						
133	Robinson,	D.	(2010)	‘The	Mysterious	Mysteriousness	of	Complementarity’	CLF	pp67-102	at	p101	
134	Katanga	Admissibility	Judgment	para.	56	
135	Williams,	S.A./Schabas,	W.A.	‘Issues	of	Admissibility’	in	Triffterer.	O.	(ed)	p610	
136	Ibid	p613	
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This	is	certainly	the	view	of	Judge	Anita	Ušacka,	who	presented	dissenting	opinions	in	
both	the	Kenyan	and	Libyan	admissibility	appeals.137	Judge	Ušacka	is	of	the	opinion	that	
the	 ‘same	 person/(substantially)	 same	 conduct’	 test	 disregards	 the	 principle	 of	
complementarity	expressed	in	paragraph	10	of	the	Preamble	and	Article	1	of	the	ICCSt	
and	is	contrary	to	the	language	of	the	chapeau	of	Article	17(1).138		She	agrees	that	the	
test	was	developed	in	cases	that	had	been	self-referred,	therefore	admissibility	was	not	
challenged	 and	 the	 state	 was	 not	 required	 to	 demonstrate	 what	 investigatory	 or	
prosecution	steps	it	had	taken	regarding	the	suspect	and	the	conduct.139		When	the	same	
test	is	then	applied	to	compare	a	case	before	the	ICC	with	a	state’s	domestic	proceedings,	
she	 argues	 ‘the	 Court	 will	 come	 to	 wrong	 and	 even	 absurd	 results,	 potentially	
undermining	 the	 principle	 of	 complementarity	 and	 threatening	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	
Court’.140			
	
It	is	Judge	Ušacka’s	view	that,	having	regard	to	the	principle	of	complementarity,	Article	
17(1)(a)	does	not	 require	 the	State	 to	 ‘focus	on	 largely	or	precisely	 the	 same	acts	or	
omissions	that	form	the	basis	for	the	alleged	crimes	or	on	largely	or	precisely	the	same	
acts	or	omissions	of	the	person(s)	under	investigation	or	prosecution	to	whom	the	crimes	
are	allegedly	attributed.’141	She	continues	‘[e]stablishing	such	a	rigid	requirement	would	
oblige	domestic	authorities	to	“copy”	the	case	before	the	Court’142	which	would	lead	not	
to	 the	 state	and	Court	 complementing	each	other	but	 rather	 to	 competition	and	 the	
‘jurisdictional	conflict’	as	PTC1	termed	it	in	Lubanga	admissibility	decision.	
	
The	approach	taken	by	the	ICC,	Judge	Ušacka	argued	in	her	dissenting	opinion	in	Gaddafi,	
has	the	effect	of	 intruding	on	the	sovereignty	of	states	and	the	discretion	afforded	to	
national	 prosecutorial	 authorities.143	 Further,	 it	 shows	 no	 regard	 for	 ‘the	 many	
differences	in	legal	frameworks	and	in	the	practice	of	criminal	justice	between	domestic	
																																																						
137	Libya	Dissenting	Opinion	ICC-01/11-01/11-547-Anx2	21	May	2014;	Kenya	Dissenting	Opinion	ICC-01/09-01/11	OA	
20	September	2011	
138	Ibid	(Libya	Dissenting	Opinion)	para.	47	
139	Ibid	para.	48	
140	Ibid		
141	Ibid	para.	51	
142	Ibid	para.	52	
143	Ibid	para.	53	
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jurisdictions	and	the	Court	but	also	between	the	various	domestic	jurisdictions’.144		She	
expressed	 concern	 about	 the	 ramifications	 of	 the	 approach,	 arguing	 that	 it	 could	
preclude	 a	 state	 from	 focusing	 its	 investigations	 on	 a	 wider	 scope	 of	 activities,	 or	
conversely,	 encourage	 the	 state	 to	 focus	 on	 only	 the	 narrower	 case	 selected	 by	 the	
Prosecutor.145		Finally,	she	argued	that	it	raises	concerns	about	timing	as	the	proceedings	
before	the	Court	might	have	progressed	further	than	the	domestic	proceedings	or	vice	
versa.146	
	
Clearly,	 the	 Court’s	 assertive	 use	 of	 its	 judicial	 power	 risks	 antagonising	 states	 upon	
which	 it	 relies	 for	 co-operation,	 especially	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 its	 own	 enforcement	
methods,	as	has	already	been	seen	from	the	discontent	expressed	by	the	African	Union	
and	 the	moves	of	 some	African	 states	 to	withdraw	 from	 the	 treaty.	 	 The	Court	must	
demonstrate	a	more	conciliatory	approach	towards	complementarity	in	an	endeavour	to	
find	the	appropriate	balance	between	respecting	the	sovereignty	of	states	and	ensuring	
an	effective	Court.		The	Defence	in	Katanga,	quoting	Kleffner,147	argued	that	a	better	test	
would	 give	 states	 ‘a	 margin	 of	 appreciation	 in	 selecting	 crimes’148	 and	 proposed	 a	
combination	 of	 a	 ‘comparative	 gravity-test’149	 and	 ‘comprehensive	 conduct-test’150	
which	 could	 be	 applied	 alternatively	 or	 jointly.151	 It	 also	 advocated	 a	 duty	 on	 the	
Prosecutor	to	consult	and	assist	national	authorities,	a	duty	which	‘lies	at	the	heart	of	
‘effective	complementarity’’152	and	which	the	Defence	alleged	was	conspicuously	lacking	
in	the	DRC	case.153	
	
Judge	Ušacka	argued	that	complementarity	should	be	assessed	using	multiple	criteria	
referenced	 to	 each	 specific	 case;	 that	 there	 should	 be	 a	 broad	 test	 of	 ‘conduct’	 not	
necessarily	requiring	the	same	acts	attributed	to	that	suspect.154		Further,	she	considers	
																																																						
144	Ibid	para.	54	
145	Ibid	para.	55	
146	Ibid	para.	56	
147	Kleffner,	J.K.	(2008)	Complementarity	in	the	Rome	Statute	and	National	Criminal	Jurisdictions	(Oxford:	OUP)	
148	Katanga	Motion	Challenging	Admissibility	para.	40	
149	Ibid	para.	46	
150	Ibid	para.	47	
151	Ibid	para.	45	
152	Ibid	para.	48	
153	Ibid	para.	49	
154	Libya	Dissenting	Opinion	para.	58	
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that	the	evidence	rules	in	challenges	should	be	relaxed	so	as	not	to	require	‘probative	
value’	 and	 ‘specificity’	 as	 this	 imposes	 too	 high	 a	 standard	 e.g.	 from	 a	 State	 in	
transition155	and	that	the	‘clearly	expressed	genuine	will’156	of	a	State	to	investigate	and	
prosecute	should	be	given	far	more	weight,	particularly	when	combined	with	the	‘active	
co-operation’	the	State	should	receive	from	the	Court.157			
	
The	attitude	of	the	ICC	seems	to	be	at	odds	with	the	desire	to	encourage	and	assist	States	
to	 investigate	 and	 prosecute	 international	 crimes	when	 they	 express	willingness	 and	
ability	to	do	so.		Given	that	current	Court	practice	appears	hostile	to	state	action	rather	
than	one	of	co-operation	and	promotion	of	state	proceedings,	how	much	more	unlikely	
is	it	that	the	Court	would	declare	a	case	inadmissible	when	the	intention	of	that	State	is	
to	deal	with	offenders	by	means	of	an	AJM?		Indeed,	the	raison	d’ětre	of	the	ICC	is	to	
ensure	 perpetrators	 of	 atrocious	 crimes	 face	 trial	 before	 either	 a	 domestic	 or	
international	court	and	if	the	Court	can	decide	against	a	state	that	declares	itself	willing	
and	able	to	bring	offenders	to	trial,	it	is	perhaps	inconceivable	that	it	will	defer	in	favour	
of	a	state	intending	to	deal	with	offenders	by	means	of	an	AJM.	
	
Conclusion	
	
The	 decisions	 of	 the	 ICC	 have	 established	 a	 legal	 framework	 for	 determining	
admissibility	challenges	and	it	 is	clear	from	the	nature	of	those	decisions	that	a	state	
cannot	rely	on	the	principle	that	it	 is	the	sovereign	right	of	every	state	to	exercise	its	
criminal	jurisdiction	when	it	is	faced	with	the	ICC	calling	it	to	account.		It	is	notable	even	
from	the	wording	of	the	RSt,	given	that	the	State	has	primary	jurisdiction,	that	the	State	
is	placed	in	the	position	of	having	to	‘request’	the	Prosecutor	to	defer	at	the	Article	18	
stage,158	rather	than	entitling	it	to	demand	the	Prosecutor	defers	to	its	jurisdiction	and	
although	 the	 Prosecutor	 must	 defer	 to	 the	 State	 upon	 receipt	 of	 the	 required	
information,	that	deferral	 is	subject	to	regular	review	of	the	State’s	activities	and	the	
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State	must	satisfy	the	Prosecutor	that	its	proceedings	are	bona	fides	and	effective.159		
Again,	for	Article	19	challenges,	it	is	for	the	State	to	prove	that	the	case	is	inadmissible	
to	the	Court	and	not	for	the	Prosecutor	to	prove	that	it	is	admissible.		When	coupled	
with	the	judiciary	of	the	Court	being	the	sole	arbiter	of	challenges	to	its	jurisdiction,	this	
gives	the	appearance	that	rather	than	respect	for	state	sovereignty,	complementarity	is	
weighted	in	favour	of	the	Court	and	international	justice160	and	certainly	this	leaves	little	
room	for	AJMs.	
	
The	Court	has	shown	that	it	will	act	decisively	even	when	its	intervention	is	opposed	by	
a	 State	 that	 declares	 itself	willing	 and	able	 to	 conduct	 criminal	 proceedings,	 so	how	
much	 more	 robust	 would	 the	 Court	 be	 when	 faced	 with	 a	 challenge	 based	 on	 a	
transitioning	state’s	intention	to	rely	on	AJMs	rather	than	trials?		Once	the	ICC	becomes	
seised	of	a	case,	current	jurisprudence	shows	that	a	state	wishing	to	assert	its	judicial	
primacy	 is	 required	 to	 provide	 concrete,	 tangible	 proof	 of	 the	 steps	 it	 is	 taking	 to	
investigate	the	same	suspects	for	the	same	criminal	conduct	as	the	ICC.		Promises	and	
assurances	are	insufficient:	to	satisfy	the	Court,	states	are	required	to	provide	adequate	
evidence	 of	 degree	 of	 specificity	 and	 probative	 value.	 	 The	 RSt	 does	 not	 define	 the	
standard	of	proof	for	the	purposes	of	a	determination	on	the	admissibility	of	a	case,	so	
these	 requirements	 are	 judge-made	 and	 serve	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 confident	 and	
assertive	the	judges	have	become	in	their	determination	to	fulfil	the	Court’s	mandate.		
Is	this,	as	Hansen	contends	‘judicial	activism	[…]	where	judges	of	the	ICC	increasingly	
grant	themselves	powers	that	were	not	clearly	envisaged	by	the	drafters	of	the	Rome	
Statute’161	and	which	could	undermine	its	key	principles’?		
	
Certainly,	it	all	seems	very	distanced	from	the	PrepCom	discussions	and	the	negotiations	
at	the	Rome	Conference	when	delegates	were	keen	to	protect	their	right	to	deal	with	
the	crimes	and	offenders	within	their	jurisdictions	themselves	and	complementarity	was	
the	sweetener	to	win	their	support	for	the	ICC.		In	hindsight,	it	seems	the	South	Africans	
were	right	to	insist	during	the	lengthy	debates	concerning	the	attitude	the	Court	should	
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160	Hansen,	T.O.	(2012)	p234	
161	Ibid;	see	also	Schabas,	W.A.	(2009)	p757	
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take	 to	 AJMs	 that	 the	 RSt	 should	 include	 specific	 provisions	 for	 AJMs	 such	 as	 TRCs	
otherwise	an	omission	might	open	the	door	to	international	prosecution.162	
	
It	 has	 been	 argued	 in	 earlier	 chapters	 that	 transitioning	 states	may	 be	 unwilling	 to	
commit	offenders	to	trial	for	fear	that	doing	so	could	disrupt	a	fragile	peaceful	transition	
to	democracy,	as	occurred	in	Latin	American	states	and	South	Africa.		Instead	they	may	
favour	AJMs	such	as	TRCs	or	ceremonies	such	as	Mato	Oput,	which	in	turn	could	involve	
amnesties	 and	 reparations.	 	 How	 the	 Court	 addresses	 AJMs	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	
complementarity	principle	is	yet	to	be	seen	but	given	their	global	rise	in	popularity	and	
acceptance	 and	 their	 perceived	 importance	 for	 the	 achievement	 of	 peace	 and	
reconciliation,	it	is	without	doubt	a	challenge	to	be	faced	by	the	Court	in	the	future.		It	
will	require	a	complete	re-assessment	by	the	Court	of	its	retributive	justice	paradigm	if	
AJMs	are	going	to	be	accommodated	within	the	sphere	of	international	justice.		Without	
the	intervention	of	the	ASP	which	could	agree	to	re-draft	specific	provisions	of	the	RSt	
that	are	perceived	to	be	problematic	insofar	as	their	interpretation	by	the	ICC	judges	is	
concerned,	such	a	paradigmatic	shift	appears	unlikely.	
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CHAPTER	EIGHT	
	
CONCLUSION	
	
The	 intention	 of	 this	 thesis	 has	 not	 been	 to	 question	 the	 role	 of	 the	 International	
Criminal	Court	(ICC)	as	a	protector	of	individual	human	rights	and	punisher	of	those	who	
violate	 them.	 	 It	 has,	 however,	 sought	 to	 discuss	 a	 new	perspective	 of	 international	
criminal	justice	(ICJ)	so	that	a	more	adaptable,	contextually-sensitive	approach	for	states	
transitioning	 from	 conflict	 or	 authoritarian	 rule	 to	 peace	 and	 democracy	 can	 be	
achieved.	 	 The	 research	 has	 been	 undertaken	 at	 a	 time	 when	 the	 ICC	 has	 faced	
substantial	challenges	in	the	form	of	lack	of	support	from	the	United	Nations	Security	
Council,	non-co-operation	from	States	Parties	and	criticism	of	its	selectivity	of	cases	to	
prosecute,	particularly	from	the	continent	of	Africa,	which	has	been	threatening	a	mass	
withdrawal	 from	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 in	 protest.1	 	 This	 thesis	 has	 suggested	 that	 to	
facilitate	co-operation	and	support	from	States	Parties	in	the	global	search	for	ICJ,	the	
ICC	 should	 adopt	 a	 more	 flexible	 interpretation	 of	 the	 complementarity	 principle,	
particularly	concerning	alternative	justice	mechanisms	(AJMs).		However,	before	it	can	
do	that,	to	comply	with	its	mandate,	the	ICC	would	have	to	satisfy	 itself	that	an	AJM	
proposed	by	a	State	wishing	to	avoid	national	or	international	criminal	prosecutions,	is	
capable	of	attaining	ICJ	goals.	 	This	thesis	has	attempted	to	establish	a	framework	by	
which	such	an	assessment	could	be	undertaken.		
	
To	enable	a	comparative	analysis	of	different	accountability	mechanisms,	Chapter	Three	
identified	the	numerous	justice	goals	attributed	to	criminal	trials	at	the	ICC	by	reference	
both	 to	 domestic	 retributive	 justice	 theories	 and	 to	 the	 aims	 of	 transitional	 justice	
which,	 as	 a	 discrete	 field	 of	 scholarship,	 has	 grown	 in	 influence	 over	 the	 last	 three	
decades.		A	comparative	study	of	the	potential	of	the	ICC,	Mato	Oput	and	the	SATRC	to	
attain	these	goals	was	conducted	in	Chapters	Three,	Five	and	Six	and	it	was	suggested	
that	a	shift	in	thinking	about	the	whole	ICJ	process	could	be	achieved	without	forfeiting	
ICJ	aims.		This	research	is	significant	because	it	is	the	first	time	that	a	comparative	study	
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has	been	undertaken	of	Mato	Oput	and	the	SATRC	vis-á-vis	the	ICC	in	terms	of	the	goals	
of	ICJ	and	also	because	it	seeks	to	broaden	the	concept	of	justice	within	a	framework	
and	structure	that	is	relevant	to	criminal	prosecutions	at	the	ICC.	
	
The	fundamental	problem	with	AJMs	and	one	which	puts	them	into	direct	conflict	with	
western	 notions	 of	 justice	 is	 that	 they	 fail	 to	 punish	 the	 perpetrators	 of	 heinous	
international	crimes.	 	For	proponents	of	retributive	 justice,	 this	 fact	alone	makes	the	
predominantly	 restorative	 justice	 focus	 of	 AJMs	 unsuitable	 for	 dealing	 with	 the	
perpetrators	of	human	rights	abuses.2	The	primacy	of	retributive	justice	can	be	seen	in	
the	Preamble	to	the	Rome	Statute	(RSt),	which	explicitly	states	that	it	is	the	duty	of	every	
state	 ‘to	 exercise	 its	 criminal	 jurisdiction	 over	 those	 responsible	 for	 international	
crimes’3	and	if	they	prove	‘unwilling	or	unable’4	to	do	so	genuinely,	the	International	
Criminal	Court	(ICC)	will	intervene	to	ensure	‘an	end	to	impunity	for	the	perpetrators’5	
of	‘crimes	of	concern	to	the	international	community	as	a	whole’.6		Retributivists	insist	
criminal	prosecutions	are	essential	to	protect	the	rights	of	every	human	being,	even	if	
this	means	overriding	state	sovereignty.7	
	
The	focus	on	the	universal	rights	of	the	individual	and	the	obligations	of	the	international	
community	to	protect	them	finds	its	roots	in	Kantian	philosophy	of	the	Enlightenment	
era	but	today	raises	questions	regarding	the	appropriateness	of	applying	one	format	for	
justice	in	a	world	marked	by	cultural	and	societal	diversity,	issues	which	lie	at	the	heart	
of	 this	 thesis.8	 	 Chapter	 Three	 discussed	 the	 currency	 of	 the	 Kantian	 deontological	
retributive	approach	to	international	criminal	law9	and	it	is	argued	here	that	the	ICC	is	
essentially	 a	 Kantian	 project,10	 ideologically	 grounded	 in	 cosmopolitanism	 and	 its	
																																																						
2	See	e.g.	Orentlicher,	D.F.	(1990-1991)	‘Settling	Accounts:	The	Duty	to	Prosecute	Human	Rights	Violations	of	a	Prior	
Regime’	100	Yale	LJ	pp2537-2615	at	pp2541-2544,	2604-2606,	2615	
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5	RSt,	Preamble,	para.	5	
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7	Leonard,	E.	K.	(2005)	‘Discovering	the	New	Face	of	Sovereignty:	Complementarity	and	the	International	Criminal	
Court’	27	New	Political	Science	pp87-104	at	p104	
8	 See	 Betts,	 A.	 (2005)	 ‘Should	 Approaches	 to	 Post-Conflict	 Justice	 and	 Reconciliation	 be	 Determined	 Globally,	
Nationally	or	Locally?	17	EJ	Dev	Research	pp735-752	for	a	summary	of	the	debates	
9	See	page	58	ante		
10	Kant	calls	for	an	international	legal	system	to	bring	international	criminals	and	aggressors	to	trial,	see	Pojman,	L.P.	
(2005)	‘Kant’s	Perpetual	Peace	and	Cosmopolitanism’	36	Journal	of	Social	Philosophy	pp62-71	at	p69	
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premise	that	an	individual	has	‘citizenship	of	the	world’11	and	is	the	‘essential	unit	of	
moral	 agency’.12	 Kant’s	 view	 of	 cosmopolitanism	 and	 world	 citizenship	 ‘involves	 a	
utopian	 anticipation	 of	 world	 peace	 to	 be	 attained	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 increased	
communication	among	human	beings’,13	through	which	communication,	‘a	violation	of	
rights	 in	 one	 place	 is	 felt	 throughout	 the	 world’.14	 	 Primarily,	 therefore,	 Kant’s	
cosmopolitan	citizenship	grants	rights	simply	by	virtue	of	being	human.15	 	For	Kant,	a	
just	world	is:	
one	 in	 which	 cosmopolitan	 principles	 of	 justice	 are	 realistically	
institutionalised,	and	this	will	be	a	world	in	which	boundaries	are	not	absent,	
but	also	one	in	which	there	are	further	institutional	structures	which	support	
international	 justice	 between	 states	 and	 cosmopolitan	 justice	 for	 people	
when	they	interact	across	borders.16		
	
In	 these	 terms	 both	 the	 ICC	 and	 the	United	Nations	 (UN)	 itself	 can	 be	 described	 as	
cosmopolitan	 institutions.	 	 The	 1948	Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (UDHR)	
evidences	the	evolution	of	this	global	civil	society,	transitioning	it	‘from	international	to	
cosmopolitan	norms	of	justice.’17		Since	1948,	the	UN	has	continued	to	promote	human	
rights	 (HR)18	 grounded	 in	 Kant’s	 philosophy	 of	 global	 citizenship.19	 However,	 the	
arguments	for	universality	based	on	the	homogeneity	of	human	beings	have	not	found	
‘universal’	approval.	Tibi,	 for	example,	comments,	 ‘[e]xisting	civilisations	and	cultures	
differ	 substantially	 in	 their	norms,	 values	and	outlooks	as	 related	 to	 their	 respective	
world	views.’20	And	as	early	as	1948,	the	American	Anthropological	Association	(AAA)	
rejected	the	UN’s	advocacy	of	the	universality	of	international	HR	norms,21	arguing	the	
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states	and	their	representatives	are	signatories,	cosmopolitan	norms	accrue	to	individuals	considered	as	moral	and	
legal	persons	in	a	world-wide	society.’	
18	See	Chapter	Two	ante	
19	Messer,	E.	(1993)	‘Anthropology	and	Human	Rights’	22	Annual	Review	of	Anthropology	pp221-249	at	p222	
20	Tibi,	B.	(1994)	‘Islamic	Law/Shari’a,	Human	Rights,	Universal	Morality	and	International	Relations’	16	HRQ	pp277-
299	at	p280		
21	Executive	Board,	AAA.	(1947)	‘Statement	on	Human	Rights’	49	American	Anthropologist	pp539-543;		in	1999,	the	
AAA	 developed	 a	 Declaration	 on	 HR	 that	 it	 believed	 had	 universal	 relevance	 [Online]	 Available:	
http://humanrights.americananthro.org/1999-statement-on-human-rights/	[Accessed	30.08.17]	
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UDHR	failed	to	encompass	rights	that	were	truly	culturally,	ideologically	and	politically	
universal.22		
	
Thus	the	UN,	the	HR	movement	and	the	ICC	are	each	seen	by	many	non-Western	states	
as	 extensions	 of	 the	 Western	 rationalist	 project	 which,	 through	 promulgating	
universality,	 ignore	 the	 diversity	 of	mankind	 and	 the	 culturally	 contingent	 nature	 of	
law.23	Allen	and	MacDonald	comment	that:	
	
Today,	despite	a	more	moderate	 relativist	position	 that	 tells	us	 there	are	
overlapping	values	from	which	we	might	be	able	to	identify	a	common	core	
of	human	rights	principles,	there	does	remain	concern	that	human	rights	law	
[…]	 will	 continue	 to	 struggle	 for	 meaning	 and	 relevance	 in	 non-western	
cultures,	which,	it	is	claimed,	have	different	concepts	of	personhood	and	the	
self.24	
	
In	 Africa,	 for	 example,	 vigorous	 debate	 has	 focussed	 on	 whether	 human	 rights	 are	
individual	 or	 collective	 and	 whether	 socio-economic	 rights	 have	 priority	 over	 the	
individual	 civil-political	 freedoms	 which	 are	 emphasised	 in	 the	West.25	 	 The	 African	
(Banjul)	Charter	on	Human	and	Peoples’	Rights	produced	by	African	political	leaders26	
reflects	African	assertions	that	in	their	societies,	‘peoples’	not	individuals,	have	rights	
and	 individual	 freedoms	 may	 have	 to	 be	 sacrificed	 to	 support	 subsistence	 and	
development	rights,	at	least	in	the	short	term.27		Messer	asserts	that	this	demonstrates	
that	African	concepts	of	‘personhood’	are	more	likely	to	be	based	on	an	acceptance	that	
‘the	human	is	a	social	being	and	only	human	by	virtue	of	his	or	her	social	roles,	fulfilment	
of	appropriate	rights	and	duties	and	relationship	as	an	individual	to	the	social	unit’.28	
This,	again,	calls	into	question	the	cross-cultural	applicability	and	appropriateness	of	a	
uniquely	Western	concept	of	human	rights	and	the	juridical	means	of	their	protection.29		
																																																						
22	Fox,	D.J.	(1998)	‘Women’s	Human	Rights	in	Africa:	Beyond	the	Debate	over	the	Universality	or	Relativity	of	Human	
Rights’	2	African	Rights	Quarterly	pp3-16	at	p9	
23	Allen,	T.	and	MacDonald,	A.	(2013)	p1	
24	Ibid	
25	Messer,	E.	(1993)	p227	
26	Adopted	27	June	1981,	in	force	21	October	1986	
27	See	Articles	27-29	
28	Messer,	E.	(1993)	p228	
29	The	difficulty	with	this	view	is	that	some	narratives	of	cultural	relativity	mask	an	intention	to	maintain	patriarchy	
and	elite	domination	and	are	simply	an	excuse	for	gross	violations	of	individuals’	rights,	as	was	seen,	for	example,	in	
Soviet	Russia	and	Nazi	Germany.		It	is	difficult	for	an	advocate	of	human	rights,	therefore,	to	accept	that	an	individual	
in	Europe	has	less	right	to	protection	than	an	individual	in	Africa	
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For	Matua,	the	‘arrogant	and	biased	rhetoric	of	the	human	rights	movement	prevents	it	
from	 gaining	 cross-cultural	 legitimacy’30	 and	 the	 right	 of	 one	 culture	 to	 ‘define	 and	
impose	on	others	what	it	deems	good	for	humanity’	will	only	serve	to	abrogate	the	very	
rights	 it	 is	seeking	to	promulgate.31	 	However,	 these	opinions	do	seem	to	be	at	odds	
with,	for	example,	SA’s	desire	to	build	a	nation	which	embodies	respect	for	individual	
HR	and	perhaps	even	with	the	views	expressed	by	participants	in	the	Ugandan	surveys	
who	supported	retributive	trials.		
	
So	if	views	that	the	ICC	represents	a	Western	justice	construction	designed	to	protect	
culturally	inappropriate	human	rights	persist	across	non-Western	societies,	one	might	
question	why	so	many	have	ratified	the	RSt.		It	was	suggested	in	Chapter	Two	that	the	
acceptance	of	Western	 justice	norms	and	standards	by	non-Western	states	could	be	
attributed	both	to	the	export	of	Western	justice	mechanisms	during	the	colonial	period	
and	to	the	‘Europeanisation’	of	the	educated	elites	in	those	former	colonial	societies.		
Matua	 suggests	 that	 states’	 ratification	 could	 mean	 they	 ‘are	 bowing	 to	 a	 false	
international	consensus	because	 in	some	sense	their	statehood	and	belonging	to	the	
‘international	 community’	 is	 dependent	 on	 paying	 homage	 to	 international	 law,	 to	
human	rights’.32		Perhaps	ratification	satisfies	the	desires	of	states’	political	leaders	to	
be	regarded	as	equals	in	the	international	community,	by	virtue	of	their	state	upholding	
the	same	norms	and	standards	of	justice	and	respect	for	human	rights	and	humanitarian	
law	as	the	rest	of	the	‘civilised’	world.			
	
Notwithstanding	 some	 vociferously	 articulated	 concerns	 about	 the	 ICC’s	 cultural	
insensitivity,	its	supporters	maintain	that	the	Court	upholds	norms	and	values	which	are	
universal,	irrespective	of	cultural	diversity.		Moreover,	they	argue	that	it	is	the	failure	of	
states	to	protect	the	HR	of	their	citizens	which	establishes	the	Court’s	moral	authority	
to	intervene	to	obtain	justice	for	the	individual,	even	against	the	interest	of	the	state.33		
																																																						
30	Matua,	M.	(2001)	‘Savages,	Victims,	and	Saviours:	The	Metaphor	of	Human	Rights’	42	Harvard	ILJ	pp201-245	at	
p206	
31	Ibid	p219	
32	Ibid	p236	
33	Fouladvand,	S.	(2012)	Complementarity	and	Cultural	Sensitivity:	Decision-Making	by	the	ICC	Prosecutor	in	Relation	
to	the	Situations	in	the	Darfur	region	of	the	Sudan	and	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	(DRC)	PhD	thesis,	Sussex	
Law	School,	University	of	Sussex	p18	
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Interestingly,	 despite	 the	 interventionist	 model	 of	 the	 ICC,	 Kant	 ‘did	 not	 ‘sanction	
intervention’,	which	would	be	a	violation	of	the	rights	of	an	independent	nation.’34		In	
any	event,	it	has	been	argued	that	these	two	concepts,	universality	and	relativism,	are	
not	necessarily	opposed.		Fox	argues	‘international	HR	norms	should	become	part	of	the	
legal	culture	of	any	given	society,	[although]	to	do	so,	they	must	strike	responsive	chords	
in	the	general	human	public	consciousness.’	35	
	
This	 universalism	 versus	 relativism	 dichotomy	 epitomises	 the	 problematic	 issue	 that	
criminal	prosecutions	are	the	only	justice	systems	which	have	been	conditioned	by	Post-
Enlightenment	ideas	about	HR	and	there	is	a	clear	conflict	between	the	ICC	as	a	Kantian	
concept	 of	 justice	 and	 ‘traditional’	 variants	which	 still	 flourish	 in	many	 areas	 of	 the	
world.	 	Whatever	 our	 views	 about	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 community-based	models	 of	
justice,	the	problem	which	must	be	addressed	is	that	it	now	seems	impossible	(and	many	
would	 argue,	 illegitimate)	 to	 envisage	 justice	 without	 some	 form	 of	 rights-based	
methodology.		It	will	be	recalled	from	Chapter	Four,	for	example,	that	Kofi	Annan	stated	
in	his	2004	Report	to	the	UN	Security	Council:	
	
due	 regard	 must	 be	 given	 to	 indigenous	 and	 informal	 traditions	 for	
administering	 justice	 or	 settling	 disputes,	 to	 help	 them	 to	 continue	 their	
often	vital	role	and	to	do	so	in	conformity	with	both	international	standards	
and	local	tradition.36	
	
There	is	a	tension	between	this	insistence	on	conformity	with	international	standards	
and	the	desire	to	localise	and	contextualise	post-conflict	justice.37		Given	that	universal	
norms	have	been	formulated	from	a	Western-centric	viewpoint,	it	is	perhaps	unrealistic	
(and	unfair)	 to	 assess	AJMs	 to	 these	 standards.38	 	 Certainly,	 there	are	 concerns	 that	
Western-inspired	 tampering	 with	 traditional	 processes	 to	 ensure	 they	 conform	 to	
																																																						
34	Ibid	p26	
35	Fox,	D.J.	(1998)	p4	
36	‘The	Rule	of	Law	and	Transitional	Justice	in	Conflict	and	Post-Conflict	Societies’	UN	Doc.	S/2004/616,	23	August	
2004,	para.	36	(emphasis	added)	
37	Baines,	E.	(2010)	‘Spirits	and	Social	Reconstruction	after	Mass	Violence:	Rethinking	Transitional	Justice’	109	Africa	
Affairs	pp409-430	at	p415	(Citing	Shaw,	R.	‘One	Size	does	not	fit	all	–	but	how	to	choose?		Re-visiting	common	myths	
and	assumptions’	(paper	presented	at	the	IJTJ	Board	Conference,	‘Challenging	the	Assumptions	in	Transitional	Justice:	
the	Role	of	IJTJ’,	Cape	Town,	South	Africa,	28-30	May	2008)	
38	Ibid	p414	
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international	 standards	 will	 effectively	 eradicate	 the	 very	 qualities	 that	 make	 them	
distinctive	 as	 local	 and	 culturally	 relevant.39	 	 In	 Chapter	 Five,	 for	 example,	 the	
establishment	 of	 Ker	 Kwaro	 Acholi	 with	 the	 assistance	 of	 international	 and	 central	
governmental	agencies	and	the	adaptation	of	the	traditional	Mato	Oput	ritual	appears	
not	to	have	inspired	the	respect	of	much	of	the	Acholi	community.		The	failure	to	secure	
justice	and	dignity	for	victims	was	one	reason	that	Chapter	Five	concluded	the	adapted	
Mato	Oput	ceremony	does	not	satisfy	the	goals	of	ICJ.		
	 	
Supporters	 of	 restorative	 justice	 and	 specifically	 of	 AJMs	 argue	 that	 adherence	 to	 a	
blueprint	for	international	criminal	justice	(ICJ)	demonstrates	disregard	for	non-Western	
cultural	 and	 historical	 tradition40	 	 and	 this	 thesis	 has	 argued	 that	 respect	 should	 be	
accorded	 to	 demands	 for	 justice	 mechanisms	 that	 function	 at	 local	 rather	 than	
international	 level.	 	This	will	require	the	ICC	to	be	far	more	flexible	in	its	 interactions	
with	 State	 Parties	 and	 their	 affected	 communities	 and	 to	 adopt	 a	 more	 nuanced	
approach	in	the	quest	for	meaningful	justice	for	victims.	
	
Similarly,	if	the	ICC	is	to	be	persuaded	to	declare	a	case	inadmissible,	there	will	have	to	
be	 an	 acceptance	 by	 proponents	 of	 AJMs	 that	 accommodations	 should	 be	made	 to	
eradicate	‘persistent	ethnic,	religious,	generational	and	gender	hierarchies	and	divisions	
that	 complicate	and	 limit	 the	effectiveness	of	 traditional	practice	 from	a	 transitional	
justice	perspective.’41		Chapter	Four’s	general	discussion	of	AJMs	and	their	domination	
by	elderly	males	highlighted	the	hierarchical	character	of	African	social	accountability	
and	 the	 routine	 suppression	 of	 certain	 groups,	 particularly	 women	 and	 youth.42		
Reconstructing	 ‘patriarchal,	 gerontocratic’,43	 pre-conflict	 structures	 devastated	 by	
violence	and	its	aftermath	without	reform	will	merely	re-instate	traditional	hierarchies,	
to	the	detriment	of	women	and	youth.		However,	the	fact	that	the	original	Mato	Oput	
ceremony	has	been	adapted	to	enable	it	to	be	used	for	returning	combatants	testifies	
																																																						
39	Allen,	T.	and	MacDonald,	A.	(2013)	p19	
40	Ibid	pp3-5;	see	also	Baines,	E.	(2010)	p412-413;	Branch,	A.	(2007)	‘Uganda’s	Civil	War	and	the	Politics	of	ICC	
Intervention’	21	Ethics	and	International	Affairs	pp179-198	at	p191-192;	Branch,	A.	(2004)	‘International	Justice,	
Local	Injustice:	The	International	Criminal	Court	in	Northern	Uganda’	51	Dissent	pp22-26	at	p25-26	
41	Allen,	T.	and	MacDonald,	A.	(2013)	p13	
42	Ibid	
43	Branch,	A.	(2014)	‘The	Violence	of	Peace:	Ethnojustice	in	Northern	Uganda’	45	Development	and	Change	pp608-30	
at	p617	
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to	its	flexibility.		Reforms	to	end	male	gerontocracy	and	enable	women	and	youth	to	be	
included	in	the	processes	of	conflict	resolution	would	ensure	the	eradication	of	gender	
and	age	discrimination.	Clearly,	communal	ceremonies	may	still	be	necessary	to	cater	
for	large	numbers	of	returnees	but	they	could	perhaps	involve	victims	in	more	positive	
roles	 than	 simply	 spectating	 and	 they	 could	 require	 from	 the	 returnees	 a	 voluntary	
acknowledgement	 of	 wrong-doing	 and	 some	 form	 of	 reparation	 in	 the	 form	 of,	 for	
example,	community	service.	
	
Regarding	the	need	for	national	reconciliation	in	Uganda,	it	was	noted	in	Chapter	Five	
that	 although	 Mato	 Oput	 is	 culturally	 specific	 to	 the	 Acholi,	 it	 does	 have	 some	
equivalence	 to	 conflict	 resolution	 practices	 of	 other	 groups	 affected	 by	 the	 Lord’s	
Resistance	Army	violence.44	This	suggests	that	the	various	ethnic	groups	in	Uganda	could	
devise	 an	 acceptable	 ceremony	 based	 on	 their	 communal	 traditional	 values	 to	 be	
performed	 nationwide	 at	 the	 local	 level,	 involving	 all	 members	 of	 the	 community,	
including	the	government,	the	army	and	other	state	institutions.			
	
Something	similar	occurred	in	Sierra	Leone	(SL)	after	the	end	of	the	civil	war	in	1999,	
when	despite	a	restorative	tradition	existing	within	the	various	ethnic	groups	of	SL,45	the	
Lomé	 Peace	 Agreement	 made	 the	 ‘regrettable’	 decision	 not	 to	 rely	 on	 traditional	
‘established	 cultural	 practices’	 but	 provided	 for	 establishment	 of	 a	 Truth	 and	
Reconciliation	Commission	(TRC)	largely	modelled	on	the	South	African	TRC	(SATRC).46	
Unfortunately,	the	SLTRC	was	criticised	not	only	for	failing	to	reach	remote	areas	but	
also	 for	 being	 ‘too	 Western,	 too	 ‘official’	 and	 fail[ing]	 to	 elicit	 apologies	 from	
perpetrators’.47	 	 These	 failings	 led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 Fambul	 Tok	 in	 2008.48	
Nationwide	consultations	over	15	months	 involving	 ‘victims,	ex-combatants,	women,	
youth,	religious	leaders,	elders,	cultural	leaders	and	local	officials’	in	all	districts	assessed	
‘people’s	 readiness	 for	 reconciliation’	 and	 revealed	 that	 ‘local	 cultural	 traditions,	
																																																						
44	Allen,	T.	(2008)	‘Ritual	(Ab)use?		Problems	with	Traditional	Justice	in	Northern	Uganda’	in	Wadell,	N.	and	Clark,	P.	
(eds.)	Courting	Conflict?		Justice,	Peace	and	the	ICC	in	Africa	(London:	Royal	African	Society)	pp47-54	at	p48	
45	Graybill,	L.S.	(2010)	Traditional	Practices	and	Reconciliation	in	SL:	The	Effectiveness	of	Fambul	Tok	(ACCORD:	Conflict	
Trends)	pp41-47	at	p43	
46	Ibid	p42	
47	Ibid	p44	
48	Krio	for	‘family	talk’,	drew	upon	tradition	of	discussing	and	resolving	issues	within	the	family	circle	
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dormant	 since	 the	 war,	 could	 be	 reawakened	 for	 social	 healing.’49	 Fambul	 Tok	was	
designed	to	address	conflict	at	a	local	level	and	to	encourage	each	person	to	contribute	
towards	peace.50		Its	voluntary	process	departed	from	tradition	by	including	women	and	
youth	in	the	reconciliation	committees	which	arranged	the	rituals	and	the	members	of	
which	all	received	training	in	human	rights	and	conflict	resolution.51		It	is	suggested	that	
this	 grass-roots	 collaborative	 effort	 to	 establish	 a	 nationally-acceptable	 means	 of	
achieving	accountability	and	reconciliation	could	be	successfully	replicated	in	Uganda.		
Such	an	AJM	could	potentially	resolve	the	issues	which	make	Mato	Oput	unsuitable	as	
a	 national	 mechanism	 for	 achieving	 justice	 and	 accountability	 and	 which	 render	 it	
incapable	of	attaining	the	aims	of	ICJ	for	the	purposes	of	a	challenge	at	the	ICC	based	on	
the	principle	of	complementarity.			
	
Turning	to	the	capacity	of	the	SATRC	to	attain	the	goals	of	ICJ	identified	in	this	thesis,	it	
was	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 Six	 that	 despite	 its	 identified	 shortcomings,	 there	was	much	
about	 the	 SATRC	 that	 has	 great	 potential	 to	 satisfy	 the	 aims	 of	 ICJ	 and	 far	 more	
effectively	 than	 trials	 at	 the	 ICC.	 	 It	 was	 suggested	 that	 the	manner	 of	 the	 SATRC’s	
establishment,	which	involved	nationwide	consultation	and	participation	in	the	drafting	
of	the	Act	which	established	it	and	in	the	selection	of	its	commissioners,	made	the	TRC	
especially	effective	as	a	nationally-approved	means	of	accountability.		The	fact	that	it	
was	well-structured,	well-resourced	and	held	nationwide	public	meetings	which	were	
extensively	covered	in	the	media	all	served	to	reinforce	its	efficacy	as	an	AJM.		For	a	TC,	
its	 ‘carefully	 balanced	 powers’52	 and	 ‘extensive	 investigatory	 reach’53	 were	
unprecedented	at	the	time	(albeit	they	were	under-utilised)	and	its	flexibility	enabled	it	
to	adapt	its	processes	as	issues,	such	as	gender-focus,	arose.		To	improve	the	range	of	
accountability	 still	 further,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 future	 generic	 TC	 models	 should	
incorporate	 institutional	 and	 special	 hearings	 into	 their	 process	 from	 the	 outset,	 to	
enable	 the	 identification	of	 the	 extent	 of	 culpability	 not	 readily-apparent	 in	 criminal	
trials,	 such	 as	 beneficiaries,	 those	 who	 profited	 from	 the	 system	 (e.g.	 business	 and	
																																																						
49	Graybill,	L.S.	(2010)	p44	
50	Ibid	p45	
51	Ibid	
52	 Hayner,	 P.	 (2011)	Unspeakable	 Truths:	 Transitional	 Justice	 and	 the	 Challenge	 of	 Truth	 Commissions	 (London:	
Routledge)	p27	
53	Ibid	
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industry)	 and	 those	 who	 upheld	 the	 system	 (e.g.	 judges,	 lawyers	 and	 the	 medical	
profession).	
	
Like	any	ground-breaking	institution,	however,	the	SATRC	made	mistakes	which	were	
identified	and	discussed	in	Chapter	Six	and	which	a	transitioning	state	wishing	to	rely	on	
this	 form	 of	 AJM	must	 address	 if	 the	 ICC	 is	 to	 be	 persuaded	 to	 defer	 in	 its	 favour.		
Concerning	 the	 important	 issue	 of	 amnesties,	 for	 example,	 to	 forestall	 the	
inconsistencies	 of	 approach	 that	 occurred	 in	 South	 Africa	 over	 the	 assessment	 of	
provisions	relating	to	disclosure,	political	objective	and	proportionality,	the	TC	should	
establish	in	advance	an	agreed	framework	by	which	these	areas	can	be	assessed.		It	must	
also	rectify	the	problem	of	perpetrators	waiting	until	they	are	targeted	for	prosecution	
before	applying	for	amnesty,	perhaps	by	imposing	a	time	limit	for	amnesty	applications	
and	 by	 ensuring	 that	 those	 who	 fail	 to	 apply	 remain	 at	 real	 risk	 of	 future	 criminal	
prosecution.	This	is	important	because	a	study	conducted	in	2010	concluded	that	TCs	
alone	‘tend	to	have	a	negative	impact	on	HR’	whereas,	when	used	together	with	trials	
and	 amnesties,	 TCs	 ‘can	 help	 provide	 a	 ‘justice	 balance’	 that	 contributes	 to	 HR	
improvements.’54	
	
The	TC	should	also	allow	sufficient	time	and	personnel	for	full	and	proper	investigations	
of	 facts	 relating	 to	amnesty	applications,	 to	ensure	 the	veracity	of	admissions	made,	
before	amnesty	is	granted.		It	should	provide	for	equal	legal	representation	to	improve	
victim	participation	in	the	amnesty	process	and	ideally,	it	should	co-ordinate	decisions	
regarding	amnesty	with	decisions	 regarding	 reparations	 to	avoid	 the	perception	 that	
perpetrators	receive	better	treatment	than	victims.		As	suggested	by	Theissen,	it	could,	
perhaps,	 consider	 ‘graded’	 amnesties	 and	 not	 preclude	 future	 civil	 claims55	 but	
primarily,	reparations	must	be	prioritised	so	as	not	to	undermine	the	effectiveness	of	
the	TRC	process	in	the	opinion	of	victims.	
	
																																																						
54	Olsen,	T.D.,	Payne,	L.A.,	Reiter,	A.G.	and	Wiebelhaus-Brahm,	E.	(2010)	‘When	Truth	Commissions	Improve	Human	
Rights’	4	IJTJ	pp457-476	at	p458	
55	Theissen,	G.	(1999)	Common	Past,	Divided	Truth:	The	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	in	South	African	Public	
Opinion	 (Paper	 presented	 at	 the	Workshop	 on	 ‘Legal	 Institutions	 and	 Collective	Memories’	 at	 the	 International	
Institute	for	the	Sociology	of	Law,	Oñati,	Spain,	22-24	September)	p51	
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In	 addition	 to	 these	 issues	 regarding	 amnesty,	 the	 TC	 should	 ensure	 that	 there	 is	
individual	communication	with	participants	in	the	TC	process,	from	providing	reasons	
for	decisions	on	why	statement-makers	will	not	be	invited	to	give	evidence,	to	follow-
up	checks	on	those	who	do	appear	advising	of	outcomes	and	to	confirm	their	well-being.		
Further,	 if	 the	 term	 ‘reconciliation’	 is	 included	 in	 its	 title,	 the	 government	 should	
encourage	a	public	debate	regarding	the	nature	of	the	reconciliation	the	TC	will	attempt	
to	facilitate	i.e.	national	or	individual.		
	
Additionally,	 the	 function	 of	 the	 TC	 report	 should	 be	 established	 and	 publicised	 in	
advance,	to	control	expectations.		The	SATRC’s	report	was	criticised	for	not	providing	a	
detailed	narrative	of	individual	and	community	histories	but	as	noted	in	Chapter	Six,	the	
Commission	was	aware	that	to	do	so	conflicted	with	its	nation-	building/shared	history	
goals	 and	 could	 ultimately	 be	 divisive.	 	 Thus,	 it	 opted	 to	 provide	 a	 sample	 of	 truth,	
sufficient	to	establish	consensus	and	exemplify	collective	truths	although,	of	course,	all	
TRC	documents	have	been	preserved	for	subsequent	historical	analysis.			
	
Having	 acknowledged	 in	 Chapter	 Six	 that	 an	 AJM	 can	 successfully	 attain	 ICJ	 goals,	
Chapter	 Seven	 investigated	 the	 likelihood	 of	 ICC	 judges	 utilising	 the	 RSt’s	 ‘creative	
ambiguity’56	to	allow	an	AJM	to	fulfil	its	complementarity	criteria.		In	the	absence	of	an	
existing	 challenge	 based	 on	 a	 proposed	 AJM,	 decisions	 in	 previous	 admissibility	
applications	reveal	the	interpretation	of	complementarity	and	provide	guidance	on	the	
factors	judges	consider	when	making	their	decisions.		Disappointingly,	it	was	noted	that	
previous	admissibility	decisions	do	not	bode	well	for	a	state	wishing	to	persuade	the	ICC	
to	allow	it	to	forgo	criminal	trials	in	favour	of	an	AJM.			
	
The	 Rome	 Conference	 was	 generally	 unfavourable	 towards	 the	 concept	 of	 judges’	
creativity,	however,	the	constructive	ambiguity	of	the	RSt	has	allowed	judges	to	display	
a	degree	of	activism.57	 	 This	 is	demonstrated	by	decisions	which	all	 tend	 to	 increase	
judicial	control	over	prosecutorial	policy	beyond	that	which	appears	to	be	the	intention	
																																																						
56	Scharf,	M.P.	(1999)	‘The	Amnesty	Exception	to	the	Jurisdiction	of	the	International	Criminal	Court’	32	Cornell	ILJ	
pp507-527	at	p522	
57	Zappalà,	S.	(2009)	‘Judicial	Activism	v.	Judicial	Restraint	in	International	Criminal	Justice’	in	Cassese,	A.	(Ed-in-chief)	
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of	the	drafters	of	the	RSt.58	 	Thus,	even	 if	 the	Prosecutor	 is	prepared	to	exercise	her	
powers	in	the	interests	of	justice	in	the	state’s	favour,	the	judges	may	seek	to	overturn	
this	decision.59		Zappalà	argues	that	the	judges’	activist	attitude	may	be	the	only	way	to	
prompt	 states	 to	 exercise	 their	 jurisdiction	 to	 avoid	 the	 intervention	 of	 the	 ICC,60	
although	how	this	translates	into	addressing	the	role	of	AJMs	is	uncertain.	
	
Clearly,	if	the	ICC	has	jurisdiction	and	is	seeking	to	intervene,	the	state	intending	to	rely	
on	an	AJM	would	have	to	address	such	issues	as	the	investigation	process	to	satisfy	the	
Court	that	this	includes,	at	the	very	minimum,	interviewing	witnesses	and	suspects	and	
collecting	evidence	to	identify	those	responsible.		Forensic	investigation	in	the	form	of	
identifying	graves	and	bodies	would	be	additional	evidence	of	a	thorough	investigation.		
It	 is	 suggested	that	 these	steps	could	be	 incorporated	 into	an	AJM	process	 relatively	
easily.	 	 A	 more	 difficult	 problem,	 however,	 could	 be	 satisfying	 the	 same	
person/substantially	same	conduct	requirement	stipulated	by	the	ICC	judges	but	this	is	
an	area	where	potentially,	an	AJM	can	improve	upon	the	capabilities	of	criminal	trials.			
	
It	was	noted	in	Chapter	Three	that	criminal	prosecutions	are	selective	and	focus	on	the	
culpability	of	 individuals	which,	 it	was	argued,	 is	 incompatible	with	the	nature	of	the	
international	crimes.		In	contrast,	AJMs	employ	a	wider	lens	and	can	focus	on	collective	
responsibility	 as	well	 as	 individual.	 	 The	 state	 intending	 to	 rely	on	an	AJM	 therefore	
should	be	able	to	demonstrate	to	the	ICC	that	its	accountability	reach	far	exceeds	that	
of	the	Court.		Furthermore,	as	Judge	Ušacka	pointed	out	in	her	dissenting	judgment	in	
the	Libya	admissibility	challenge,	Article	17(1)(a)	does	not	require	the	State	to	‘focus	on	
largely	or	precisely	the	same	acts	or	omissions	that	form	the	basis	for	the	alleged	crimes	
or	on	largely	or	precisely	the	same	acts	or	omissions	of	the	person(s)	under	investigation	
or	 prosecution	 to	whom	 the	 crimes	 are	 allegedly	 attributed.’61	 	 For	 the	 ICC	 to	 insist	
otherwise	risks	negating	the	whole	principle	of	the	state	and	Court	complementing	each	
other	and	instils	instead	a	sense	of	antagonism	and	conflict	between	the	Court	and	the	
very	states	from	which	it	is	seeking	co-operation	in	the	fight	to	end	impunity.	
																																																						
58	Ibid	
59	Rome	Statute,	Article	53		
60	Ibid	p222	
61	Libya	Dissenting	Opinion	ICC-01/11-01/11-547-Anx2	21	May	2014para.51	
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More	empirical	research	needs	to	be	undertaken	(perhaps	in	the	form	of	‘before	and	
after’	 surveys	of	 individuals	 and	 communities	 affected	by	 the	 crimes	perpetrated	by	
defendants	who	have	appeared	before	the	ICC	to	date)	to	ascertain	how	effectively	the	
ICC	achieves	ICJ	goals.		It	really	is	not	sufficient	to	say	what	trials	at	the	ICC	are	expected	
to	achieve	in	terms	of	ICJ,	we	need	to	know	what	they	do	achieve	in	order	to	be	able	to	
properly	assess	their	efficacy	as	a	transitional	 justice	mechanism.	 	Likewise,	although	
study	in	the	field	of	transitional	justice	has	grown	over	the	last	three	decades,	empirical	
studies	should	be	undertaken	to	establish	the	long-term	success	of	AJMs	in	improving	
lives,	healing	divisions,	fostering	social	reconstruction	and	promoting	peace.	
	
Similar	 empirical	 research	 is	 required	 to	 establish	 how	 other	 AJMs	 that	 states	 may	
regard	as	preferential	to	criminal	prosecutions	in	the	context	of	their	own	transitions	
from	 conflict	 or	 tyrannical	 rule,	 can	 achieve	 ICJ	 goals.	 	 The	 thesis	 has	 proposed	 a	
framework	by	which	the	ICC	can	assess	an	AJM	for	the	purposes	of	its	complementarity	
provisions.		Further	research	is	necessary	to	fully	develop	and	analyse	this	framework	to	
enable	 its	 use	 by	 both	 the	 ICC	 in	 its	 appraisal	 of	 an	 AJM	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
complementarity	and	by	states	when	establishing	an	AJM	which	is	intended	to	negate	
the	requirement	for	criminal	prosecutions.		
	
This	thesis	has	aimed	to	provide	a	thorough	analysis	of	three	forms	of	justice	procedure	
in	the	light	of	the	ICJ	principles	that	were	established	in	Chapter	Three	and	as	a	result,	
has	reached	some	potentially	radical	conclusions	about	the	viability	of	AJMs	and	what	
needs	 to	be	done	 to	make	 them	operational	 in	 this	 context.	 	 Its	 findings	have	wider	
implications	for	the	architecture	of	ICJ	and	justice	practice	more	generally	than	simply	
an	acceptance	of	 the	 impossibilities	created	by	cultural	 relativity.	 	 It	has	argued	 that	
justice	for	victims	is	often	more	than	the	retributive	justice	offered	by	criminal	trials,	
thus	it	must	be	recognised	that	in	some	transitional	contexts,	prosecutions	at	the	ICC	
may	 not	 be	 the	 best	 option.	 	 Therefore,	 when	 deciding	 on	 the	 mechanism	 of	
accountability,	the	social	and	political	realities	of	a	specific	situation	must	be	taken	into	
account.		The	thesis	has	suggested	that	even	if	prosecutions	at	the	ICC	are	justified	and	
practicable,	 an	AJM	potentially	 could	be	more	effective	 in	achieving	many	of	 the	 ICJ	
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objectives	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	 Three.	 	 It	 is	 proposed	 that	 if,	 at	 the	 preliminary	
examination	 stage,	 the	 ICC,	 in	 tandem	with	 relevant	 national	 stakeholders,	 were	 to	
prioritise	the	ICJ	goals	applicable	to	that	particular	situation,	the	response	given	to	the	
needs	of	the	local	community	could	be	tailored	to	meet	ICJ	objectives.	
	
The	former	prosecutor	stated	that	‘there	is	a	difference	between	the	concepts	of	the	
interests	of	justice	and	the	interests	of	peace	and	[…]	the	latter	falls	within	the	mandate	
of	institutions	other	than	the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor’.62		It	is	argued,	however,	that	in	
many	contexts	 the	two	are	 intertwined	and	 it	 requires	a	reformulation	of	 the	 justice	
paradigm	to	reflect	this.		As	a	means	of	healing	the	wounds	of	the	past	and	coping	with	
the	 future,	 justice	 and	 even	 truth-telling	 ‘without	 socio-economic	 empowerment	 is	
ephemeral;	a	mere	short	 term	palliative	that	does	not	address	substantive	and	 long-
term	needs	in	the	post-conflict	dispensation.’63		It	has	been	suggested	that	transitional	
justice	(TJ)	may	lose	its	relevance	if	it	does	not	better	connect	with	the	trend	towards	
social	movements	 that	underlie	conflicts	 (e.g.	 the	Arab	Spring),	which	again	makes	 it	
essential	that	links	between	TJ	and	development	frameworks	(rather	than	focussing	only	
on	human	rights	violations)	be	established.		The	reformulation	proposed	by	this	thesis	
therefore	would	entail	 viewing	 the	 ICC	as	part	of	a	package	of	 transitional	measures	
which	could	include,	for	example,	increasing	access	to	education	and	health	care,	the	
provision	of	employment	opportunities,	improving	infrastructure	and	access	to	services,	
as	well	as	facilitating	accountability	measures,	including	AJMs.			
	
Finally,	 it	has	been	argued	that	reparations	in	themselves	are	seldom	transformative,	
that	whenever	they	are	tied	to	TJ,	it	is	always	unsatisfactory	as	they	never	achieve	the	
aim	of	restoration.64	 	 In	which	case,	this	must	be	worked	into	the	consideration	of	TJ	
																																																						
62	OTP	Policy	Paper	on	the	Interests	of	Justice,	September	2007	p1	
63	Sesay,	A.	(2007)	Does	one	size	fit	all?		The	Sierra	Leone	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	Revisited	(Uppsala:	
Nordiska	Afrikainstitutet)	p46	
64	Wierda,	M.	(2017)	‘Transitional	Justice	and	Human	Rights’	Presentation	given	at	a	Seminar	on	Transitional	Justice,	
Social	Justice,	and	Human	Rights	held	at	Utrecht	University,	8th	June;	see	also	Wlaschutz,	C.	(2014)	‘Paul	Gready,	The	
era	of	transitional	justice:	the	aftermath	of	the	truth	and	reconciliation	commission	in	South	Africa	and	beyond’	2	
Restorative	Justice	pp245-248	at	p246	stating	‘Despite	their	often	material	connotations,	they	are	usually	looked	upon	
as	pay-offs	by	the	political	elite	to	satisfy	international	pressure	with	symbolic	payments.		At	best,	they	may	serve	as	
a	‘costly	signal’	for	further	systemic	changes.’	
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measures	and	other	ways	of	transforming	lives	must	be	implemented.		To	do	this,	the	
victims	themselves	must	be	consulted	and	involved	in	identifying	their	needs.			
	
David	Crane,	 former	Prosecutor	 at	 the	 Special	 Court	 for	 Sierra	 Leone	 commented	 in	
2005,	“Our	perspectives	are	off	kilter	…	we	consider	our	justice	as	the	only	justice	…	we	
don’t	 create	 mechanisms	 by	 which	 we	 can	 consider	 the	 cultural	 and	 customary	
approaches	to	justice	within	the	region”.65		This	thesis	has	proposed	the	creation	of	such	
a	mechanism	and	has	argued	that	it	will	require	a	complete	re-assessment	by	the	ICC	of	
its	retributive	justice	paradigm	if	AJMs	are	to	be	accommodated	within	the	sphere	of	
ICJ.		If	justice	is	viewed	as	a	multi-dimensional	concept	encompassing	judicial	and	non-
judicial,	 retributive	 and	 non-retributive	 elements,	 then	 AJMs	 which	 focus	 on	 the	
restoration	of	relationships	through	dialogue	and	inclusiveness,	to	uphold	principles	of	
truth,	 accountability	 and	 compensation,	 potentially	 can	 be	 endorsed	 by	 the	 ICC	 as	
appropriate	justice	mechanisms	in	the	future.		
	
	
																																																						
65	 Kelsall,	 T.	 (2009)	Culture	 under	 Cross-Examination:	 International	 Justice	 and	 the	 Special	 Court	 for	 Sierra	 Leone	
(Cambridge:	CUP)	p11	quoting	a	speech	made	by	David	Crane	during	which	he	posed	the	rhetorical	question	whether	
the	justice	‘we	seek	to	impose’	is	not	merely	‘[w]hite	man’s	justice’.	
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APPENDIX	ONE	
	
	
Methodology	
	
According	to	Salter	and	Mason,	‘[m]any	interdisciplinarians	perceive	doctrinalists	to	be	
intellectually	rigid,	inflexible,	and	inward	looking;	many	doctrinalists	regard	[socio-legal]	
interdisciplinary	 research	 as	 amateurish	 dabbling	 with	 theories	 and	 methods	 the	
researchers	do	not	 fully	understand.’1	 	With	some	trepidation,	 therefore,	 it	 is	owned	
that	the	two	legal	research	methods	used	in	this	thesis	are	doctrinal	and	socio-legal.	
	
Historically,	all	legal	research	was	doctrinal	and	the	ability	to	conduct	doctrinal	research	
was	considered	a	core	skill	for	lawyers	as	the	two-part	process	entails	first	identifying	
and	locating	the	sources	of	the	law	and	then	the	rigorous	analysis	and	creative	synthesis	
of	 its	 content.	 	 The	 term	 ‘doctrinal’	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 Latin	 ‘doctrina’	 meaning	
instruction,	knowledge	or	learning.2	It	also	is	linked	to	the	doctrine	of	precedent	in	that	
‘legal	 rules	take	on	the	quality	of	being	doctrinal	because	they	are	not	 just	casual	or	
convenient	norms,	but	because	they	are	meant	to	be	rules	which	apply	consistently	and	
which	evolve	organically	and	slowly.’3	Doctrine	has	been	defined	as	a	‘synthesis	of	rules,	
principles,	norms,	interpretive	guidelines	and	values	which	explains,	makes	coherent	or	
justifies	a	segment	of	the	law	as	part	of	a	larger	system	of	law.’4	
	
Doctrinal	 research	 regards	 the	 legal	 system	 as	 autonomous	 (or	 at	 least	 as	 relatively	
autonomous)	in	that	it	assumes	it	can	legitimately	be	described	by	reference	to	its	own	
sources.5	 It	 focusses	on	primary	sources,	that	 is,	statutes	and	court	 judgments	and	 is	
																																																						
1	Salter,	M.	&	Mason,	J.	(2007)	Writing	Law	Dissertations:	An	Introduction	and	Guide	to	the	Conduct	of	Legal	Research	
(Edinburgh:	Pearson	Education	Ltd)	p35	
2	Hutchinson,	T.	 	 (2013)	 ‘Doctrinal	Research:	Researching	 the	 Jury’	 in	Watkins,	D.	and	Burton,	M.	 (eds.)	Research	
Methods	in	Law	(Abingdon:	Routledge)	p9	
3	Ibid		
4	Ibid		
5	McCrudden,	C.	(2006)	‘Legal	research	and	the	social	sciences’	LQR	pp632-650	at	p635	
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supported	 by	 secondary	 sources,	 such	 as	 law	 journal	 articles,	 to	 assimilate	 what	 is	
known	and	not	known	about	the	law.		Doctrinal	research,	therefore,	is	not	concerned	
with	how	the	law	affects	the	outside	world,	its	context;	in	its	purist	form,	it	is	an	internal,	
self-sustaining	inquiry,	narrowly	confined	to	the	law	itself.	 	Hutchinson	ruefully	notes	
that	 the	doctrinal	 researcher’s	 ‘underlying	 views	 are	often	not	 articulated’6	 thus	 the	
theoretical	stance	often	lies	unstated	but	she	does	acknowledge	Westerman’s	argument	
that	 ‘the	 legal	 system	 functions	 as	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 that	 selects	 facts	 and	
highlights	them	as	legally	relevant	ones’.7		
	
Doctrinal	legal	(or	‘black	letter’)	research	uses	‘reason,	logic	and	argument’8	as	it	seeks	
to	 clarify	 and	 analyse	what	 the	 law	 is	 and	 how	 it	 applies,	 which	 for	 this	 thesis	was	
essential	to	fully	comprehend	the	function	and	processes	of	the	ICC	in	its	capacity	as	the	
standard-bearer	 of	 international	 criminal	 justice,9	 against	 which	 alternative	 justice	
mechanisms	could	be	assessed.		This	involved	not	only	examining	the	sources	of	the	law	
itself:	the	Rome	Statute	and	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	but	also	the	records	
of	the	drafters	of	the	statute,	(including	inter	alia)	the	International	Law	Association,	the	
Preparatory	Committee	and	the	Preparatory	Commission.		Also	examined	in	detail	were	
judicial	decisions	of	the	ICC	(including	dissenting	judgements)	to	ascertain	whether	the	
jurisprudence	 of	 the	 Court	 reflects	 the	 intentions	 of	 the	 drafters	 so	 far	 as	 issues	 of	
admissibility	 are	 concerned	 or	 whether	 the	 judges	 are	 going	 beyond	 the	 original	
intentions	of	the	drafters	to	the	extent	that	they	could	accused	of	being	reactionary.	
	
In	 further	 considering	 this	 question,	 existing	 literature	on	 the	 topic	was	 located	 and	
critically	 analysed	 for,	 as	 Richard	 Posner	 observed,	 ‘the	messy	 work	 product	 of	 the	
judges	 and	 legislators	 requires	 a	 good	 deal	 of	 tidying	 up,	 analysis,	 restatement	 and	
critique.’10	 	 The	 secondary	 literature	 and	 commentary	was	 sourced	 from	 (inter	 alia)	
textbooks,	journal	articles,	law	reform	commission	reports,	online	information	and	blogs	
																																																						
6	Hutchinson,	T.	(2013)	p15	
7	Westerman,	P.	(2011)	‘Open	or	Autonomous?	The	Debate	on	Legal	Methodology	as	a	Reflection	of	the	Debate	on	
Law’	 in	Van	Hoeke,	M.	 (ed)	Methodologies	of	Legal	Research:	Which	Kind	of	Method	for	What	Kind	of	Discipline?	
(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing)	p91	
8	McCrudden,	C.	(2006)	p633	
9	Darcy,	S.,	Powderly,	J.	(eds)	(2010)	Judicial	Creativity	at	the	International	Criminal	Tribunals	(Oxford:	OUP)	p2	
10	Posner,	R.A.	(2007)	‘In	Memoriam:	Bernard	D.	Meltzer	(1914-2007)’	74	University	of	Chicago	LR	pp435-438	at	p437	
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and	newspaper	reports.	 	Accordingly,	using	the	doctrinal	method	of	research	for	this	
thesis	 provided	 the	 foundation	 of	 knowledge	 about	 the	 ICC’s	 processes	 and	
jurisprudence	and	thus	its	capacity	to	satisfy	the	aims	of	ICJ,	upon	which	the	analysis	of	
AJMs	to	achieve	the	same	aims	could	be	constructed.	
	
In	their	support,	Richard	Posner	states	that	doctrinal	researchers	are	essential	for	the	
vitality	of	the	legal	system	and	because	doctrinal	analysis	cannot	be	left	to	judges,	it	is	
of	greater	social	value	than	much	esoteric	interdisciplinary	legal	scholarship.11	Likewise,	
Hutchinson	argues	that	the	doctrinal	method:		
	
still	forms	the	basis	for	most	if	not	all	legal	research	projects.		Valid	research	
is	built	on	solid	foundations,	so	before	embarking	on	any	theoretical	critique	
of	the	law	or	empirical	study	about	the	law	in	action,	the	researcher	must	
verify	the	authority	and	status	of	legal	doctrine	being	examined.12	
	
However,	the	doctrinal	research	method	has	been	criticised	as	being	‘mere	scholarship	
[…]	 less	 compelling	 or	 respected	 than	 the	 research	 methods	 used	 by	 those	 in	 the	
sciences	or	social	sciences.’13		Richard	Cotterell,	for	example,	has	argued	that	true	legal	
scholarship	 also	entails	 a	 sociological	 understanding	of	 the	 law,	 that	 is,	 law	must	be	
studied	 in	 its	practice,	 from	a	standpoint	outside	 the	 legal	 system,	using	scientific	or	
social	science	methodologies.14		Eric	Posner	has	gone	further	than	merely	calling	for	an	
interdisciplinary	approach	and	has	proclaimed	‘doctrinal	legal	research	is	dead’.15			
	
Socio-legal	studies	highlight	the	‘limitations	of	doctrinal	research	as	being	too	narrow	in	
its	scope	and	application	of	understanding	law’16	and	certainly,	the	doctrinal	approach	
did	not	enable	the	underlying	theme	of	this	thesis	to	be	addressed,	namely,	does	the	
ICC’s	‘one-size-fits-all’	approach	to	ICJ	suit	every	situation	where	the	crimes	within	its	
jurisdiction	 have	 been	perpetrated	worldwide	or	 are	 there	 situations	where	 an	AJM	
																																																						
11	Posner,	R.	(2008-9)	‘The	State	of	Legal	Scholarship	Today:	A	Comment	on	Schlag’	97	The	Georgetown	L	J	pp845-55	
at	p854	
12	Hutchinson,	T.	(2013)	p7	
13	Ibid	
14	Cotterell,	R.	(1998)	‘Why	Must	Legal	Ideas	be	Interpreted	Sociologically?’	25	Journal	of	Law	and	Society	pp171-192		
15	Cited	 in	Van	Gestel,	R.	 and	Micklitz,	H-W.	 (2011)	 ‘Revitalizing	Doctrinal	 Legal	Research	 in	Europe:	What	About	
Methodology?’	European	University	Institute	Working	Papers	Law	2011/05	p1	
16	McConville,	M.	and	Chui,	W.H.	(2007)	‘Introduction	and	Overview’	in	McConville,	M.	and	Chui,	W.H.	(eds.)	Research	
Methods	for	Law	(Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	UP)	p5	
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would	be	a	better	fit?		Studying	statutes	and	court	judgments	cannot	shed	light	on	this	
area	of	inquiry	whereas	socio-legal	research	with	its	‘rich	toolbox	of	methods’	held	more	
possibilities.17		The	law	and	society	movement	emerged	in	the	late	1960s	and	1970s	as	
belief	in	law’s	autonomy	declined,	as	did	confidence	in	the	ability	of	lawyers	alone	to	
put	 right	 the	major	 problems	of	 the	 legal	 system.18	 	 Contemporaneously,	 disciplines	
complementary	to	law	which	used	scientific	(meaning,	in	this	context,	the	generation	of	
knowledge	by	empirical	investigation)	and	other	exact	methods	of	research	were	rising	
in	prestige	and	authority	and	they	highlighted	the	gap	between	‘law	in	books’	and	‘law	
in	action’.19			
	
Also	referred	to	as	‘law	in	context’,	socio-legal	research	is	an	‘external	method’	which	
examines	not	the	law	itself	but	the	societies	in	which	that	law	is	being	or	will	be	applied.		
This	 inquiry	 can	 reveal,	 for	 example,	 that	 the	 law	 itself	 is	 problematic	 because	 it	
contributes	to	or	even	causes	social	problems	and	that	other	solutions	may	be	more	
beneficial,20	an	 issue	which	 is	especially	pertinent	 in	the	peace	versus	 justice	debate.	
The	law	in	context	approach	gives	an	additional	dimension	to	legal	studies,	broadening	
legal	 discourse	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 theoretical	 and	 conceptual	 framework.	 	 It	 rejects	 the	
assumption	that	 law	is	autonomous,	that	 legal	research	is	a	separate	skill	and	argues	
that	law	should	be	examined	using	the	same	tools	and	methodologies	used	to	study	any	
other	political,	social	or	economic	practice.		It	employs	a	wide	range	of	social	science	
methods,	including	quantitative	and	qualitative	research.	
	
It	 is	 this	variety	of	different	approaches	 that	 leads	 to	a	 lack	of	consensus	as	 to	what	
precisely	 constitutes	 socio-legal	 research	 although	 for	 Cownie	 and	 Bradney,	 it	 is	 an	
‘‘approach	to	the	study	of	 law	and	legal	processes’	which	‘covers	the	theoretical	and	
empirical	 analysis	 of	 law	 as	 a	 social	 phenomenon’.’21	 	 Not	 all	 socio-legal	 research	 is	
empirical,	although	according	to	Epstein	and	King’s	very	broad	definition:	
																																																						
17	Morrill,	C.,	Hagan,	J.,	Harcourt,	B.E.	and	Meares,	T.	(2005)	‘Seeing	Crime	and	Punishment	Through	a	Sociological	
Lens:	Contributions,	Practices,	and	the	Future’	University	of	Chicago	Legal	Forum	pp289-323	at	p299	
18	Posner,	R.A.	(1987)	‘The	Decline	of	Law	as	an	Autonomous	Discipline:	1962-1987’	100	HLR	pp761-80	at	p769	
19	McCrudden,	C.	(2006)	p637	
20	McConville,	M.	and	Chui,	W.H.	(2007)	p1	
21	Cownie,	F.	and	Bradney,	A.	(2013)	‘Socio-legal	studies:	A	challenge	to	the	doctrinal	approach’	in	Watkins,	D.	and	
Burton,	M.	(eds.)	p35	(emphasis	in	original)	
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What	makes	 research	empirical	 is	 that	 it	 is	 based	on	observations	of	 the	
world	-	in	other	words,	data,	which	is	just	a	term	for	facts	about	the	world.		
These	 facts	may	be	historical	or	contemporary,	or	based	on	 legislation	or	
case	law,	the	results	of	interviews	or	surveys,	or	the	outcomes	of	secondary	
archival	research	or	primary	data	collection.		Data	can	be	precise	or	vague,	
relatively	certain	or	very	uncertain,	directly	observed	or	indirect	proxies,	and	
they	 can	 be	 anthropological,	 interpretive,	 sociological,	 economic,	 legal,	
political,	biological,	physical	or	natural.		As	long	as	the	facts	have	something	
to	do	with	the	world,	they	are	data	and	as	 long	as	research	 involves	data	
that	is	observed	or	desired,	it	is	empirical.22	
	
	
Hutchinson	and	Duncan	consider	there	are	even	empirical	aspects	to	doctrinal	research,	
as	‘legislation	and	judgments	may	be	seen	as	social	phenomena’	but	they	then	qualify	
this	view,	stating	that	‘these	are	different	because	they	are	legitimated	by	sovereignty	
of	the	source	(parliament	or	court)	rather	than	because	they	are	the	‘naturally	occurring’	
observable	phenomena	usually	used	in	empirical	work.’23		Relying	on	this	qualification,	
therefore,	the	doctrinal	element	of	this	thesis	is	non-empirical	because	it	does	not	rely	
on	 evidence-based	methods	whereas	 the	 assessment	of	 the	AJMs	 and	evaluation	of	
their	capacity	to	satisfy	the	requirements	of	ICJ	is	empirical	because	it	does.		
	
No	 interviews	 or	 surveys	 were	 undertaken	 specifically	 for	 this	 thesis	 as	 it	 was	
unfortunately	not	possible,	 for	 a	 variety	of	 personal	 reasons,	 to	 travel	 to	Uganda	or	
South	Africa	during	the	period	of	the	research	and	it	was	decided	not	to	conduct,	for	
example,	interviews	via	Skype	because	of	the	very	limited	knowledge	of	and	access	to	
the	 people	 who	 would	 need	 to	 be	 canvassed.	 	 Elite	 interviews	 would	 have	 been	
relatively	straightforward	to	arrange	but	the	views	obtained	would	not	be	those	that	
matter	for	the	purposes	of	this	research.		The	best	results	would	have	been	achieved	by	
spending	time	in	northern	Uganda	and	South	Africa,	to	establish	contacts	and	trust	and	
then	to	conduct	face-to-face	interviews	and	surveys	with	members	of	different	tribes	
living	 in	northern	Ugandan	rural	communities	and	with	different	ethnic	communities	
living	in	South	Africa.		Fortunately,	there	already	exists	a	wealth	of	excellent	and	detailed	
																																																						
22	Epstein,	L	and	King,	G.	(2002)	‘The	Rules	of	Inference’	69	Uni	of	Chicago	LR	pp1-133	at	p2-3	
23	Hutchinson,	T.	and	Duncan,	N.	(2012)	‘Defining	and	Describing	What	We	Do:	Doctrinal	Legal	Research’	17	Deakin	
LR	pp83-119	at	p114	
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population	surveys,	interviews	and	empirical	data	undertaken	in	northern	Uganda	and	
in	South	Africa	by	well-respected	academics	and	NGO	institutions	and	access	to	this	via	
the	 internet	 and	 its	 inclusion	 in	 the	 chapters	 on	Mato	 Oput	 and	 the	 SATRC	 added	
strength	and	depth	to	the	arguments	formulated	in	these	chapters.		
		
It	 is	 argued	 that	 the	 study	 of	 ICJ	must	 involve	multidisciplinary	 and	 interdisciplinary	
research	methods	to	fully	understand	and	be	sensitive	to	the	many	different	contexts	in	
which	it	is	called	into	play.		An	internal	study	of	the	ICL	and	its	practice	and	a	declaration	
that	it	will	apply	in	every	other	situation	that	arises	globally,	that	‘one-size-fits-all’	to	use	
that	well-worn	phrase,	will	not	suffice.		ICL	must	be	not	be	studied	in	isolation	from	its	
context	and	its	practice	must	be	flexible	and	culturally	sensitive.		McCrudden	says	that	
today’s	legal	research	embraces	a	pluralism	of	methodological	approaches	‘which	have	
moderated	 important	 elements	 of	 legal	 research	 dominated	 by	 both	 internal	 and	
external	 approaches,	 creating	 opportunities	 for	 closer	 working	 across	 these	
boundaries’.24			The	inter-disciplinary	approach	has	facilitated	research	for	this	thesis	in	
its	 enquiry	whether	 the	 ICC	 is	 the	best	 option	 in	 all	 instances	 of	 transitional	 justice.		
Rubin	argues	that	the	apparently	irreconcilable	approaches	in	legal	research	are	‘being	
significantly	eroded’	by	developments	in	each	to	the	extent	that	what	is	emerging	are	
approaches	‘that	combine	both	the	internal	and	the	external	approaches,	pinpointing	
what	 is	 distinctive	 about	 law	 as	 a	 social	 construction	 as	well	 as	 examining	 its	 inter-
relationship	 with	 other	 social	 phenomena.’	 	 It	 is	 intended	 that	 adopting	 an	 inter-
disciplinary	approach	for	this	thesis	should	not	be	regarded	as	a	weakness	but	rather	as	
demonstrating	‘a	mature	openness	to	other	disciplines	that	demonstrates	a	welcome	
self-confidence.’25	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
24	McCrudden,	C.	(2006)	p642	
25	Ibid	p645	
	 281	
	
APPENDIX	TWO	
	
	
The	postamble	to	the	Interim	Constitution	of	South	Africa	reads:	
	
This	Constitution	provides	a	historic	bridge	between	the	past	of	a	deeply	divided	society	
characterised	by	strife,	conflict,	untold	suffering	and	injustice,	and	a	future	founded	on	
the	 recognition	 of	 human	 rights,	 democracy	 and	 peaceful	 co-existence	 and	
development	 opportunities	 for	 all	 South	 Africans,	 irrespective	 of	 colour,	 race,	 class,	
belief	or	sex.	
	
The	 pursuit	 of	 national	 unity,	 the	well-being	 of	 all	 South	 African	 citizens	 and	 peace	
require	 reconciliation	between	 the	people	 of	 South	Africa	 and	 the	 reconstruction	of	
society.	
	
The	adoption	of	 this	Constitution	 lays	 the	secure	 foundation	 for	 the	people	of	South	
Africa	to	transcend	the	divisions	and	strife	of	the	past,	which	generated	gross	violations	
of	human	rights,	the	transgression	of	humanitarian	principles	in	violent	conflicts	and	the	
legacy	of	hatred,	fear,	guilt	and	revenge.	
	
These	can	now	be	addressed	on	the	basis	that	there	is	a	need	for	understanding	but	not	
vengeance,	a	need	 for	 reparation	but	not	 for	 retaliation,	a	need	 for	ubuntu1	but	not	
victimization.	
	
In	order	to	advance	such	reconciliation	and	reconstruction,	amnesty	shall	be	granted	in	
respect	 of	 acts,	 omissions	 and	 offences	 associated	 with	 political	 objectives	 and	
committed	in	the	course	of	the	conflicts	of	the	past.		To	this	end,	Parliament	under	this	
Constitution	shall	adopt	a	law	determining	a	firm	cut-off	date,	which	shall	be	a	date	after	
8	October	1990	and	before	6	December	1993,	and	providing	for	the	mechanisms,	criteria	
																																																						
1	This	African	word	has	no	direct	translation	into	English.		Akin	to	‘tolerance’	or	‘reconciliation’,	It	is	more	a	conception	
that	‘a	person	is	only	a	person	through	other	people’.	
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and	procedures,	including	tribunals,	if	any,	through	which	such	amnesty	shall	be	dealt	
with	at	any	time	after	the	law	is	passed.	
	
With	this	Constitution	and	these	commitments	we,	the	people	of	South	Africa,	open	a	
new	chapter	in	the	history	of	our	country.	
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APPENDIX	THREE	
	
	
List	of	UN	Member	States	which	submitted	written	statements	on	the	draft	statute	for	
an	international	criminal	court	of	the	International	Law	Commission	in	1994:	
	
Algeria	
Australia	
Austria	
Belarus	
Chile	
Cuba	
Cyprus	
Czech	Republic	
Denmark	
Finland	
Germany	
Hungary	
Iceland	
Japan	
Kuwait	
Malta	
Mexico	
New	Zealand	
Norway	
Panama	
Romania	
Slovenia	
Spain	
Sri	Lanka	
Sweden	
Tunisia	
United	Kingdom	
United	States	
Yugoslavia	
Switzerland	
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